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ABSTRACT 
Two different academic literatures--public opinion and 
international security studies--have produced three hypothesis to 
explain the mixed record of arms control success. First, public opinion 
may have had little or no impact on decision-making over arms control. 
Second, if there is a relationship between government decisions and 
public attitudes, a lack of public opinion consensus in favor of arms 
control may have occurred either because attitudes have been volatile or 
because they have been highly fragmented. Third, the "opinion and 
policy elite" and the "attentive public" may not have been in favor of 
arms control, and these elite attitudes may have eventually diffused to 
the general public in a top-down fashion. 
This dissertation reviews data from over 500 public opinion surveys 
conduzted from 1938 to 1988 and relates this body of data to actual 
governnnlent decisions made during four arms control initiatives: the 
International Control of Atomic Energy, the Limited Test Ban, the 
Anti-ballistic Missile/SALT I treaty, and SALT 11. 
Several findings concerning the nature of public opinion stand out 
from this research. First, public awareness of nuclear issues is 
extremely high, "functional" knowledge is relatively high compared to 
other public policy issues, but detailed knowledge is extremely low. 
Second, an attentive public exists for arms control, nuclear, and 
forelgn policy issues that varies from approximately 25 to 40 percent of 
the public, depending on the issue. Thizd, an opinion and policy elite 
exists for nuclear, arms control, and foreign policy issues, but it 
constitutes less than 10 percent of the public. Fourth, peoples' 
knowledge and interest about nuclear issues form a distinctly 
hierarchical and bimodal pattern which favor the nuclear dimension over 
the arms control dimension of the issue. Levels of public awareness, 
knowledge, and interest of nuclear weapons are twice as high as for arms 
control negotiations or agreements. 
Throughout this dissertation public opinion has been shown to have 
an impor1:ant impact on decisions made at all stages of the policy 
process from getting on the agende, to negotiation, ratification, and 
implementlation. The degree to which public opinion influences arms 
control clecisions is directly related to three factors: the level of 
public attitudes, awareness of the different dimensions of public 
opinion by competing political activists, and the sophistication of 
communica.tion strategies utilized by competing political factions, 
Public attitudes that maintain plurality support (under 50 percent) 
rarely influence decision-makers. Popular presidents can make foreign 
policy decisions that fly in the face of majority opinion (50-59 
percent), but doing so provides the political opposition with fertile 
ground from which a successful "counter-attack" can be launched. 
Consensus level public opinion (60-69 percent) sacccssfully influences 
the policy process even if powerful opposing bureaucratic interests 
exist. Preponderant public opinion (70-79 percsnt) not cnly "causes" 
the political system to act according to its dictates, but i .e also 
deters political opposition from challenging the specific decision. 
Virtually unanimous opinion (8C%+) dominates the entire political. system 
and sweeps all political opposition away. 
A comprehensive review and quantitative analysis of public 
attitudes toward arms control finds that public opinion is relatively 
stable, not volatile as postulated by the dominant theories iri the 
field. Attitudes toward arms control have become increasingly 
fragmented along partisan and demographic lines after the war in 
Vietnam, but this has not been the cause of the relative failure of arms 
control. Finally, there is no evidence that n~ass attitudes change as a 
result of a diffusion of beliefs from the opinion and policy el.ite to 
the "attentive public" and then to the general public. 
A "two-worlds" model has been developet to explain both mass and 
elite attitudes change and to delineate the conditions under which 
public opinion has an impact on the policy process. The "first" world 
consists of the general or voting public. First world attitudes are 
formed and change in relation to real world events which are 
communicated directly to the mass public by the media, not through a 
top-down process involving the attentive public. Public attitudes are 
relatively immune to pressure generaced by policy-makers or members of 
the "opinion and policy elite." However, people in the first world are 
selective in their attention, and this selectivity over time forms 
patterns in public awareness, knowledge, and interest. Even though 
public attention comes in short bursts and is uneven, members of the 
general public are quite capable of making quite subtle distinctions on 
complex foreign policy issues. 
The "second" world consists of a small group of people, less than 
ten percent of the public, who constitute the opinion and policy elite. 
Opinions among this elite segment of society change relatively quickly 
in relation to media coverage, variation in goverment policy, and 
intellectual fads. Perceptions among members of this elite are 
extremely important because most of the time government leaders mistake 
attitudes held by these politically active people for mass attitudes. 
The first and st.ond world can be linked, but this requires that 
elite policy-makers or political activists understand the difference 
between the two worlds, discover the nature of mass public opinion 
through survey research, and develop a political communication strategy 
that discusses policy issues using a vocabulary that is compatible with 
pre-existing mass attitudes. 
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Introduction: Why Public Opinion and Arms Control? 
Chapter 1 
In the late 1980s, a multiplicity of international relations 
scholars have begun to emphasize the importance of domestic political 
factors to the conduci of foreign policy. Today thare is a growing 
consensus among international relations specialists that domestic 
politics is important. However, there is no agreement on what aspect of 
domestic politics is most important, under what conditions do1 stic 
considerations dominate those of real politic, and over what type of 
foreign policy issues domestic politics matters most. 
While a few realist theorists continue to argue that domestic 
politics is essentially unimportant to the conduct of foreign policy, 
most scholars conclude that domestic factors are relevant to a wide 
array of questions in contemporary international relations (IR) 
theory.' To cite a fe,w examples, the debate over hegemoiric stability 
may rest more with changes in domestic psychology and mood than in 
actual changes in indices of power.2 Some scholars believe that 
future developments in IR theory will require integra~ing the neorealist 
"structural" side of the equation with neoliberal llprocess. "3 This 
. . - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
I. The realist skepticism of the importance of domestic factors 
can be seen in Waltz 1979 and Lake 1988. 
2 Kennedy 1987; Nye 1988, 237; Russett 1985. 
Keohane and Nye 1987, 744-7; Nye 1988, 238-9, 246. 
requires getting a better handle on the domestic political aspect of the 
problem. Several authors have noted that the current focus on rational 
choice ignores the importani question of preference f~rmation.~ This 
process of determining preferences is heavily influenced by domestic 
factors. Before more precise theories can be developed about the 
creation of or change in international regimes, domt'stic political 
factors must be analyzed and traced to actual decision-making. We must 
understand the learning process and understand how elites perceive and 
redefine national constraints. Finally, one scholar has used the 
metaphor of a two-level game to characterize the process by which 
international negctiations are influenced by domestic factors. h 
To date the most definitive research on these questions has came 
from the literature on international political economy (IPE). Many IPE 
scholars have emphasized the importance of state structure or the 
influence of particular commercial firms . However, one key caveat: 
has been expressed by most senior scholars in the IPE field. In 
international affairs, domestic influences are likely to be more 
pervasive in issues of "low" policy such as economics than in "high" 
policy such as military or nuclear strategy. 8 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Jervis 1988; Keohane and Nye 1987, 
742; Lebow and Stein 1987. 
5 Haggard and Simmons 1987, 515-7; Keohane and Nye 1987, 742-3, 
6 749-53; Nye 1987. Putnam 1988. 
7 Evangelista 1989; Frieden 1988; Friman 1988; Ikenberry 1988; 
8 
Katzenstein 1978; Milner 1987. 
See Krasner 1978, 329; Putnam 1988, 455. Several younger 
scholars are challenging this assumption. See Evangelist8 
1989; Kupchan 1988; Jentleson 1987; Larson 1987; Vasquez 1985. 
To make progress in developing IR theory with respect to domestic 
influences, a cogent research strategy should be initiated that takes 
into account six factors. 
First, issue areas must be selected on the basis of being easily 
falsifiable with respect to the agreed assumptions of both liberal and 
realist I R  theory. This means that more cases must be chosen from the 
international security field, r~ther than continuing to come 
predominantly from the international political economy field. 
Second, many domestic political factors can influence foreign 
policy decisions. These range from the well-established focus on 
bureaucratic politics to an emphasis on state structure, business firms, 
interest groups, pulitisal parties, elections, and public opinion 
Public opinion often is considered the most ephemeral element of 
domestic politics, the one least developed in liberal IR theory, and one 
that is least likely to infldence government decisions.' For this 
reason, research should focus on this dimension of domestic influences 
If it is possible to specify the conditions under which public opinion 
influences international relations decision-making, then one will be 
able to build a theory of domestic influences "from the ground up." 
Other research conducted on the influence of other domestic factors, 
such as interest groups, firms, and elections, can then be put into a 
broader frai.~ework. A complete theory will specify ttre conditions under 
which various domestic factors influence foreign policy decision-making, 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
9 For a discussion of the need to further develop the 
"sociological" strand of liberal international relations 
theory, see Nye 1988, 246. 
Third, when evaluating domestic political factors, scholars must 
cite the academic literature concerning domestic politics from the 
country in which their cases reside. This will mean being conversant 
with the best: ideas from the politics literature of that country. 
Fourth, sufficient research must be undertaken to assure the 
reader that: the review of the specific dimension of domestic politics 
being examined has been comprehensive. In most cases, this translates 
into a requirement for significant data collection. In many instances, 
this in turn will require quantitative analysis of a "new body of data." 
Fif'th, single case studies should be avoided in favor of multiple 
cases that extend over a sufficiently long time frame to ascertain 
whether the specific argument being made is due to the posited variable 
or is caused by other factors unique to one or two execucive 
administrations. In addition, "influencet1 should be demonstrated by a 
review of primary source documents, not by relying primarily on 
interviews with participants or reviews of secondary sources. 
Finally, an explicit, multi-stage model of the policy process must 
be established at the outset of the research. Narrowing the focus of 
research to only one or two stages of the policy process--such as 
negotiating or ratifying a treaty--leaves two very important stages of 
the policy process (getting on the agenda and implementation) out of the 
equation. 10 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
lo By ignoring the process of getting on the agenda and 
implementation, Putnam (1988) reaches fundamentally incorrect 
conclusions in developing his two-level game theory. 
All six factors have influenced the selection of my dissertation 
topic and the development of my research design. As reviewed in Chapter 
2, the field of study selected has been in the international security 
aree, specifically nuclear arms control. The domescic influence that is 
being examined is public opinion. Out of a review and evaluation of two 
different academic literatures--public opinion and international 
security studies--three hypothesis are developed to explain the mixed 
record of arms control success. 
First, public opinion may have had little or no Impact on 
decision-making over arms control. Not only is the "no-impact" 
hypothesis conventional wisdom among many statesmen and policy-makers, 
but it is also supported by many academic studies. Second, a lack of 
public opinion consensus in favor of arms control may have occurred 
either because attitudes have been volatile (Almond and Lippmann) or 
because they have been highly fragmented (Schneider). Third, the 
"opinion and policy elite" and the "attentive public" may not have been 
in favor of arms co~ltrol, and these elite attitudes may have eventually 
diffused to the general public in a top-down fashion. 
Other elements of my Lesearch design are discussed in Chapter 2. 
A comprehensive review of public opinion has been undertaken, producing 
the most complete collection of nuclear/arms control surveys known to 
experts in the field of public opinion. Quantitative analysis has been 
employed in addition to evaluating primary source documents. Four case 
studies have been selected that run from 1945 to 1980, over seven 
presidential administration. A four stage model of the policy process 
is outlined at the beginning of this research. Finally, other terms and 
concepts such as the attentive public and the opinion & policy elite are 
defined in operational terms. 
Chapter 3 reviews the pattern and importance of public awareness, 
knowledge, and interest concerning nuclear weapons, arms control, and 
foreign policy issues over the period 194.5 to 198a. Several important 
conclusions are reached. First, public awareness of nuclear issues is 
extremely high, and "functional" knowledge is relatively high compared 
to other public policy issues. However, detailed knowledge is extremely 
low. Second, an attentive public exists for arms control, nuclear, and 
foreign policy issues that varies from approximately 25 to 40 percent of 
the public, depending on the issue. Third, a much smaller group, an 
"opinion and policy elite" exists for nuclear, arms control, and foreign 
policy issues that constitutes less than 10 percent of the public. 
Fourth, contrary to existing theory, public knowledge and interest about 
arms control, nuclear weapons, and foreign policy issues are quite 
stable, not volatile. Finally, several new findings from this chapter 
relate to patterns found among public awareness, knowledge, and 
interest. People's knowledge and interest about nuclear issues form a 
distinctly hierarchical and bimodal ,pattern wh:'ch favor the nuclear 
dimension over the arms control dimension of the issue. Levels OL 
public awareness and knowledne of nuclear weapons are twice as high as 
awareness and knowledge of arms control negotiations or agreements. A 
similar pattern exists for the public's interest in these issues: 
interest over nuclear war and nuclear weapons dominates interest about 
arms control at siightly less than a two-to-one ratio. These twin 
discoveries provide the foundation needed to understand the pattern of 
public attitudes toward arms control, which are discussed in Chapters 4 
through 7. 
Chapter 4 reviews the structure of public opinion and the impact 
it had on decision-making with respect to my first case study, the 
international control of atomic energy In contrast to conclusions 
reached by most historians and political scientists, this chapter argues 
that public opinion had a great deal of influence on creating both the 
content and form of the American government's position on international 
control of atomic energy. An important relationship between public 
opinion and the policy process was discovered in the uneven level of 
understanding of public opinion held by elite cpponents versus that of 
advocates of international control. Opponents of this arms control 
effort had a far more sophisticated ~~nderstanding of the public mood and 
used this to frame the main issues inside the administration and in the 
public debate in ways that strengthened cheir preferred policy 
position. Arms control opponents' close mcnitoring of public opinion, 
content analysis of the media, and timely reaction to the pclitical 
activities of the advocates of arms control made a reversal of 
policy--necessary for international control to be seriously 
negotiated--impossible. 
Chapter 4 goes on to conclude that at the mass level, there was no 
consensus in favor of or opposed to the international control of atomic 
energy. The general pl~blic supportcd some policies, changed its opinton 
on other aspects, and opposed several other elzments of international 
control. This pattern suggests that no simple consensus existed during 
the Cold War concerning the international control of atomic energy. 
Quantitative analysis of public opinion data shows that issues 
associated with international control were not highly fragmented along 
partisan, regional, or demographic lines. At the mass level, public 
opinion was not volatile, as hypothesized in Almond's mood theory, but 
was rather stable over the five year effort to negotiate international 
control of atomic energy from 1945 through 1950. The "attentive public" 
was more supportive of internaiional control than was the general 
public, but contrary to the top-down model of attitude change, these are 
no indications that these elite attitudes led or influenced attitudes 
held by the general public. Attitudes held by the attentive public and 
the general public changed in different directions at different times. 
Chapter 5 reviews the structure of public opinion about nuclear 
testing and argues that public opinion had an important impact on 
government decision-making with respect to the Limited Test Ban Treaty 
(LTBT). There 1s no question that public concern over fallout helped 
set the public debate over the test ban issue or influenced government 
decisions on scveral non-test bdn issues. However, there is reason to 
question what aspect of American and international public opinion was 
responsible for successfully getting the test ban issue onto the 
Executive branch agenda. 
This chapter finds that strong public support for a bilateral test 
ban agreement, the Eisenhower administration's correct reading of the 
1956 election results, and several other technical and bureaucratic 
factors all combined to get the test ban negotiations onto the agenda. 
Survey data clearly show that public concern over fallout played a 
limited role in explaining tht structure of public opinion and in 
influencing government decision-makers. 
As was true during the political fight associated with negotiation 
of the international control of atomic energy, a very important variable 
turned out to be the degree to which various political actors understoad 
the true nature of public opinion. Political efforts by Adlai Stevenson 
during the 1956 presidential campaign and by anti-nuclear interest 
groups in the late 1950s to build support for a test ban agreement by 
focusirlg on the fallout controversy failed. By failing to discover the 
true nature of public opinion and by pressuring the Eisenhower and 
Kennedy administrations to agree to a test moratorium for which there 
was 1it:tle public support, arms control advocates helped to obscure 
strong public support for a bilateral test ban aEreernent, This inept 
political strategy was in turn indirsctly responsible for producing the 
circumstances that forced President Kennedy to reswne testing in the 
atmospklere and then to conclude a limited, rather than a comprehensive, 
test ban treaty. 
Etesearch summarized in Chapter 5 argaes that the level of public 
support: is clcsely related to the impact public opinion has on the 
policy process. Two popular presidents--Dwight Eisenhower and John 
Kennedy--made foreign policy decisions that flew in the face of majority 
opinion ( 5 0 - 5 9 X ) ,  but doing so provided their politicai opposition with 
fertile ground from which a successful "counter-attack" wfis launched. 
Consensus level public opinion ( 6 0 - 6 9 2 )  successfully influenced the 
policy process even though powerful bureaucratic opposition existed. 
Pre~onderant public opinion (70-79%) not only "caused" the political 
system to act according to its dictates, but it also deterred political 
opposition from challenging the specific decision. Virtuallv unanimog 
opinion (80%+) dominated the entire political system and swept all 
political opposition away. 
Public opinion on test ban-related issues was relatively stable, 
not volatile or moody, and a close reading of the survey data about 
public awareness, knowledge, and interest show that public attitudes 
were not contradictory as argued by some scholars. The public had a 
reasonably sophisticated logic which can explain the structure of mass 
attitudes, but the logic was different from that held by most elites. 
Quantitative analysis shows that with the exception of one period, 
the;= was little fragmentatlon of attitudes along political or 
ideological lines. This tends to support the proposition advanced by 
William Schneider and other scholars who argue there was a foreign 
policy attitude consensus before Vietnam. However, the exception is 
important. During the 1956 election, and for six months after, public 
opinion was sharply split along partisan lines. This pattern supports 
some of the conclusions reached by Richard Brody and Ben Page ( 1 9 7 5 )  
with respect to the war in Vietnam. mien political parties or 
candidates make their difference; clear on specific foreign policy 
issues, voters are able to discern thcse differences, iw.3 respond in a 
rationale manner 
The test ban case shows that the attentive public: did not 
consistently lead the public in terms of attitude chanl5e. However, 
consistent wizh the findings of Gamson and Modigliani (1966) and Mueller 
(1973) ,  once government policy began to change on the zest ban issue, it 
was the highly educated opinion and policy elite that picked up the 
policy change and supported a test ban agreement at levels higher than 
the general public. The elite public thus followed changes in 
govermnent policy and did not lead mass attitudes. 
A final conclusion from Chapter 5 relates to the dominant paradigm 
in American voting behavior published in The American Voter. Not only 
Is its analysis of the 1956 election wrong with respect to Adlai 
Stevenson's inability to get his foreign policy message to voters and 
with respect to the salience of the test ban issue, but evidence is 
presented that calls into question the Michigan paradigm's de-emphasis 
of issue voting. 11. 
Chapter 6 reviews the structure of public opinion and its impact 
on decision-making with respect to the ABM/SA?,T I treaty. Conventional 
accounts of the controversy over deployment of the anti-balli.stic 
missile (ABM) syst:em and negotiation of SALT I paint a picture 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
'I For contemporary research that also concludes that voters take 
into account; foreign policy issues when voting, see Aldrich, 
Sullivan and Borgida 1989; Hess and Nelson 1985; Kessel 1988. 
of increasing public opposition zo building the anti-missile system as a 
"great" national debate unfolded between proponents (the Pentagon and 
conservative Congressior\al al1i.e~) and opponents (grass roots activists , 
scientists, former Johnson administration officials, and liberal members 
of Congress). According to this ~onkentiona~ view, public opinion 
played an important role in pressuring Congress to lisit the deployment 
of the ABM and in pressuring the Nixon administration to initiate 
strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. 
Contrary to most dcddemic accounts, the structure of mass public 
attitudes and the process of attitude change was quite different than 
perceived by many participants in the controversy. A plurality 
supported deployment of the ABM system, and a consensus favored 
negotiating arms control with the Soviet Union. The structure of public 
opinion was much like it had been during the test ban controversy. The 
only public attitudes that changed as a result of the ABM debate were 
perceptions among the tiny opinion and policy elite. Before the 1969 
Congressional hearings, elite attitudes were more in favor of ABN 
depVloyment than the general public. After the hearings, elite attitudes 
became strongly apposed to ABM deployment. 
Public cpinion had an impact on some, but not all, stages of the 
pclicy process concerning both deployment of the ABM and negotiation of 
SALT I. However unlike the previous two cases, neither the arms control 
advocates nor critics were particularly well informed on the true nature 
of public opinion. Limited grassroots activity, concentrated television 
news coverage, and interest group pressure successfull.y created the 
false impression that "the public" was against deployment of the .\RM. 
Against the backdrop of the war i n  Vietnam and 1ncreasLngly critical 
public attitudes toward military spending, it is understandable that 
many Congressional leaders, Executive branch officials, and political 
activists incorrectly perceived public opinion as anti-ABM. 
The concluding Chapter 7 reviews the structure of public opinion 
and the impact it had on decision-making with respect to the SALT I1 
treaty. By the time SALT I1 was initiated, arms control had become 
"permanently on the agenda." Public opinion was a major reason for this 
phenomena. When Ronald Reagan took strategic arms control off the 
agenda, the political system erupted with the nwlear freeze 
"movement." When Reagan put it back on the agenda and resumed 
negotiations with the Soviets, the nuclear freeze withered and died. 
The negotiating process for SALT I1 was under the firm control of 
highly trained policy experts in the Executive branch. This community 
ignored government public opinion experts' warnings that public opinion 
had to be taken into account at the beninnine of the process. Thus, by 
the time preparations for ratification were made inside the 
administration, the effort was doomed. The public education strategy 
used by the State Department relied on the top-down model of attitude 
change, and development of a political comnunication strategy was 
conducted almost independent of survey research. Speeches by senior 
officials such as Paul Warnke and Cyrus Vance that attempted to sell 
SALT were written in the language of the "opinion and policy elite." 
Survey research showed that this group heard the message and 
supported SALT. However, at the mass level, public supporc declined 
with reduced Presidpntial popularity and strong counter politic~l. 
communications from the right wing of the Republican party. The whole 
episode was ended, politically, by the Soviet icvhsion of Afghanistan 
and the Iranian hostage crisis. 
This final chapter concludes with a sumrnary of the evaluation of 
the three key hypothesis examined in this dissertation. First, mass 
public attitudes are relatively stable, not moody or volatile. One can 
clearly reject the Almond/Lippmann volatility hypothesis. Contrary to 
established views in the public opinion field, the public is not 
uniformly uninterested or uninformed about foreign policy issues such as 
arms control. Also, the public is able to make quite subtle 
distinctions on complex foreign policy issues. 
Second, moderate support for the fragmentation hypothesis has been 
found. Attitudes became increasing fragmented over time, but this trend 
began before the Vietnam war. This dissertation argues, however, that 
fragmentation has not been a cause of failure of arms control. 
Third, there is little evidence that mass attitudes change as a 
result of elite opinion influence as hypothesized in the top-down model. 
Fourth, contrary to the dominant theories prevailing in the field 
of international relations, public opinion has an impact at every stage 
of the policy process-- from getting on the agenda, to negotiating an 
agreement, to ratifying a treaty, and finally to implementing an 
international obligation. 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 2 
T Summary 
This chapter reviews four key propositions that make up the 
dominant paradigm in the field of public opinion about American foreign 
policy. These key concepts include: the limited effects proposition, 
the mood theory, the fragmentation concept, and the top-down model of 
attitude change. Even though a critique of the dominant paradigm 
reveals that there is reason to question the continued validity of these 
four main theoretical propositions, a review of the international 
security literature finds that existing conclusions reached with respect 
to public opinion and arms control are sympathetic to mainstream theory 
in the public opinion literature. 
Out of a review and evaluation of these two different academic 
literatures-- public opinion and internatioral security studies-- three 
hypothssis are developed which will be the focus of this dissertation. 
First, public opinion may have had little or no impact on 
decision-making over arms control. Second, a lack of public opinion 
cbnsensus in favor of arms control may have occurred either because 
attitudes have been volatile or because they have been highly 
fragmented. Third, opinion leaders and the attentive public may not 
have been in favor of arms control, and these attitudes eventually 
diffused to the general public in a top-down fashion. 
The final section of this chapter describes the scope of this 
research, outlines the methods employed to evaluate the three 
hypothesis, and defines several key terms. 
I1 Review of Public Opinion Theory 
After World War I--even before the beginning of probability-based 
survey rese~rch--an academic literature emerged on the subject of 
AmerLcan attitude:; toward foreign policy and national security. : 2
While this literature has expanded considerably over the last fifty 
years, the dominant p r -  ;gm has changed very little since publication 
of three major books by Gabriel Almond American People and Foreign 
Pol'icv, James Rosenau Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, and Bernard 
Cohen The Public's Impact on Foreign Polic y . l3 In the 1970s and 
1980s, several "fragmentation" theorists, such as William Schneider, Ole 
Holsti, James Rosenau, and Eugene Wlttkopf have developed public opinion 
theory with respect to the structure of public attitudes, but these 
authors have worked largely within the boundaries of the traditional 
paradigm. Four central propositions from this literature are worth 
highlighting because they constitute the dominant paradigm in academic 
theories of public opinion and foreign policy. 
A. The Limited Impact Proposition 
The first element of the traditional paradigm is the proposition 
that public opinion plays a lind.tsd role in influencing government 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
I* H. Hart 1933; Lasswell [I9271 1971; Levering 1978, 43-46; 
Lippmann 119221 1965. 
l3 Recent studies which fall into the traditional paradigm include 
Genco 1984; Holmes 1985; Hughes 1978; Klingberg 1979, 1983; 
Levering 1978. 
l4 For a comprehensive indexed bibliography or, the literature 
concerning public opinion and foreign policy, see Graham 1987. 
policy. While this idea has been mentioned by Lippmann ([I3221 1965), 
Almond (1956), ana other political. sclentists, its main proponent is 
Bernard Coherl (1973) .I5 He argues that scholars who have concluded 
that public opinion had an impact on decisions such as ,:he founding af  
the United Nations, recognition cf the Soviet Union, creation of the 
Truman doctrine, and non-recognition of China in the 1960s have made 
"non-evidential assertions. "I6 In addition, Cohen strongly criticizes 
the case study approach on methodological g:counds, ar,d he finds fault 
with all the researc!~ which asserts that public opinion has an important 
impact on various foreign policy decisions. Since Cohen discounts case 
studies, his research involves interviewing a sample of foreign service 
officers and mid-level foreign policy experts and asking them to 
describe the decision-making process. iiir; study concludes that p u l ~ l i c  
opinion has little direct influence on almost all foreign policy 
decisions and that bureaucratic factors are far more important in 
determining pblicy outcomes. Another scholar who uses the same 
interview methodology reaches similar conclusions. l7 In addition, 
research by several historians, who mainly study the Truman 
administration, also find that public opinion plays a minimal role in 
foreign poiicy decision-making. 18 
- * - - - - - - - - - - - - *  
Other political scientists who support the limited impact 
hypothesis include Chittick 1970; Cohen 1970; Cohen & Harris 
1975; Hero 1973; Holsti & Rosenau 1986; W. Miller 6 Stokes 
1963. 
I 6  Cahen criticizes the following authors who conclude that public 
opinion Faas an impact on foreign policy decisions: Browdsr 
1953; Dawson 1959; Feis 1947; J. Jones 1955; A. Steele 1966. 
l7 Madson 1385. 
l8 La Feber 1977; May 1964, 1973; Patterson 1979. 
B .  The Mood Ti~eory or Volatility Concept 
The mood theory, sometimes called the volatility concept, is the 
second element of the traditional paradigm. The mood theory states that 
the public's attitudes toward foreign policy are unstable and are 
characterized by extren? shifts between moods of isolationism and 
internationalism. While some elements of the mood theory have been 
described by authors as diverse as Alexis de Tocqueville, Margaret Mead 
and Walter Lippmann, the intellectual founders of the foreign policy 
mood theory are Gabriel Almond and Frank Klingberg. l9 Based on an 
evaluation of responses to the "most important problem" question asked 
in twenty-one public opinion surveys conducted from 1936 to 1949, Almond 
demonstrates that the public has an erratic level of interest in foreign 
a£ fairs. 20 He argues that public interest, knowledge, and attitudes 
on questions of a remote nature, such as foreign policy, are anstable. 
When a crisis forces foreign policy issues into the American psyche, 
then a majority will become interested in foreign affairs for a 
reiatively short period of time. However, when the crisis subsides, a 
majority will return to their natural pattern of indifference toward 
international issues. These alternating cycles nf interest translate 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
I' Almond published two editions of his Americcn People and 
Foreign Policy in 1950 and 1960. Except for the introduction, 
the rext is the same in both editions. Citations used in this 
dissertation will be made from the 1960 edition. Almond [I9501 
1960 32, 53-6, 76; Klingberg 1952; Lippmann [I9221 1965 4-18. 
20 A more extensive review of data from the "most important 
problem" survey question for the years 1935-1984 also shows an 
uneven level of public interest in fortign policy. See T. W. 
Smith 1985. 
into moods of -iztervention in and withdrawal from world affairs such as 
occurred with isolationism between World War I and World War I1 and 
internationalisn after 1945. 2 1 
In his review and interpretation of 150 years of American histc 'y 
and his content analysis of Presidential speeches, Klingberg (1952) 
strongly supports the mood thesis. He argues that America has 
experienced seven alternating moods of introversion and extroversion, 
which occur every 20-30 years. More recently, Klingberg (1379, 1983) 
and Holmes (19e5) independently have updated and expanded the original 
research and reaffirmed the validity of the mood theory. 
In addition, one author associated with the fragmentation school 
believes that the mass public is still subject to significant shifts in 
mood. William Schneider argues that the mood thesis is even more 
applicable today than it was after World War I1 due to the influence of 
the mass media. Television has the power to mobilize those who are 
inattentive to foreign policy. According to this argument, the 
important political dynamic in public opinion is not attitude change per 
se, but the aggregate level and intensity of attitudes held by the 
majority of the public. If the large, inattentive, segment of society 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
21 Literature on isolationism and internationalism includes J. 
Benson 1982; H. Cantril 1940a, [I9441 1972, 1948; Chester 1975; 
Fensterwald 1958; Foster 1983; Free 6 Watts 1980; Graham 1989a; 
Janowitz & Marvick 1953; Jonas 1966; Link 1943; MacKinnon & 
Centers 1956; Modigliani 1972; Riesselbach 1960; Russett 1960; 
U.S. Departmant of State 1943; Watts & Free 1978; Williams 
1945, 1947. 
becomes interested in foreign policy for a short period sf time, then 
their attitudes can "shift the balance" and have an important impact on 
the aggregate level of public opinion. 2 2 
C. The Fragmentation or Breakdown in Consensus Proposition 
The fragmentation concept, also called the breakdown in consensus, 
is the third element in the traditional paradigm. This theoretical 
proposition places particular importance on the Vietnam experience and 
its impact on public attitudes. One public opinion expert, Andrew 
Kohut, president of the Gallup Organization, calls the mid-1960s the 
dividing line between "ancienc and modern history" with regard to public 
opinion and foreign policy. 2 3  Authors who are associated with the 
frhgmentation school posit that Vietnam broke a pre-existing attitude 
consensus in the area of foreign affairs which was in place from the 
late - 1940s through the late- 1960s. 24 This period of consensus was 
characterized by an operational agreement both on foreign policy goals 
and broad tactics among the opinion and policy elite, the attentive 
22 W. Schneider 1982. 
23 Kohut 1988, 1989. Authors who have supported the 
fragmentationfireakdown in consensus model include: Allison 
1970-71.; Barton 1974-5, 1980; Graubard 1980; Hosti & Rosenau 
1979, 1 4 8 0 ,  1984; Levering 1978; Mandlebaum 6 Schneider 1978, 
1979; Public Agenda Foundation 1976; Rosenau & Holsti 1983; 
Russett 1974, 1975; Russett & Hanson 1975; W. Schneider 
1974-75, 1983, 19d4, 1985; Yankelovich 1979. 
24 Various authors use different dates to define the period of 
Cold War attitude consensus. Levering (1978) uses the dates 
1946-1968; Holsti and Rosenau (1984) do not mention a 
beginnfng date but use the mid-1960s as an ending date; W. 
Schneider (1985) uses the dates 1948-1968. 
public and the general public. 25  During and after Vietnam this 
picture changed dramatically. While the precise terms and 
classifications of the post-Vietnam attitude clusters differ slightly 
among the half-dozen authors who support the fragmentation theory, there 
is remarkable agreement on the basic idea: forergn policy leaders and 
the attentive public have been split into two or three 
mutually-exclusive groups. According to Schneider, elites have 
fragmented into three groups: liberal interventionists, conservative 
interventionists and non-interventionists. Using slightly different 
definitions, Holsti and Rosenau state that elite att,itudes have been 
split into three belief systems: Cold War internationalists, Post-Cold 
War internationalists, and neo-isolationists. Russett and Hanscn (1975) 
and Barton (1974-75, 1980) conclude that the pre-Vietnam consensus has 
been destroyed and that anti-interventionist attitudes have increased 
among elite businessmen. 
While most fragmentation theorists concentrat2 their research and 
analysis on elite attitudes, one author applies his attitude clusters 
to the general public as well. According to Schneider, the public has 
been split unevenly into three groups: non-interventionists, liberal 
internationalists and conservative internationalists. Most of the 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
25 Hinckley (1988) disagrees with other fragmentation scholars and 
believes that no attitude consensus existed during the Cold 
War. He argues that contemporary and Cold War foreign policy 
attitudes can be divided into four clusters: unilateralists, 
internationalists, accomodationists, and isolationists. 
public ( 4 0 - 6 0 % )  are non-interventionist, with the rest either liberal 
internationalists or conservative internationalists. 2 6  
D. The Attentive Public and the Top-Down Attitude Change Model 
The final concept which makes up the mainstream paradigm for 
pliblic opinion on foreign policy combines the twin ideas of the 
attentive public and a top-down model of attitude change. The idea of 
an "attentive" public has been accepted by virtually all public opinion 
scholars, either as an explicit or implicit assumption. Based in part 
on his active participation in the U.S. propaganda effort of World War 
I, Walter Lippmann ([I9221 1965) believed that an attentive public 
existed, and he stressed the role that should be played by a 
knowledgeable elite in edccating the public on foreign policy 
matters. 27  According to Lipprnann, since most citizens devote so 
little time to reading about foreign news, the average person's 
perceptions of the world are based on crude stereotypes. The solution 
to the problem of public ignorance concerning foreign affairs is to 
train a professional cadre of expert policy makers and to educate a 
somewhat larger attentive group that could form the basic political 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
26 Non-interventionists are alrc characterized by Schneider as 
"popular isolationists." Without presenting any detailed 
rationale, Schneider says these popular isolationists are 
different from the "ideological isolationists" of the 1930s. 
27 Lasswell I19221 1971 xxxii; Leigh 1976, 55. 
choices for the majority who are not attentive.28 Gabriel Almond 
built on this tradition and helped to define further the concept of the 
"attentive" public.29 According to Almond, in the area of foreign 
affairs there are four publics: the general public, an attentive public, 
a policy and opinion elite, and finally a feu ~olicy makers. In terms 
of providing democratic support for f~reign policy decisions, the most 
important group is the attentive public, a segment of society that is 
"informed and interested in foreign policy problems, and which 
constitutes the audience for the foreign policy discussions among the 
elite. " 
While Almond's research did not attempt to quantify the size of 
this "attentive public," his discussion of several other studies 
suggests that he believes the attentive public to constitute 
approximately 25 percent of the populaticn. 30 Since publication of 
Almond's influential book, many authors have attempted to define the 
attentive public in operational terms, calculate its size, or analyze 
the character of attitudes held by its members. Various scholars have 
used different indicators to define foreign policy attentiveness: 
knowledge-based indicators, socio-economic indicators, 3 2 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
28 Lippmann (19223 1965 142-3. Inhis 1955 book, Lippmanr, is ever, 
mcre explicitly elitist than in his earlier work. Critics of 
Lippmann's elitist approach include Waltz 1967 and Wriston 
1956. 
29 Almond [I9501 1960. 
30 Almond [I9501 1960, 81-84. 
31 Caspary 1970; Cohen 1966; Erskine 1963b. 1962; Free and Cantril 
1967; Graham 1988; M. Kriesberg 1949; National ~c'ience Board 
1981, 160; 1983, 159; Rosi 1965. 32 Galtung 1969; Rosi 1965; P. Smith 1961. 
behavioral indicators, 33 media exposure indicators, 34 and ineerest 
indicators. 35 Despite the intellectual pot pourri in approaches used 
by many scholars to measure the attentive public, most studies hsvs 
reached some common conclusions. First, the actual size of the 
attentive public is no larger than one quarter of the population and may 
be as small as 10 percent of the public. A sumnary of findings from the 
literature is listed in Table 2-1. 36 Second, confrary to the 
hypothesis posited by some scholars (Almond [1950] 1960; Rosenau 1968, 
1974), the attentive public has not increased in size over time despite 
the fact that the level of educational attainment has grown. 37 A 
third conclusion, shared by many studies, is that while high levels of 
education do not guarantee attentiveness to foreign policy, a majority 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -  j3 Cohrn 1966; Devine 1970; Hughes 1978; J .  Robinson 1976; Rosenau 
1974; Rosi 1965. 
34 Devine 1970; Genco 1984; Nstional Science Board 9. &.  35 Caspary 1970; Cohen 1966; Deutsch and Merrit i965; Key 1961; 
Genco 1984; Mandlebaum and Schneider 1979; National Science 
Board o~.cit.; Rosenau 1961; Rosi 19G5. 36 One should be cautious in using different indicators to measure 
change in the size of the attentive public over time. Table 
2-1 has been produced to show that no author, regardless of 
methodology, has estimated the size of the attentive public to 
be more than one quarter of the public. 37 Using consistent indicators of attentiveness from the American 
National Election Survey data for 1960-1980, Genco was able co 
measure changes in the size of the attentive public over time 
(Genco 1984, 143-145.) Similar conclusions were reached 
concerning the public attentive to science policy (National 
Science Board 1981, 177.) For changes in the level of college 
education, see Kinder and Sears 1985, 705. 
of those who are found to be attentive have at least a four year college 
degree. 3 8 
Several authors have attempted to estimate the size of the 
"opinion and policy elite" mentioned by Almond (1960). Tdo basic 
approaches have been used to determine the size and composition of this 
elite group. Th'e most interesting approaches--from a theoretical and 
methodological perspective--have been the work of Russell 
Estimated Size of the Attentive Public 
(percent of the population) 
Table 2-1 
Author Date Type of Indicator Size 




Nat. Sci. Board 
Cohen 









Knowledge 2 6 
Knowledge 2 5 
Behavior, Interest, Media Exposure 25 
Interest, Media Exposure 2 2 






Behavior, Knowledge 13 
Membership 10 
Behavior & Interest 10 
Behavior & Interest 9* 
Knowledge 8 
-R Based on analysis of a state, not a national, survey. 
- - - - - - - - - -  
Genco (1984, 206) concludes that the exact composition of the 
attentive public changes over time as the foreign policy 
context changes. However, from 1960 to 1980, education was the 
most powerliul univariate characteristic of attentiveness. Over 
50% of the attentive public had at least a college degree. 
Other studies which support this conclusion include Free and 
Cantril 1967, 61 and NSB s. &. 
Neuman (1986) and Steve Genco (1984). Neuman examines political 
sophistication and has re-analyzed data from nine of the classic 
American voting studies conducted from 1948 through 1980. Genco 
calculated th size of the attentive public using five American National 
Election Studies completed from 1960 through 1980. Both scholars 
concludz that the sophisticated, highly attentive, and politically 
active segment of the public--which correspo~tds to Almond's policy and 
opinion elite--constitutes approximately five percent of the public. 3 9 
Another academic approach that has been used to determine 
attitudes held by foreign policy and opinion elites has been to define a 
particular elite group and then to interview a sample of its members to 
obtain their attitudes about various foreign policy issues. By using 
this process, scholars have obtained information about attitudes and 
demographic charactkristics of various elite groups such as businessmen, 
military officers, and foreign policy specialists. While this procedure 
is not designed to reconfirm the conclusions reached by Neuman or Genco 
on the s& of the opinion and policy elite, when combined with 
traditional pollii~g, it has produced a large amount of data on elite 
attitudes. 40 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
39 Genco (1980, 120) finds that 6% of the public arc "very 
attentive" to foreign policy. Neuman (1986, 167-178) finds 
that 5% nf the public are very sophisticated and politically 
active. 
40 Elite surveys with foreign policy/nuclear questions include: 
Adler & Bobrow 1956; Allison 1970-71; Barton 1980, 1974-5; 
Bischoff 1985; Communication 1988; M. Gorden & Lerner 1965; 
Holsti & Rosenau 1980, 1984, 1986; Kohut & Horrock 1984; 
Oldendick & Bardes 1982; Public Agenda Foundation 1984; Rielly 
1975, 1979, 1983a, 1983b, 1987a, 1987b; Rothman & Liechter 
1982; Russett & Hanson 1975; J. Schneider 1979; Skelly 1986. 
For this dissertation, the importance of the attentive public is 
its relationship with the top-down model of attitude change. The 
top-down attitude change inodel was a product of innovative research 
which utilized a panel study during the 1948 Presidential election. 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1948) concluded that ideas often flow 
from the media to local opinion leaders and then from these opinion 
leaders to the less attentive sectors of the population. Even though 
the model has been revised and criticized over the years by several 
social scientists, this elite-driven image of opinion change is the 
conventional wisdom in the foreign policy community. 41 ~ o t  only is 
the model dominant in defining the public education campaigns which were 
used by the State Department to sell ratification of the Panama Canal 
treaty, SALT I1 and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, but 
many foreign policy interest groups also use the same model to organize 
their public education campaigns. As a result, even if the top-down 
attitude change model may seem outdated to some social scientists, it 
still lives inside the foreign policy community. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
'I Reformulations of the model have been made by E. Katz & 
Lazarsfeld 1955, E. Katz 1957, and D. Katz 1967. A review of 
major critiques of the mcdel is in E. Rogers 1973. A thorough 
re-evaluation of the model was conducted by J ,  Robinson 1976. 
For a review of the attitude change literature, see McGuire 
1985. 
111 Critique of the Academic Literature Concerning Public Opinion on 
Foreign Policy 
A. The Limited Impact Proposition 
Over the last fifteen years, several criticisms have been made of 
the limited impact proposition. First, a large literature has been 
written both before and after Cohen (1973) published his book which he 
has not evaluated.12 This material has reached fundamentally 
different conclusions concerning the relationship between public 
opinion and policy-making. It suggests that the impact of public 
opinion on government policy is more extensive and more complex than 
characterized by Cohen. Not only is there evidence that Presidents 
work hard to influence public opinion on foreign policy in order to 
improve their electoral prospects, but there is evidence that 
successful Presidents spend a great deal of time monitoring public 
attitudes and use this acute awareness of public opinion to help reach, 
package and implement their decisions. 4 3 
Second, authors who find that public opinion has an impact on 
policy-making conclude that public opinion has its greatest impact on 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
42 Authors who conclude that public opinion has had an i~nportarlr 
impact on policy include Beal and Hinckley 1984; Broder 1987a; 
Cantril 1967; Clymer 1982; Dionne 1980; Ellsberg 1972; D. 
Hoffman 1987; Hosmer 1984; Jacobson 1984; Kusnetz 1984; Leigh 
1976; I.ioyer 1968; Nathan and Oliver 1975; Page and Shapiro 
1983; R. Steele 1978. 
43 Russett and Graham's (1989) review of the literature on war and 
elections argues that the linkage between elections and war is 
as strong as that demonstrated by Tufte (1978') in terms of 
electiors and the domestic economy. On the issue of 
Presidential monitoring of public opinion and its impact on 
policy decisions, see Beal and Hinckley 1984; H. Cantril 1967; 
J. Converse 1987, 153, 163, 165. 
decisions made at the White House, not inside the bureaucracies of the 
State and Defense departments. If this is true, then studies like 
those of Cohen (1973) and Madson (1985), which rely on interviewing 
mid-level foreign policy bureaucrats, do not validate a limited impact 
model; they only show that public opinion has a limited impact inside 
executive branch agencies. 
Third, it is too simplistic to conclude that public opinion does 
or does not have an impact on the policy process. There is no reason 
to believe that public opinion will have the same impact at different 
stages of the decision-making cycle. If the policy process is divided 
into distinct stages, as will be done in this dissertation, one may 
find that public opinion has a different quantitative and qualitative 
impact at various stages such as getting on the agenda, negotiation or 
during ratification. 
B. The Mood Theory or Volatility Concept 
The mood theory advocated by Almond ([I9501 1960) asserts that 
foreign policy attitudes, as well as interest, are unstable. However 
to support his proposition Almond did not systematically analyze 
attitudes; he only looked at levels of public interest. A closer 
review of foreign policy attitudes over the last fifty years produces 
some disturbing findings for the mood thesis or volatility concept. 
First, public opinion data show that isolationist attitudes disappeared 
in 1943 during World War 11, not after the war as a result of a Cold 
War mood shift. Since that time, except for three years immediately 
after the war in Vietnam, internationalist attitttdes have been quite 
stable for 45 years, well beyond the 20-30 year cycle when a major rnood 
shift should have occurred. 4 4 
Second, a sophisticated review of attitudes and their 
relationship to interest in foreign policy, conducted by Caspary 
(1970), raises serious questions concerning the validity of using the 
indicator examined by Almond--the "most important problem" survey 
question--to study either foreign policy interest or attitudes. 
Third, Klingberg's research (1952) only demonstrates that the 
content of elite political communication has shown a pattern of 
shifting from an emphasis on internal political issues to stressing 
foreign involvement. However, his analysis says nothing about mass 
attitudes or mood shifts by the general public. He did not support his 
conclusions by examining any survey research which was available during 
his hypothesized last two mood shift cycles. 
A final criticism of the mood theory can be found in research 
completed by Shapiro and Page (1988). These scholars conclude that 
public attitudes are relatively stable, not volatile or moody. Based 
on a review of over 6,000 survey questions asked between 1935 and 19182, 
these researchers examined 1,128 questions which were repeated, in 
exactly the same form, over time. Of these repeated questions, over 
one-third (38%) deal with foreign policy and national defense. Out of 
this sample of foreign affairs questions, half show no change at 
all. 45 Of the remaining foreign policy questions, most attitudes 
44 J. Benson 1982; H. Cantril 1948; Caspary 1970; Foster 1983; 
Graham 1989a; Watts and Free 1978. 
45 The authors define attitude change as 6 percent. 
changed only between 6-9 percent. 46 Elen compared with opinions 
about domestic issues, foreign policy attitudes were eaually stable. 
This research clearly refutes Almond's av2  Li.ppmannfs assertions that 
"remote" foreign policy attitudes are unstable by definition. However, 
one conclusion from the Shapiro and Page research provides a rationale 
for the existence of the conventional wisdom about foreign policy 
attitude instability. For the minority of Eoreign and domestic policy 
attitudes that changed quickly (20 percent of all repeated questions), 
foreign policy attitudes changed at three times tbc ;-cte of domestic 
attitudes. Of these, not surprisingly, attituhes toward war changed 
the fastest. While no other research has demor,strated the scope and 
methodological sophistication of the Shapiro and kage work, other 
studies completed by Graham (1985), Kohut (1988), anA Bardes and 
Oldendick (1985) also argue that attitudes tend to be relatively stable 
over long periods of time. 
Taken together, the finding of relative attitude stability has 
important implications for this dissertation. If public attitudes have 
been relatively stable over time, then a thorough review and 
examination of attitudes about arms control from the 1940s and 1950s 
may be extremely relevant both to the historical case studies and also 
to academic theory concerning contemporary nuclear attitudes and 
politics. 
46 The percent of all the repeated foreign policy questions that 
showed various levels of attitude change are listed in 
parentheses below: attitude change of 6-7 percent (21%)) 
attitude change of 8-9 percent (22%), attitude change of 10-14 
percent (28%), attitude change of 15-19 percent (15%), attitude 
change of 20-29 percent (12%), and attitude change of 30% or 
more (3%). 
C. The Fragmentation or Breakdown in Consensus Proposition 
While more analytically precise than much of the academic 
literature pr0duc.d by the first generation traditionalist scholars, 
fragmentation theorists still present an incomplete model of public 
opinion about foreign policy. First, none of the auL\ors present data 
on the structure of atti?.lrles before Vietnam. As a result, their model 
contains no specification--either at the elite or at the mass 
level--that describes the degree of attitude consensus that existed 
before the Vietnam war. This omission makes it difficult to determine 
whether the breakdown in consensus is primarily at the mass level or at 
the elite level. This lack of specification in the fragmentation model 
also makes it impossible to determine what level of public agreemenc 
would constitute e reemergence of a foreign policy attitude consensus. 
Second, the specific topics examined by the authors of this 
school under-represent military and national security subjects. Very 
few arms control or nuclear weapons topics have been included in the 
collective work of these authors. As a result, even though the 
stimulus to the breakdown in consensus was the war in Vietnam, it is 
not clear whether the fragmentation concept applies to public attitudes 
toward both foreign policy and national security issues. 
Third, even though the fragmentation scholars have conducted more 
quantitative analysis than early traditional scholars, the existing 
academic literature in both schools is based on analysis of a 
relatively small number of public opinion surveys. Table 2-2 shows 
Authors 
Scope of Research Supporting 
Theory in the Public Opinion & Foreign Policy Field 
(Number of national surveys) 
Table 2-2 
Adler & Bobrow 1956 
Almond 1950/1960 
Arian 1987 























Russett & Hanson 1975 
W. Schneider 1974-75 
W. Sctlneidsr 1983 
W. Schneider 1984 
W, Schneider 1985 
Shapiro & Tage 








a A state or local poll, not a national survey. 
b An elite survey, not a national survey. 
c A parallel elite survey and national survey. 
d A survey conducted outside of the United States. 
that with the exception of work completed by Graham (1988, 1989a), 
Levering (1978), Kueller (1973, 1979), Schneider (1985), and Shapiro 
and Page (1988), the body of theory in the field is based on analysis 
of approx5ua:ely 50 national surveys. At first glance this might not 
seem so bad because the entire American voting behavior literature is 
based on analysis of approximately one dozen surveys. However, the 
main difference between the two fields of American voting behavior 
versus public opinion on foreign policy is that research which makes up 
the former has at least covered the relevant phenomena: all of the 
Presidential elections since 1940. The major problem with developing 
theory in the area of foreign policy public opinion with this 
relatively narrow base of research is that most academic writing 
ignores many of the best foreign policy surveys that were explicitly 
commissioned either by various Presidents or by the State 
Department. 4 7 
Until this dissertation and work by Shapiro ti Page, tllis rich 
body of information has not been examined systematically. This 
omission is particularly serious for the development of academic theory 
because the literature concerning the impact public opinion has on 
policy-making suggests that public opinion is likely to have more of an 
impact at the White House than in the State Department. To test this 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
47 Franklin Roosevelt comisioned over 70 opinion polls from 
before Pearl Harbor through the end of WW 11. These Offic~ of 
Public Opinion Research (OPOR) surveys were declassified in the 
early 1960s. The State Departmenc commissioned the National 
Opinion Research Center (NORC) to conduct over 90 confidential 
opinion surveys from 1945 through 1958 when the contract was 
cancelled by Congress. 
proposition, one needs to review the results of Presidential and other 
"confidential" polling, track primary source documents to determine 
which policymakers were aware of public attitudes, and then determine 
whether Presidents take public opinion into account when making 
decisions. 
Finhlly, in one important way fragmentation scholars work within 
the boundaries of the traditional paradigm. None of these scholars 
explicitly state how and under what conditions public opinion has an 
impnct on decision-making. As a result, fragmentation theorists have 
not refuted the Cohen (1973) no-impact conclusion. 
D. The Attentive Public and Top-Down Attitude Change Model 
One of the two components of this theoretical proposition has 
been validated by most research conducted over the past fifty years. 
All scholars agree that an attentive public exists. Research 
universally shows that one segment of society, concentrated among the 
highly educated minority, is more attentive to foreign policy and to 
politics in general. However, research completed by Genco (1984) and 
Neuman (1986) disagrees with one part of the original formulation of 
the concept of an attentive public. They conclude, in separate 
studies, that the size of the attentive public has not grown over the 
last several decades and that it may be smaller than initially 
estimated, approximately 10 percent rather than 25 percent of the 
population. 
On the related issue of attitude change and the role played by 
the attentive public, research completed after the development of the 
top-down model has shown that the correlation between the attentive 
public and the general public is quite weak, making a causal linkage 
unlikely. Recent research on attitude change emphasizes the 
diversified nature of the audience, the limited amount of communication 
between an attentive public and the general public, and the independent 
role played in attitude change by the mass media, especially 
television. 4 8 
Several studies completed by Gamson and Modigliani (1971, 1966) 
have shown that attitudes among the general public have been relatively 
stable, but those of the attentive public have been variable. This 
research shows that the "attentives" are the ultimate followers: often 
their attitudes change after government policy changes. If Gamson and 
Modigliani are correct, the attentive public does not seem to provide 
any democratic check on government policy, as hypothesized by Lippmann, 
due to their role as attentive judges of foreign policy. As a final 
criticism of the top-down attitude change model, there is empirical 
evidence that when the attentive public changes its attitudes, the 
general public does not always go along with the new ideas. The 
reverse is also often the case: when attitudes among the general public 
change, attentives' attitudes do not follow necessarily change in the 
same direction. 49 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
48 Fan 1988; Neuman 1986; J. Robinson 1976. 
49 Graham 1989a; Modigliani 1972; Mueller 1973; Rosi 1965. 
Other  r e s e a r c h  shows t h a t  r e a l  world e v e n t s ,  n o t  d i f f u s i o n  of 
i d e a s  from t h e  a t t e n t i v e  p u b l i c  o r  p u b l i c  e d u c a t i o n  campaigns d i r e c t e d  
by P r e s i d e n t s ,  have t h e  most powerful  i n f l u e n c e  on a t t i t u d e  change.  
Research by Muel le r  (1971,  1973,  1979) concludes  t h a t  mass a t t i t u d e s  
change ~ I I  r e l a t i o n  t o  r e a l  world e v e n t s  such a s  c a s u a l t y  r a t e s  d u r i n g  
t h e  w i n s  i n  Korea and Vietnam. He a l s o  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a t t i t u d e s  h e l d  by 
t h e  mass p u b l i c  may look q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from what they  may be 
pe rce ived  t o  be  by e l i t e  p o l i c y  makers.  For example, Muel le r  was n o t  
a b l e  110 f i n d  e i t h e r  a  c o n s i s t e n t  "hawk" o r  "dove" p o s i t i o n  wi th  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  wars i n  Korea and Vietnam even though t h e  p o l i c y  community 
d i v i d e d  i t s e l f  a l o n g  t h e s e  l i n e s .  More r e c e n t  work reviewed i n  R u s s e t t  
and Graham (1989) shows t h a t  op in ion  change may t a k e  p l a c e  i n  smal l  b u t  
q u i t e  r a p i d  s t e p s  which a r e  i n f luenced  by t h e  media. 
The most comprehensive r e s e a r c h  which f u r t h e r  c a l l s  i n t o  quest ior i  
t h e  top-down a t t i t u d e  change model was completed by Page,  Shapi ro  and 
Dempsey (1987) .  They examine t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  P r e s i d e n t i a l  l e a d e r s h i p  
and a t : t i t u d e  change.  These a u t h o r s  f i n d  t h a t  such  top-down mass 
l e a r n i n g  only  t a k e s  p l a c e  w i t h  popular  P r e s i d e n t s ,  d e f i n e d  a s  t hose  
w i t h  cover 50 p e r c e n t  i n  j ob  performance r a t i n g s ,  and P r e s i d e n t i a l  
l e a d e r s h i p  has  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t . t l e  impac t - -on ly  5 t o  10 p e r c e n t - - o n  
p u b l i c  a t t i t u d e s .  
The s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between r e a l  world e v e n t s  and a t t i t u d e  
change and t h e  l i m i t e d  i n f l u e n c e  t h a t  t h e  a t t e n t i v e  p u b l i c  p l a y s  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  mass a t t i t u d e  change can  be  s e e n  i n  a review o f  p u b l i c  
o p i n i o n  d a t a  concern ing  t h e  u s e  o f  n u c l e a r  weapons. Th i s  r e s e a r c h ,  
produced by Graham (1989a), shows that the public may learn one lesson 
from real world events, while the attentive public, opinion and policy 
elite, and policymakers may learn a very different lesson. Since the 
mid-1950s, the public has rejected the idea of using nuclear weapons 
unless these devices are used first by the Soviet Union. The Koreali 
war experience, where nuclear weapons were not used, and the growing 
awareness that the Soviet Union could retaliate with nuclear weapons 
seem to have convinced the public to become cautious with regard to 
using nuclear weapons. At the same time this attitude was taking hold 
at the mass level, policymakers were implementing nuclear weapons 
strategies of massive retaliation and flexible response which placed 
the threat to use of nuclear weapons at the center of U.S. defense 
policy. The attentive public supported this policy, while the general 
public did not. In this example, mass attitudes were changed as a 
result of real world events, and public attitudes went in the opposite 
direction of attitudes held by either the attentive public or 
government policymakers. 
IV Academic Theory Concerning Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and 
Its Relationship with Arms Control 
Prior to the writing of this dissertation, there has been no 
comprehensive academic study of public attitudes toward arms control 
throughout the nuclear age.50 While a number of publications have 
looked at one or another aspect of public attitudes about nuclear power, 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
50 While many studies have been published on selected nuclear 
issues, none are comprehensive over a 40 year period. 
nuclear weapons, civil defense, a specific arms control agreement, or 
nuclear war--none have produced an intellectual framework from which 
hypotheses for this dissertation can be developed. 51 As a result, the 
hypotheses to be examined in this dissertation will be derived from the 
academic literature on public opinion on foreign policy reviewed above. 
Even though the large academic literature on arms contrnl and 
international security has not fc~cused on public opinion, a few 
conclusions have been reached which coincide with the dominant paradigm 
from the foreign policy public opinion literature. First, there is an 
assumption, which has been tested rarely, that the public is in favor of 
peace in general and arms control in particular. This idea that the 
public favors peace permeates the work of Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel 
Kant and, in more recent times, can be seen in speeches given by various 
Nobel Peace Prize winners. 52  The second theme from the arms control 
literature is that public opinion played a positive role in stimulating 
the successful negotiation and ratification of the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty and ths Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. However these two cases 
are considered exceptional. In line with existing theory in the public 
opinion field, most arms control scholars conclude that public opinion 
usually has little impact on arms control decisions or outcomes. 5 3 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
51 For a list of publications about attitudes toward various 
nuclear issues, see Appendix 10. 
52 For a review of Kant and Bentham's work with regards to peace, 
see Davidson 1973. For texts of Nobel Peace Prize speeches by 
Frank Kellogg [I9291 and Sean MacBride [1974], see Laszlo, 
Ervin and Yoo 1986, Vol. 3, 253, 336. 
53 Barton & Weiler 1976; Blacker & Duffy 1984; Epstein 1983. 
Third, while there is a large literature on the politics of arms 
control, almost all of the work ignores the role of political parties, 
party platforms, elections, interest groups, and public opinion. As is 
true in the field of American foreign policy, the academic literature on 
the politics of arms control really focuses on bureaucratic politics. 
This means that the current conclusions about the relationship between 
public opinion and the politics of arms control noted above are mostly 
speculation, not the product of detailed scholarship. 
V Hypothesis Being Tested 
A The Question 
Until the United States and the Soviet Union began dismantling 
nuclear delivery systems covered by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty, one could easily characterize the history of nuclear arms 
control between the two superpowers as mixed, with more failure than 
success. Immediately after World War 11, the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
failed to agree on international control of a~omic energy. Negotiations 
held in the 1950s and 1960s to end nuclear testing resulted in an 
agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which improved the environment 
but placed only a slight constraint on nuclear testing and on the 
further development of offensive weapons. The corner-stonz of strategic 
arms control, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty which eventuated 
from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) agreement, placed 
limits on the deployment of defensive systems; but SALT I only had a 
marglnal effect on the number or quality of offensive syitems deployed 
by both superpowers. The SALT I1 agreement was never ratified by the 
United States, and while sevoral of its provisions have been informally 
adhered to by the two parties, other sections have been violated by both 
nations. 
These examples show that the history of strategic arms control 
from 1945 to the end of the Carter administration in 1980 has an uneven 
pattern of success and failure. This mixed pattern is presented in 
Table 2-3 below. Of the four arms control initiatives that will be the 
focus of this dissertation, all reached the executive branch agenda. 
However, while three were successfully negotiated, only two were 
ratified and only one has been fully implemented. 
Mixed Record of Arms Control Accomplishment 
Table 2-3 





Test Ban Yes 
ABM/SALT I Yes 









This mixed history raises one basic question: why have superpower 
negotiations to control and reduce strategic nu.clear weapons produced 
such a dismal track record? This dissertation will attempt to answer 
this question by focusing on the domestic poli1:ical pressures that 
influence American foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on public 
opinion. 
B. Three Hypotheses 
Three possible hypotheses relating to the role public opinion 
plays in the policy process might explain the failure to achieve 
significant strategic arms control in the nuclear age: 1) public 
opinion has little or no effect on arms control policy (the mixed 
pattern of success and failure can be explained by other fantors); 2) 
there has been no mass public opinion consensus in support of arms 
control due to attitude volatility or fragmentation; and 3) the 
attentive public has not supported arms control and these attitudes have 
eventually trickled down to the general publi: in a top-down fashion. 
The first hypothesis will evaluate conclusions reached by Bernard 
Cohen (1973) that public opinion has little o:r no impact on government 
Zoreign policy decisions. In the context of arms control, it would not 
be surprising to find that as a result of low public knowledge and 
limited i~terest in arms control, government leaders may ignore public 
opinion and focus instead on bureaucratic polLtics. In the context of 
this dissertation, if the no-impact hypothesis is correct, then public 
opinion on arms control will be found to be largely irrelevant to the 
success or failure of the four cases being examined. If this is true, 
the pattern of success and failure must be due to other factors. 
The second hypothesis is that publie opinion may have had an 
impact on decision-making, but the mass public may not have supported 
arms coatrol throughout the post World War I1 era. Such a lack of 
opinion consensus would mean that there has been no stable political 
constituency to supDort arms control. A lack of public opinion 
consensus could be caused by one of two factors. In the tradition of 
Gabriel Almond an3 Frank Klingberg, arms control attitudes could be 
volatile and fluctuate wildly as the mood of the country changes from 
internationalism to isolationism. A second source of instability could 
be that attitudes have been divided among the opinion 6 policy elite, 
attentive public, and the masses and also fragmented along ideological, 
partisan, and other demographic lines. Even though the volatility and 
fragmentation concepts are quite different, their ability to explain the 
failure of arms control are similar: they provide alternative reasons 
why a consensus of the public might not have supported arms control. 
The third hypothesis is that the attentive public has not been in 
favor of arms control and, after a lag consistent with the top-down 
attitude change model, the general public eventually shared this same 
critical perception. This hypothesis is an outgrowth of the work by 
Walter Lippmann and Gabriel Almond concerning the importance to which 
decisionmakers give to attitudes held by the attentive public. 
VI Scope and Methodology Used in This gissertation 
To strengthen the internal and external validity of my research, I 
have taken several steps to address methodological weaknesses of 
previous studies. First, the scope of my review and analysis of public 
opinion data will be the most extensive conducted to date in the field 
of arms control. Second, the four case studies extend over 7 
Presidential terms. This will strengthen any consistent conclusions 
because they will be independent of a particular adminiseration. Third, 
the policy-making process will be disaggregated into four distinct steps 
which will permit testing whether public opinion plays a different role 
at each step. Fourth, if a correlation can be found between public 
opinion and policy outcomes, primary source documents will be reviewed 
to help determine if the link is causal or spurious. Finally, several 
terms that have been used in the academic literature, but never 
precisely defined, will be defined. 
To address the three hypotheses noted above, I have identified and 
reviewed all available public opinion polls which contain questions 
relating to my four arms control cases. Of the approximately 360 
surveys that pertain to nuclear arms control from 1945 through 1980, 
cross- tabulation and statistical analysis have been conducted on about 
90. To compare and contrast public attitudes toward the four cases with 
other attitudes about arms control and nuclear issues, I have created a 
comprehensive data-set on public attitudes which currently contains 
approximately five thousand questions from over 800 national surveys 
conducted from August, 1945 through August, 1988. The collection 
includes surveys sponsored by 40 different organizations, and particular 
effort has been made to include questions and data which originally were 
considered "confidential" by political parties, Presidents or government 
agencies. One of the academic benefits of conducting this thorough 
search will be the eventual publication of a great deal of public 
opinion data that has never been reviewed by scholars. While it is 
impossible to know if my database is complete, it has been characterized 
by the president of the Gallup Organization and by specialists in the 
State Department as the most comprehensive collection in existence. 
Some previous scholars have been skeptical that the case study 
method can be used to determine whether public opinion has an impact on 
foreign policy decisions. For this reason, the decision-making system 
has been defined for this study as a four stage process: getting on the 
agenda, negotiation of an agreement, ratification of a treaty and 
implementation of an international obligation. To determine whether an 
arms control issue has reached the first policy stage--getting on the 
agenda--several questions will be asked. Has the issue been decided by 
the President? If the President has been involved in making relevant 
decisiocs, has the arms control initiative successfully moved onto the 
next stage of negotiation? When evaluating the role public opinion has 
played during this first policy stage, particular attention will be paid 
not only to whether the arms control issue has made it onto the agenda, 
but also to how the arms control issues have been framed. A similar set 
of detailed questions will be asked at the other policy stages. 
To represslit the full range of arms control initiatives since 
World War 11, the four arms control cases were selected because they 
reached different stages of completion. One proposal, international 
control of atomic energy, reached the agenda of the Executive Branch but 
was not successfully negotiated with the Soviet Union. One proposal, 
SALT 11, reached the agenda, was successfully negotiated, but was not 
ratified. One proposal, ABM/SALT I, reached the agenda, was negotiated 
and ratified, and partially implemented, but the ABM agreement had 
difficulty at the implementation stage during the Reagan 
administration. The fourth agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
passed through all four policy stages, including implementation. 
The four arms control case studies also cover the full range of 
Presidential administrations from Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy through 
Nixon, Ford and Carter. As a result, any conclusions rezched throughout 
the dissertation will not be limited to a specific historical context of 
any one administration. 
To determine that public opinion has an impact on policy, one must 
first show that opinion and policy correspond. If this necessary, but 
not sufficient condition is met and there is a positive relationship 
between opinion and policy, is the temporal sequence consistent with the 
proposition that public opinion had an impact on decision-making? If 
this can be shown, is there evidence from primar~? and secondary source 
documents that policymakers were aware of public opinion and took it 
into account in their decisions? 
To address the question whether the public has supported arms 
control, case studies were selected that could test both potential 
causes of a lack of public consensus: attitude volatility and 
fragmentation. The four arms control cases occur throughout the 
post-war period from the beginning of the Cold War (International 
Control of Atomic Energy, 1945-1950), to the middle and "end" of the 
Cold War (Limited Test Ban, 1952-1963), to the Vietnam era (ABM/SALT I, 
1960-1972), and to the beginning of the Reagan era (SALT 11, 
1973-1980). Since the mood cycles are posited to be 20-30 years long 
and since my four cases extend over a 35 year period, there should be 
striking differences in public opinion among the four cases if the 
volatility hypothesis is correct. If the isolationist- internationalist 
mood dichotomy is really an important fault-line in American foreign 
policy attitudes, I would expect to find that internationalists are more 
likely to support arms control than isolationists. 
One of the weaknesses of the public opinion literature has been 
the absence of definitions for widely-used terms such as consensus, 
fragmentation, and the attentive public. An attitude consensus could 
have two quite different meanings. 54 One definition would be to 
consider a high aggregate level of public opinion as a consensus; 
another type of consensus could relate to close agreement among 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
54 Two authors have defined an elite consensus as less than a 10% 
difference in attitudes among various elite groups on various 
policy issues. See Bardes and Oldendick 1985, 12. 
different segments of society such as the attentive public and the 
general public, Republicans and Democrats, womzn and men. Since both 
definitions seem equally valid, the data on public attitudes toward arms 
control will be evaluated to determine if either type of consensus can 
be discovered. 
However, this twin definition of consensus leaves its precise 
operational meaning unspecifieJ. For the mass-level meaning of 
consensus, the following five-level, heuristic typology has been 
developed. It is sunu7larized in Table 2-4. It is based on the concept 
of majority rule as it applies to American foreign policy decisions that 
involve Congress. For this aspect of American foreign policy, 
decision-rules are clear-cut: a majority or a two-thirds majority are 
needed to support various legislation. In the context of the arms 
control treaties being examined in this dissertation, ratification 
requires a two-thirds vote. This is the main reason for defining an 
attitude consensus at the approximate level of two-thirds. 5 5 








LEVEL OF' PUBLIC SUPPORT 
8CX and above 
70% to 79% 
60% to 69% 
50% to 59% 
modal category < 50% 
- - - - - - - - * - - - - - -  
55 Holsti and Roscnau (1988) have used iO% or xore to define a 
consensus. Schuman and Presses (1477-78) implicitly define a 
consensus as 68% and above. 
Two other definitions, majority and plurality levels of public 
opinion, are straight-forward and follow normal usage. However, the 
classification of public opinion into the last two levels-"preponderance 
and virtual unanimity-- are more original. In politics, one can observe 
situations when a group or a nation is sufficiently powerful so that it 
not only controls policy, but it also dominates the entire system over 
long periods of time. In such cases, opposition, while extant, is muted 
and mostly irrelevant to the workings of the political system. To 
explore whether this phenomenon is applicable to public attitudes, the 
category of preponderance has been created. 
A final category hss been created to deal with rare, but 
important, pt )lit opinion events. Every once in a while virtually all 
members of a polity agree on a common position. While there may be 
token opposition, the overwhelming size of the majority often sweeps 
dissenters away and even inhibits freedom of expression involving 
contrary opinions. One foreign policy example which illustrates this 
type of virtual unanimity is passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 
Again, to explore whether this phenomenon is applicable to public 
attitudes, the category of virtual unanimity has been created. 
As was true for the term consensus, the concept of fragmentation 
also has not been defined by scholars who argue that a breakdown in 
consensus occurred as a result of the war in Vietnam. To enable 
comparison of the degree of fragmentation of public attitudes over time, 
a scale has been developed in Table 2-5 below. It measures the degree 
to which various groups in the population--such as Democrats, men, the 
high educated, high status professions, and younger adults-- hold 
attitudes that differ from the mean of all attitudes held by the general 
public. For example, if attitudes are extremely fragmented, several 
groups will hold attitudes that differ from the norm by over 18 
percent. If attitudes demonstrate only medium fragmentation, virtually 
all groups will hold attitudes that differ from the mean by 
approximately 10 percent. If attitudes are not fragmented at all, 
attitudes of most groups in society will vary less than the typical 














If the fragmentation hypothesis is correct, I should find that a 
foreign poiicy attitude consensus supported arms control prior to 
Vietnam but not after it. This would translate into either consistent 
levels of mass support for my first two cases (ICAE and LTBT) or 
homogenous attitudes among various segments of the general public. As 
the foreign policy attitude consensus begins to break down in the late 
196Cls, I should see a more distinct pattern of opinion beginning with 
the ABM/SALT I agreement. Ideological ~ n d  partisan indicators will 
become more important, and a gap will grow between opinions held by the 
attentive pilblic and the general public. This fragmented pattern should 
be clearly in force for attitudss about the iast case, SALT 11. 
The final operational definition covers the term "attentive" 
public. Literature on the attentive public, summarized in Table 2-1, 
shows no agreement whether this concept is best defined by levels of 
knowledge, levels of interest, socio-ecunomic characteristics--such as 
college education--or by types of behavior. Ideally, one should 
idencify members of the attentive public by a combination of knowledge, 
interest, and behavioral characteristics. However, this will not be 
possible in this dissertation because all three measures of 
attentiveness do not exist on all of the relevant surveys. As a result, 
this dissertation will use completion of college as a surrogate for 
atten~iveness. Three reasons led to this conclusion. First, college 
educarion was used by Almond ([I9501 1960) in his original analysis of 
foreign policy attitudes held by the attentive public. He found that 
education was a much better indicator than occupation or income to 
diffsrentiate foreign policy attitudes. 56 The second reason for 
selecting education is that the most methodologically sophisticated 
56 Almond [I9501 1960, 126-30. Since Almond's work, many authors 
have reached the same conclusion that education is the best 
single socio-economic measure of attentiveness. See Cohen 
1966; Free and Cantril 1967, 61; National Science Board 1981, 
177. 
studies of the attentive public, completed by Devine (1970) and Genco 
(1984), have come to the conclusion that the strongest correlation 
between membership in the attentive public and any other univariate 
variable is education. While completion of a college or post-college 
degree does not assure that a person is attentive to foreign policy 
issues, more than half of those who have been identified as attentive 
have at least a college degree. Since levels of education are recorded 
on virtually every national public opinion survey, a college education 
will be used to provide a rough approximation of attitudes held by the 
attentive public. Where individual surveys include interest and 
knowledge questions, these will be used to compare and validate the 
generic use of education measures. The third reason education has been 
selected to track attitudes of the attentive public is because the large 
literature on voting behavior finds close association between education 
cnd many politically relevant characteristics such as political 
participation, ideciogical and policy sophistication, and efficacy. 5 7 
Before getting into the next chapters, one final comment on 
methodology should be made. Research for this dissertation has reviewed 
thousands of public opinion questions about arms control and nuclear 
weapons. Since the research is based on secondary analysis of existing 
surveys, one is not always able to confine evaluation to questions that 
have been repeated, word for word, by the same survey organization. 
When the exact same question has been repeated over time, the data will 
57 Numerous studies show that education is strongly associated 
with interest and participation in politics. See Campbell s. 
a. 1964; Converse 1964; Key 1961; Kinder and Sears 1985, 705; 
Nie g .  a. 1979. 
provide a valuable opportunity to judge whether relatively small changes 
in public attitudes have taken place. However, the research for this 
dissertation is not confined to analysis of repeated questions. The 
main reason is that a comprehensive review of sources of error in public 
opinion polling shows that question wording, question order, sample 
design, interview procedures, and sampling error all contribute. 5 8 
Question wording is not the only, nor even necessarily the largest, 
source of error. As a result, all questions relevant to my four arms 
control cases will be reviewed. This will allow one to study the 
effects of changed question wording on a case by case basis. Using data 
from a large number of surveys conducted over a relatively long 
time-frame will allow for the possibility that many sources of error, 
other than question wording, may cancel themselves out. For all of 
these reasons, conclusions will be drawn concerning attitude change when 
shifts on the order of 10 percent have taken place and when data from 
different questions and survey organizations show the same pattern. 
This conservative approach will partially help to overcome the lack of 
true trend data for most of the four arms control cases. 5 9 
58 Turner and Martin 1984. 
59 This definitionof attitude change expands onworkby Shapiro 
and Page 1988. While they confine their analysis to repeated 
questions, they define attitude change as a shift in opinion of 
6%. These scholars acknowledge that public opinion data is 
"softer" than often implied by measures of statistical 
significance which only measure sampling error. 
The Pattern of Public Awareness, Knowledge and 
Interest on Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control 
and Foreign Policy Issues, 1945 - 1988 
Chapter 3 
I Summary 
Determining the level of public awareness, knowledne, and interest 
concerning nuclear and arms control issues is necessary as the first 
step in evaluating all three hypothesis which are being examined for 
this dissertation. The no-impact hypothesis is justified, in part, 
because many scholars consider the public to be ignorant of foreign 
policy issues. The volatility hypothesis posits that public interest on 
foreign issues is erratic. Existence of an attentive public is a 
necessary precondition to confirm the validity of the top-down attitude 
change model. To evaluate these hypotheses, this chapter asks four 
questions. What is the level of public awareness and knowledge 
concerning arms control and nuclear weapons issues? Is there evidence 
of an "attentive public" for nuclear and arms control issues, and if so, 
what is its size? Is there an "opinion and policy elite" for nuclear 
and arms control issues, and if so, what is its size? Finally, is the 
pattern of public interest concerning arms control and nuclear issues 
volatile? 
A comprehensive review of approximately 250 public opinion surveys 
that include over 550 questions which measure public awareness, 
knowledge, and interest about nuclear, arms control, and foreign policy 
issues reaches some important conclusions. First, public awareness of 
nuclear issues is extremely high, and "functional" knowledge is 
relarively high compared to other public policy issues. However, 
detailed knowledge is extremely low. Second, an attentive public exists 
for arms control, nuclear, and foreign policy issues that varies 
depending on the issue from approximately 25 to 40 percent of the 
public. Third, there is clear evidence of an opinion and policy elite 
for nuclear, arms control, and foreig;~ policy issues that constitutes 
less than 10 percent of the public. Fourth, contrary to existing 
theory, public knowledge and interest about arms control, nuclear 
weapons and foreign policy issues are quite stable, not volatile. 
Finally, the most unusual findings from this chapter relate to patterns 
of public awareness, knowledge and interest. People's knowledge and 
interest about nuclear issues form a distinctly hierarchical and bimodal 
pattern which favor the nuclear dimension over the arms control 
dimension of the issue. Levels of public awareness and knowledge of 
nuclear weapons are twice as high as awareness and knowledge of arms 
control negotiations or agreements. A similar pattern exists for the 
 public';^ interest in these issues: interest over nuclear war and nuclear 
weapons dominates interest about arms control at slightly less than a 
two-to-one ratio. These twin discoveries provide the foundation needed 
to understand the patterns of public attitudes toward arms control, 
which will be discussed in Chapters Four through 7. 
I1 Questions To Be Examined 
To provide building blocks to evaluate my three central 
hypotheses, this chapter will address four questions. First, what is 
the level of public knowledge and awareness concerning arms control and 
nuclear weapons issues? Is it true as aca'demic research would have it 
that the public is poorly informed on virtually all public policy 
issues? 60 More importantly, is the publFc so ignorant ai to sustain 
Walter Lippmann's justification for reliance on a foreign policy and 
opinion elite to evaluate and interpret international news for the 
general public? 6 1 
Second, is there evidence of an "attentive public" for nuclear and 
arms control issues? If so, what is its approximate size? Determining 
whether an attentive public exists is important because an attentive 
public is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for validating the 
top-down mcdel of attitude change. 
Third, is there evidence of an "opinion and policy elite" (Almond 
[I9501 1960), and if so, what is its size? Does this opi~lion and policy 
elite serve as an "issue publicw which some scholars claim asserts 
democratic control over government policy? 6 2 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Go Kriesberg 1949; Kinder ai~d Sears 1985 I 661. 
Lippmann [I9221 1965. 
62 The concepts of "opinion and policy elite' and "issue public" 
will be used inter-changeably in this dissertation. For 
discussion of the concept issues publics, see Converse 1964, 
245-6; Neuman 1986, 35, 67-73. 
Finally, what is the pattern of public interest conce~ning arms 
control and nuclear izeapons issues? Is Almond ([I9501 1960) correct in 
arguing that public interest fluctuates widely and follows distinct 
internationalist and isolatioi~ist moods? 
I11 Scope and Quality of the Evidence 
A comprehensive review of data from over 800 national public 
opinion surveys that contain questions about arms control and nuclear 
weapons finds one immediately surprising conclusion. There is a great 
deal of data about public awareness, knowledge, and interest in this 
issue area. 63  Approximately 200 questions, which measure either 
awareness or knowledge of nuclear and arms control issues, have been 
summarized in Appendix 1 (Volume 11) of this dissertation. Appendix 1 
begins with one survey question which received a 100 percent positive 
response from the public and ends with one which elicited only a 3 
percent affirmative response. Each entry in Appendix 1 contains a 
short, one sentence version of each awareness or knowledge question and 
the percent of the public that was cognizant of that particular issue. 
Entries are ranked from highest public awareness or knowledge to lowest. 
To compare and contrast public awareness and knowledge concerning 
arms control and nuclear issues with awareness and knowledge of foreign 
policv issues, data from an additional 165 relevant questions has been 
summarized in Appendix 2. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
'' Throughout this chapter, an attempt will be made to distinguish 
between public awareness, public knowledge, and public 
interest . 
Against this background, data from 40 questions have been 
evaluated concerning public interest in arms control and nuclear issues, 
and an additional 70 questions have been examined concerning public 
interest about foreigr. policy. After completing this comprehensive 
review of public knowledge and interest in these areas, it is possible 
to conclude that the quantity and quality of this public opinion data 
makes it possible both to sustain and to challenge several existing 
theories in the public opinion and foreign policy fields. 
IV Awareness of Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons 
A strong pattern emerges from this mountain of data. It shows 
that public awareness is distinctly different from public knowled~e. 
Whilc often lacking in detail, public awareness of an issue is the 
prerequisite for more detailed mass knowledge. In addition, 
understanding the level, pattern, and diffusion of public awareness 
about arms control and nuclear issues is essential if one is to fully 
comprehend the meaning of public attitudes toward these subjecrs. 
A. An exceptionally high floor of awareness provides a necessary 
precondition for political mobilization. Several commentators have 
noted that public concern over arms control and nuclear issues seems to 
follow a cyclical pattern. 64 During some periods, interest in arms 
control can be intense with hundreds of thousands of people 
demonstrating in the streets. At other times, the public seenrs totally 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
64 Boyer 1934, 1985; Paarlberg 1973; Yankelovich and Harman 1988, 
5-10. 
apathetic. How is this dramatic change possible? One reason is that 
virtually everyone is pware nuclear weapons exist. Those who are 
unfamiliar with public opinion data may think this is a trivial 
finding. It is not. In no other area of public policy is at least 90 
percent of the public awere of the existence of the public policy 
topic. This exceptionally high floor of awareness has persisted from 
1945 through the 1980s, over forty years into the nuclear age. 65 As 
will be documented in more detail in other chapters, this high "floor" 
provides a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for extensive 
mobilizations of the politically active public when issues are defined 
in terms of nuclear war and peace. 
B. A hierarchy of awareness exists, where nuclear weapons are 
more familiar than arms control. More important, one finds that 
awareness of nuclear weapons systems is much higher than awareness of 
arms control negotiations or agreements. For some important cases, the 
gap is as large as forty percent. Over 80 percent of the public have 
been aware of the following nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons systems: 
the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, nuclear weapons testing, the neutron 
bomb, Star Wars/SDI, the MX missile, and the fact that both the U.S. and 
Soviet Union have thousands of nuclear weapons aimed at each other. 
Only one arms control proposal or agreement, SALT 11, reached this 80 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
65 Social Science Research Council 1947. See Appendix 1 for 
recent data on public awareness of nuclear weapons in the 
1980s. 
percent level of awareness. 66 Awareness of most arms control 
agreements falls far short of the 80 percent level. As shown in Table 
3-1 below, awareness of specific arms control initiatives varies from 70 
percent to approximately 25 percent. 
Awareness of Arms Control Agreements & Proposals 
(in percent) 
Table 3-1 
Level Agreement or Proposal Time Period 
Comprehensive Test ban proposals 
INF talks 
Stevenson's call for a unildteral 
US moratorium on nuclear tests 
Test ban agreement 
Soviet proposals to e1tminai:e 
nuclear weapons 
Soviet proposal tc cut nuclear 
weapons in half 
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal 
The nuclear weapons freeze proposal 
The Baruch plan 
US armed forces limitation proposal 
The Acheson-Lilienthal report 
The SALT I/ABM treaty 
Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal 
The U.N. Special Session on Disarmament 
The U.S. zero-zero INF proposal 
UN Disarmament talks 
1986 
pre 1987 summit 
- - - - - - - - -  
Using definitions developed by Neuman (1986), the bO percent 
level of public awareness suggests that the entire politically 
aware public has heard of most nuclear weapons systems. Only 
the 20 percent who are classified as "apoliticai" remain 
unaware of nuclear weapons systems. For the methodology that 
divides the public into activist (5%), mass (75%) and 
apolitical (20%) groups, see Neuman 1986, 169-176. 
Probably the most important single measure of awareness about arms 
control records that only 43 percent knew that the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union had concluded anv arms control treaty prior to the 1987 INF 
agreement. Since this question measures general awarenes: of arms 
control, not public awareness of arms control jargon or the name of an 
esoteric treaty, it provides an irnportanc cor~firmation of a major 
conclusion reached from reviewing all of this data. Awareness of 
s7ecific arms control agreements--such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
SALT I, and SALT 11--is approximately half the awareness of most nuclear 
weapons systems. 
C. Diffusion of awareness, public education and presidential 
leadership ha-re their limits. During the Senate ratification stage of 
the foreign policy process, Presidents often attempt to increase public 
support for arms control treaties they have negotiated. Part of the 
task of selling a treaty to the Senate involves expanding the "name 
recognition" of the particular arms control agreement among the general 
public. One empirical rule of thumb, presented in Table 3-2 below, is 
that awareness of arms control and nuclear issues rarely increases over 
20 percent from its initial base in a 6 to 12 month time-frame. For 
several cases, awareness of nuclear issues increased less than ten 
percent in the politically- relevant time period of six to twelve months 
necessary for Senate consideration of a treaty for ratification. 
Two exceptions to this pattern--a fifteen percent increase in 
awareness in one month and a thirty-five percent increase in six 
I n c r e a s e s  i n  Awareness of  A r m s  Cont ro l  
I n i t i a t i v e s  and Nuclear  I s s u e s  
( i n  p e r c e n t )  
Table 3 - 2  
I n c r e a s e  A r m s  Corltrol I n i t i a t i v e  
I n  
Awareness 
Time 
Pe r iod  
The p r o p o s a l  t o  c u t  s t r a t e g i c  n u c l e a r  
weapons i n  h a l f  8 months 
The n e u t r o n  bomb 8 months 
The Baruch p l a n  9 months 
The c o u n t r i e s  involved  iq SALT I1 11 months 
The B i k i n i  t e s t  3 months 
F a l l o u t  12 months 
SALT T,I 12 months 
S o v i e t  a c q i i i s i t i o n  o f  t h e  atomic bomb 9 months 
The S o v i e t  p roposa l  t o  e l i m i n a t e  n u c l e a r  
weapons by t h e  y e a r  2000 4 months 
The ABM system 1 month 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  ~f atomic energy 8 months 
mon ths - - a re  impor t an t  t o  n o t e .  The f i r s t  was t h e  announcement by t h e  
S o v i e t  Union t h a t  i t  had test led a  hydrogen Lomb. The second e x c e p t i o n  
was t h e  Rosenberg atomic spy ing  t r i a l .  bo th  were d rama t i c  and r e a l  
world e v e n t s ,  n o t  p u b l i c  e d u c a t l ~ n  campaigns sponsored by i n t e r e s t  
groups o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  at t .empting t o  b u i l d  s u p p o r t  f o r  a n  arms 
c o n t r o l  t r e a t y .  
Of t en  awareness  o f  sJme n u c l e a r  evenc o r  i s s u e  does n o t  d i f f u s e  a s  
q u i c k l y  o r  a s  e x t e n s i v e l y  as e l i t e  pol icymakers  t h i n k .  For example, 
P r e s i d e n t  Truman's announcement t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  Union had t e s t e d  a n  
a tomic  d e v i c e  was r e l a t i v e l y  s low co d i f f u s e  (8 p e r c e n t  i n  9 months) and 
only reached  approximate ly  t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  o f  the p u b l i c  ( 73  p e r c e n t ) ,  A 
close examination of survey data shows that this key announcement did 
not change public attitudes about various issues such as U.S. policy 
-
toward the Soviet Union, the use of nuclear weapons, or the desirability 
of international control of atomic energy. 6 7 
In contrast, the announcement that the Soviets had tested a 
hydrogen bomb diffused quickly (15 percent in one month) and reached the 
entire politically aware public (85 percent). Unlike the Soviet 
development of the A-bomb, Russian development of thermonuclear weapons 
seems to have changed American public attitudes toward various nuclear 
and arms control issues. 
Understanding the level and diffusion rate of public awareness is 
important because there seems to be a relationship between the diffusion 
process and the impact public opinion has on government policy. One 
example from the early 1980s shows that awareness of the nuclear weapons 
freeze did not diffuse to a large proportion of the public (only to 57 
percent). While the nuclear freeze movement generated a great deal of 
media and interest group attention and mass demonstrations, it is no 
coincidence that this arms control initiative failed to get onto the 
executive branch agenda.68 A second example comes from the Reagan 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
67 Unlike the elite which was divided over the issue of the time 
it would take the Soviets to build nuclear weapons, the public 
believed that the Soviets would develop atomic devices within a 
few years. Thus, contrary to policymakers' predictions, 
Truman's announcement was not met by any public hysteria. 68 A review of survey data about participation in mass 
demonstrations shows that less than 10 percent of the U.S. 
population has participated in this type of activity. Thus, 
mass demonstrations, despite their name, are relatively elite 
phenomeua, not mass political phenomena. See 6/1983 CRS; 
3/1985 AbC/WP; 9/1985 M&K listed in Appendix 11, 
administration from 1984 to 1987. The President was under political 
pressure to produce results on arms control. At the time, some peace 
activists, former arms control negotiators, and members of Congress were 
pressuring the administration to agree to halt nuclear weapons testing. 
In one of his first foreign policy initiatives, Mikhail Gorbachev 
unilaterally halted Russian nuclear testing and proposed that the United 
States agree to a test moratorium. During this time period private 
polling, conducted by an interest group sympathetic to the 
administration, reported to the White House that awareness of a proposal 
to stop nuclear testing d-clined in 1986. This data told the 
administration that public awareness of the Soviet test ban proposal was 
not diffusing throughout the public and that many people actually 
credited Ronald Reagan with the test moratorium proposal. This polling 
information convinced the White House that the Soviet test ban 
initiative was not a serious challenge from the political point of 
view. 6 9 
D. Public awareness declines slightly after an issue has passed 
its prime. The public is constantly confronted with many public policy 
issues. Despite the importance of nuclear weapons issues, when they 
leave the front page and the TV news screen, they recede slowly in the 
public's mind. Examples include a fall-off in awareness of the 
controversy over nuclear power plant construction (8 percenr drop in 10 
years), declining awareness of the controversy involving David 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
69 The surveys are cited in Appendix 11 as U / N S I C .  The surveys 
were read by senior Reagan administration officials and had an 
impact on their decision-making. Interview with former NSC 
staff member Dr. Ronald H. Hinckley. 
Li,l.ienthal and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (8 percent drop in 22 
months), reduced awareness of SALT I1 (6 percent drop in 9 months, and a 
15 percent drop in 7 years), declining awareness of the nuclear freeze 
(3 percent drop in 18 months), reduced awareness of the ABM system (3 
percent drop in 2 months), and even a drop in awareness of the H-bomb (5 
percent drop in 22 months). 
E. Significant expansion or reduction in awareness is possible 
over longer periods of time. When the time frame is expanded from 6-12 
months to several years, both awareness and knowledge of nuclear issues 
can increase or decrease significantly. The best example cart be seen 
with the significant growth in awareness and knowledge of the term 
"fallout," by 40 percent, over a period of six and one half years. Even 
when less dramatic events are involved, when the time frame is expanded, 
awareness can increase a great deal. The number of people who could 
correctly identify the two countries that negotiated in the SALT/START 
nuclear arms talks incressed 24 percent over the seven year period from 
On tlte other side of the coin, if the time-frame is extended, 
public awareness can drop substantially. Over a 17 years period, the 
number of people who could remember the location of a local public 
fallout shelter dropped 53 percent. 
- - - - . , - - - - - - - - - -  
70 This knowledge question was asked five times from 1979 throiigh 
1986 in slightly different forms. The following percent of the 
population could identify the U.S. and Soviet Union as the 
countries negotieting strategic arms control: 23 percent 
(1/1979), 30 percent (6/1979), 37 percent (10/1981), 38 percent 
(11/1979), 47 percent (5/1986). 
V Knowledge of Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons 
As was noted earlier in this chapter, public awareness of an issue 
is quite different from more detailed public knowledge. Does a 
review of data about public knowledge confirm or reject the findings 
reached above concerning public awareness? Does a "policy and opinion 
elite" exist for arms control and nuclear issues? If it does, what is 
its approximate size? 
A. Knowledge of nuclear weapons and arms control show the same 
hierarchical pattern as for awareness. Often a relatively large percent 
of the population has detailed knowledge of specific nuclear 
weapons-related facts such as the targets selected for the Bikini test 
( 7 8  percent after the test, 63 percent before the test), description of 
the H-bomb ( 6 3  percent), description of the neutron bomb ( 6 3  percent), 
description of feasible ways a nuclear bol,!!) could be delivered ( 5 1  
percent), knowledge of the radius of destruction for an A-bomb (50  
percent) and for an H-bomb ( 4 3  percent), description of SDI/Star Wars 
( 4 3  percent), and correct identification of the materials which produce 
atomic energy (30 percent). 
In contrast, fewer people had knowledge of various arms control 
phenomena: identified the purpose of SALT ( 5 8  percent), knew the U.S. 
was negotiating international control of atomic energy ( 5 3  percent), 
knew that the U.S. did not ratify SALT I1 (48  percent), named the 
countries involved in the strategic arms coi,trol negotiations ( 4 7 - 2 3  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
71 In terms of survey research methodology, most knowledge 
questions rely on an open-ended question format. In contrast, 
most questions used to measure awareness use a closed-question 
format. 
percent), knew that the U.S. and Soviet Union had concluded an arms 
control treaty (43 percent), knew Ronald Reagan opposed the nuclear 
weapons freeze (30 percent), knew about the ABM treaty (17 percent), and 
had a clear idea about the Baruch plan (15-14 percent). 7 2 
B. Survey data shows a small opinion and policy elite. Survey 
data show that a knowledgeable "opinion and policy elite" exists for 
arms control and nuclear issues, in support of the general proposition 
made by Almond ((19501 1960). However,this opinion and policy elite is 
quite small, probably under 10 7 3  A review o f  Appendix 1 
shows that less tkan 10 percent of the public believe themselves to be 
well informed on various arms control and nuclear-related issues such as 
SDI, SALT, arms control, the MX missilc, nuclear winter, Soviet medium 
range missiles, the 1NF agreement, or the Limited Test Ran Treaty. 
Not only do data from these self-defined knowledge questions point 
to a very small opinion and policy elite or "issue public" for nuclear 
and arms control, but data from "objective" knowledge questions show the 
same pattern. 74 Two major surveys, which develop~d objective 
indicators to determine the level of public knowledge and used these 
indicators to create knowledge scales, found that less than 10 percent 
of the public is quite knowledgeable about arms control and nuclear 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
72 Given that relatively few questios that probe for public 
knowledge about arms control, it is difficult to determine 
whether the two to one ratio that existed for awareness of 
nuclear weapons versus awareness of arms control holds for 
knowledge. However, knowledge of nuclear weapons clearly is 
more extensive than knowledge of arms control. 
73 Cohen 1966; Graham 1988. 
74 See Appendix 1 for the specific questions. 
issues. 75  In addition, there is some evidence that the small size of 
the opinion and policy elite has been true throughout the nuclear age. 
In the 1950s, only 5 percent of the public could define the term 
"preventative war." 
C. Functional knowledge exceeds understanding of abstract arms 
control concepts or terms. Can one conclude from this evidence that the 
public is ignorant of many first principles of the nuclear age? 
Probably not. When broader questions are asked, the public comes out as 
being "functionally knowledgeable." For example, on the topic of 
nuclear deterrence, when asked whether the U.S. has given up the right 
to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, 83 percent gave the 
correct answer of "No. "76 While only 23 percent of the public could 
name the countries that participated in the SALT talks at one point in 
time, when this question was asked several years later, 49 percent 
correctly provided the answer. In 1980, when the ability to recall that 
the U.S. and Soviet Union were participating in the SALT negotiations 
hovered at the one third mark, 58 percent could identify the purpose of 
the negotiations. Few people (31 percent) knew about the "zero-zero 
option" when it was under negotiation at the INF talks, but 76 percent 
knew that the Russians had walked out of those arms control talks. When 
U.S.-Soviet a r m  control discussions resumed, 77 percent knew that the 
- - . . . . - - - - - - - - - - -  
75 Marttile & Kiley 1985; Social Science Research Council 1947. 
76 This data shows that, contrary to the conclusions made by some 
authors, the public is not totally ignorant of U.S. policies 
concerning the use of nuclear weapons. See Yankelovich & Doble 
1964. 
f i r s t  meet ing was j u s t  t o  a r r ange  f o r  f u t u r e  t a l k s ,  n o t  t o  conclude an  
agreement .  I n  t h e  1950s,  on ly  12 p e r c e n t  knew t h a t  t h e  U . N .  Atomic 
Energy Commission had s topped  i ts  d e l i b e r a t i o n s , .  b u t  6 3  p e r c e n t  knew 
t h a t  t h e  U . S .  and t h e  S o v i e t  Union had f a i l e d  t o  r each  agreement on t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  of  atornic energy .  These examples s u g g e s t  t t ~ a t  t h e  
p u b l i c  may have f u n c t i o n a l  knowledge o f  many n u c l e a r  and arms c o n t r o l  
i s s u e s  which is f a r  h i g h e r  t han  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  r e c a l l  s p e c i f i c  t e c h n i c a l  
o r  arms c o n t r o l  j a r g o n .  
D. Measurement of  p u b l i c  knowledge through survey  r e s e a r c h  shows 
c o n s i s t e n t  r e s u l t s  and s t a b i l i ~ y .  There h a s  always been a  concern  among 
s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  t h a t  knowledge measured by p u b l i c  op in ion  surveys  may 
n o t  be  v e r y  a c c u r a t e .  The p u b l i c  might s a y  t h a t  they  know of  a  
pc . i r t i cu lar  i s s u e  only  t o  p l e a s e  an  i n t e r v i e w e r  o r  t o  appear  
we l l - i n fo rmed .  Desp i t e  t h e s e  conce rns ,  t h e r e  S.s r eason  t o  have moderate 
f a i t h  i n  t h e  d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  concern ing  l e v e l s  of  p u b l i c  
awareness  and knowledge. Data from s e v e r a l  q u e s t i o n s ,  i nc luded  i n  
Appendix 1 ,  show t h a t  t h e r e  i s  6. g r e a t  d e a l  o f  temporal  s t a b i l i t y  i n  
r e sponses  t o  s i m i l a r  knowledge q u e s t i o n s  which have been asked  ove r  
t:ime. One s e t  o f  r e p e a t e d  survey  q u e s t i o n s ,  which asked  r e sponden t s  t o  
' t e l l  r e s e a r c h e r s  t h e  pe rcen tage  of  e l e c t r i c i t ,  produced w i t h  n u c l e a r  
power, shows remarkably s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s  even though t h e  su rveys  were 
conducted two y e a r s  a p a r t .  The sarile p a t t e r n  o f  temporal  s t a b i l i t y  was 
r e a f f i r m e d  i n  a n o i h e r  s e t  o f  surveys  when respondents  were asked  t o  
define the percentage of the defense budget spent on nuclear 
weapons. 7 7 
On occasion, some social scientists also have been unsure whether 
it is valid to use respondents' own self-perceptions to provide an 
accurate measure of public knowledge. This is an important issue 
because many survey research organizations use self-defined knowledge 
questions because they are simple and do not take valuable time. A 
review of Appendix 1 shows that these self-defined measures of knowledge 
are fairly good, but not perfect, indicators of actual public 
knowledge. The pattern of responses to self-defined knowledge questions 
demonstrates the same temporal stability which was discovered in 
responses to factual questions noted above. Also, answers to several 
"objective" questions--such as the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile, the specific provisions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and 
the definition of terms associated with nuclear deterrence--all show 
levels of affirmative responses which coincide with results from 
self-defined knowledge questions. Again, this data indicate that the 
nuclear opinion and policy elite constitutes betwee,n 5-10 percent of the 
population. 
Finally, social scientists wonder to what extent people exaggerate 
their knawledge about particular issues. In the entire data set of 
surveys about nuclear issues, four pairs of questions first asked 
respondents whether they had heard about or knew about a particular 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
77 I am arguing that le..rels of public knowledge can be stable over 
time, not that public attitudes or knowledge is necessarily 
rnternally consistecy. The large psychological literature on 
this subject is discussed in Ross et.al. 1976; N. Wood 1985. 
nuclear issue and then followed up by asking them to provide specific 
descriptions of the particular nuclear issue. Between 16 and 37 percent 
of those who said they knew of a particular nuclear issue were unable to 
provide any specific information about that issue. These data are 
important for two reasons. First, they show there is an inflation 
factor in responses to self-defined knowledge evaluations of 
approximately one fifth to one third. At the same time, this level of 
public exaggeration is not so extensive as to call into question data 
obtained from such self-defined knowledge survey questions. Second, 
taking this inflation factor into account reinforces the conclusion that 
the opinion and policy elite for arms control is no larger than 10 
percent of the public. 7 8 
E. Question wording effects may be exaggerated. Since changes 
in question wording can have a dramatic impact on survey results, most 
scholars limit trend analysis to dhta from exactly repeated questions 
from the same survey organization. 79 A review of Appendix 1 reveals 
that similar, but not identical, questions asked by different survey 
organizations in the same general time frame often produce equivalent 
results. This is true even though question wording or survey 
organization vary. Examples include awareness of the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty (73 and 72 percent), awareness of the nuclear power plant 
accident at Chernobyl (93 and 92 percent), and awareness of the Israeli 
78 Thus, data which shows that 14-15 percent of the public had a 
good understanding of the Baruch plac has not led me to 
increasing the estimated size of the nuclear issue public above 
ten percent. 
79 Belson 1968, 1981; H. Cantril [1.944] 1972; Payne 1951; Schuman 
and Presser 1977; Sudman and Bradburn 1982. 
bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor (86 and 80 percent). These data 
support the methodological approach used in this dissertation that all 
questions should be reviewed and analyzed, and that time series analysis 
should not be restricted exclusively to repeated questions. 
Scholars must be aware of possible effects due to changes is question 
wording, but an approach that rejects evaluating all but true time 
series data would have the effect of severely restricting the subjects 
appropriate for academic study. 80 
V Public Awareness and Knowledge Concerning Nuclear Versus Foreign 
Policy Issues 
To determine whether awareness and knowledge patzerns concerning 
arms control and nuclear issues are unique or whether they share common 
characteristics with awareness and knowledge of foreign policy issues, 
data from approximately 165 relevant questions have been summarized in 
Appendix 2. The same format used in Appendix 1 has been used with these 
foreign policy questions. Survey questions that received the highest 
level of awareness/knowledge are listed first, and questions are 
thereafter listed in descending order of public awareness/knowledge. A 
comparison of the two sets of opinion data concerning awareness/ 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
80 The pattern of equivalent results from different questions 
asked in the same time frame did not occur for the issue of the 
neutron bomb. Two pairs of questions which measured awareness 
of the neutron bomb varied by 10% and 9% even though the 
surveys were conducted within one month of each other: 89% 
versus 7 9 %  in March/April 1978 and 7 4 %  versus 65% in August 
1981. 
knowledge for nuclear versus foreign policy issues is summarized in 
Table 3-3 below. 
A. Many patterns are the same. As with public awareness and 
knowledge of nuclear and arms control issues, a distinct hierarchy 
exists concerning awareness and knowledge of foreign policy issues. Not 
surprisingly, for foreign policy issues, awareness of military conflict 
leads the list. Presidential summits are next and receive 20 percent 
more public awareness than do major diplomatic meetings between foreign 
ministers. Awareness of landmark diplomatic initiatives--e.g. the 
United Nations, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North 
Atlantic Security Pact--is much hlgher than awareness of other, more 
day-to-day, foreign policy initiatives such as the Good Neighbor Policy 
or bilateral trade treaties. Knowledge of the function of various 
foreign policy institutions--the U.N., the foreign service, the Voice o,f 
America, UNESCO, and reciprocal trade agreements--is less than half as 
extensive as awareness of the institutions themselves. 
Again, consistent with the empirical findings discovered for 
nuclear and arms control issues, there are limits to the diffusion of 
awareness for foreign policy issues. A maximum awareness diffusion 
level for foreign policy of approximately 20 percent is discernible for 
most issues: 19 percent (Suez conflict), 18 percent (United Nations), 13 
percent (Indochina conflict), 12 percent (Truman's Point Four Program), 
Awareness and Knowledge of 
Nuclear and Arms Control 




& Arms Policy 
Ccntrol 
A-Nuclear weapons (90s) 
A-Nuclear testing (90s) 
A-Nuclear accidents (90-80s) 
A-Nuclear weapons systems (80s) 
A-Major military conflicts (80-70s) 
A-Presidential slimrnits (80-70s) 
A-United Nations (80-70s) 
A-Landmark diplomatic initiatives (80-70s) 
A-Deployment of nuclear weapons (70-60s) 
A-Test ban proposals (70-50) 
K-World War I1 facts (60s) 
K-Nuclear weapons facts (60s) 
A-Initial awareness of military conflict (60-50s) 
A-Secretary of State's name (60-50s) 
A-Major foieign policy controversies that have 
domestic implications (60-50s) 
A-Foreign minister's conferences (60-40s) 
A-Foreign leaders' names (60-30s) 
A-Arms control efforts (60-20s) x* 
A-Foreign policy jargon (50-20s) 
K-Mainstream diplomatic facts (40-20s) 
K-Basic arms control facts (40-20s) x* 
K-Function of diplomatic institutions (40-10s) 
A-Domestic foreign policy debates and issues (30-20s) 
A-Obscure diplomatic events (30-20s) 
K-Implementation of foreign policy (30-10s) 
K-Function of obscure diplomatic institutions (20s-5) 
K-Detailed knowledge (10-5) x* 
A- Awareness 
K- Knowledge 
* Arms control related 
10 percent (NATO), 9 percent (the term Cold War), 9 percent (Truman 
Doctrine/Aid to Greece), and 8 percent (SEATO). 8 1 
As was true for nuclear and arms control issues, functional 
knowledge is higher than recognition of foreign policy terms or jargon. 
While few people (-10 percent) could define the term "reciprocal trade 
agreement," a plurality (47 percent) knew that the basic American trade 
policy in the 1950s encouraged rather than dfscouraged imports into the 
U.S. More people knew that the U.S. and U.K. were members of NATO than 
wcre able to define the acronym "NATO." While less than one third of 
the public could identify the location of Iran in a 1951 survey, a 
majority (57 percent) could describe the reason for conflict between 
Iran and Britain. 
Again, similar to the discoveries concerning awareness of nuclear 
and .xms control issues, when an issue is no longer o n  the active 
political agenda and reported in the media, public awareness can 
decline. Fall-off in attentiveness occurred for several foreign policy 
issues such as the United Nations and the concept of world government. 
Finally, data concerning foreign policy awareness supports the 
methodological approach taken in this dissertation that it is acceptable 
to compare data from questions which have not been repeated, wor6 for 
word, I - .  the same survey organization. Often, surveys that ask the same 
- - - - - - - - -  . - - - - -  
81 Two examples associated with major developments in U.S. foreign 
policy did not fit this pattern. Awareness increased 38 percent 
concerning the term North Atlantic Security Pact and 33 percent 
for the Marshall Plan. 
basic question, during the same general time period, record very similar 
results. 8 2 
B. New evidence about the opinion and policy-elite and the 
attentive public suggests that the former is very small. A review of 
Table 3-3 above and Appendix 2 provides support for the proposition that 
the "opinion and policy elite" is quite small, under 10 percent. This 
is true both for nuclear and arms control issues as well as for foreign 
policy issues. 83 It is also clear from the data that chis key group 
has not grown over the past 40 years. 
On the other hand, the "zttentive public" is quite a bit larger 
than the opinion and policy elite. To the extent that one uses 
knowledge-based indicators to define the attentive public for foreign 
policy, approximately 25 percent of the population falls i n t ~  this 
category. About one quarter of the population is aware of foreign 
policy debates and issues, sware of somewhat obscure diplomatic events, 
and possess knowledge concerning the implementation of various foreign 
policy initiatives. 
This review of public awareness and knowledge of foreign policy 
reinforces the conclusion reached by Genco (1978) that the size of the 
attentive public has not changed over time. For example, a review of 
resu:ts concerning awareness and knowledge of UNESCO suggests that the 
- " " " - - - - - - - - - - -  
82 See the following surveys listed in Ap~endix 2: awareness of 
67% vs 64% regarding trouble at the Suez canal; awareness of 
23% for Truman's Point Four Program (recorded by two different 
srtveys); awareness of 80% vs 77% concerning the Moscow summit 
c:)rlfere~ce; and awbceness of 74% vs 70% regarding the United 
rations. 
83 This conclusior reinforces simil2r findings made by Genco 1978 
and Neulran 1986. 
percent of the population that had heard of UNESCO (30 percent.) had not 
changed over time. However, there are indications of a slight 
improveme.lt in the auality of information possessed by those attentive 
to foreign policy. Over time, more of the people who were aware of 
UNESCO were ahle to describe its function. 8 4 
Awareness & Knowledge of Foreign Policy Terms 
(in percent)* 
Table 3-4 
Define the term united command 
Define the term isolationist 
Define the term Cold war 
Define the term tariff 
Define the term 38th ,parallel 
Aware of the term peaceful co-existence 
Define the term foreign pqlicy 
Define the tern Iron Curtain 
Aware of the Connally Resolution 
Aware of the term Four Freedoms 
Define the term bi-partisan foreign policy 
Cefine the tern world government 
Aware of the principle of self-determination 
Aware oE the Atlantic Charter 
Aware of the Bricker amendment 
Define the term peaceful coexistence 
* For question wording, interview dates and survey organizations, see 
Appendix 2 and Xppeadix 11. 
C. Use of abstract terms and jargon in foreign policy debates 
inhibits greatei diffusion of awareness and public participation. The 
language used in foreign policy debates often is abstract and filled 
with jargon. Data summarized in Table 3-4 show that the majority of the 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
84 From 7 percent in April 1953 to 11 percent in August 1955. 
public are able to define only very broad terms such as "united 
command," "isolationist," and "Cold War." Awareness of many specific 
foreign policy terms--such as the Connally resolution, the four 
freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, or the Bricker amendment--is much 
lower. More complete knowledge, such as the ability to define these 
abstract phrases, is often extremely low. 
This finding suggests that the language used by foreign policy 
experts "shuts out" a majority of the public most of the time from 
participating in foreign policy debates. This is an important finding 
with respect to this dissertation because it relates to the first step 
of the policy process, getting on the agenda. As E. E. Schattschneider 
argues, the outcome of every political conflict is determined in large 
part by the extent to which the "audience" becomes involved. 8 5  The 
data presented in this chapter shows that the audience for foreign 
policy and arms control issues depends on the way a specific issue is 
framed. If arms control and foreign policy debates focus on very 
specific negotiating issues, the audience will be limited to the opinion 
and policy elite which constitutes less than 10 percent of the 
population. If slightly broader policy goals are discussed, 
approximately one quarter of the public (i.e. the arms control attentive 
public) is able to comprehend and participate in the debate. If an 
issue can be defined in terms of nuclear war or nuclear weapons, then 
the issue can diffuse to the entire politically aware public. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
85 Cchattschneider 1960. 
These conclusions suggest that there will be a distinct incentive 
for advocates of arms control to attempt to define their proposals in 
terms of nuclear weapons or nuclear war. More people are aware of 
nuclear weapons than of any other foreign policy or arms control issue. 
From the point of view of developing political strategies, it seems 
logical that by focusing on the nuclear dimension of the issue, the 
chances are increased that political pressure can be organized to get a 
specific arms control issue onto the agenda. As will be shown in the 
fcllowing chapters, this is exactly what has happened on many historical 
occasions. 
However, a review of data on public awareness and knowledge shows 
that there is a problem with relying on a nuclear-centric political 
communications strategy. The data in Table 3-3 show a clear bimodal 
distribution. Awareness about nuclear weapons is high, but it is also 
quite distinct from awareness about arms control. Awareness of arms 
control, other than for test ban proposals, is much lower tkan for 
nuclear weapons, i.e. approximately 60 percent to 25 percent for arms 
control compared to 80 percent and higher for nuclear weapons. It seems 
that extensive awareness about nuclear weapons has not translated into 
substantial awareness about arms control. This same pattern exists for 
public knowledge. Most arms control issues are quite far down the 
public knowledge list (approximately 40 to 20 percent), similar to most 
mainstream diplomaCic initiatives. Thus the perceived political 
incentive to frame an arms control initiative in terms of its nuclear 
dimension is a mirage: it might produce some short-term interest, but a 
closer analysis shows that it provides no long-term political benefits. 
This con be seen in Table 3-5, below. In comparison with other domestic 
and foreign policy subjects, the public believes that i,t knows less 
about arms control than about any other related foreign policy subject. 
For example, in 1963 among four foreign policy and nuclear subjects, 
individual respondents believed themselves to be least knowledgeable 
about arms control. Compared to nuclear issues in general, people 
thought they were better informed on civil defense issues than about 
arms control. A similar survey was conducted in 1978. It found that 
among six domestic, foreign policy, and nuclear issues, individual 
respondents believed themselves to be least knowledgeable about civil 
defense issues and most knowledgeable about the economy and energy 
situations. Unfortuna:ely, there was no arms control question in this 
1978 survey. However, if one assumes that the relative ranking between 
knowledge about civil defense and knowledge about arms control stayed 
the same between 1963 and 1978, then one could infer that arms control 
was still the least familiar subject to the public in 1978. 
Self Evaluations of Knowledge on Nuclear, 
Foreign Policy, and Domestic Issues 
(percent) 
Table 3-5 
12/1963 This is the last scale, In this instance, 10 means that an 
individual knows all, or practically all, there is to be 
known about a given issue. Five represents a medium amount 
of information. Zero means that he has no knowledge of the 
issues at all. Everything considered . . . (NORC SRS-330) 
A. How well do you consider yourself informed about the issues of 
the Cold War in general? 
B. How well are you informed about the effects of nuclear 
weapons? 
C. How well do you consider yourself informed about civil defense 
in harica? 
D And finally, how much information do you feel you have about 
arms contr- and disarmament efforts? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 
Low Medium High 
12/1978 People have different amounts of information about various 
things. On this card is a scale from zero to 10. Ten stands 
for a great deal of information. Zero, of course, stands for 
no information at all. Using any appropriate number on this 
scale, how would you characterize the amount of informatian 
you have about . . . A) the overall world situation; B) the 
economy of America; C) national defense in general; D) the 
Soviet Union; E) civil defense in America; F) the energy 
situation? (MIS/N) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low Medium High 
Up to this point, this chapter has focused entirely on public 
awareness and knowledge, The finding that the public has relatively low 
levels of awareness and knowledge about arms control (versus other 
nuclear issues) forms the first structural "pillar" of a model of public 
attitudes toward arms control. The second pillar consists of public 
interest about arms control, and it will be discussed in the next 
section. The third pillar, actual public attitudes toward specific arms 
control initiatives, will be discussed in Chapters Four through Seven. 
VII Interest in Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons Issues 
A review of data from 40 questions which measure public interest 
about arms control and nuclear weapons issues is contained in Table 3-6 
below. Several distinct patters emerge from this data. First, interest 
in nuclear issues is higher than interest about arms control. While the 
magnitude of the difference is slightly less than the gap found 
concerning awareness/knowledge of nuclear weapons versus arms control, 
the same general hierarchical pattern is discernible. 86 Second, while 
interest or concern about nuclear war can often reach very high levels, 
there are indications that it is quite shallow. For example, during the 
1980s when public concern about nuclear war was extremely high, only 6-7 
percent worried about nuclear war "a :reat deal of the time." In 
another era in the early 1960s, only 15 percenE were so concerned about 
the possibility of nuclear war that they said they had changed their 
future plans. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
86 Th,e ratio of evareness/knowledge of nuclear issues versus 
awareness/knowledge of arms control was approximately 2 to 1. 
The racio of interest in nuclear issues versus interest in arms 
control is approximately 1.4 to I .  
Pllbl ic  I n t e r e s t  i n  Nuclear  and A r m s  Cont ro l  I s s u e s  
Table 3-6 
I n t e r e s t  About Nuclear  War. Nuclear  Power Accidents  o r  Nuclear  Bo~nbs 
I n t e r e s t r d  i n  t h e  atomic bomb [ 2 ] *  
Very c l o s ~ l y  fo l low TMI n u c l e a r  a c c i d e n t  [ 3 ]  
Worry a  l o t  r e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  n u c l e a r  war [ 3 ]  
Worry a  l o t  about  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  n u c l e a r  war [ 3 ] e  
Grea t  concern  r e  c o n t r o l  u se  o f  nuc weapons [ 4 ]  
Good d e a l  i n t e r e s t  a tomic bomb [ 3 ]  
V concerned about  nuc power p l a n t  a c c i d e n t  [ 3 ]  
Worry a  l o t  r e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  n u c l e a r  war [ 3 ]  
V c l o s e l y  fo l low Chernobyl a c c i d e n t  [ 4 ]  
V i n t e r e s t e d  i n  Hydrogen bomb t e s t  [ 3 ]  
V i n t  i n  c h i l d r e n ' s  f e a r s  r e  n u c l e a r  war (41 
Worry a  l o t  r e  n u c l e a r  p l a n t  a c c i d e n t  [ 3 ]  
Worry a  l o t  r e  n u c l e a r  p l a n t  a c c i d e n t  [ 3 ]  
Worry a  l o t  r e  n u c l e a r  p l a n t  a c c i d e n t  (3113 
Worry a  l o t  r e  n u c l e a r  p l a n t  a c c i d e n t  [ 3 ]  
Worry a l o t  r e  n u c l e a r  p l a n t  a c c i d e n t  [ 3 ]  
I n t e r e s t e d  i n  B i k i n i  t e s t  !3]  
Worry a  l o t  r e  n u c l e a r  p l a n t  a c c i d e n t  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t e d  i n  hydrogen bomb [ 3 ]  
V c l o s e l y  fo l low d i s c u s s i o n  over  S t a r  War [3],; 
Follow S t a r  Wars v c l o s e l y  [ 3  p t  s c a l e ]  
Follow S t a r  Wars v  c l o s e l y  ( 3  p t  s c a l e j  
Fear  n  w a r / f a l l o u t  a f f e c t  o u t l o o k / f u t u r e  p l a n s  [ 2 ]  
Worry g r e a t  d e a l  of  t ime r e  ch n u c l e a r  war [ 4 ]  
Worry greh: d e a l  of t ime r e  ch n u c l e a r  ?Tar [ 4 ]  
I n t e r e s t  i n  A r m s  Con t ro l  
Paying a t t e n t i o n  t o  n u c l e a r  f r e e z e  d i s c u s s i o n  [ 2 ]  
Follow v e r y  o r  somewhat c l ~ s e l y  s t r a t e g i c  
arms l i m i t a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  [ 4  p t  s c a l e ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  c o n t r o l  o f  a tomic bomb [ 3 ]  
SALT I1 v e r y  i m p ~ r t a n t  [ 3 ]  
V c l o s e l y  f o l l o w  news r e  SALT I1 [ 3 ] b  
A r m s  c o n t r o l  most impor tan t  of  f i v e  problems [ 5 ] f  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  s h a r e  atomic energy [ 3 ]  
V c l o s e l y  f o l l o w  news r e  arms c o n t r o l  neg ( 3 j d  
Talk  t o  f r i e n d s  about  c o n t r o l  nuc weapons [ 2 ]  
C lose ly  f o l l o w  news r e  a c  n e g o t i a t i o n s  (41 
V c l o s e l y  fo l low news r e  arms c o n t r o l  n sg  [ 3 ] d  
V c l o s e l y  f o l l o w  n a t  s e c u r i t y  news [ 4 ]  
V c l o s e l y  f o l l ~ :  n u c l e a r  weapons i s s u e s  [ 4 ]  
V c l o s e l y  f o l l o w  news r e  arms c o n t r o l  neg [ 3 ] d  
C lose ly  f0llOw SALT I1 [ 3 ;  
A t t e n t i v e  t o  news on arms c o n t r o l  n e g o t i a t i o n s [ 9 ] a  
Follow news s t o r y  r e  a n t i - m i s s i l e  p r o t e s t  [ 9 ] a  
NORC 142 
Roper 79- 5 
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* [2] indicates that the question included two response options, 
such as yes or no; [3] indicates three response options were 
available such as high, medium and low; a~ld [4] indicates four 
response options. 
Respondent's choice among 9 listed news stories. 
This question was asked 11 times from 11/77 through 1/80; the 
highest response was 34% (1/80), the lowest was 27% (2/7R), and 
the average was 31%. 
This question was asked 3 times in 1/85, 10/85, and 10/86; the 
lowest rssponse was 15% and the highest 18%. 
The question was repeated three times; all are summarized on the 
chart. 
The question was repeated twice; bcth surveys contained two 
questions that compared interest about a nuclear power accident 
with interest about nuclear war; worry about nuclear war declined 
8% in 3 m,?r.ths; concern about a nuclear power plant accident was 
stable. 
This ques,:ion was repeated 3 times. The responses varied from 30% 
(11/85), to 28% (6/85), to 19% (7/85). 
For purposes of comparison, a review of data from 70 questions 
concerrling interest in foreign policy is presented in Table 3-7 below. 
A summary of similarities and differences in levels of interest for arms 
control/nuclear issues and fo-eign policy can be seen in Table 3-8. The 
basic conclusion from these two tables is that a hierarchical ?attern of 
public interest also exists in the area of foreign policy. Interest 
about war and weapons dominates interest about diplomacy and arms 
control. This is the same Factern that was discovered for public 
awareness and knowledge. 
I n t e r e s t  i n  Foreign Policy I s sues  
Table 3-7 
V i n t e r e s t  i n  r e l a t i o n s  with Russia [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  war i n  Korea [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  inc reas ing  armed fo rces  [ 3 ]  
Watch Col. North Congressional testimony [ 2 ]  
Worry r e  US-Soviet r e l a t i o n s  
Pay a  l o t  a t t e n t i o n  news I ran-Contra  i s sue  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  r e l a t i o n s  with Russia [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  Korean peace t a l k s  [ 3 ]  
Importance of Iran-Contra mat ter  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  occupation of Germany [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  r e l a t i o n s  with Russia [ 3 ]  
S e e h e a r  Reagan speech on I r a n  Contra [ 2 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  occupation of Japan [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  change i n  Russian government [ 3 ]  
Importance of I ran-Contra  mat ter  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  European peace t r e a t i e s  (31 
V i n t e r e s t  i n  Ber l in  quest ion [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  t r ade  w o ther  coun t r i es  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  our gov t ' s  fo re ign  po l icy  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  Ber l in  s i t u a t i o n  [3]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  Formosa s i t u a t i o n  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  amount of a i d  s e n t  a l l i e s  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  a l l i e s  defense bu i ld -up  [ 3 ]  
V i n t  Congress i nves t i ga t i on  of S t a t e  Dept [3 ]  
'4 i n t e r e s t  i n  United Nations [3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  United Nations [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  b i g  4  Geneva conference [ 9 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  United !Jations [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  Marshall p lan [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  Mars-la11 plan European recover [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  Formosa s i t u a t i o n  [ 3 ]  

















NORC 1 6 2  
NORC 243 
NORC 315 










NORC 1 5 5  
NORC 371 
NORC 372 
Table 3-7 ( c o n ' t )  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  United Nations [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  German rearmament [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  German u n i f i c a t i o n  [ 3 ]  
Follo,w I r an -Con t ra  s i t u a t i o n  v  c l o s e l y  141 
V i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i c y  toward P a l e s t i n e  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  way f o r e i g n  s e r v i c e  works [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i c y  toward P a l e s t i ~ ~ e  [ 3 ]  
Follow n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  i s s u e s  v  c l o s e l y  1 ;: 
V i n t e r e s t  ic r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  L a t i n  America [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  wha t ' s  going on i n  Germany [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  Indochina war [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  sp read  of  Communism i n  Asia  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  Uni ted  Nations 
V i n t e r e s t  i n  v i s i t  o f  Russian farmers  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  way S t a t e  Dept handle  job  [ 3 ]  
Follow s i t u a t i o n  i n  P e r s i a n  Gulf v  c l o s e l y  [ 4 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i c y  towards China [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  Ya l t a  papers  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  Po l i cy  towards China [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i c y  towards China [ 3 ]  
V i n t  England's  p r e s e n t  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  [ 3 ]  
Follow I r an -Con t ra  Cong h e a r i n g s  v  c l o s e l y  (41 
Follow I r an -Con t ra  s i t u a t i o n  v c l o s e l y  [ 4 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  t a r i f f  p o l i c y  (31 
V i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i c y  towards P a l e s t i n e  (31 
V i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i c y  towards P a l e s t i n e  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  f o u r  power P a r l s  conference  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  North A t l a n t i c  Pac t  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  t a r i f f  p o l i c y  
" i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i c y  toward Korea [ 3 ]  
' '  i n t e r e s t  i n  Indochina war [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i c y  toward Spain  [ 3 ]  
V i n t e r e s t  i n  work o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  s e r v i c e  [ 3 ]  



































V i n t e r e s t  i n  UNESCO [ 3 ]  8/55 NORC 374 
V i n t e r e s t  i n  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  Yugoslavia [ 3 ]  3/50 NORC 276 
V i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i c y  toward Spain [ 3 ]  l l/!+8 NORC 162 
V i n t e r e s t  i n  p o l i c y  toward Spain  I31 6/49 NORC 166 
V i n t e r e s t  i n  UNESCO [ 3 ]  4/53 Iu'OYC 339 
Interest in Arms Control & Nuclear Issues 
Versus Interest In Foreign Policy Issues 





Conflict involving the US or its major allies (70s) 
Nuclear war (60-50s) x 
Nuclear accidents (60-40s) x 
Military strength (50s) 
International security issues (40-30s) 
Arms control negotiations (40-20s) x 
Main stream diplomacy (30-20s) 
Actively follow arms control (20-10s) x 
Diplomatic details and implementation (10s) 
Obscure diplomatic issues (under 10) 
Anti-nuclear protests (under 10) x 
Foreign 
Policy 
However, two new patterns emerge from this data on public 
interest. Nuclear war and nuclear weapons do nat rank first in public 
interest: they rank second behind military conflict such the Korean 
war. Also, interest in the "strength" issues of international 
security is slightly higher than interest in the "?eaceU issues of arms 
control. This latter conclusion is important because William 
Schneider's work highlights the fact that the American public ofcen 
prefers to have both strength and pzace. 88 However, when reviewed 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
" Nuclear war ranks ahead of conventional war in terms of 
awareness but behind conventional war in terms of interest. 
See Table 3-3 and Table 3-7. 
88 W. Schneider 1984, 1985 , 1986b. 
from a historical perspective, it seems that aast people are more 
interested in strength than in peace even if they want both. One other 
conclusion about patterns of interest can be shown by reviewing data in 
Table 3-9. This summary of public interest concerning a variety of 
foreign policy and domestic issues shows that, on average, the public is 
twice as interested in domestic issues as they are in foreign policy 
issues. 
In addition to illustrating various patterns of public interest in 
nuclear and foreign policy issues, data from Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 
provide additional evidence of the existence of an attentive public for 
arms control, nuclear issues, and foreign policy. These data also 
illustrate several new patterns that have not been mentioned in the 
academic literature. First, no single number can be used to estimate 
the size of the attentive public. The size of the attentive publi? 
depends bo,h on the specific topic (arms control, nuclear or foreign 
policy) and on the format of the survey question.89 If one restricts 
calculations to data obtained from the more numerous three-point 
response scale, it is possible to estimate the approximate size of the 
attentive public for several different issues. For arms control issues, 
about one third of the public seems to be attenti~re. For nuclear 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
a' The size of the attentive public depends on whether the survey 
question uses a 3 point or a 4 point response scale. A three 
point response scale would ask people to indicate whether they 
have high, medium or low interest in an issue. A four point 
scale might ask respondents to indicate ~lhether they follow 
news about an issue very closely, fairly closely, not very 
ciosely or hardly at all. 
The mean and standard deviation for data from 8 questions that 
measure interest about arms control are 29.25 and 9.95 
respectively. 
Interes: in Domestic Versus Foreign Policy Issues 
(percent very interested) 
Table 3-9 
Domestic issues 64 [average] 
Communists in govt 53 g 
Inflation 82 1 82 m 80 n 61. p 
Possible depression 62 i 46 j 
Presidential elections 60 1 46 m 
Shortage of food 73 P 
Strikes 60 h 
Forei~n policv 2 8 [average] 




Communism in AsLa 
England finances 
European peace treaties 
Foreign aid 
Formosa 
Four power conferenc~ 
Germany 
H bomb/tests 

















#/ denotes significant difference in question or response wording. 
Letter abbreviations: a (8/55 NORC 374); b (6/55 NORC 372); 
c (4/55 NORC 371); d (3/55 NORC 373); e (5/53 NORC 340); f (4/53 
NORC 339); g (12/51 NORC 315); h (3/50 NORC 276); i (9/49 NORC 169); 
j (6/49 NORC 166); k (11/48 NORC 162); 1 (10/48 NORC 161); m (6/48 
NORC 158); n (2/48 NORC 155); o (12/46 NORC 147); p (9/46 NORC 2A3) ;  
q (5/46 NORC 142). 
issues (not including arms control), approximately forty percent of the 
public seems to be attentive. For foreign policy, between one 
quarter to one third of the public seems to be attentive. 9 2 
G.%ere question wording and the survey organization are kept 
constant, producing narrowly defined "trend" data, one can see that the 
level of interest in a particular foreign pol-icy, arms control or 
nuclear subject is quite stable. For example, with rezpect to arms 
control, levels of public interest varied only 13 percent over an eight 
year period. As measured by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations, interest in arms control was relatively 
low in 1978 (16 percent), moderate when measured again in 1982 (23 
percent), and relatively high when measured in 1986 (29 percent). For 
foreign policy issues such as Berlin, the United Nations, Formosa and 
Palestine, levels of interest varied only from 5 to 8 percent over 
periods of approximately two years. This data hardly present a pattern 
of volatility, as argued by Almond. 
Two exceptions to this pattern of stability are important to 
noce. The level of interest about Korea increased 60 percent from 
before to during the Korean war. Interest about Russia declined 
approximately 30 percent from a high of approximately 75 percent to 45 
percent from 1946 to 1949. However, during these periods of dramatic 
change in public interest about these two specific foreign policy 
- - - - - . . - - - - - - - - -  
'I The mean and standard deviation for data from 19 questions that 
measure interest in nuclear issues are 40.63 and 15.14 
respectively. 92 The mean and standard deviation for data from 60 questions that 
measure interest about foreign policy are 26.95 and 15.28 
respectively. 
issues, the general level of interest in foreign affairs did not change 
significantly among the general public. This conclusion suggests that 
Almond's mood theory does not stand up when it is put to a test using 
precise indicators of public interest on a wide array of foreign policy 
issues over a period of forty years. 
VIII Conclusions and Implications for Academic Theory on Public Opinion 
This review of public opinion data concerning mass awareness, 
knowledge, and interest has produced important findings that relate to 
all three hypotheses being examined in this dissertation. 
The no-impact hypothesis is justified, in part, on the "fact" that 
the public is considered to be ignorant of foreign policy issues. Data 
presented on public awareness and knowledge show that this academic 
perception of public ignorance is incorrect. Levels of public awareness 
about nuclear issues are extremely high, and the public possesses 
"functional" knowledge pertaining to nuclear and arms control issues. 
At the same time, this data presents convincing evidence that an 
"issue public" or "opinion and policy elite" exists for arms control, 
nuclear, and foreign policy issues. This finding, based both on 
knowledge questions, which used objective and self-defined indicators, 
and on interest questions, re-confirms the concept developed by Almond 
([I9501 1960). However, my data show that the issue public is extremely 
small, under 10 percent of the population. Also, the size of the issue 
public does not vary (for this elite audience) depending on whether the 
issue is defined in terms of its nuclear, arms control, or foreign 
policy dimension. 
Additional findings concerning public awareness, knowledge, and 
interest go beyond the existing academic literature and are relevant to 
the larger question concerning the impact public opinion has 3n policy 
decisions. First, public awareness is quite distinct from public 
knowledge. For the issues being examined in this dissertation, the 
public is twice as aware and knowledgeable about nuclear weapons issues 
as they are about arms control. Public interest in the nuclear 
dimension of the issue is also twice as high as the arms coutrol 
dimension. This consistent pattern produces a strong political 
incentive for arms control activists to frame their issue in the context 
of ics nuclear dimension. However, such a political strategy will 
produce only short-term results related to getting an issut onto the 
agenda. 
Second, there seems to be a limit to the diffusion of public 
awareness of an arms control or nuclear issue once real world events 
place it on the political agenda. Even popular Presidents are unable to 
substantially influence this phenomena. 
Third, the public can learn about arms control issues, b u ~  to
occur to any significant extent, this mass learning takes more time (one 
year or longer) than is relevant for most politicai decisions. This 
relatively slow rate of learning in turn reinforces in policymakers and 
scholars the incorrect perception that the public is ignorant. 
Fourth, a new variable has been identified that links levels of 
public awareness, knowledge, and interest to the policy process. It is 
the degree to which policymakers are aware of public attitudes. The 
higher the level and the faster the rate of diffusion of public 
awareness and knowledge, the greater the chance policymakers will have 
an accurate perception of actual pGblic opinion. However, an incorrect 
or insufficient reading of public opinion by policymakers also can have 
an impact on decision-making. 5 3 
When all these findings are combined, one central conclusion can 
be drawn: how a policy question is framed will determine the level and 
quality of public opinion about the policy question. If an arms control 
issue is framed in terms of nuclear war and peace, the entire 
politically sctive public can become engaged in the debate. If the 
issue is framed in terms of traditional issues of foreign policy, then a 
quarter of the public--the attentive public--can become involved. If 
the issue is defined in terms of very specific negotiating details, then 
less than 10 percent of the public--the "issue publicn--will become 
involved. Thus, the communications strategy used by activists involved 
in the policy fight will determiae the size and composition of the 
audience that will become engaged in the issue. In line with the 
thinking of E.E. Schattschneider, in a democratic system all of these 
factors will determine both thc degree to which public opinion 
influences policy and the actual outcome itself. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
93 The series of decisions made after the U.S. learned about the 
Soviet A-bomb test in September 1949 all assumed, incorrectly, 
that the public would react to the announcement with hysteria. 
This perception among elLtes was a major reason decisions were 
made to drastically increase the stockpile of atomic weapons 
and to produce the H-bomb. 
The second hypothesis being examined for this dissertation focuses 
on the degree of public support for arms control. A lack of public 
opinion consensus in favor of arms control may have occurred either 
because attitudes have been volatile or because they have been highly 
fragmented. An examination of public awareness, knowledge and interest 
has been able to answer part of this question which focuses on 
volatility. Does this data support the proposition made by Almond 
([I9501 1960) and Klingberg (1952) that public interest in foreign 
affairs fluctuates widely? The short answer is NO. Quite to the 
contrary, the levels of public interest, knowledge, and awareness are 
quite stable, and the patterns are distinct and logical. Public 
interest and knowledge vary depending on the issue: actual military 
conflict, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, and summits being at the top of 
the list, mainstream diplomacy in the middle, and arms control near the 
bottom. This pattern is not one of uniformity, but within t.-ch specific 
issue area, it is one of relative stabilitv. Thus, in keeping with the 
research findings on public attitudes discovered by Shapiro and Page 
(!988), one finds stability not volatility. A review of Table 3-10 
below also finds a consistent pattern among public awareness, attitudes, 
interest, and knowledge. More people are aware of an issue than pay 
attention to it. %ore people have an opinion about an issue than have 
heard a lot about it. More people follow an issue a great deal than 
actually know a lot about it. Again a hierarchy emerges ~ i t h  awareness 
on top, followed by interest, then opinion, and finally knowledge. The 
stability of  his pattern shows that despite changes in the level of 
Hierarchy of Awareness, Interest, Opinions, and Knowledge 
(percent) 
Table 3-10 
Arms Control Initiatives 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Aware 87 82 89 7 6  77  - 88 99 45 - 
Paying 
Attention 6 3 6  - 
Heard 













SDI/S tar Wars 
SALT 
Neutron Bomb 
INF/Geneva arms control talks 
Limited Test Ban Treaty 




Soviet arms control treaty violations 
START talks 
This question was asked 2 times: 79% (1/80 Roper 80-2) and 
63% (1/75 Roper 75-2). 
interest the public has with respect to specific foreign policy issues, 
such as interest in Korea measured before and during the Korean war, the 
general level of interest in foreign issues throughout the period from 
1945 to 1988 has been stable. Almond's mood theory is totally 
inconsistent with data presented in this chapter and was the product of 
superficial research. 
The third hypothesis being examined in this dissertation focuses 
on the top-down model of attitude change. Existence of an "attentive 
public" is a necessary precondition to confirm the validity of the 
top-down attitude ct~ange model. In this instance, the essential element 
of existing public opinion theory is confirmed: there is substantial 
evidence that an attentive public exists for nuclear, arms control, and 
foreign policy issues. 94 However, the size of the attentive public 
varies depending on the issue. For arms control, approximately one 
quarter to one third of the public is attentive, depending on whether 
one uses knowledge or interest indicators of attentiveness. 95  The 
attentive public for foreign policy seems to be approximately 25 percent 
of the public. However, fcr nuclear issues, approximately 40 percent of 
the public are attentive. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
94 This chapter thus has validated some, but not all, of the ideas 
developed by Almond [I9501 1960. 
95 If one uses knowledge indictors, the attentive public is 
approximately one quarter of the population. If one uses 
interest indicators, about 30 percent of the public is 
attentive to arms control. 
A major conclusion from this chapter does not relate to past 
academic literature, but is entirely new. Again and again, a 
comprehensive review of data on public awareness, knowledge, and 
interest finds that the most important findings relate to patterns not 
to absolute levels. Many patterns of public awareness, knowledge, and 
interest about arms control seen more similar to those associated with 
foreign policy than to those associated with nuclear war or nuclear 
weapons. As a result, even chough the subject of nuclear weapons is 
logically linked to arms control, in the the public's mind, these two 
issues seem quite distinct. This bimodal characteristic of public 
perceptions will prove to be important in each of the four arms control 
case studies when I examine public attitudes toward these arms control 
initiatives and trace the impact public opinion has on policy-making, in 
Chapters 4 through 7. 
A final conclusion relates to methodology. For foreign policy, 
nuclear, and arms control issues, one finds that similar survey 
questions (not exactly the same questions) can be used for analysis of 
broad trends. By reviewing data from hundreds of surveys and thousands 
of questions, it is possible to draw clear conclusions despite the 
absence of true "trend data." While conclusions reached after reviewing 
exactly repeated questions will allow one to be more precise concerning 
the magnitude of opinion channe, an extensive review of similarly-worded 
questions will suffice to be able to fully characterize the nature of 
public opinion with respect to my four arms control case studies. 
International Control of Atomic Energy: 
Forging the Cold-War Consensus, 1945-1950 
Chapter 4 
He [Oppenheimer] says they [Baruch and his staff] 
are enthusiastic about proceeding right away with 
negotiations and proposals, but have no hope of 
an agreement. They talk about preparing the 
American people for a re usal by Russia. 
- -  David E. Lilienthal 4 % 
We can't do that [force a confrontation with 
the Soviets and terminace the negotiations]. 
We mist go on until the people generally 
come to the opinion we have. 
- -  Bernard M. Baruch to Fred Eberstadt [member 
of the U.S. delegation to 
Atomic Energy Commission] 
In the long run, the Baruch Plan, inspite of 
its rejection by the U.S.S.R., must be 
considered historically as an astute move and 
a very considerable victory for American 
diplomacy. For so great was the success 
with which this specious plan was put across 
in most countries as a wise and generous 
measure, that it became possible to brand 
the Soviet Union, by her rejection of it, 
as the sole obstacle t world peace. 
- - P. M. S, Blackett 3 8 
I Summary 
From the quixotic attempt to restrict publication of scientific 
papers on atomic energy in 1939 through the termination of the United 
Nation's Atomic Energy Commission in 1950, concerned individuals and 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
96 Lilienthal 1965, 43. 
97 Bernstein 1974, 1043; Herkin 1981, 177; Gerber 1982, 92 
98 Blackett 1949, 158. 
governments grappled with the issues of controlling the military uses of 
atomic energy. In contrast to the conclusions reached by most 
historians and political scientists, this chapter argues that public 
opinion had a great deal of influence on creating both the content and 
form of the American government's position on international control of 
atomic energy. 
Analysis of relevant public opinion data concerning international 
control of atomic energy from thirty-five nacional and four state 
surveys (131 questior,;) and a review of primary source documents 
conclude that public attitudes and diplomatic pressure from the British 
government forced a reluctant Democratic administration to begin 
negotiations to control atomic weapons. With major bureaucratic actors 
strongly against international control and with secret U.S.-U.K. 
war-time agreements precluding multilateral international nuclear 
cooperation, the main question was not why did this negotiation 
ultimately fail, but rather why and how did it get onto the policy 
agenda? Public opinion, measured and reported to pollcy makers by 
confidential polling conducted for the State Department, provides an 
important part of the answer. 
However, the impact of opinion on policy was not limited to 
"getting on the agenda." It also influenced the transformation of the 
initial American negotiating position from the "radical" Acheson- 
Lilienthal plan into the almost non-negotiable Baruch plan. While 
public opinion played a role in Baruch's developing his negotiating 
strategy, it also played a key role in an unusual form of 
implementation: it made a policy reversal by arms control advocates 
impossible. 
Another important relationship between public opinion and the 
policy process was discovered in the uneven level of understanding of 
public opinion held by opponents versus advocates of international 
control. Opponents of this arms control effort had a far more 
sophisticated understanding of the public mood and used this to frame 
the main issues in the policy and public debate in ways that 
strengthened their position. Their close monitoring of public opinion, 
content analysis of the media, and timely reaction to the political 
activities of the advocates of arms control made a reversal of 
policy--necessary for international control to be seriously 
negotiated--impossible. 
In terms of the other hypothesis being tested for this 
dissertation--was there a consensus in support of arms control, were 
attitudes fragmented, were attitudes volatile, and was there evidence of 
top-down learning-- data from this case study challenge some existing 
academic theories. A t  the mass level, there was no consensus in favor 
of or opposed to the international control of atomic energy. The 
general public supported some policies associated with international 
control such as the idea that atomic arms control negotiations should be 
conducted and that atomic facilities should be under international 
ownership. The public changed its opinion on other aspects of 
international control such as the willingness to take unilateral U.S. 
initiatives to obtain an agreement to control nuclear weapons and the 
question of building atomic weapons. In other areas--such as using the 
bomb against Japan, sharing the atomic secret and coo~erating with the 
Soviet Union--the public was against these elements of international 
control. This pattern suggests that no simple Cold War consensus 
existed concerning the international control of atomic energy. 
Quantitative analysis of relevant public opinion data shows that 
issues associated with international control were not highly fragmented 
along party, regional or demographic lines. There were slight 
differences in att2tudr.s along age, region, sex and veteran status 
lines. In general, younger people, women, those outside of the South, 
and veterans were more supportive of international control than the 
general public. 
At the mass level, public opinion was not volatile, as 
hypothesized in Almond's mood theory, but was rather stable over the 
five year effort to negotiate international control of atomic energy 
from 1945 through 1950. With one exception, opinion stability or only 
small changes in attitudes persisted despite massive media attention and 
dramatic events such as the Bikini atomic test and the announcement that 
the Soviets had developed atomic weapons. When public opinion changed, 
it did so in a coherent, not erratic, pattern toward the policy 
positions supported by opponents of international control. 
In terms of evaluating the top-down model of attitude change, the 
"attentive public" was more supportive of international control than was 
the general public. However these are no indications that these elite 
attitudes led or influenced attitudes held by the general public. 
Attitudes held by the attentive public and the general public changed in 
different directions at different times. 
I1 Public Attitudes on International Control of Atomic Energy 
Public attitudes concerning the international control of atomic 
energy were as complex as the scientific and diplomatic aspects of the 
problem debated in the high councils of government. Public opinion 
toward eleven specific issues, summarized in Table 4-1, provide a 
comprehensive picture of the public's views concerning this first 
nuclear arms control effort. Public attitudes can be grouped into four 
general categories: those consistently in support of international 
control, those consistently opposed to international control, those that 
changed against international control, and those about issues which were 
contested. 
A. Public Opinion in Support of International Control 
1. Negotiating International Control 
The public strongly believed that arms control negotiations should 
be conducted. 99 Initially, there was preponderant - level support for 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
99 As described in Chapter 2, the five categories being used 
throughout this dissertation to describe mass opinion include: 
plurality (the modal opinion category under 50%), majority 
(50%-59%), consensus (60%-69%), preponderance (70%-79%) and 
virtual unanimity (80%+). 
Eleven Dimensions of Opinion On Internatiohial Control 
Table 4-1 
A .  Public Opinion Consistently in Support of International 
Control 
1. International control should be initiated; 
2. Atomic facilities should be under international 
ownership ; 
B. Public Opinion Consistently Opposed To International Control 
1. The bomb should have been used against Japan; 
2. The atomic "secret" should not be shared with any 
country ; 
3 .  Satisfaction with the government's atomic energy job 
performance; 
4. Pessimistic perceptions concerning the possibility to 
successful negotiations; 
C. Public Opinion That Changed in Opposition to International 
Control 
1. Initial support, then opposition to initiating a 
unilateral step toward nuclear disarmament; 
2. Initial reluctance, then support for basing U.S. on 
building atomic weapons; 
3. Disbelief that the Soviet Union would cooperate with the 
United States. 
D. Public Opinion On Contested Issues Related to International 
Control 
1. Strong support for inspection in any international 
regime ; 
2. Belief that the bomb would spread to other c,ountries. 
the basic idea of international control of atomic energy. loo The 
public continued to support the ger.eric ideh of conducting negotiations 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - . .  
loo All survey quertions concerning international control are 
reproduced in Appendix 3. In the following footnotes, they 
will be identified by data and survey number. For support for 
international control, see 12/1945 NORC T42 and 3/1946 NORC 
140. 
on this issue well into 1950. Over time, there was a moderate 
reduction in the level of support for conducting negotiations, but even 
after the public had become pessimistic about the chances of success, a 
majority still wanted this diplomatic effort to continue. lo* After 
President Truman announced that the Soviet Union had tested an atomic 
bomb, support for negotiations increased to the level of consensus. 
However, eight months later, the level had subsided to a majority. 
In the first 18 months of the nuclear age, several other 
indicators suggest that there was strong support for international 
control of atomic energy. Early in 1946, there was majority support for 
international control even if it meant the U.S. would have to take the 
radical step of stopping production of bombs and destroying its existing 
stockpile. lo3 A majority supported the idea of trusting America's 
national security to the United Nations and international control rather 
than building U.S. security on atomic weapons. lo4 Placed in the 
historical perspective of Cold War attitudes that were to follow, these 
beliefs seem utopian. Many people also thought that arms control cou1.d 
be effective. A plurality thought that an international organization 
might be able to control the atomic bomb so that no country could use it 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Either a majority or a plurality supported international 
control through 1950: 7/1946 NORC 143; 2/1947 NORC 148; 7/1947 
NORC 151; 10/1947 NORC 152; 6/1948 NORC 158; 10/1949 NORC 170, 
and 6/1950 NORC 282-3. 
lo2 2/1947 NORC 148; 6/1948 NORC 158; 6/1950 NORC 282- 3. 
lo3 3/1946 NORC 140. This attitude was to change- see 6/1946 and 
8/1946 Psy Corp 173 & 178. 
lo4 7/1946 NORC 143. 
to start a war. lo5 Finally, the public was not opposed to giving an 
international organization some elements of national sovereignty if this 
was needed to control atomic weapons. For example, seventy-seven per 
cent of the public thought the international organization should be able 
to punish people who attempt to make nuclear weapons. 106 
When all this data is reviewed, one gets a clear impresrion that 
the public held many idealistic hopes for the world and wanted to give 
international control a chance. 
2. International Ownership 
From 1947 through 1949, there was weak majority support for 
international control of atomic energy if it meant that the U.S. had to 
place all of its atomic factories under the control of an international 
agency. lo' This attitude did not change over time, and was not 
influenced by President Truman's announcement that the Soviets had 
tested an atomic bomb. 108 
B. Public Opinion Opposed To International Control 
1. Use of The Atomic Bomb Against Japan 
For all but a handful of nuclear scientists and senior officials 
in several governments, the nuclear age began with the bombing of 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
lo5 7/1946 NORC 143. Slightly different results are obtained in 
6/1946 and 8/1946 Psy Corp 173 & 178. 
lo6 7/1946 NORC 143. 
lo7 2/1947 NORC 148; 10/1947 NORC 152; 10/1949 NORC 170. 
lo8 10/1949 NORC 170. The only outlier to the pattern of weak 
support for international ownership was registered in a 1946 
survey-- 7/1946 NORC 143. 
Hiroshima on August 5 t h  1945. P o l l i n g  on atomic i s s u e s ,  which s t a r t e d  
t h a t  same month, showed t h a t  t h e  pub l i c  s t r o n g l y  and c o n s i s t e n t l y  
suppor ted  P r e s i d e n t  Truman's d e c i s i o n  t o  drop t h e  bomb on Japan .  
Depending on t h e  t iming of the  survey and the  q u e s t i o n  wording, suppor t  
ranged from t h e  l e v e l  of  v i r t u a l  unanimity t o  consensus.  The f i r s t  
opin ion  survey of  t h e  n u c l e a r  age ,  conducted by t h e  Gallup Organiza t ion  
(AIPO) i n  August,  showed t h a t  t h e  pub1-ic was v i r t u a l l y  unanimous i n  i t s  
op in ion  t h a t  atomic wea?ons should have been used a g a i n s t  Japanese  
c i t i e s :  85 pe rcen t  approved. lo9 When t h e  Nat ional  Opinion Research 
Center  (NORC) asked people what d e c i s i o n  they would have made concerning 
u s i n g  t h e  bomb, a  consensus (67 pe rcen t )  s a i d  they would have used t h e  
bomb a g a i n s t  Japanese  c i t i e s ;  only  27 pe rcen t  s a i d  they would have 
opted  f o r  a  demonstrat ion where no people lived.' ' .0 Anocher p o l l ,  
conducted by t h e  Roper Organiza t ion  f o r  Fortune magazine (RFOR), showed 
t h a t  77 pe rcen t  of t h e  p u b l i c  e i t h e r  would have dropped t h e  bomb j u s t  a s  
was done o r  would have dropped more bombs. I n  t h i s  survey only 14 
pe rcen t  of  t h e  p u b l i c  suppor ted  a  demonstrat ion a g a i n s t  a  t a r g e t  which 
was n o t  popu la ted .  
The r eason  f o r  t h i s  p u b l i c  suppor t  f o r  Truman's d e c i s i o n  is not  
ha rd  t o  f i n d .  A m a j o r i t y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  wi thout  u s i n g  t h e  atomic bomb, 
Japan would have cont inued t o  f i g h t  f o r  a t  l e a s t  6 more months. 11 1 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
log 8/1945 AIPO 353kbt.  The complete wording and d a t a  f o r  a l l  
q u e s t i o n s  concerning use of  atomic weapons a g a i n s t  Japan a r e  
inc luded i n  Appendix 4 .  For an a n a l y s i s  of d a t a  on t h e  gene ra l  
t o p i c  of  use of  nuc lea r  weapons, s e e  Graham 1989a. 
9/1945 NORC 237A6B. 
10/1945 RFOR 50.  
The public seems to have accepted the argument presented by Secretary of 
War Stimson and President Truman that the alternative to dropping the 
bomb was an invasion of Japan. Even though the decision whether the 
United States should have dropped the bomb is still debated by 
historians today, the question whecher Japan would have surrendered 
without using the bomb was not a serious public topic in 1945. 112 Not 
only did the public support the decision to use the bomb at the level of 
consensus or greater, but virtually all segments of the public shared in 
this belief.l13 The only exception to this pattern of support for 
dropping the bomb on Japan was recorded in a survey conducted among 
atomic scientists at the Manhattan Project laboratory in Chicago. In 
this informal poll, 37 percent of the atomic scientists wanted a 
demonstration in the U.S. or before Japanese officials, 46 percent 
wanted a demonstration against a strictly military target in Japan, and 
only 15 percent supported use by whatever means were necessary to cause 
Japan to surrender. 114 
The relevance of the issue about dropping the bomb on Japan to 
international control of atomic weapons is that many of the same people 
who opposed dropping the bomb against Japan became leading advocates of 
international control. This opposition to dropping the bomb came 
through in much of their political communication and reduced their 
Bernstein 1976; Miles 1985. 
In surveys asked from the late 1940s through the 1980s, the 
~merican-public has continued to support the decision to use 
atomic weapons against Japan. See Appendix 4: 8/1945 AIPO 353; 
9/1945 NORC 237; 1G/1945 RFOR 50; 9/1948 RFOR 70; 6/1965 
Harris; 1/1971 Harris 2053; 3/1982 Harris/AS, and 7/1985 
CBS/NYT . 
Lieberman 1970, 109. 
credibility, in the eyes of the public, on the issue of international 
control of atomic energy. As illustrated in this first horrible example 
of the nuclear age, the divergence between attitudes held by these 
elite, pro-arms control scientists and those held by the general public 
are important. Unfortunately for the sake of arms control, this gap 
will persist throughout the next forty years. Unfortunately, what 
transformed the scientist's arte into hubris and ultimately tragedy for 
all future arms control efforts was their unwillingness to learn why 
arms control policy positions often do not receive mass public support. 
2. Sharing the Atomic Secret 
From the very beginning of the nuclear age, the public strongly 
and consistently rejected the idea that the United States should share 
the atomic "secret" either with the United Nations or with any other 
country. This attitude was at the preponderant or consensus level 
from August 1945 until relevant questions were last asked in October 
1946."~ It is hard to overstate the intensity of this attitude or to 
exaggerate its importance to the entire debate concerning international 
control of atomic energy. This one issue of sharing the secret 
- - - - - - - " - - - - - -  
i15 An exception to this attitude occurred after the Soviers had 
tested an atomic bomb. In this survey, slim plurality 
supported sharing the secret, see 10/1949 NORC 170. 
Repeated questions include 8/1945 AIPO 354; 10/1945 AIPO 357t; 
4/1946a AIPO 368; 10/1946 AIPO 379k&t. Other relevant 
questions include 9/1945 NORC 237a&b and 10/1945 NORC 135. i17 This intensity was picked up in both traditional survey 
research and also in more qualitative research conducted by 
specialists at the University of Michigan. See Social Science 
Research Council 1947 pp. 113-115. 
framed the debate over international control and, for the public, may 
have sealed the fate of the entire exercise. Every survey conducted on 
this issue came up with the same result. A majority of the public was 
against sharing the secret. This was true even if questions posited 
that the U.N. could control the secret so that atomic arms could not be 
used to start another war. The intensity of feelings agair.st 
sharing the secret can be gauged by by reviewing results from questions 
which combined the idea of sharing the secret with otheiwise popular 
policies such as negotiating international control or establishing an 
inspection regime. In every case, the critical attitude against sharing 
the secret prevailed over all other aspects of the problem of 
international control and caused people to reject any form of 
international control that involved sharing the secret. 119 
3. Job Performance on Atomic Energy Policies 
As will be described below, actual U.S. government policy 
concerning international control of atomic energy was designed to 
conduct high-visibility negotiations but to make no serious effort to 
come to an agreement with the Soviet Union. As a result, public 
approval of the administration's atomic policies had the effect of 
supporting this de facto anti-international control policy. 
Unfortunately, only two questions were asked that measured public 
satisfaction with the government's policies toward atomic energy. They 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
10/1945 NORC 135. 
10/1945 NORC 135; 12/1945 NORC T42. 
both recorded a consensus approving the administration's job 
performance. 120 Results from several other questions, indirectly. 
support the proposition that the public was satisfied with the 
government's efforts to negotiate international control. The public 
increasingly credited the government with working to obtain 
internatimal control. 12' At the same time, the public did not 
believe this negotiation would result in sharing the atomic secret with 
the rest of the world, which most people opposed. 122 
4. Chances of Successful Negotiations 
Perhaps the most critical attitude with respect to the 
negotiations of arms control agreements in the 40+ years of the nuclear 
age has been that people give these negotiations very little chance of 
success. This skeptical attitude has been strengthened by real-world 
negotiations that rarely produced agreement. In early 1947, one-third 
of the public believed that international control had a chance of 
success. 123 However, by October 1947, the public had adopted what was 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
12* 2/1946 NORC 139; 2/1947 NORC 148. In contrast, Truman's 
general job performance declined over 50 percentage points from 
April, 1945 through December 1946 when serious negotiation over 
international control of atomic energy ended. From January to 
March 1947 his popularity increased 25% before repeating a slow 
decline. See Mueller 1970; Hibbs 1973-74; Public O~inion V. 9 ,  
NO. 1, 36-7. 
12' 2/1946 NORC 139; 2/1947 NORC 148; 10/1947 NORC 152. This 
perception grew by 16%. This magnitude approximates the twenty 
percent empirical maximum discussed in Chapter 3. 
2/1946 NORC 139. 
123 2/1947 NORC 148. 
to become a post-World War 11 norm: less than 15 percent thought the 
chsnces of successful negotiation were "good. ,,I24 
C. Public Opinion That Changed Toward Opposition to 
International Control 
1. Unilateral U.S. Initiatives For Disarmament 
In 1946 a majority of the public opposed the United States 
unilaterally turning over its bombs to an international organization. 125 
What is unusual about this public perception was that only a 52 
percent majority opposed this quite radical step. This was the only 
time in the entire nuclear age when the public was only moderately 
opposed to America taking a unilateral step to achieve nuclear arms 
control. By the end of 1946, a consensus (68 percent) was against 
taking such a unilateral action. By this time, only a small minority 
(28 percent) thought that taking this step would facilitate an agreement 
with the Soviets. This rejection of any unilateral steps continued 
throughout these negotiations. 127 
e m - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
124 10/19947 NORC 152; 6/1948 NORC 158; 10/1949 NORC 170. The 
only exception to this pattern was after the Soviet A-bomb test 
when a slim plurality believed an agreament could be reached if 
an international conference were called. See 6/1950 NORC 
282-3. 
125 6/1946 AIPO 373kbt. 
126 11/1946 AIPO 383t. 
127 2/1947 NORC 148; 10/1947 NORC 152. The public reacted 
favorably to a slightly different tquestion that called Lor 
disarmament of the U.S. "and all other countries" afte:- the 
Soviet Union had tested its atomic bomb, See 10/1949 NORC 170. 
2. Building Atomic Weapons 
On the question whether the United States should continue to build 
nuclear weapons, public attitudes seem to have changed. Initially in 
1945, a slim plurality of the public believed that the United States 
should not rely on making better atomic bombs for its security, but 
rather should rely on an international- agency to prevent any country 
from using nuclear weapons. This survey shows that immediately 
after World War 11, this element of international control was quite 
popular. 
By mid-1946, this attitude seems to have changed, with a consensus 
or a majority believing the U.S. should continue manufacturing atomic 
bombs. By late 1946, a consensus was against stopping production 
of bombs and destroying those already in the United States stockpile. A 
majority of the public also rejected the idea that unilaterally 
terminating U.S. bomb production and destruction of America's stockpile 
would bring about an agreement with Russia. 130 
Unfortunately, no single question asked during this period was 
repeated over time. Often the polling questions that asked about 
building nuclear weapons were worded in such a way as to link them with 
other issues. Due to these survey research methodological problems, 
before one can conclude that opinion change took place, each survey 
question must be examined closely. In October 1945, 48 percent of the 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
128 9/1945 NORC 237. 
4/1946b AIPO 369 kbt; 6/1946 NORC 143; 6/1946 PSY CORP 173; 
8/1946 PSY CORP 178. 
130 11/1946 AIPO 384t; AIPO 384k. 
public were opposed to continuing to build nuclear weapons. By April, 
June, and November of 1946, opposition to building nuclear weapons 
dropped to one-third and then to one-quarter of the public. 13 1 
Was this "attitude change" merely an artifact of question 
wording? Not entiraiy. If one asked the simple question whether the 
U.S. should continue to build atomic bombs, then it seems that attitude 
change took place and that the public increasingly became more hawkish. 
However, if the context of the question changed, the public was 
marginally more sympathetic to freezing America's production of nuclear 
weapons. When question wording separated the issue concerning 
terminating production of additional nuclear weapons from the issue 
whether the United States should unilaterally destroy its nuclear 
weapons, and when stopping nuclear weapons production was placed in the 
context of international control of atomic energy, a slim majority 
supported the radical step of stopping production of atomic bombs. 132 
After the Sov5ets had tested their first atomic weapon, this willingness 
to stop production of atomic weapons to obtain international control 
grew to a consensus. When people were asked whether the United 
States should temporarily stop making bombs for one year to facilitate 
negotiating international control, a slim plurality supported this more 
moderate position. 134 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
13' Since these questions are not repeated exactly, word for word, 
this author is able to conclude only about the direction of the 
attitude change, not its magnitude. 8/1945 NORC 237 a&b; 
4/1946b AIPO 369k&t; 6/1946 NORC 143 and 11/1946 AIPO 384k. 
132 2/1947 NORC 148; 10/1947 NORC 152. 
133 10/1949 NORC 170. 
11/1946 NORC 146. 
The data presented above paint a complex picture of public 
attitudes on the issue of building nuclear weapons. In the abstract, 
the public increasingly supported building atomic weapons and basing 
U.S. security around nuclear deterrence. However, a detailed 
examination of the data shows that if one makes important distinctions 
among various questions, then public attitudes created political 
opportunities for advocates of international control. 
3. Attitudes Toward Russia 
Since survey researchers first began asking questions about Russia 
in the 193Gs, two types of attitudes have been measured--perceptions 
about Russia and policv preferences toward Russia. The perceptions 
category of questions focus on broad attitudes toward the Soviet Union 
such as will the Russians cooperate with the United States or will it be 
possikle to reach a diplomatic agreement with the Soviets. The policy 
category of questions include specific steps which the United States 
should take with respect to Russia. A review of both types of questions 
reveal four interesting conclusions 
First, there are many more survey questions that ask about 
perceptions than ask about specific policy steps. Most of the academic 
analysis of attitudes toward the Soviet Union focuses on broad public 
perceptions, not on attitudes about policy toward the Soviet Union. 13 5 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
135 This finding is not reflected in the existing literature. See 
Buckley 1978; Caspary 1970; Filene 1967; R. Gorden 1952; 
Grayson 1978; Levering 1976; Nincic 1985; Schneider 1984; M. 
Smith 1947-48; T.W. Smith 1983; Whithey 1962b. 
The second discovery in this data is that attitudes concerning 
perceptions have gone through several four phases in the 1940s. 
However, for the entire period from 1942 through 1949, a majority of the 
public rarelv thought the Soviet Union would cooperate with the United 
States. 13' The data, which is presented in Figure 4-1, falls into 
four general phases. From February through June 1942, as the war-time 
alliance was being formed, perceptions that Russia would cooperate with 
the U.S. "after the war" averaged in che low 40s. 137 This level will 
be considered the "norm" against which other data will be judged. The 
second phase existed from July 1942 through the end of World War I1 in 
September 1945. During this "marriage of convenience," public 
perceptions that cooperation would continue after the war averaged in 
the high 40s. 138 Even though this second phase registered the 
"high-water mark" in public support for Russia, it is important to note 
that positive perceptions of the Soviet Union never consistently reached 
more than a plurality.139 The third phase coincided with the active 
negotiation of international control of atomic energy and the beginning 
of the geo-political and attitude transition from alliance to the 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
136 The questions and data presented in Figure 4-1 are contained in 
Appendix 5. 13' Mean 40.75; standard deviation 2.68. 
138 Mean 48; standard deviation 3.89. 
139 This fact has important implications for developing political 
strategies to achieve arms control. In short, for arms control 
to succeed, positive attitudes toward the Soviet Union do not 
have to reach a majority. Negative attitudes need to be 
neutralized to below 60 percent of the public. 

to the Cold War. It covers the period from October 1945 through 
December 1946. During this third attitude phase, perceptions of a 
cooperative Soviet Union averaged in the mid-30s. 140 The fourth 
period, which ran from February 1947 through the Soviets' first atomic 
bomb test announced in 1949, registered perceptions of US-Soviet 
cooperation in the low 20s. 141 
Perceptions about Russia are more moderate than attitudes on 
specific U.S.-Soviet policy issues. This third finding is shown in data 
from a number of Soviet-related policy questions, presented in Table 
4-2. It shows a consistent patcern that attitudes on many policy 
questions arc more extreme than are general perceptions of the Soviet 
Union. When perceptions of the Soviet Union were relatively positive 
from 1942 through September 1945 (i.e. -40 percent positive), several 
pro-Soviet policy initiatives received public support that ranged from 
80 percent to 50 percent. Once generic perceptions toward Russia turned 
more strongly negative (i.e. 20 to 35 percent positive), large 
majorities of the public (50 to 80 percent) supported adopting tough 
policies toward the Soviet Union. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Mean 36.9; standard deviation 5.66. 
141 Mean 21.9; standard deviation 4.34. 
Public Opinion on Policy Issues Concerning 






Positive Attitudes Toward Soviet Union 
Send Germins to rebuild Russia 
Approve loan to Russia if get quid pro quo 
If loan, Soviets will repay in part or in full 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. should sign a permanent alliance 
Approve loan to Russia 
Approve loan to Russia 
Russia should have its sphere of influence 
Agreement with Russia is possible 
Russia should have more say in Eastern Europe 
Should U.S. compromise more 
U.S. is insisting too much on its own way 
U.S. should compromise with Russia 
U.S. should compromise with Russia 
Approve Russia's foreign policy 
Follow U.S. foreign policy debate and supports 
Wallace's (dove) position 
Negative Attitudes Toward Soviet Union 
U.S. policy is right or should be firmer 7 9 
U.S. too soft on Russia 73-62 
Too little/enough U.S. concern with stopping Russia 7 2 
'--op US shipments oil/machines to Russia 7 1 
Send troops or threaten war to defend Greece 6  8 
U.S. should be firm toward Russia 6  3  
U.S. should negotiate Japanese peace treaty w/o Russia 6 0  
U.S. should be firmer even if it means trouble 5 9 - 5 3  
U.S. should be firm or build military 56 - 4 5  
Russia would respect U.S. more if U.S. increased 
its military 55-50 
U.S. should try to stop Russia 5 2 
U.S. should be firmer with Russia 5 1 
U.S. should not make too many concessions 50 - 46$/ 
U.S. should try to stop Russia 4 6  
Try to stop Russia even if increase chance of war 3 5 
Approved Churchill's Iron Curtain speech 31-21 
U.S. should pull out of U.N. (because of Russia) 13 
# Question asked before and after Soviet atomic test. 
The fourth finding reveals no clear consensus on Soviet-related 
policy questions until 1947. For example, in 1945 there was support for 
sending Germans to help rebuild Russia, approval for giving the Soviet 
Union a loan if the U.S. received a quid pro quo, and even plurelity 
support for forming some type of U.S.-Soviet alliance. During the early 
post-war period, policy attitudes were neither consistently pro-Soviet 
nor anti-Soviet. 
By 1947, when positive perceptions of the Soviet Union had dropped 
to the low 20s, public support for moderation in terms of policy 
preferences had been reduced to minority status. By 1947, the Cold War 
and anti-Soviet attitude consensus had been formed. A t  the preponderant 
level, the public thought the U.S. should be firmer with the Soviets and 
should stop economic trade with Russia. A consensus supported 
attempting to stop Soviet expansion in certain situations such as in 
Greece, and a majority supported strengthening the U.S. military. 
D. Public Opinion on International Control-Related Issues That 
Were Contested 
1. Inspection 
The public strongly supported international inspection. Qne 
initial question, which was repeated over a period of several months, 
showed the public was in favor of inspection at the level of virtual 
unanimity or preponderance. Another poll recorded a consensus for 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
12/1945 NORC T42; 3/1946 NORC 140. 
the proposition that an international inspection system could verify 
whether a country was making many bombs. 143 In 1946, a plurality who 
favored inspection continued to favor it even if such a regime meant 
that U.S. property would be searched and that inspectors might find out 
some details concerning making atomic weapons. 144 over time, support 
for inspection continued at a slightly lower levels, but always at a 
consensus or above. By 1948, this here-to-fore uniform support 
for inspection showed its only decline. When a question asked about 
international control in the context of inspection, support was reduced 
from its "normal" majority or higher to plurality. 146 
2. The Bomb Will Spread 
From the very begi.nning of the nuclear age, the public believed 
that the ability to produce atomic weapons would spread to other 
countries. The level of support for this proposition was extremely 
high, often virtually unanimous. The public, unlike many experts, 
correctly believed that the bomb would spread to other countries in less 
than five years. 147 As early as October 1945, long before the Cold 
War attitude consensus was formed, a majority thought that the atomic 
secret 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
143 12/1945 NORC T42. 
144 3/1946 NORC 140. 145 2/1947 NORC 148; 10/1947 NORC 152; 10/1949 NORC 170. 
146 6/1948 A I P O  417. 
147 9/1945 NORC 237e; 10/1945 RFOR 50; 10/1945 NORC 135; 12/1945 
NORC 42T; 2/1946 NORC 139. 
would spread to ~ussia.'~~ By 1946, a plurality thought that other 
countries were already making atomic bombs. 149 One final data point 
on this aspect of international control relates to survey research 
methodology. Introduction of "expert" testimony into question wording 
on this issue did not seem to dramatically change mass opinion. When 
questions clearly stated that scientists believed that the bomb would 
spread, only 5 percent more people thought nuclear weapons would 
proliferate than was the case when questions without the reference to 
scientists' attitudes were asked. 150 
E. Summary of Mass Public Opinion on International Control 
A summary of public attitudes toward international control of 
atomic energy is included in Table 4-3. It shows that strong public 
support (preponderant-consensus level) existed for international control 
in the context of holding arms control negotiations. In addition, there 
was weak support for international ownership of atomic facilities and a 
willingness to give up elements of national sovereignty to achieve 
international control. In 1945 and early 1946, the public did not want 
to base U.S. security on building atomic weapons and was not strongly 
opposed to America taking unilateral steps to make negotiation 
possible. These latter two attitudes are quite remarkable in the 
history of American opinion toward international security in the nuclear 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
148 10/1945 RFOR 50; 12/1945 NORC 42T; 4/1946b AIPO 369k6t. 
149 4/1946b AIPO 369kht; 6/1947 AIPO 398kht. 
l5O 9/1945 NORC 237a and NORC 237b. 
Issue 
Summary of Public Opinion and Policy Positions On 
International Control of Atomic Energy (ICAE) 
Table 4 - 3 
Public Policy Position Policy Position 
Attitudes Of ICAE Advocates Of ICAE Opponents 
PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORT FOR ICAE 
Negotiating Pro Pro 
level 3-4 jt 
International ownership Pro Pro 
level 2 * 
PUBLIC OPINION OPPOSED TO ICAE 
Use Against Japan Pro Anti 
level 3-5 * 
Sharing the secret Anti Pro 
level 4-5 * 
Job Performance Pro Con 
level 3 * 
Chance of successful N o Yes 
negotiations level 3 . , 4  j/ 
Cooperative USSR N o Yes 
level 2-4 11 
CHANGED PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST ICAE 
Unilateral U.S. initiative Pro to Con Pro 
level 2-3 11 
Building atomic weapons Con to Pro Con 
level 1 to 2 11 
PUBLIC OPINION ON CONTESTED POLICY ISSUES 
Inspection Pro Pro 











Will the bomb spread Yes Yes Yes 
level 4-5 * 3-5 years 7-10 years 
KEY Level 1- Plurality (less than 50%); Level 2- Majority (50% to 59%); 
Level 3- Consensus (60% to 69%); Level 4- Preponderance (70% to 
79%); Level 5- Virtually Unanimous (80% and above). 
* Attitudes were stable. 
/ Attitudes changed in the direction of the opponents of ICAE. 
age. Together all these findings suggest that crucial opinions needed 
to develop a domestic political strategy to achieve international 
control existed for the first 18 months of the nuclear age. Not all 
attitudes supported the idea of international control of atomic energy, 
but a solid attitude foundation existed to support this first arms 
control proposal. 
At the same time, right from the beginning of the atomic age, 
important and powerful attitudes were opposed to international control. 
Strong support for use of nuclear weapons against Japan undermined the 
credibility of scientist-dominated arms control activists who advocated 
international control. More important, the public was totally opposed 
to "sharing che secret" with any other country or with the United 
Natio~s. Over time, a majority became increasingly pessimistic about 
the chances of successful negotiation and increasingly critical of the 
Soviet Union. All of these attitudes presented advocates of 
international control with serious political problems. 
Finally, on two issues the public, advocates of international 
control, and opponents of international control all seemed to be in 
agreement. All groups thought the bomb would spread (the only 
disagreement was over the time). All were in favor of international 
inspection. However, as will be shown in the next section, opponents of 
international control were more effective in framing the valence issue 
of inspection in ways that supported their policy preferences. 
I11 Relationship Between Public Opinion and Policy-making 
Throughout the nuclear age the politics of arms control have been 
dominated by the activities of a few elite scientists, military 
officers, politicians, and civilian defense "intellectuals." As 
reviewed in Chapter 2, most scholars have reinforced this elite-focused 
view and concluded that public opinion plays an insignificant role in 
the making of foreign and arms control policy. Indeed, the first 
efforts to limit the potential military uses of atomic energy fit this 
elite pattern. Public opinion played no appreciable role in the first 
five unsuccessful attempts to place this issue on the executive branch 
agenda. It is important to review these early, unsuccessful, 
attempts to get international control onto rhe agenda because they 
provide a sharp contrast with latter efforts: early efforts were not 
aided by public opinion pressure, while later efforts benefited from 
strong public support. 
A. Getting on the Agenda 
The first attempt at controlling the military uses of atomic 
energy started before nuclear weapons existed. On February 2, 1939, Leo 
Szilard wrote a letter to French physi.cist Frederic Joliot imploring hi.m 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
15' During these early efforts, public opinion was mentioned on 
only two instances. Vanover Bush and James Conant were 
concerned about public opinion in the context of domestic 
control of atomic energy, and James Byrnes was worried about 
public reaction about the large expenditure for the Manhattan 
Project if the bomb did not work. See Lieberman 1970, 59; 
Sherwin 1977, 121, 138. 
to withhold publication of scientific information related to atomic 
fission. 152 This nascent movement, organized by many of those who 
later would form the first pro-arms control interest group after World 
War 11, received support from a number of prominent American and British 
scientists. However, this effort was destroyed both by the explicit 
refusal of Joliot to cooperate and by the sheer magnitude of ths 
international research effort being conducted at the time. Jolit's 
March 1939 publication of a paper suggesting the possibility of a chain 
reaction was followed by a flood of other papers: by the end of 1939 
almost 100 related articles had appeared in print. Dissemination of 
this information led to the creation of nuclear weapons programs in 
several countries and ended this first attempt at "arms cantrol." 
The second effort to place international control on the agenda was 
much more sophisticated and concerted, but also was unsuccessful. World 
famous physicist Niels Bohr began advocating international control of 
atomic weapons in 1943 soon after he had escaped Nazi-controlled 
Denmark. For the next two years, he and other American atomic 
scientists, such as Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein, successfully 
lobbied senior atomic scientists, American and British scientific 
administrators, and diplomats. 153 This effort triggered extensive 
staff work by Vannevar Bush and James Conant which eventually had a 
powerful and positive impact on Secretary of War Stimson. Bohr received 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Sherwin 1977, 17-29; A .  Smith 1965. 
153 Bernstein 1974, 1006-7; Lieberman 1970, 28-35, 70; Sherwin 
1977, 90-114, 127, 167. 
personal audiences w i ~ h  both Churchill and Roosevelt, However, his arms 
control proposition was explicitly rejected by both heads of state with 
the signing of the Quebec, Hyde Park, and other secret U.S.-U.K 
subsidiary agreements. 154 
A third attempt to raise the issue of international control was 
initiated by Secretary of War Stimson and was stimulated by bureaucratic 
pressure exerted on him by his senior atomic and foreign policy 
specialists John J. McCloy, Harvey Bundy, Vannevar Bush, and .James 
Conant. On several occasi,ons Stimson tried to raise the issue of 
international control with President Roosevelt, but only succeeded in 
getting FDR to inform then Secretary of State Stettinius of the 
existence of the Manhattan project. While Stimson saw this as a small, 
but necessary, success needed to initiate State Department planning for 
the diplomatic and post-war consequences of the bomb, his effort failed 
to place international control on the agenda during the Roosevelt 
administration. The detailed examination of post-war atomic policy, 
promised by President Roosevelt, never took place before his death. 15 5 
The fourth attempt to place international contr~l on the agenda 
was a continuation of Secretary Stimsonfs efforts with FDR, but this 
time it was focused on the overwhelmed new President, Harry S .  Truman 
Truman agreed to Stimsonfs proposal that issu~s of the atomic bomb be 
- - - - - - - - - - * - - - -  
154 Loewenheim, Langley & Jonas 1975, 32-3, 332, 366. 648; Acheson 
1969, 167; Bernstein 1974, 1005-7; Groves [I9621 1983, 
401-2; Lieberman 1970, 36-8; Sherwin 1977, 6-7, 38, 124-127. 
155 Sherwin 1977, 124-127, 138-9, 144-5; Lieberman 1970, 41, 46-59; 
Herken 1981, 12-14; Bernstein 1974, 1009-10. 
studied, and the President authorized formation of the Interim 
Committee. While this famous committee focused most of its attention on 
a variety of issues other than international control, its discussions on 
this subject found two very powerful people, General Groves and soon to 
be Secretary of State Byrnes, strongly against such an effort. 156 The 
Committee never issues a formal report on the subject of international 
conzrol. Ironically, one reason why this effort failed in placing 
international control on the agenda was that Secretary Stimson--the 
ultimate insider advocate of international control--changed his mind 
several times on the desirability or feasibility of international 
control. By vacillating on this issue before the bomb was used against 
Japan, he forfeited several opportunities to get this complex issue onto 
the Presidential agenda. 
The final failed attempt to get international control on the 
agenda was a semi-comic effort by Leo Szilard to use low-level Kansas 
City political "connections" to talk directly with President Truman. 
Truman did not grant Szilard an interview, but instead sent him to talk 
with future Secretary of State James Byrnes. While this effort went no 
where, it left lasting impressions with both men. Szilard, and many of 
his scientific colleagues, came to the conclusion that all policy makers 
were ignorant of the relevant facts; for his part, Byrnes concluded 
that scientists were both naive as to the realities of world pol.itics 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
15' Bechhoefer 1961, 32; Bernstein 1974, 1011-2; Gerber 1982, 71; 
Herken 1981, 16; Lieberman 1970, 70-85; Sherwin 1977, 169-70, 
202 - 10. 
and arrogant. 157 While each att:tude had some basis in fact, neither 
perceptio~l was to help further arms control in the years ahead. 
International control of atomic energy finally made it onto the 
agenda when President Truman's made a public statement on the subject, 
in the context of the proposed May-Johnson bill for domestic control of 
atomic energy. In his October 3, 1945 message to Congress, Truman 
stated his intentions to negotiate with his war-time allies, Canada and 
the U.K., over the issue of exchange of scientific information and 
renunciation of the use and development of atomic weapons. 158 
President Truman followed up this message with a press conference a few 
days later and a major speech given on Navy Day which clarified his 
position that the process of negotiating with Canada and the U.K. did 
not mean he intended to share the "secret," i.e. disclose details 
relating to the manufacturing process which produced the bomb. These 
public presentations were followed by an important trilateral conference 
with the British and Canadians which produced a public declaration that 
stated that international negotiations would be undertaken before the 
United Nations. 159 As a result of Truman's actions, international 
control had finally reached the Executive branch agenda--the first step 
in the policy process. However this history leaves one outstanding 
question: why did Truman make this decision? 
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157 Sherwin 1977, 200-2; Lieberman 1970, 75-7; Yergin 1977, 136. 
Churchill's similar negative reation to Bohr one year earlier 
also hurt the prospects of international control. 
158 Bernscein 1974, 1021-2; Herken 1981, 35-40; Yergin 1977, 
140-1. 
Truman 1955, 538-9, 542-4; Walton 1976, 60-1. 
Two possible answers to this question c&n be rejected almost 
immediately: interest group pressure and bureaucratic politics. There 
is no evidence that Truman or any member of his cabinet, other than 
Henry Wallace, either had direct communications or agreed with any arms 
control or foreign policy lohby group which supported international 
control of atomic energy. There are no indications from the 
historical record that interest group-led political pressure was ever 
mentioned by senior officials when they discussed international 
control. As a result, it seems that interest group politics can be 
ruled out as a possible explanation. 
At the same time, a majority of Truman's cabinet were on record as 
against international control. In the special cabinet meeting set aside 
for this topic, which was Secretary Stimson's last official government 
action before retirement, a majority of the domestic cabinet was against 
international control. In addition, the majority of foreign policy 
decision-makers, such as Secretary of State Byrnes, Secretary of the 
Navy Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Groves--still 
head of the functioning Manhattan project--were all against Stimson's 
proposal concerning international control. 16' Truman clearly knew 
about the near-universal bureaucratic opposition to international 
control because he asked all cabinet members, even those who were not at 
Henry Wallace met with scientists and also supported 
international control. See Seaborg 1987, 61-65. 
16' Herken 1981, 29-31; Bernstein 1974, 1018-20; Truman 1955, 
525-30; Walton 1976, 55-7; Donovan 1977; Lieberman 1970, 
144-9; and Millis 1951. 
the meeting, to communicate their views to him in writing. Thus, one 
can reject a bureaucra~ic policics hypothesis concerning getting 
international control oilto the agenda. 162 
Two factors which favored entering into negotiations over 
international control were diplomatic pressure, in the form of 
correspondence from British Prime Minister Atlee, and public opinion. 
The former reason was explicitly acknowledged by President Truman in his 
memoirs and is accepted by most historians who have studied the 
period. The latcer hypothesis, that public opinion was an 
important factor in placing internatlonal control onto the agenda, is a 
more original proposition. It is supported by three arguments. First, 
a review of polling data discussed above shows that public support for 
initiating negotiations was at the level of preponderance or greater. 
I.S is often the case when public attitudes are this clear-cut, the 
alternatives to such opinion--even if supported by strong bureaucratic 
factions--are not taken seriously by the ultimate policy maker, in this 
case the President. While key actors could and did argue against the 
substance of international control, no person or organization made an 
explicit argument against inithting negotiations per se. Once the bomb 
had been used and became a public issue, it was impossible for even 
powerful bureaucratic opponents to keep arms control negotiations off 
the agenda. This examp12 illustrates how preponderant or unanimous 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
162 Congressional attitude at the time also was critical of 
interntional control. 
163 Lieberman 1970, 156-60; Truman 1955, 534-5. 
level public opinion creatcs a context for ideas and thereby has an 
important., but subtle, impact on decisions. 
The second factor which supports the public opi~iion hypothesis is 
that British Prime Minister Atlee was encouraging President Truman to 
initiate negotiations because the Prime Minister was under his own 
political pressure from an aroused Labor party and public opinion. 164 
The third reason that supports the argument that public opinion played a 
role in getting international control on the agenda relates to the fact 
that one key member of Truman's cabinet changed his opinion on 
international control, Secretary of State Byrnes. Public opinion, 
measured by confidential polling conducted for the State Department, was 
an important factor which ieinforced his growing support for 
international cont.ro1. 165 To my knowledge, no historian who has 
written on this period has discovered these surveys or has understood 
their significance. One poll in particular--completed at the 
Secretary's personal request and conducted at significsnt expense within 
a period of 24 hours--illustrates haw private polling can have an 
important influence on senior policymakers. 166 
The history of attempts to get international control onto the 
agenda shows that before the bomb was used against Japan, bureaucratic 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
164 Gowing 1964, 50-51, 64-70, 77; Lieberman 1970, 161. 
At this time, all of the survey work conducted for the State 
Department by NORC was considered confidential, and results 
were only circulated within the Executive branch. 
166 The survey was NORC T42. These overnight polls, which were 
extremely innovative at the time, attest to the fact that on 
occasion senior policy makers want detailed data on public 
opinion. 
opposition to any form of international control was sufficiently strong 
to keep the issue off the agenda. Neither the interest group-type 
pressure from atomic scientists nor the strong personal appeal of 
Secretary of War Stimson were able to get Roosevelt or Truman to take 
this issue seriously and place it on the agenda. However, after 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, overwhelming public opinion in the U.S. and 
U.K.--at the level of consensus to preponderance--forced a reluctant 
Truman administration to initiate negotiations over the international 
control of atomic energy. 
B. Defining An Issue: How An Issue Is Placed On The Agenda 
A more important relationship between public opinion and the 
policy process goes far beyond determining whether public opinion helped 
place international control onto the agenda. Public opinion played a 
very significant role in defining how the issue of international control 
was defined once it reached the agenda. Two aspects of international 
control--sharing the secret and inspection--became key to the policy 
debate. A review of Table 4-3, above, shows that the public wanted 
negotiations to be initiated. However, at the same time, the public did 
not want to share the atomic secret. Senior policy makers were aware of 
these divergent public attitudes as documented by the fact that polling 
information on this particular issue was discussed at the Cabinet 
meeting which first, briefly, debated the issue of international 
control. 167 As a result, Truman mentioned in his memoirs that the 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
167 Herken 1981, 29. 
issue of sharing nuclear technology--part of the most ambitious plans 
for international control--was not an issue. "Stimson did not propose 
that we 'turn the bomb over' to Russia. As far as 1 was concerned, this 
was not a matter for discussion. This example illustrates a 
pattern previously noted that when opinion is clear-cut at the 
preponderant level or above, alternative arguments tend not to be taken 
seriously by the final decisionmaker. Not only was a radical form of 
international control, advocated by some scientists, precluded from 
Presidential consideration, but opponents of any form of international 
control leaksd information to the press and inaccurately characterized 
proponents of international control of advocating "sharing the 
secret . "169 Even though President Truman responded to these 
inaccurate press reports and stated that arms control proponents had 
suggested no such thing, the parameters of the public debate had now 
become set. Advocates of international control started on the defensive 
and had to explain why they were not for sharing the secret. 17 0 
The second key aspect associated with framing the issue of 
international control involved the issue of inspection. As Table 4-3 
indicates, the public was strongly and consistently in favor of 
inspection. Even before the executive branch began its effort to 
establish a formal negotiating position, the idea of inspection became 
paramount. In addition to strong public support, this position was 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
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16' Herkin 1981, 31; Truman 1955, 528; Liebcrman 1970, 149. 
170 The Association 1945. 
forcefully advocated by Senators Vandenberg and Connally and was quickly 
agreed to by President Truman. Inspection had to be extremely rigorous 
and had to proceed before other aspects of an agreement were 
implemented. It was in this public opinion and policy context that 
Secretary of States Byrnes appointed a committee to study the 
feasibility of international control, the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Committee. 172 After two months of intensive work the committee sent 
to the Secretary of State and the President a proposal for international 
control of atomic energy. In the subsequent months, many of its 
provisions were deleted or modified in ways that totally transformed the 
plan. This was possible in part because members of the 
Acheson-Lilienthal committee were totally ignorant of public attitudes 
and as a result were unable to develop a political strategy to defend 
their proposal. 
Even before the Acheson-Lilienthal report was completed, critics 
went to work to water-down its major provisions. One fact that aided 
this political campaign was that most of the policy positions taken by 
critics of international control were more in step with public opinion 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
17' Lieberman 1970, 218-23, 235; Tare 1969, 230, 242; Bechhoefer 
1961, 35. 
A great deal has been written on the Achrson- Lilienthal 
effort. See Barton & Weiler 1976, 70; Tate 1969, 220-33; 
Bechhoefer 1961, 35-6; Groves [I9621 1983, 411-12; Lieberrnan 
1970, 233-59; Acheson 1969, 152-6; Bernstein 1974, 1029-30; 
Hewlett and Anderson 1962. However, this author believes the 
current literature exaggerates the importance of the failed 
Acheson-Lilienthal effort. 173 For a text of the Acheson-Lilienthal report and the official 
history of the negotiations at the United Nations, see U.S. 
Department of State 1946b, 1946a, 1948. 
than were the policy positions advocated by proponents of international 
control. The first move to undermine the substance and spirit of the 
Acheson-Lilienthal report, and the decision that in the end proved to be 
the most important, was the agreement by Secretary of State Byrnes and 
President Truman to appoint conservative financier Bernard Baruch to 
represent the United States as Ambassador before the U.N. Atomic Energy 
Commission. 174 Almost immediately, Baruch objected to the widespread 
discussion of the Acheson-Lilierlthal report because it created the 
impression of representing government policy.175 He also fought hard. 
but unsuccessfully, to keep the report from being published. 176 over 
the next two months, until the U.S. position was presented before the 
U.N., Baruch threatened to resign three times. 177 Historians, who 
have emphasized Baruch's ego, have missed the crucial point. Each time 
Baruch threatened to resign, he received concrete assurances from the 
Secretary of State or the President which had the effect of und~rmining 
key provisions of the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal. Baruch's threats and 
his effective use of the press were part of his political communications 
strategy to transform the Acheson-Lilienthal plan into his own version 
of a proposal on international control of atomic energy. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
174 Advocates of international control were immediately opposed to 
Baruch's appointment. See Acheson 1969, 154; Lilienthal 1965. 
175 Bernstein 1974, 1033; Gerber 1982, 74; Herken 1981, 160; 
Lieberman 1970, 263. The main proponent of publication was 
Secretary Byrnes- see Lieberman 1970, 265-69. 
176 Public opinion data indicates why Baruch was concerned. 
Awareness of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan was more universal 
than was awareness of the Baruch plan. See Appendix 1. 
177 Lieberman 1970, 267 - 75. 
In the fight that transformed the Acheson-Lilienthal plan into the 
official U.S. government position, four major changes were made. 178 
One revision severely limited international ownership of atomic-related 
facilities such as uranium mines. The uranium mine owners lobbied 
Baruch and found him sympathetic to their arguments. 179 A review of 
public opinion on this subject shows that only a weak majority favored 
international ownership of the nuclear fuel-cycle. This example 
illustrates an important conclusion reached in this dissertation 
concerning the relationship between the level of public opinion and 
policy formation. For public opinion to be effective against organized 
economic or bureaucratic opposition that has access to the policymaker, 
public attitudes must be at the consensus Level or above. Even if a 
majority approves of a certain policy issue, as was the case concerning 
this issue of international ownership of the nuclear fuel-cycle, when 
attitudes are below the 60 percent consensus threshold, public opinion 
rarely determines policy outcomes. 
The second major change to the Acheson-Lilienthal plan uaived the 
provision of the U.N. charter that gave a permanent member of the 
Security Council, such as the Soviet Union, a veto to stop action taken 
by the United Nations. A review of public opinion data shows that 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
A key meeting, where the differences between the 
Acheson-Lilienthal and Baruch plans were discussed, was held 
with Baruch, his staff, and the Acheson-Lilienthal committee 
See Acheson 1969, 155-6; Bernstein 1974, 1034-6; Lieberman 
1970, 279-85. 
Lieberman 1970, 275-6. 
eliminating the U.N. veto was popular with the public.180 While this 
issue had been debated in the Acheson-Lilienthal group, it had been 
rejected because this practically cssured that the Soviet Union would 
oppose any form of international control. While the prediction came to 
pass, Baruch stuck to his position that the Security Council veto should 
not apply to atomic issues, and he retained the full support of 
President Truman on this issue. 
The third change, requiring that safeguards be implemented before 
any other provisions of international control, had been etched into 
policy in the process of international control being placed on the 
agenda. As discussed above, the public strongly supported the idea that 
safeguards be applied and did not differentiate between the positions 
taken by international control advocates and critics. However, the 
strong public support for inspection tended to strengthen the policy 
position taken by critics of international control such as Senator 
Vandenberg who used this position to narrow the U.S. negotiating 
position on this issue. 181 
The final change in the Acheson-Lilienthal plan involved addition 
of Baruch's call for "swift and immediate sanctions." Unfortunately, 
there is no available public opinion data to determine mass attitudes on 
this specific issue. However, with the "Munich analogy" so wide-spread, 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
180 See public attitudes about the United Nations in Cantril and 
Strunk 1951. This same idea is supported by unpublished 
polling conducted for FDR by the Office of Publtc Opinion 
Research (OPOR). 
18' Vandenberg 1952. 
it would seem likely that the public would have supported this aspect 
Baruch's position. 
C. Negotiation 
Not only did public opinion play an important role in the 
transformatiol~ of the Acheson-Liliental plan into the Baruch plan, it 
also played an important part in the development of Baruch's strategy 
for conducting the negotiations before the United Nations. Baruch's 
knowledge of polling data and his detailed review and analysis of press 
reaction to his presentation made him aware that his position was 
vulnerable in two areas: disarmament and building nuclear lveapons. 18 2 
As reviewed earlier in this chapter, the public was in favor of the idea 
of disarmament, but they were unsure whether it was good to base U.S. 
security around buildtng nuclear weapons. 
Aware of his potential political vulnerability, Baruch kept in 
close touch with foundations and interest groups which were advocating 
international control to learn about their political strategy. He 
used this information to tailor his negotiating position to anticipate 
"counter-attacks" by his domestic or foreign opponents. His superior 
knowledge of public opinion meant that he knew more about the political 
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'a* See Baruch Papers (Atomic Energy) Princeton University Library, 
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Department which began June 27, 1946. 
183 The groups ranged from the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace to the Federation of American Scientists and various 
faculty groups at the University of Chicago, Colgate, and 
University of Denver. 
strategy that would be most effective in criticizing his effort than did 
his opposition. For example, he knew that the public was sympathetic to 
calls for disarmament. As a result, in his discussions with Secretary 
of State Byrnes, Under-Secretary Acheson, and President Truman, Baruch 
strongly pressed for the authority to be able to discuss the issue of 
disarmament. He did not want to give the Soviet Union an opportunity to 
exploit this rhetorical position. Truman rejected Baruch's requests 
several times. 184 As it turned out, Baruch's fears were 
well-founded. The Soviets indeed perceived this weakness in the United 
States negotiating position, and called for disarmament both in their 
initial response to Baruch and in Molotov's major counter-attack of 
November, 1946. In his attempt to get his negotiating instructions 
reversed, it is clear from previously classified correspondence that 
Baruch's rationale was not understood by Dean Acheson, who served as the 
communications link between Baruch and Byrnes and Truman. Acheson did 
not realize that Baruch did not want to advocate disarmament per se, but 
that he wanted to use the rhetorical weapon of disarmament to fend off 
Soviet propaganda initiatives. It turns out that the Soviet 
counter to Baruch was too little and too late. 186 However, what is 
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Baruch Papers (Atomic Energy) Princeton University Library 
under several files: Acheson, Dean (6/26/46, 11/2/46), Senator 
Warren (11/2/46) and Byrnes, James (11/2/46). 186 The key "swing" group in this, and some future, negotiations 
was the Europeans. Baruch spent a great deal of time trying to 
keep them "in line." Had he not done this, it is possible that 
this first international nuclear arms control negotiation could 
have caused a split between the U.S. and its European allies on 
fundamental security issues even before the creation of NATO. 
clear from the primary sources and a review of public opinion data is 
that Baruch's close watching of public opinion and monitoring of the 
national a~,? international press reaction to his effort made him the 
first person to realize his own political vulnerabilities. This allowed 
him time to develop political and communication strategies to support 
his position and to undermine potential counter-attacks by his 
opposition. This is the essence of strategic planning in political 
campaigns and is a classic demonstration of the effective use of public 
opinion in the policy process. 18 7 
Another important relationship between public opinion and this 
negotiation concerned the achievement of Baruch's main goals: to 
convince the American public that it was necessary to build nuclear 
weapons and to base U.S. security on nuclear deterrence, not on 
disarmament. 188 Polling data reviewed above showed that from 1945 
through the middle of 1946, the public was not so sure it wanted to 
follow this approach and structure America's national security around 
the production and deployment of nuclear weapons. 18' This created a 
potential opening for advocates of international control. By this time, 
the major political opposition to Baruch's position came from former 
Vice President Henry Wallace. Wallace's celebrated dissent from the 
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negotiating instructions, See Baruch Papers (Atomic Energy) 
Princeton University Library, Truman, Harry 9/19/46, p. 21 
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emerging Cold War foreign policy positions of Baruch and Byrnes, and his 
controversial resignation from the cabinet created a vocal 
opposition. lgO Wallace increasingly called for the United States to 
stop building atomic weapons and to be more forthcoming with regard to 
its position on international control. However, Wallace's political 
challenge failed for four reasons. First, he and his political allies 
failed to focus their attack by recommending that the United States 
temporarily stop making nuclear weapons. Public opinion data clearly 
shows that people supported a temporary halt even as public attitudes 
turned against the combined steps of terminating production and 
destroying America's acomic bombs. lgl This is one example where 
question wording was extremely important. By focusing the public 
political debate on unilateral steps--which were not popular--rather 
than on temporary, limited steps to prove America's good faith, 
Wallace's political communication missed his main audience. 192 
The second reason for Wallace's failure to mobilize support for 
his position relates to a "cycle" in political communications. 19 3 
When viewed graphically, this cycle follows an "S" curve. Ideas rarely 
spring up overnight. To diffuse ideas, it takes a great deal of effort 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
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lgl Reviewing 40t years of survey data on arms control leads to the 
conclusion that the American public is extremely reluctant to 
take steps which are perceived of as being unilateral in 
nature. This same point is made by Kohut 1988. 
lg2 Baruch followed this data carefully and used Gallup data to 
evaluate the strength of his position. See Baruch Papers 
(Atomic Energy) Princeton University Library, Lindsay, Frank A .  
(11/25/46). lg3 For a discussion of this concept, see Newnan 1986. 
before a "take-off" point is reached. Some times public attitudes 
change. Other times the public holds ideas for long periods of time 
befole a political leader discovers them. If one happens to be 
advocating an idea at the time a take-off occurs, then one is credited 
as being a leader who can mobilize public opinion.lg4 As a corollary, 
if one begins advocating an idea when it is at it, plateau or on the 
decline, one is characterized as a failed leader. Wallace began his 
calls for America to stop building atomic weapons as public opinion in 
support of this idea was on the decline. As a result, his political 
efforts reinforced the elite perception of Wallace as a failed leader 
rather than as an innovative statesman. Thus, his advocacy of 
international control had the political effect of hurting, rather than 
helping, the chances for conclusion of this arms control agreement. 
The third reason for Wallace's failure was the success of a 
vicious counter-attack on him organized by Bernard Baruch. This 
campaign characterized Wallace as an appeaser and pro-Russian advocate. 
Public opinion data is clear that Baruch's negative message, not 
Wallace's, was heard and accepted by the public. Gallup data showed 
that 40 percent of the public had heard of the Wallace criticism of the 
Truman administration's foreign policy (more than those who had heard of 
- - - - - - - - -  
Rarely is such a leader actually responsible for creating such 
an attitude change, but few politic1 actors delve into the 
causality of attitude change. For an example that describes 
how the Committee on the Present Danger was able to claim 
(incorrectly) that it was responsible for changing attitudes 
toward increasing military preparedness in the late 1970s and 
1980s, see Graham 1985. 
the Baruch plan). Of these who had heard of the controversy, 80 perce.1t 
supported the hard line policies advocated by Secretary of State Byrnes 
over those advocated by Wallace. 195 
Flnally, as discussed in the public opinion section above, in 1946 
public opinion was turning against the Soviet Union. As a result, 
attempting to ',marketw a challenge to Baruch's policies by emphasizing 
cooperation with the Russian's, as Wallace did, was bound to fail. 
Baruch's superior icrlowledge of public opinion put him in an excellent 
position to develop a political strategy that had the best chance of 
success. At the same time, arms control advocates--whether dovish 
atomic scientists or Henry Wallace--either were not aware of public 
opinion or did not take it seriously. As will be demonstrated in future 
chapters of this dissertation, this pattern where arms control advocates 
adopt political strategies without paying any regard to public opinion 
will repeat itself tllroughout the nuclear age. In general, this has 
been a major reason why arms control has a mixed pattern of success. 
D. Implementation 
Another important relationship between public opinion and policy 
formation for international control of atomic energy involved the 
ultimate consummation of Baruch's victory. This required terminating 
- - - * * - - - - - - - - - -  
lg5 See AIPO 379 
Baruch's negotiations at the appropriate time and making sure that -his 
victory was not reversed after he resigned as Ambassndor to the U.N. 
Atomic Energy Comrnis~ion.~~~ After it had become clear to 
participants of the U.N. discussions that no agreement was possible, 
U.S. delegation member Fred Eberstadt held an unauthorized meeting with 
Soviet representative Gromyko and suggested that the negotiations be 
terminated. When he found out about this diplomatic end-run, Baruch 
strongly rejected this position and berated his close advisor both in 
private and at a staff meeting. He told Eberstadt "We must go on until 
the public generally come to the opinion we have. "Ig7 Baruch made 
sure that this message got through to all members of his staff by 
telling them he would not end the negotiations until he perceived the 
time "was right." He told them they had no reason to be discouraged 
with the "progress" of the negotiations, but at the same time he made it 
clear that NO changes were to be considered in the U.S. negotiating 
position. 198 
For Baruch, the confirmation that the public was accepting "the 
opinion we have" became clear in the Fall. of 1946 as public opinion 
polls indicated increased support for the United States building atomic 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
lg6 Since this negotiations did no produce a treaty, there was no 
ratification stage. However, there was an implementation stage 
which lasted from Baruch's resignation in January 1947 through 
the announcement that the Soviets had tested an atomic bomb in 
1949. Radical shifts in public opinion in this time period 
could have provided an opportunity for the liberal opposition 
to reverse American pol~cy. 
lg7 Bernstein 1974, 1043 ; Lieberman 1970, 336 - 7. 
lg8 Baruch Papers (Atomic Energy), Princeton University Library, 
Notes on Meetings 1946 (8/1/46, 8/23/46). 
weapons and increased criticism of the Soviet Union. With this 
knowledge of public opinion in hand, Baruch asked for and received 
authorization from Secretary of State Byrnes and President Truman to 
conclude the negotiations before the end of 1946. 199 
Terminating the negotiations would assure that agreement 0.1 
international control of atomic energy would never be concluded, but 
this strategy also had its diplomatic risks. By this time, America's 
European allies were more interested in continuing arms control 
negotiations than was the United States. The Soviets belatedly 
attempted to convince France and Britain that agreement was possible, 
but this effort was very limited and failed. During this last stage of 
the negotiations, Baruch spend much of his time trying to convince 
French and British diplomats that no agreement was possible. With 
America's allies reluctantly supporting its position, the United States 
brought the Baruch plan--in exactly the same form as it was when 
presented to the world in June 1946--to a vote on December 30, 
1946. 200 Even though proforma negotiations cor.tinued at the Uni t r d  
Nations through 1950, this final vote in 1946 terminated the real 
discussion of international control of atomic energy. By this time the 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
lg9 Baruch, rather than Byrnes or Truman, seemed to be in control 
of the political strategy for these negotiations. Baruch 
instructed his staff to begin work to terminate negotiations 
before he had received authorization to do so. See Baruch 
Papers (Atomic Energy), Princeton University Library, 
Memoranda, Misc. 1946 (10/28/46). On his instructions, see 
Lieberman 1970, 368-9. 
200 Acheson 1969, 156; Dupuy and Hammerman 1973, 313-20; Gerber 
1982, 73. 
attitude foundation for the Cold War had been established, and Baruch's 
work was completed. 201 
IV. Diversity and Dynamics of Public Opinion 
Previous sections of this chapter have described public attitudes 
toward international control of atomic energy and evaluated the impact 
public opinion has had on policy-making at various stages such as 
getting on the agenda or negotiation. This material has demonstrated 
that the Cohen (1973) no-impact thesis can be clearly rejected. 
This final section will address the two other major hypothesis 
being examined in this dissertation. Has there been a lack of public 
opinion cons ?sus in favor of arms control either because attitudes have 
been volatile or because they have been highly fragmented? Have opinion 
leaders and the attentive public been against arms control, and have 
these elite attitudes eventually changed mass attitudes to be critical 
of arms control through a top-down diffusion process? To answer these 
two larger hypotheses, four specific questions must be answered. Does 
the public opinion data presented in this chapter show that a consensus 
of the general public supported international control? Is there 
evidence that attitudes were fragmented along political or demographic 
lines? Were there any indications that attitudes held by the attentive 
public had more of an impact on government policy than did attitudes 
held by the general public? Is there any evidence that mass attitudes 
changed in a manner consistent with the top-down model? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
''I For a discussion of the impact of the Truman doctrine on 
attitudes, see Kernell 1986. 
A. Attitude Consensus 
The first aspect of an attitude consensus has been defined for 
this dissertation as a high level of public opinion (above 60 percent) 
and relative attitude stability over time. Whether such an attitude 
consensus existed in support of international control has been partially 
answered. At the mass level, there was no simple consensus either in 
favor of or opposed to the international control of atomic energy. The 
general public supported some aspects of international control, such as 
the idea that atomic arms control negotiations should be conducted and 
that atomic facilities should be under international ownership. On 
other elements of international control, the public changed its 
opinion. These include the willingness to take unilateral U.S. 
initiatives to obtain an arms control agreement, the question of 
building atomic weapons, and the possibility of cooperating with the 
Soviet Union. In other areas--such as using the bomb against Japan and 
sharing the secret--the public was against these elements of 
international control. This complex pattern suggests that no simple 
attitude consensus existed concerning the international control of 
atomic energy. 
Even though there was no clear consensus, data from this arms 
control initiative does not show that a lack of a consensus was due to 
attitude volatility. As summarized in Table 4-3 (above), within each 
i.ssue area, public attitudes were quite stable. Significant attitude. 
change (over 10 percent) took place in only two areas: perceptions of 
the Soviet Union and willingness to build atomic weapons. In neither 
area were attitudes volatile; they changed gradually and in one 
consistent direction. As a result, data from this first arms control 
case tends to further undermine the validity of Almond's mood or 
volatility theory. 
B. Attitude Fragmentation 
The second aspect of an attitude consensus relates to the 
relative homogeneity or fragmentation of attitudes along political or 
demographic lines, To address this issue, quantitative analysis was 
performed on 8 national surveys that were conducted over the entira 
period of the when international control was being discussed from August 
1945 through 1950. Cross tabulations and correlations were run on all 
questions relating to international control and a number of other social 
and political variables. 202 BY using a seven-point fragmentation 
scale discussed in Chapter 2, this analysis found that attitudes showed 
very low to moderate fragmentation along partisan, ideological, or 
demographic lines. A summary of the quantitative analysis is reviewed 
in Table 4-4 below. It shows that issues associated with international 
control were highly fragmented along partisan, regional, or 
demographic lines. One finds that party identification, voting behavior 
or preferences, and perceptions of the President's/government's job 
performance had little to do with attitudes toward international 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
202 Since virtually all of the results were statistically 
si.gnificant at- the 95% confidence level, separate chi square 
values will not be presented for each result. 
Fragmentation of Opinion Concerning 
International Control of Atomic Energy 
(7 point scale)# 
Table 4-4 
Surveys 
















AGE- age; ISOL- isolationism/internationalism; JPERFP- job 
performance about foreign policy; JPERPRS- presidential job 
performance; PTYID- party identification; PTYBEST- party best to 
handle the most important problem; RACE- white or non-white; 
REGION- South; SEX- male or female; VOTE- voted in the last 
presidential election; VOTECONG- party voted for in Congressional 
election; VOTEPRS- candidate voted for in the last Presidential 
election; VET- veteran status. 
Surveys 
8/1945 AIPO 354; 6/1946 NORC 143; 2/1947 NOKC 148; 
10/1947 NORC 152; 6/1948 NORC 158; 10/1949 NORC 170; 
2/1950a AIPO 452k; 2/1950b AIPO 452 tps. 
{I Fragmentation Scale 
1- 0%-2.9% (none); 2- 3.0%-5.9% (very low); 3- 6.0%-8.9% (low); 
4- 9.0%-11.9% (medium); 5- 12.0%-14.9% (high); 
6- 15.0%-17.9% (very high); 7- 18.O%< (extreme). 
control. There were slight differences in attitudes along age, region, 
sex, and veteran status lines. In general, younger people, women, those 
outside of the South, and veterans were more supportive of international 
control than the general public. What is interesting to note is that 
the magnitude of these differences was extremely small, usually under 10 
percent. Non-whites were the only group that held divergent attitudes. 
They often answered "don't know" in unusually high numbers (up to 50 
percent) and did not consistently support or oppose international 
control. 
C. The Attentive Public and Top-Down Attitude Change 
To answer the two questions whether government policy was more 
sensitive to attitudes held by the attentive public and whether mass 
opinion was influenced by the attentive public, attitudes of this elite 
segment of society were determined. To study the issue of attentiveness 
in the context of international control of atomic energy, one survey 
(NORC 148) was examined in detail because it included six different 
indicators that could be used to measure various levels of 
attentiveness: awareness of the Baruch plan; professional, business or 
white collar occupations; interested in international control; 
membership in interest groups that discussed foreign policy issues; a 
college degree, and upper class status. As summarized in Table 4-5 
below, these six different indicators define various levels of 
attentiveness that range in size from 45 percent to 2 percent of the 
Opinion 61 Policy Elite and Attentive Public 
Attitudes Toward International Control of Atomic Energy: 
[Analysis of NORC 1481 
(in percent) 
Table 4-5 
Indicators of Attentivenes 
Heard of Upper Interest Club College Upper General 
Baruch Occup- in ICAE member Graduate Class Public 
Plan ation 
percent in 
population 45 40 2 7 18 10 2 (100) 
Question 
Quest ions 
1) Approve the govermtent's foreign policy; 2) Approve the 
government's atomic policy; 3) Believe Russia can be trusted to 
meet the U.S. half way; 4) Supports international control of 
atomic energy (icae); 5) Had a fairly clear idea of the Baruch 
plan; 6) Would support icea if it meant the US htid to stop 
building bombs; 7) Would support icae if it meant the US tiad to 
destroy its existing stockpile; 8) Would support icea if there 
was verification; 9) Would support icae if it meant international 
ownership of atomic facilities; 10) Would support icae if it meant 
the U.S. had to share some atomic technology with the 
international organization. 
population. The attitudes held by these six groups were compared with 
the general public on ten different issues concerning international 
control and foreign policy. Two general conclusions emerge. First, all 
six indicators of attentiveness show that by any definition of 
attentiveness, the attentive public was more in favor of international 
control than was the general public. Support for international control 
of atomic energy registered approval by a majority of the public ( 5 5  
percent). All the various attentive groups supported international, 
control, on average, at the level of consensus (61 percent.) Those ten 
percent of the public with a college degree supported international 
control at an even higher levels ( 6 4  percent). 203  
The second conclusion that emerges from this data relates to 
determining the most appropriate indicator of attentiveness. As shown 
in Chapter 3, both knowledge-based and interest-based indicators place 
the size of the attentive public for arms control and foreign policy at 
approximately 25 percent of the public. Most scholars use college 
education as a surrogate variable to indicate membership in the 
attentive public. 204 This approach is being used in this 
dissertation. A review of Table 4-5 shows that opinions held by those 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
203 In this survey, those with a college degree could be considered 
not only attentive, but also members of the "opinion and policy 
elite. " 
204 One scholar, Genco (1984), strongly criticizes the use of 
knowledge-based or socio-economic ,based indicators of 
attentivness. This author disagrees with Genco on this point. 
Data from Table 4-5 shows that use of college education to 
measure attentiveness is justified to determine the direction 
of attitude difference between the attentive public and general 
pub1 ic . 
with a college degree were approximately the same as those who could be 
deemed "attentive" either by their interest in international control (27 
percent of the public) or by their participation in an interest group 
that discussed foreign policy topics (18 percent of the public). While 
attitudes about international control held by college graduates differed 
by as much as 10 percent from attitudes held by other types of 
"attentives," in all cases the direction was the same. All attentive 
groups were more in favor of international control than was the general 
public. This finding is important because it justifies using the 
college education indicator to identify attitudes held by the attentive 
public. *05 When surveys contain questions that measure interest and 
knowledge toward foreign policy issues, these indicators will be used to 
check whether they agree with results obtained by using college 
education as a measure of attentiveness. 
Data from all eight surveys that were analyzed find that the 
attentive public was relatively strongly in support of international 
control of atomic energy, compared to the general public, from 1945 
through 1947. By 1948, the attentive public became increasingly 
skeptical that international control would be successfully negotiated, 
and their level of support declined to the approximate level of the 
general public. However, after President Truman announced that the 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
*05 For surveys conducted from the 1930s to the mid-1960s, before 
the large expansion in th~b percent of the population with a 
college degree, use of a college degree to define attentiveness 
will have the effect of measuring attitudes of a smaller, more 
elite group of the public than would be the case if one used 
interest-based based indicators of attentiveness. 
United States would develop the hydrogen bomb, the attentive public and 
the general public both supported the idea of international control at 
significantly higher levels. One interesting observation, shown in 
Table 4-6, is that in response to Truman's dramatic announcement, the 
attentive public changed its attitude more than the general public. 
Dramatic Attitude Change 
(in percent) 
Table 4-6 
AIPO 452k AIPO 452tps Attitude 
2/1950a* 2/1950b** Change 
College graduates 5 0 7 9 +29 
Attended college 5 1 7 2 +2 1 
General Public 4 9 6 9 +20 
* Question: "Do you think we should try again to work out an 
agreement with Russia to control the Atom bomb before we try to 
make a Hydrogen bomb?" (Asked before Truman's announcement that 
the U.S. would proceed with making the H-bomb.) 
** Question: "Do you think we should try again to work out an 
agreement with Russia to control the Atom bomb and the Hydrogen 
bomb?" (Asked after Trun~an's announcement that the U.S. would 
proceed with making the H-bomb.) 
Not only were attitudes held by the attentive public more in favor 
of international control than the general public, but attentives also 
were more positive regarding the possibility that the Soviet Union would 
cooperate with the United States. 206 During World War 11, in April 
1943 and August 1945, people with business and professional occupations 
206 Cantril and Strunk 1951, 371. 
were approximately 10 percent more positive regarding the possibility of 
Soviet cooperation with the U.S. than was the general public. Those 
with a college education were more optimistic (from +7 percent to +17 
percent) regarding cooperation with Russia from 1944 through December 
1946. In 1946, as public attitudes concerning possible U.S.-Soviet 
cooperation were becoming more pessimistic, attitudes held by the 
attentive public continued to stay relatively positive toward Rvssia. 
The data presented above support the concept discovered by Almond 
that attitudes of the attentive public often are quite different from 
those held by the general public. However, there is no indication that 
government policy was more responsive to public opinion held by the 
attentive public than to the general public. In some areas, such as 
perceptions of a cooperative Soviet Union, government actions seemed to 
be more in step with mass attitudes that with attentive attitudes 
Concerning the attentive public and the top-down attitude dhange 
hypothesis, there is no evidence that public attitudes changed in the 
direction of attitudes held by the attentive public. Not only were most 
attitudes held by the general public relatively stable, but changes in 
attitudes by members of the attentive public did not seen1 to influence 
or lead attitudes held by the general public.. Mass public attitude 
changed trith respect to U.S.-Soviet cooperation, unilateral steps to 
achieve disarmament, or the desirability of building atomic bombs. 
However, in some of these instances attitudes held by the attentive 
public either did not change, or changed in the opposite direction as 
did attitudes held by the mass public. 
D. Academic Theory and Public Opiriion 
The most important conclusion from this chapter finds that public 
opinion clearly had an impact on decision-making at all stages of the 
policy process. The no-impact hypothesis, advocated by Bernard Cohen, 
clearly can be rejected for this first arms control case. Public 
opinion was the key reason that explains why international control got 
onto the agenda when it did over the opposition of powerful bureaucratic 
actors. Public opinion also influenced the transformation of the 
initicl. American negotiating position from the "radical" 
Acheson-Lilienthsl plan into the almost non-negotiable Baruch plan. 
Public opinion also played a key role in the development and timing of 
Baruch's actual negotiations before the United Nations. 
Two additional findings concerning the impact public opinion has 
on decision-making are original to this research. First, there is a 
relationship between the level of public opinion and its influence in 
the policy process. When attitudes are relatively clear-cut (at 
preponderance or higher, i.e. above 70 percent), public opinion 
dominates the decision-making process and is able to determine outcomes 
even in the face of powerful bureaucratic opposition. Second, a review 
of public opinion data and primary source documents find that different 
interest groups and government actors have very different levels of 
understanding of public attitudes. In this case, the person who had the 
best understanding of public opinion, Bernard Baruch, dominated the 
policy process even though he was not the dl? iure decision-maker. 
Concerning the second hypothesis, no support was found for the 
mood theory/volatility hypothesis. While no simple attitude consensus 
existed at the mass level concerning international control of atomic 
energy, this was not due to attitude volatility. It also was not caused 
by fragmentation. Data on international control do not Sind a great 
d ~ e l  of fragmentation of opiilion along political, regional, or 
demographic lines. As a result, findings from this base line case tend 
to support the fragmentation hypcthasis posited by scholars such as 
William Schneider: in this pre-Vietnam case, attitudes were not highly 
fragmented. 
With respect to the third hypothesis, while there was evidence 
that attitudes held by the atrentive public concerning international 
control of atomic energy differed from attitudes held by the general 
public, there was no evidence that attentive attitudes had a more 
important impact on government policy than did mass attitudes. In 
addition, no support was found that top-down learning took place from 
the attentive public to the general public. 
Some conclusions from in this chapter, when combined with data on 
levels of public awareness, knowledge, and interest from Chapter 3, 
reinforce the importance of a key concept originated by E. E. 
Schattschneider. He argues that the scope of political conflict is an 
important determinant with respect to the policy outcome. Throughout 
the nuclear age, awareness, knowledge, and interest in arms control has 
been relatively low. This has had the effect of directing political 
fights about arms control upward into elite circles rather than having 
them unfold at the mass political level. For this first arms control 
case, there was relatively low awareness of both the Baruch plan and the 
Acheson-Lilienthal plan. More importantly, awareness of the Baruch plan 
is positively correlated with supportive attitudes toward international 
control of atomic energy. As reviewed in Table 4-5, those who had heard 
of the Baruch plan were almost 10 percent more supportive of all aspects 
of international control than was the general public. This suggests 
that low awareness of arms control, which is the product of the type uf 
communicati~~ns trategies adopted by arms control advocates, has 
translated directly into lower support for arms control. In the context 
of Schattschneider, keeping arms control as an esoteric subject known to 
relatively few people has reduced its chances of success. 
A final conclusion concerns attitude change. One corollary to 
Almond's and Lippmann's theories has been a conventional wisdom that 
mass attitudes are vulnerable to dramatic events while elite attitudes, 
being more well though out, are considered to be more stable. Data 
summarized in Table 4-6 clearly refutes this conventional wisdom of 
elite attitude stability. My findings sdpport two theoretical concepts 
developed by Mueller and by Gamson & Modigliani. First, real world 
events, not top-down diffusion of attitudes, change public opinion. 
Second, contrary to a common sense understanding of elite attitudes, the 
attentive piablic, rather than the general public, are the real 
"followers" in terms of attitude change. Elite attitudes are much more 
susceptible to dramatic events than are attitudes held by the general 
public. 
'ihe Limited Test Ban Treaty: 
Partial Success, 1952-1963 
Chapter 5 
I Summary 
Contrary to the no-impact hypothesis from the public opinion 
literature, most writings about arms control posit that the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty (LTBT) was the product of massive U.S. and international 
public pressure mobilized over the issue of radicactive fallout. 
According to r.his literature, the LTBT case demonstrates that public 
opinion can have s strong impact on government policy when the public is 
activated by nuclear ;.lenomena which can be directly linked to peoples' 
everyday lives. 
In terms of the structure of public opinion, most authors argue 
that public attitudes about nuclear fallour; and rluciear testing changed 
over time and were quite volatile, consistent with traditional public 
opinion theory. The eventual strong public support shown for the LTBT 
was a result of effective Presidential leadelship after the Cuban 
missile crisis, and attitude change followed a top-down process. 
This chapter argues that the existing arms control literature is 
wrong on several important points both about the structure of public 
opinion and its impact on policy. My findings sustain the argument that 
public opinion had an important impact on government decision-making 
with respect to the LTBT. In this instance, the arms control literature 
is more correct than the non-impact hypothesis from the public opinion 
literature. There is no question that public concern over fallout 
helped set the public debate over the test ban issue or influenced 
gavernment decisions on several non-test ban issues. However, there is 
reason to question what aspect of American and international public 
opinion was responsible for successfully getting the test ban issue onto 
the Executive branch agenda. 
This chapter finds that strong public support for a bilateral test 
ban agreement, the Eisenhower administration's correct reading of the 
1956 election results, and several other technical and bureaucratic 
factors all combined to get the test ban negotiations onto the agenda, 
However, survey data clearly show that public concern over fallout 
played a limited role in explaining the structure of public opinion and 
in influencing government decision-makers. 
As was true during the political fight associated with negotiation 
of the international control of atomic energy, a very important variable 
turned out to be the degree to which various political acrors understood 
the true nature of public opinion. Political efforts by Adlai Stevenson 
during the 1956 presidential campaign and by anti-nuclear interest 
groups in the late 1950s to build support for a test ban agreement by 
focusing on the fallout controversy failed. By being ignorant of the 
true rature of public opinion and by pressuring che Eisenhower and 
Kennedy administrations to initiate or continue a test moratorium for 
which there was little public support, arms contrc)l advocates helped to 
obscure strong public support for a bilateral test ban agreement and are 
indirectly responsible for producing the circumstances that forced 
President Kennedy to resume testing in the atmosphere and then to 
conclude a limited, rather than a comprehensive, test ban treaty. 
President Kenncdy only learned of strong public support for a bilateral 
test ban treaty after he made the key decision to negotiate a lilnited 
agreement. 
This chapter clearly shows that the level of public support is 
closely related to the impact public opinion has on the policy process, 
Popular presidents can make decisions that fly in the face of maiority 
opinion, but doing so provides the political opposition with fertilz 
ground from which a ;uccessful "counter-attack" can be launched. This 
occurred when President Eisenhower and then President Kennedy agreed to 
or continued the test moratorium with the Soviets. Consensus level 
public opinion can influences the policy process even though powerful 
bureaucratic opposition may exist. This was demonstrated when President 
Eisenhower, with consensus level public support, overruled his military 
and atomic energy advisors and pressed forward with negotiating a 
bilateral test ban agreement. Preponderant public opinion not only 
"causes" the political system to act according to its dictates, but it 
also deters political opposition from challenging the specific 
decision. The successful ratification and implementation of the LTBT 
illustrates this aspect of the relationship between public opinion and 
the palicy process. Virtually unanimous opinion dominates the entire 
political system and sweeps all political opposition away. President 
Kennedy's decision to resume testing after the Soviet Union broke the 
test moratorium clearly demonstrates this phenomena. 
A comprehensive review of 42 national, 18 state, and 1 elite 
public opinion polls concludes that public opinion was relatively 
stable, not volatile or moody as argued by Almond ((19501 1960). The 
public perceived the test ban controversy not as a single issue but as 
two distinct issues. If all public opinion questions on the test ban 
are divided into two separate groups--should testing continue and should 
a bilateral test ban agreement be concluded--one finds that the major 
fault-line ir~ public opinion ran between strong o~position to unilateral 
termination of atmospheric testing and solid support for a negotiated 
agreement with the Soviet Union to stop nuclear testing. Throughout tzhe 
entire period from 1945 to 1963, a majority of the public opposed 
American atmospheric testing only in one survey conducted during the 
U.S.-Soviet testing moratorium. However, by 1961, tt~is anti-testing 
attitude disappeared, and a majority or a consensus of the public 
supported renewed testing by the U.S. before the Soviets unilaterally 
resumed testing in the atmosphere. 
A close reading of the survey questions and a review of public 
awareness, knowledge, and interest concerning the test ban issue show 
that public attitudes were not contradictory. The public had a 
reasonably sophisticated logic which can explain the structure of mass 
attitudes, but the logic was different from that held by most elites. 
In terms of fragmentation of attitudes, quantitative snalysis of 
17 surveys shows that with the exception of one period, there was little 
fragmentation of attitudes along political or ideological lines. This 
tends to support the proposit.ion advanced by Schneider and other 
scholars who argue there was a foreign policy attitude consensus before 
Vietnam. However, the e~ception is important. During the 3956 election 
and for six months after the voting, public opinion was sharply split 
along partisan lines. This pattern supports some of the conclusions 
reached by Brody and Page (1975) in the context of the war in Vietnam. 
When political parties or candidates made their differences clear on 
specific issues, voters are able to discern these differences, and 
attitudes in turn become more split along partisan lines. 
In terms of the top-down learning hypothesis, the test ban case 
shows that the attentive public did not consistently lead the public in 
terms of attitude change. Before Eisenhower switched his public 
position on the test ban treaty in 1957, the attentive public was more 
supportive of nuclear testing than was the general public. The 
attentive public was particularly unrecep~~ve to the argument that 
fallout was a major public problem and >!as strongly opposed to the U.S. 
unilaterally terminating its testing program. However, consistent with 
the findings of Gamson and Modigliani (1966), once government policy 
began to change on the test ban issue, it was the highly educated 
attentive public that picked up the policy change and supported a test 
ban agreement at levels higher than the general public. The attentive 
public thus followed changes in government policy and did not lead mass 
attitudes. 
The pattern of mass and elite attitude change and the relationship 
between public opinion and policy decisions is best analyzed in the 
context of a "two worlds" model. 
A final conclusion from this chapter relates to the dominane 
paradigm in American voting behavior, The American Voter. NOL only is 
its analysis of the 1956 election wrong with respect to Adlai 
Stevenson, the importance of foreign policy, and the test ban, but 
evidence is presented that calls into question general conclusions made 
concerning the ability of the public to vote in line with their 
attitudes toward specific issues. 
Public Attitudes on Nuclear Testing and a Tes! Ban 
A. Traditional Academic Analysis 
By 1989 one might well consider the academic literature on the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty to have reached a mature stage. Approximately 
one dozen books and major articles have been written on this subject, 
and many researchers have had an opportunity to review and evaluate both 
secondary source and previously classified primary source 
documents. *07 More importantly, all these academic publications agree 
on two major points that relate to public opinion and its impact on the 
policy process: the test ban issue was placed on the agenda by the 
emergence of public controversy over atomic fallout, and this public 
concern over fellout had an important impact on the eventual conclusion 
of the treaty. In addition, mdst authors argue that public attitudes 
about nuclear testing changed over time and were quite volatile. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
207 The most important academic accounts of the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty include Affelder 1983; Ball 1986; Daalder 1987; Dean 
1966; Divine 1978a; Jacobson and Stein 1966; Leppkr 1971; R. 
Miller 1986; Rosi 1967b; Seaborg and Loeb 1981; Terchek 1970. 
Traditional accounts of the test ban saga begin with public 
controversy over fallout that began with the 1954 Bravo thermonuclear 
test in the Pacific which contaminated a Japanese fishing boat-- the 
Lucky Dragon. In the twelve months that follo~~ed, Indian Prime Minister 
Nehru called for a test ban, the Pope issued Easter warnings about the 
dangers of fallout, the White House received substantial mail calling 
for a halt in testing, one of :he fishermen on the Lucky Dragon died of 
radiation poisoning, numerous private and governmect studies on the 
health risks of fallout were initiated, and President Eisenhower tried 
to diffuse the controversy by appointing Harold Stassen as his Special 
Assistant for Disarmament. 208 There is no debate over these events or 
whether public concern over fallout helped set the public debate over 
the test ban issue. However, this chapter argues that the existing 
literature is wrong on several important points about both the structure 
of public opinion and its impact on policy. 
Why do these academic accounts of the test ban controversy reach 
the conclusions that they do? With respect to characcerizing public 
attitudes as volatile, an initial review of the data confirms this 
conclusion. If the opinion data about the nuclear testing issue, 
that is concerning both the desirability of placing constraints on 
nuclear testing and the desirability of a test ban are graphed (see 
Figure 5-1, below) one finds great attitude instability. Since 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
208 This appointment carried with it cabinet rank and for a time 
made Stassen a potential power center in competition with the 
State, Defense, and Atomic Energy departments. Divine 1978a, 
Chapter 1 ;  Blacker and Duffy 1984, 45; Jacobson and Stein 
1966, 20. 
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policy makers are bombarded with data from different opinion polls at 
many different points in time, it would be reasonable for them to 
conclude from a quick review of this data that public attitudes were 
indeed volatile. Following this logic, it is understandable that 
scholars have discovered this same pattern of variability and in turn 
have concluded that current public opinion theory is correct concerning 
foreign policy attitude instability. However, a closer examination of 
the questions and the data shows that such a conclusion would be 
inaccurate. 
B. Support for Continued Nuclear Testing 
A detailed review of relevant public opinion data shows that the 
general public perceived the test ban controversy not as a single issue 
but as two distinct issues. If all public opinion questions on the test 
ban issue are divided into two separate categories--should testing 
continue and should a bilateral test ban agreement be concluded--one 
finds that relative attitude stability, rather than volatility, becomes 
the dominant pattern. 209 Data from all questions which asked whether 
nuclear testing should continue are presented in Figure 5-2. While che 
graph shows that some changes took place over time, over the entire 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
*09 While Rosi (1967b) noticed this duality in public attitudes, he 
went on to argue that public attitudes were volatile. However, 
his limited research focus (public opinion from 1954 to 1958) 
led him to many conclusions that are not shared by this 
author. Unfortunately his work has served as the basis for 
most other academic analysis of publ~c attitudes on the test 
ban treaty. 
Support for Continued Nuclear Testing 
Figure 5-2 
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period from 1946 through 1963, the mean of all survey questi.ons shows 
support for continued nuclear testing at the Level of consensus (60 
percent) compared to opposition to testing at a mean of 28 
percent. 210 This public support for continued nuclear testing began 
with the nuclear age itself. In 1946, either a plurality (43 percent) 
or a majority (51 percent) supported nuclear testing. 211 Even before 
public attitudes associated with the Cold War became dominant throughout 
America, only one-third of the population had reservations about early 
U.S. atomic testing. Not only was the public supportive of these early 
atomic weapons tests, but they also were extremely reluctant to put any 
constraints on the American atomic testing program. For example, a 
consensus (66 percent) opposed allowing representatives from other 
countries to observe U.S. tests, a majority (50 percent) opposed similar 
observation by United Nations' officials, and a consensus opposed 
sharing any information from the tests (63 percent). 212 
The first public opinion survey conducted in 1954, after the 
international uproar caused by contamination of the Japanese fishing 
boat Lucky Dragon, indicated that a preponderance (71 percent) of the 
public supported going ahead with U.S. hydrogen bomb tests. *I3 1n 
1955 and 1956, survey questions, worded without reference to the idea 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
210 These means are not weighted by sample size as suggested by 
Stewart (1984, 115-116) because all of the sample sizes are 
similar in magnitude and quite large, averaging about 1500. 
211 4/1946a AIPO 368 kht; 2/1946 MINN 31. All test ban related 
questions and data are reproduced in Appeudix 6. 
*I2 2/1946 AIPO 365k&t; 2/1946 MINN 31; 8/1946 MINN 36. 
213 4/1954 AIPO 529k. 
that some people called for termination of nuclear testing, re:corded 
public support for continued testing as virtually unanimous (80-84 
percent). 214 Either a majority or a consensus suooorted continued 
nuclear testing throughout the Presidential campaign in 1956 during 
which time the test ban issue received a great deal of publicii:y, This 
stable and relatively high level of support for nuclear testing 
continued on iilto 1958. 215 
Contrary to conventional academic accounts of this period that 
characterize the public as becoming increasingly opposed to nuclear 
testing in the atmosphere, throughout the entire period from 1945 to 
1963, a majority of the public O D D O S ~ ~  American atmospheric testing only 
in one survey conducted during the U.S.-Soviet testing moratorium. This 
relatively rare opposition to U.S. atmospheric testing occul-red only 
after the Eisenhower administration had announced that it would join the 
Soviet Union in a testing moratorium that would last as long as the 
Soviets refrained from testing.'16 However, by 1961 and the beginning 
of the Kennedy administration, this anti-testing attitude disappeared, 
Thereafter a majority or consensus of the public supported renewed 
testing by the United States. It is important to note that this changed 
public attitude, or rather a return to the "normaln pro-testing pattern, 
occurred before the Soviets resumed atomic testing in August, 1961. 217 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
214 1/1955 NORC 366; 3/1955 NORC 370; 2/1956 NORC 382. 
*I5 10/1956 MINN 154abb; 10/1956 AIPO 573k; 7/1957b AIPO 586k; 
4/1958 MINN 170; 4/1958 AIPO 598k. 
216 3/1960 MINN 190. 
*I7 1/1961 MINN 201; 6/1961 AIPO 647k; 7/1961 MINN 206. 
After the Soviet Union abruptly resumed its own nuclear testing in 
the atmosphere, a majority of people in several large American cities 
supported renewed U.S. nuclear testing. 218 After President Kennedy 
announced that the U.S. would also resume testing and after the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) had conducted its first nuclear test in 34 
months, the public supported this step at the level of virtual unanimity 
(89 percent). 219 American public attitudes continued to harden over 
the next year as initial plurality opposition to resuming testing in the 
atmosphere switched to plurality and then consensus support f a r  testing 
above ground. 220 All of this data show that the general public did 
not support the argument presented by many peace activists and arms 
control advocates that the U.S. should terminate or restrict its nuclear 
testing. 
The data presented in Figure 5-2 actually overstate the degree of 
change in public minion on the generic issue of nuclear testing. In 
addition to t'. . survey conducted during the U.S.-Soviet 
moraco-rium whic:.. .,owed majority opposition to resumed testing, a close 
review of question wording shows that two data points which find low 
levels of support for continued testing come from surveys which asked 
whether the U.S. should resume atmospheric testing. 221 since these 
surveys were conducted at a time when the U.S. had already resumed 
underground testing, plurality support for resumed atmospheric testing 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
218 9/1961 Gallup special. 
219 9/1961 MINN 208. 
220 11/1961 AIPO 652k; 1/1962 AIPO 654kb; 3/1962 AIPO 656k. 
221 11/1961 AIPO 652; 1/1961 AIPO 654kb. 
actually represents very aggressive support for continued nuclear 
testing, and opposition to resuming testing in the atmosphere at this 
time should not be considered opposition to nuclear testing in general. 
If one calculates the mean and standard deviation for data concerning 
continued testing and excludes these three questions noted above, the 
level of support increases to 63 persent (from 60 percent for all 
questions) and the level of temporal stability increases, i,e. the 
standard deviation declines to 12.6 ( f rqm 14.5 for all questions). 
Wnile this data does not paint a picture of perfect atritude stability 
supporting continued nuclear testing, it is difficult to characterize 
public opinion as volati1.e. 
C. Awareness and Knowledge of Fallout and Testing Related Issues 
One possible reason that could explain the genzrally pro-testing 
attitude described above could be that lcnowledge of atomic testing and 
fallout might have not diffused widely throughout the population. I f  
this is true, relative public ignorance could just mean that the public 
held permissive attitudes toward government actions, in this case 
meaning that the public supported testing because it was goverrment 
policv. A review of data that measure awareness a2d knowledge of 
atmospheric testing, presented in Table 5-1, c-ncludes that this 
explanation has no empirical support. From 1946 throueh tile 1960s, 
awareness of U.S. nuclear resting and fallout was extremely high, and 
public knowledge eventually grew to relatively high levels. 
Date Survey 
Awareness and Knowledge of 
Fallout and Testing-Related Issues 
Table 5-1 
P S Y  CORP 173 
P S Y  CORP 178 
A I P O  544 
NORC 398T 
A I P O  582 
I S R  423 
A I P O  598 
A I P O  652 
A I P O  659 
A I P O  676 
I S R  728 
Topic 
Bikini test (pre) 
Bikini test (post) 
Fallout: 





Test ban proposal 
Test ban agreenrer~t 





In the mid-1940s, people were aware of the planned Bikini test at 
the level of preponderance (75 percent). After the test took place, 
awareness had reached the virtually unanimous level (89 percent). The 
public also had relatively detailed knowledge of the purpose of the 
tests and the targets that wore bombarded with atomic weapons. 2 2 2 
In tlle 1950s, awareness of atomic fallout was at the level of 
consenst~s or preponderance. 223 I n  addition, public responses to 
open-ended questions demonstrated a substantial increase in relstively 
detailed knowledge about nuclear fallout. From 1955 until 1961, public 
knowledge about fallout increased from 17 percent to 56 percent. 2 24 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
222 4/1946b AIPO 369k6t; 6/1946 P S Y  COBP 17:kbt; 8/1946 P S Y  CORP 
178k&t. 
223 4,4957 A I P O  582k; 4/1958 A I P O  598k. 
22'* 3/1355 A I P O  544; 11/1961 A I P O  652. 
This is the largest: increase in public knowledge on any nuclear or arms 
control issue that has occurred in the atomic age. In 1963, awareness 
of the nuclear test ban talks consistently reached the level of 
preponderance. 225 By the end of 1963, relatively detailed public 
knowledge of this treaty had diffused to a majority of the 
population. 226 When this data is compared with forty years of data on 
awareness and knowledge about other nuclear and arms control issues, one 
can see that both awareness and knowledge of atmospheric testing and the 
cest ban negotiations were extremely high from a historical 
2erspective. 227  
D. Public Interest in ~uclead Testing Issues 
A second reason that might expiain the gtnerally strong 
pro-testing attitude among the American public might have to do with the 
level of people's interest in the subject. If public interest ir, this 
issue was low, then all the knowledge in the world about fallout might 
not translate into critical attitudes toward nuclear testing. The daca 
available to evaluate this question, summarized in Table 5-2, is 
fragmentary, a bit complicated, but sufficiently good to draw two 
co~clusions. First, there was relatively public interest in issues 
associared with the rest ban and fallout controversies. Second, 
determining the t,xact level of public interest depends critically on the 
formal: of the survey question. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
225 3/1963 AIPO 669; 8/1963 AIPO 676k; 12/1963 ISR 729. 
226 1?/1963 ISR 729. 227 See Chapter 3 and Graham 1988. 
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A 
Public Interest in Nuclear Testing-Related Issues 
Table 5-2 
Public Interest in Nuclear Testing-Related Issues 
Table 5-2 




MINN 38 Bikini test closed (A) 3 2 
NORC 366 Atomicfiydrogen bombs closed (B) 2 3 
NORC 370 H bomb tests closed (C) 4 6 
MINN 154 Test ban proposal closed (D) 17 
ISR 423 Atomic bomb fallout closed (A/C) 60 
ORC 466 Test ban treaty closed (E) 2 8 
RCOM 63 Stop A-bomb tests open ( F )  1 
RCOM 68 Stop A-bomb tests open ( F )  5 
AIPO 610 Nuclear testing open ( G )  1 
AIPO 612 Nuclear testing open ( G )  1 
AIPO 616 Nuclear testing open ( G I  1 
AIPO 618 Nuclear testing open ( G I  3 
MINN 210 Atomic bamb tests open ( H I  3 
Three point scale: greatly interested, moderately interested 
and not interested. Data for greatly interested put into the 
table. 
List of four domestic and foreign policy issues presented to 
the respondent. 
Three point scale: great deal of interest, some interest, 
practically none. 
Two point scale: is or is not a major election issue. 
List of issues presented to the respondent. 
Two open ended questions asked what is the most important 
issue in the Presidential election this year and what is the 
second and third most important issue in the election. 
Open ended question: what is the most important problem 
facing this country today? 
Open ended question: what problem should Congress deal with 
first? 
A s  a  f i r s t  approximat ion ,  t h e  hypo thes i s  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  had 
r e l a t i v e l y  low t o  moderate i n t e r e s t  about  t e s t  ban i s s u e s  seems t o  be 
confirmed.  The e x a c t  magnitude o f  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  depends on t h e  format  
o f  t h e  survey  q u e s t i o n .  When people  a r e  asked "open ended" q u e s t i o n s ,  
o n l y  between one t o  f i v e  p e r c e n t  of  t h e  p u b l i c  exp res sed  i n t e r e s t  i n  
n u c l e a r  t e s t i n g  i s s u e s .  228 For t h e  p u b l i c  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  
i n  n u c l e a r  t e s t i n g  i s s u e s  when answering t h e s e  "open" q u e s t i o n s ,  they  
had t o  respond wi thou t  any h e l p  o r  prompting from an  i n t e r v i e w e r .  I n  a  
s e n s e ,  t h i s  t ype  of  survey  q u e s t i o n  i s  q u i t e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  and may t end  
t o  unde res t ima te  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  i n  any p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e .  229  However, 
i f  survey  respondents  a r e  p re sen ted  wi th  "c losed"  q u e s t i o n s ,  t h a t  is a 
l i s t  of  i s s u e s  and then  asked whether they  were i n t e r e s t e d  i n  one 
p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e ,  d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e i r  l e v e l  o f  i n t e r e s t  i n  n u c l e a r  
t e s t i n g  i s s u e s  i s  recorded  a t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h i g h e r  l e v e l s .  I n  t h e  c a s e  
of  t h e  n u c l e a r  t e s t i n g ,  t h e  average  i n t e r e s t  was 34 p e r c e n t  i f  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  format  was " c l o s e d .  1,230 
I t  i s  imposs ib le  t o  de te rmine  whether t h e  1 - 5  p e r c e n t  o r  t h e  34 
p e r c e n t  l e v e l  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  " c o r r e c t "  measure of  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  
- - - - - - - . . - - - - - - -  
228 6/1956 RCOM 63;  10/1956 RCOM 68;  ?/I959 AIPO 610; 4/1959 AIPO 
612; 7/1959 AIPO 616; 9/1959 AIPO 618; 12/1961 M I N N  210. 
229  Desp i t e  t h i s  c o n s e r v a t i v e  " b i a s "  t o  open ended q u e s t i o n s ,  t hey  
a r e  ex t remely  v a l u a b l e  r e s e a r c h  t o o l s  and a r e  used by v i r t u a l l y  
a l l  su rvey  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  t h e  form of  t h e  "most impor tan t  
problem" q u e s t i o n .  A review of  long  t ime s e r i e s  d a t a  from 
G a l l u p ' s  v e r s i o n  of  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  shows t h a t  major i s s u e s  o f  
t h e  day such  a s  war and peace o r  t h e  economy can  r each  h igh  
l e v e l s  of  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t .  Sae T ,  W .  Smith 1985. 
230 8/1946 M I N N  38; 1/1955 NORC 366; 3/1955 NORC 370; 10/1956 MINN 
154;  4/1957 ISR 423; 11/1963 ORC 466. 
test ban issue. However, when these open-ended and closed questions are 
compared with similar data for other issues, it is possible to conclude 
that public interest in nuclear testing issues was not extremely high. 
As dramatic as the debate over the health effects of nuclear fallout 
seemed to be for many scientists and peace activists, survey data show 
that the general public was only moderately interested in the subject. 
Data obtained in response to a series of closed questions record the 
relative degree of public interest in test ban issues compared to other 
domestic and foreign policy issues. This evidence indicates that 
nuclear testing and fallout issues were of less public interest than 
issues concerning the chance of war, personal health, or the domestic 
economy. However, interest in nuclear testing issues was not at the 
bottom of the list. There was relatively more public interest in 
nuclear testing issues thall in other mainstream diplomatic topics such 
as the U.N., German rearmament, relations with Latin America, or many 
science topics. 231 
E. Concern Over Fallout 
Even though interest in nuclear testing issues remained moderate 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, as knowledge about nuclear fallout 
increased from 1955 co 1961, the level of public concern over the 
negative health implications of fallout increased. By 1957, a slim 
majority (52 percent) of the public thought that fallout was a danger, 
231 1/1955 NORC 366; 3/1955 NORC 370; 4/1957 ISR 423. 
and by 1958, a large plurality thought that it was a threat to future 
generations. 232 By 1961, the public had a high degree of knowledge 
about atomic fallout with many people believing that it would cause 
disease and cancer. 233 However, this data lead to an intellectual 
quandary. If concern about atomic fallout increased but support for 
continued nuclear testing remained relatively constant, does this 
indi.cate that public attitudes were "inconsistent? "234 A ,-.lose 
reading of the data suggests that the public had a reasonably 
sophisticated logic behind its structure of attitudes, but the logic was 
different from that held by rnost elites who are as a general rule very 
knowledgeable, interested, and highly politically artive. First, while 
the public had become increasingly concerned about atomic fallout, a 
consensus (61 percent) did not think that there was enough radiation in 
the air to present a current, as opposed to a future, danger. 2 3 5  All 
of the political mobilization and public education by anti-testing 
scientists and interest groups had not convinced a large segment of the 
public that fallout was a near term problem of sufficient magnitude to 
change its generic support for continued nuclear testing. 
If there was a relatively weak relntjonship between concern over 
fallout and opposition to co1;tinued testing, what can explain the 
conventior~al wisdom on this subject-- that concern over fallout 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
232 4/1957 AIPO 582k; 4/1958 AIPO 598k. 
2 3 3  11/1961 AIPO 652k. 
234 Daniel Yankelovich often interprets the public as being 
"contradictory" or "inconsistent." See Public Agenda 
Foundation 1984, 4. 
2 3 5  111.1961 AlPO 652k. 
stimulated opposition to nuclear testing? The main data that supports 
the proposition that concern with fallout stimulated opposition to 
continued nuclear testing comes from histories of the period that rely 
on the activity of interest groups, editorials, or participation in mass 
rallies. While all of this political activity actually took place, only 
a very small percent of the public was involved in these 
activities. 236 This example illustrates the danger of using 
indicators other than public opinion data or election results to 
determine mass attitudes or political involvement. The public 
controversy over fallout fully mobilized the arms control "issue 
public," but as discussed in Chapter 3, this is a relatively small 
segment of the population. Survey data show that only a relatively 
small percent of the total population, approximhtely 10 to 20 percent, 
was sufficiently concerned about fallout to give it as the reason to 
stop nuclear testing or to support a test ban agreement. 237 As 
reviewed in Table 5-3 below, this finding is relatively consistent both 
in state and national surveys conducted froin 1958 through 1963. 
The third reason for continued public support for nuclear testing 
relates to Americans' well-documented faith in technology. 238 For at 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
236 Surrey data from a wide firray of sources indi.cate that less 
than 10 percent of the population have ever participated in a 
"mass" demonstration. 
237 5/1958 MINN 170; 3/1960 MINN 190; 11/1961 Alp0 652; 11/1961 
IOWA 166; 4/1962 IOWA 167; 7/1963 Harris; 8/1963 AIPO 676; 
9/1963 Harris. 
238 La Porte and Chisolm 1980; J. Miller, Prewitt and Pearson 1980; 
J. Miller 1981, 1982; National Science Board 1973, 1975, 1977, 
1979, 1981, 1983; Pion and 1,ipsey 1981; Tavis 1972. 
Concern With F a l l o u t  and 
Opposi t ion t o  T e s t i n g  o r  Support f o r  a  T e s t  Ban 
Table 5 - 3  
Date Survey Leve 1 I s s u e  
( p e r -  
cen t )*  
MSNN 170 
M I N N  190 
AIPO 652 
A I P O  652 
IOWA 166 
IOWA 167 
H a r r i s  
AIPO 676 
H a r r i s  
IOWA 172 
Gave f a l l o u t  a s  t h e i r  reason f o r  
s topp ing  t e s t i n b  
Mentioned f a l l o u t  a s  a  d isadvantage  of 
continued t e s t i n g  
Believed t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  l e v e l  of  
f a l l o u t  c o n s t i t u t e d  a  hee1t.h danger 
Concern over  f a l l o u t  has  e f f e c t e d  o n e ' s  
out look on l i f e  
Gave f a l l o u t  a s  t h e  reason f o r  th ink ing  
the  U.S. should n o t  resume t e s t i n g  
Gave f a l l o u t  a s  t h e  reason f o r  th ink ing  
the  U.S. should n o t  resume t e s t i n g  
Gave f a l l o u t  a s  t h e  reason f o r  approving 
t h e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  
Gave f a l l o u t  a s  t h e  reason f o r  approving 
r a t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  
Gave f a l l o u t  a s  t h e  reason f o r  approving 
t h e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  
Gave f a l l o u t  a s  t h e  reason f o r  approving 
t h e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  
Since  t h e s e  t i g u r e s  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d  on t h e  b a s l s  of t h e  pe rcen t  
of  t h e  e n t i r e  p u b l i c ,  they  may appear  a t  f i r s t  g lance  t o  be 
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  than  d a t a  p resen ted  i n  Appendix 6 .  
least the first two decades of the nuclear age, thi.s positive attitude 
toward technology applied to nuclear testing. In the 1940s, a 
consenstis of the public believed that the reason for testing was to 
experiment with new technologies, not to demonstrate U.S. power. 2 3 9  
In the 1950s, a plurality (49 percent) were persuaded by the argrlrnent 
put forward by advoc~tes of continued testing--that it was needed to 
produce a clean bomb. A larger consensus (60 percent) thought that 
testing was necessary to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. 240 
A fourth reason why worry about fallout did not translate into 
critical attitudes toward nuclear testing was that dramatic nuclear 
events, such as those conducted at the Bikini atoll in the Pacific, did 
riot trigger a r.agative attitude toward nuclear testing in general. 
-
After the 1946 tests, a majority believed that atomic weapons did less 
damage than they had expected. However, this belief did not lead to a 
simplistic or planless attitude toward nuclear weapons, as a majority of 
the. public continued to believe that at0rr.i~ weapons were terrible. On 
the other hand, early atomic testing did not convince the public that 
the United Ststes could rely excl.usively on atomic, rather than 
conventional, weapons. After the Bikini tests, the public supported 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
239 4/1946b AIPO 369k6t. In contrast, at a much later period, a 
majority of the public (55%) believed that Soviet nuclear 
testing was to frighten the U.S., create tension, and remind 
the world of Russian military power. See 9/1961 MINN 208. 
240 7/1957b AIPO 586k. 
maintenance of !, slightly larger conventional military force than they 
had before the atomic explosions. 24 1 
A fifth and final explanation for the lack of an attitude linkage 
betweer. concern over fallout and support for nuclear testing relates to 
the ever-present critical attitude toward the Soviet Union. One of the 
main reasons given by people who wanted to continue testing was a lack 
of trust in ~ u s s i a . * ~ ~  As can be seen in Table 5-4, this critical 
attitude did not change throughout the entire period of negotiation and 
ratification of the test ban. 24 3 
Lack of Trust of the Soviet Union 
Table 5-4 
Date Surv~,y Leve 1 Issue 
(per- 
cent) 
4/1957 MINN 160 8 7 Could not count on Russia to stop tests 
if the U.S. halted its tests 
7/1957 MINN 162 8 0 Could not count on Russia to live up to 
test ban agreement 
11/1961 AIPO 652 7 9 Believe Khrushchev was bluffing abour his 
proposal for a test ban agreement 
3/1963 AIPO 669 t; 5 Could not count on Russia to live ~p to 
test ban agreement 
11/1963 Harris 1285 73 Eelieved that Soviet agreement to the 
test ban did NOT mean Russia had become 
more peaceful 
- - - - - - - .  - - - - - - -  
241 6/1946 PSY CORP I .  3k&T; 7/1946 AIPO 385k; 8/1946 PSY CORI' 
178k&t; 8/1946 MINN 36. 
242 4/1958 MINN 170; 9/1958 MINN 174; 8/1963 MINN 226. 243 Some authors conclude that attitudes towards the Soviet Union 
improved in 1962 and 1963. A rmiew of data in Appendix 5 
shows that while the public shifted its attitudes on the 
relative threat of the Soviet Union (compared to China), 
critical attitudes toward the Soviet Union stayed the same 
during the negotiation and ratification of the test ban. 
F. Support for Bilateral Test Ban Agreement 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the public held one attitude that 
was uniformly supportive of a nuclear test ban: a consensus supported a 
negotiated test ban agreement with the Soviet Union as long as the 
question made it clear that the United States was not unilaterally 
terminating its testing program. As can be seen in Figure 5-3, chis 
positive attitude (mean of 67 percent with a standard deviation of 13.4) 
was both higher and more stable than public attitudes that favored 
continued nuclear testing. The public made a clear and consistent 
distinction between objecting to the U.S. stopping its nuclear testing 
(which people assumed would be unilateral if the survey question was 
ambiguous) while at the same t i ~ e  supporting a bilateral test ban 
agreement that included some form of verification. 244 As will be 
discussed in greater detail in sec,tion I11 of this chapter, virtually 
a?.l anti-testing or pro-arms control groups failed to understand this 
basic distinction in the public mind. A consensus of the public 
suppol ted a bilateral test ban agreement prio:i to discussion cf nuclear 
testing in the 1956 electiuil campaign, before anti-nuclear inc1:rest  
groups were organizing aro~nd the fallout issue, before influential 
columnists had voiced support for a test ban, and before President 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
244 This distinction in attitudes was firsc discovered by !losi 
1964. However not only does his analysis of public atticudcs 
differ from this authors', but the scope of his research 
(?ublic opinion data from 1954-1958 and no review of primary 
source documeccs) was much more limited than research conducted 
for this chapter. 
Suppart for Bilateral Test Ban AGREEMENT 
F i g u r e  5-3 
P 
date 
Opposition to Bilateral Test Ban AGREEMENT 
date 
Eisenhower supported a bilateral test ban. 245 A close reading of two 
questions repeated in two different surveys in 1955 and 1956 is 
essential to understanding public attitudes on the testing and test ban 
issues. The first question asked whether the United States should stop 
its hydrogen bomb tests. Eighty percent of the public answered "No." 
Fifteen percent answered "Yes." The 80 percent who answered "No" were 
then asked if it would be a good idea or a bad idea If all countries, 
including Russia and the United States, would sign an agreement to stop 
any further H-bomb tests. Sixty two percent of t,hese people answered 
"Yes." When the results of these two questions are combined, one finds 
that 15 percent of the public could be considered hard-core supporters 
of unilateral cessation of American nuclear testing. One could 
logically assume they would support a test ban agreement; 50 percznt 
supported a U.S.-Soviet agreement to stop testing, but in the absence of 
such n bilateral agreement favored continued U.S. testing; only 27 
percant opposed a U.S.-Soviet test ban agreement and wanted to continue 
testing regardless; and 8 percent had no opinion. By this 
reconstruction of the data, a consensus (65 percent) supported a 
bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the Sovi,.-ts to stop hydrogen 
bomb testing. A review of Figure 5-3 shows that this consensus level 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
245 A systematic review of the development of interest groups and 
the writings of major columnists was conducted by Rosi 1964. I 
have drawn on his conclusions in these two areas. For the 
polls, see 3/1955 NORC 370; 2/1956 NORC 382. 
suppor t  f o r  a  t e s t  ban agreement s t a y e d  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n s t a n t  throughout  
t h e  1950s and 19hQs.  246 
The d a t a  p resen ted  i n  Figure 5 - 3  probably under -es t ima tes  p u b l i c  
suppor t  f o r  a  t e s t  ban agreement because it  inc ludes  t h r e e  ques t ions  
t h a t  e i t h e r  r equ i red  t h e  p u b l i c  t o  answer a  f i l t e r  q u e s t i o n  (having t h e  
e f f e c t  of  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  pe rcen t  of  t h e  p u b l i c  coded i n t o  
t h z  "no answer" c a t e g o r y ) ,  framed the  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  i s s u e  as a  Russian 
p roposa l ,  o r  asked about  the  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  i n  the con tex t  of  suppor t  
f o r  Barry Goldwater.  If  one c a l c u l a t e s  g e n e r i c  suppor t  f o r  a  t e s t  ban 
agreement wi thout  inc lud ing  these  t h r e e  q u e s t i o n s ,  average suppor t  
i n c r e a s e s  from a l e v e l  of consensus t o  a  l e v e l  of  preponderance (from 67  
t o  73 p e r c e n t ) ,  and t h e  s t a b i l i t y  of t h i s  a t t i t u d e  i n c r e a s e s  (from a 
s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  of 1 4 . 4  t o  1 0 . 7 ) .  
G .  Other  Lessons From This  Publ ic  Opinion Data 
Three f i n a l  obse rva t ions  can  be made by reviewing p u b l i c  opin ion  
d a t a  concerning  t h e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y .  F i r s t ,  throughout the  e n t i r e  
p e r i o d  from 1958 through 1963, a  ma jo r i ty  of t h e  pub l i c  were s k e p t i c a l  
t h a t  an agreement between t h e  U.S. and t h e  Sov ie t  Union could  be 
concluded.  247 Second, throughout t h e  nuc lea r  a g e ,  arms c o n t r o l  
advocates  have a t tempted  t o  communicate t o  t h e  p u b l i c  by us ing  t h e  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
246 3/1955 NORC 370; 2/1956 NORC 382; 4/1957 A I P O  582k. Support 
f o r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  Limited Tes t  Ban Trea ty  reached 
consensus l e v e l s  and h i g h e r :  P/1963 AIPO 676k; 8/1963 M I N N  
226; 10/1963 IOWA/IAPO 172;  12/1963 ISR 729. 
247 9/1958 M I N N  174;  3/1963 AIPO 669k. 
press as opposed to the mass media (i.e. radio or television). This 
strategy made sense in 1946 when slightly more people gained their news 
about nuclear testing from newspapers than from radio. 248 However, as 
radio and television gained the dominant position as the source of news 
for the public, this print-dominated media strategy would be less and 
less effective. By 1957, approximately one-quarter of the population 
relied on newspapers for most of their news. 249 Third, there is 
little evidence that the Cuban missile crisis changed public preferences 
for a test ban agreement or for, in the absence of a bilateral 
agreement, continued nuclear testing. This dual pattern in public 
attitudes had been firmly established in the public mind well before the 
crisis. However, the Cuban missile crisis increased the level of public 
fear of the chance of war between the two superpowers and also 
stimulated President Kennedy and General Secretary Khrushchev to 
negotiate a test ban agreement. 250 In this manner, despite its lack 
of impact on public opinion concerning the test ban per se, attitudes 
about the Cuban crisis had an impact on the negotiation of the test ban 
agreement. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
248 8/1946 MINN 36. 
249 4/1957 AIPO 582. This survey reports that 85% of the public 
had TVs and that only 27% would find giving up newspapers, 
rather than TV or radio, as difficult. 
250 Two surveys (AIPO 665 and 666) indicate that a total of 59% and 
43% of the population listed "Cuba" or "a chance of war" as the 
most mportant problem during the crisis. On Kennedy-Khrushchav 
correspondence, see Pope 1982. 
I11 Relationship Between Public Opinion and Policy 
A. Getting on the Agenda 
As noted in the summary of this chapter, traditional accounts of 
the Limited Test Ban negotiations begin with the public controversy 
generated by the 1954 Bravo thermonuclear test in the Pacific which 
contaminated the Lucky Dragon. There is no dispute that the H-bomb test 
generated a great deal of public controversy. However, there is reason 
to question what aspect of American and international public opinior~ was 
the most important factor responsible for successfully getting the test 
ban issue onto the Executive branch agenda. Several early efforts to 
~ e t  a test ban onto the agenda failed during the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations. However, a test ban finally reached the agenda and 
moved onto the negotiation stage well after public concern over fallout 
had become ebident. This suggests that public attitudes over fallout 
were not the aspect of public opinion that influenced government 
decisionmakers. 
Prior to the 1954 Bravo explosion, nuclear testing by any country 
generated little public controversy. In 1946, when public support for 
testing was at the level of consensus, America's two nuclear tests in 
the Pacific generated only token public opposition by a small veteran's 
group and a few dozen Socialist protesters. 251 The United States next 
conducted three tests in 1948; the Soviet Union conducted its first 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
251 Affelder 1983, 8, 44-47. 
t e s t  i n  1949;  t h e  B r i t i s h  t e s t e d  t h e i r  f i r s t  a tomic weapon i n  1952. 
None of  t h e s e  a tomic  exp los ions  t r i g g e r e d  p u b l i c  con t rove r sy  among the  
g e n e r a l  p u b l i c .  
The f i r s t  e f f o r t  t o  g e t  a  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  on to  t h e  Execut ive 
branch  agenda occu r red  b e f o r e  any p u b l i c  con t rove r sy  was expres sed  about  
n u c l e a r  t e s t i n g .  The i d e a  of  a  t e s t  ban was f i r s t  r a i s e d  by Vanoever 
Bush i n  1952,  two y e a r s  a f t e r  P r e s i d e n t  Truman had o rde red  development 
o f  t h e  hydrogen bomb. Bush proposed t o  S e c r e t a r y  of  S t a t e  Acheson and 
t o  P r e s i d e n t  Truman t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  United S t a t e s  H-bomb t e s t ,  code named 
Mike and p lanned  t h r e e  days b e f o r e  t h e  p r e s 2 d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n ,  be 
postponed and t h a t  an  o v e r t u r e  be made t o  t h e  S o v i e t s  t o  p r o h i b i t  a l l  
hydrogen d e t o n a t i o n s .  A f t e r  b r i e f l y  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  i d e a ,  P r e s i d e n t  
Truman dec ided  t o  go ahead wi th  t h e  t e s t  because weather  c o n d i t i o n s  
would have caused  a  d e l a y  of  6  months i f  t h e  t e s t  was n o t  conducted i n  
e a r l y  November. 252 Thi s  f a i l u r e  of arms c o n t r o l  q u i c k l y  l e d  t o  t h e  
thermonuclear  arms r a c e .  Less t han  one y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  American 
thermonuclear  t e s t ,  t h e  S o v i e t s  took  a  temporary l e a d  i n  t h e  n u c l e a r  
arms r a c e  w i t h  t h e i r  t e s t  of a  d e l i v e r a b l e  H-bomb i n  August ,  1953. 
However, t h i s  e v e n t ,  d i d  n o t  s t i m u l a t e  s e r i o u s  government o r  p u b l i c  
d i s c u s s i o n  of  a  t e s t  ban .  
The second a t t e m p t  t o  g e t  t h e  t e s t  ban i d e a  on to  t h e  execu t ive  
branch  agenda was made by t h e  s o l e  remaining Democrat on t h e  Atomic 
Energy Commission, Thomas Murray. 253 I n  February ,  1954,  he proposed 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
252 Divine 1978a,  1 6 ;  Lepper 1971,  24 
253 Murray was n o t  a  c l a s s i c  l i b e r a l  arms c o n t r o l l e r .  He had 
opposed t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Cont ro l  of  Atomic Energy. 
to President Eisenhower that United Nations observers be invited to the 
Castle test series and that a test moratorium be proposed as an 
inducement for the Soviets to enter into disarmament negotiations. 
Eisenhower rejected both ideas and approved the fateful Bravo test which 
was subsequently held in March, 1 9 5 4 . ~ ~ ~  It is worth noting that 
public opinion was supportive of President Eisenhower's decision to 
continue testicg and to exclude foreign observers from the testing 
area. Throughour the 1950s and 1960s the public did not back proposals 
like those of Commissioner Murray that would have required the United 
States to take unilateral arms control initiatives. 
After the 1954 Bravo test, a substantial amount of public and 
political pressure was placed on the Eisenhower administration to halt 
testing and to deal with the problem of atomic fallout. 255 However, 
most of the administration's efforts over the next two years were 
directed at public relations damage control, rather than making changes 
in United States nuclear testing or arms control policy. In the month 
after the Bravo test, senior aaministration officials held several news 
conferences, declassified and released photographs of the first H-bomb 
test (Mike), and showed a 30 minute film of it on prime time 
television. 256 Secretary of State Dullee was forced to defend 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
254 Divine 1978a, 24. 
255 Political pressure to negotiate a test ban came in many forms: 
Prime Minister Nehru's call for a test ban; petitions from aver 
100 Labor members of the British parliament; a private letter 
to the White House from the Chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy. See Jacobson and Stein 1966, 20. 
256 Divine 1978a. 17-23. 
America's policy of continuing testing to the normally supportive NATO 
foreign ministers. As non-government scientists published analysis that 
fallout would have major negative health and genetic effects, they set 
the political agenda and put the administration constantly on the 
defensive. Congressional hearings were held, and the fallout issue 
stayed in the press and became the focus of various interest groups' 
activities for the next several years. 
Public opinion, supplemented by interest group and Congressional 
pressure, forced the administration to engage on more than just public 
relations efforts. It is clear from a comprehensive review of primary 
and secondary sources that public opinion did have an impact on some 
U.S. government policy. However, these policies were only indirectly 
related to the test ban treaty. The administration took several steps 
which key decisionmakers attributed to public opinion. For exarriple, 
immediately after the Bravo test in 1954, President Eisenhower n~.qde a 
public announcement that the United States would not build bigger 
hydrogen bombs. 257 In 1955, Eisenhower appointed Harold Stassen as a 
cabinet-level advisor to coordinate and publicize America's disarmament 
policy. Later in that same year, the administrat5on reversed its 
original position and agreed to national and international scientific 
studies on the fallout issue. 258 On the international diplomatic 
257 Affelder 1983, 97; Divine 1978~1, 23. 
258 These studies were eventually carried out by the National 
Academy of Sciences and the United Nations. Divine 1978a, 
56-7, 63. 
front, the United States attempted to take the initiative by proposing 
its "Open Skies" arms control and cor-fidence building measure. 259 1n 
1959, Eisenhower transferred supervision of r~diation safety from the 
Atomic Energy Commissior to a new Federal Radiation Council. 260 
However, despite all the public controversy immediately after the 
Bravo test and various changes in policy directly attributed to public 
opinion, the administration did not change its policy with respect to 
negotiation of a test ban agreement. Thus, public opinion did nc.. have 
the impact on test ban decisions that is often attribuLed to it. After 
a thorough interagency study completed in June, 1954, President 
Eisenhower reaffirmed his opposition to a test ban treaty. 261 
Throughout 1956 and 1957 tkis Eisenhower position against negotiaring a 
test ban was supported by all of the major press commentators. 262 
While there is evidence that public opinion caused the administration to 
engage in various public relations activities and to make policy changes 
noted above, two years after Bravo, the test ban issue had moved 
from Executive branch consideration to being truly on the agenda. 
Even in the face of Soviet initiatives and growing international 
pressure, the Eisenhower administration did not change its basic 
anti-test ban position until mid-1957 or 1958. 263 After the Soviets 
proposed a reciprocal test moratori~un in late 1955 and the Pope called 
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259 Blacker and Duffy 1984, 103; Lepper 1971, 28-9; Seaborg and 
Loeb 1982, 5. 
260 Divine 1978a, 262-18, 330. 
Divine 1978a, 25. 
262 Rosi 1967b. 315-6. 
263 Blacker and Duffy 1984, 104-5; Divine 1978a. 61-62. 
for a test ban in his New Year's message, the United States responded by 
proposing a cutoff in the production of fissLonable material and linking 
a test ban to Soviet acceptance of this initiative. Knowing that the 
United States by this time had an overwhelming advantage in stockpiled 
nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissionable material, few scholars 
have considered this a serious arms control proposal. 264 The key 
point to emphasize is that despite the significant amount of public 
controversy about fallout from 1954 through 1956, public opinion did not 
force the administration to begin test ban negotiations. 
In 1957 and 1958 things began to change inside the Eisenhower 
administration. Several technical and bureaucratic changes, combined 
with a correct analysis of public opinion in the context of the 1956 
election, were responsible for placing the test ban issue onto the 
Executive branch agenda. However, public opinion was only one of 
several factors that finally get the test ban issue on the agenda. The 
proximate cause for the test ban getting onto the agenda was that 
President Eisenhower became increasingly supportive of a test ban 
agreement in his second administration. While he rarely directly 
overruled the recommendations of his defense and atomic energy advisors, 
the pattern of his decisions shows that he became increasingly 
supportive of concluding a test bail agreement. In May 1957, Ambassador 
Stassen was given instructions to obtain European support for an 
Eisenhower proposal for a test moratorium. Even though this initiative 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
264 Blacker and Duffy 1984, 104-5; Divine 1978a, 66. 
failed and effectively ended Stassen's influence in the administration, 
this was the first indication that the test ban idea was firmly on the 
Executive branch agenda. A month later, Eisenhower was inclined to go 
along with a Soviet proposal for a two to three year test moratorium 
until he was convinced by scientists from the Atomic Energy Commission 
that further U.S. testing was needed to develop a clean bomb, to perfect 
peaceful nuclear explosives, and to improve the design of tactical 
nuclear weapons for Europe. By April 1958, Eisenhower asked his 
departments to study whether the U.S. should break from its past 
diplomatic position and de-link the test ban from a cutoff in the 
production of fissionable material. This study, and a flawed analysis 
completed by Hans Bethe on the ability to verify a camprehensive test 
ban, convinced Eisenhower that technical talks should be initiated with 
the Soviets. This led to a conference of Soviet and American experts 
and represented the first time that test ban issues were being seriously 
negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Throughout this period Eisenhower mentions that public opinion was 
a pressure on him to negotiate a test ban agreement. 265 Not only does 
the public opinion data show that there was clear support for a 
bilateral test ba11 agreement, but White House mail was supportive of a 
test ban, and newspaper columnists shifted from being opposed to split 
over a test ban. 266 The Eisenhower administration discovered from its 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
265 Divine 1978a, 146-150; Jacobson and Stein 1966, 15, 28; 
Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 8-9. 
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own polling that the public was in favor of a test ban agreement if the 
Soviet Union were a party. Thus, the important element of public 
opinion that helped get the test ban treaty negotiatiorls successfully 
onto the Executive branch agenda was support for a bilateral test ban 
agreement, not concern over fallout. Discovering this pattern in public 
opinion required relatively detailed polling and sophisticated knowledge 
of public attitudes. 
However, one should be cautions in concluding that public opinion 
was the main factor in moving President Eisenhower toward a pro-test ban 
position. Other factors also influenced his change in attitude. By 
1957, the United States had demonstrated for itself the feasibility of 
testing large nuclear devices underground. As a result, halting testing 
in the atmosphere wo~ld have less cost in terms of the development of 
nuclear weapons technology than was believed in 1954 and 1955. Several 
changes in bureaucratic politics also strengthened the pro-test ban 
cause. Secretary of State Dulles, citing world opinion, took an 
increasingly pro-test ban position especially after his bureaucratic 
rival, Harold Stassen, resigned. Also, the powerful Chairman of the 
Atomic Energy Commission and Assistant to the President for Atomic 
Energy, Lewis Strauss, stepped down in mid-1958. While his replacement 
continued to take an anti-test ban position, this change in personnel 
diminished the AEC's influence over President Eisenhower. 
B. The 1956 Presidential Election 
Ironically, by incorrectly framing the issue, Adlai Stevenson's 
actions in the 1956 election served to delay the test ban issue from 
getting onto the agenda. The test ban issue entered the 1956 
presidential campaign when Adlai Stevenson proposed in a speech before 
the American Society of Newspaper Editors that the United States stop 
future large H-bomb tests. 267 Throughout the campaign, Stevenson 
either explicitly called for unilateral U.S. susp2nsion of tescing or 
failed to emphasize that his proposal would require a bilateral 
agreement with the Soviet Union. As summarized earlier in this chapter, 
by calling for a unilateral cessation of testing and by failing to call 
for a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union, Stevenson's proposal 
was flying in the face of public opinion. However, throughout the 
campaign, there is no indication that Stevenson understood the 
fundamental error in his political communications strategy that 
emphasized firllout and a unilateral test moratorium. President 
Eisenhower, who had access to the detailed "confidential" State 
Department polling on the test ban issue, quickly countered with an 
effective po1-itical communications strategy. 268 As the campaign moved 
inco September and October and Stevenson's discussion of the test ban 
issue brought new activity to his campaign, Eisenhower responded by 
emphasizing the unilateral nature of Stevenson's proposal and stressed 
267 Brown 1961, 201-2; Davis 1967, 327; Divine 1978a, 72-73; 
Rosi 1967b, 23-25. 
268 Eisenhower 1965, 17 - 18. 
the need for strict verification of any test ban agreement. 269 1n 
Stevenson's rejoinder to Eisenhower, the Cemocratic nominee did not deny 
that he was advocating a unilateral U.S. step and failed to address the 
issue of inspection. Stevenson's strategy for raising the test ban 
issue was strongly supported by liberal scientists associated with the 
Federation of American Scientists and the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences an3  supported by a majority of people who wrote to Stevenson 
and to th* White House on the issue. 270 However in a pattern that was 
remarkably similar to the failed efforts of Henry Wallace a decade 
earlier, in the 1956 campaign arms control advocates used a political 
communication strategy that insured that the majority of the public 
would reject it. By failing to consult survey research, by relying on 
imprecise indicators of the public mood such as mail, the size and 
enthusiasm of crowds at campaign rallies, and positions taken by 
interest groups, st even so;^ actually set back the cause for reaching a 
test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. His efforts undercut initiatives 
that were being taken inside the administration in mid-September 1956 to 
advance the cause of a bilateral test ban treaty. 2 7 1 
Soviet attempts to interject their proposal to immediately end 
testing into the presidential campaign, the Anglo-French invasion of 
Egypt, and the Soviet invasion into Hungary all combined to end what 
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little momentum Stevenson had achieved in the campaign. On election 
day, Eisenhower won the election with fifty-eight percent of the popular 
vote and carried 41 states. Most political reporters concluded that 
raising the test ban issue had hurt Stevenson more than it helped him. 
A review of polling data would have confirmed this evaluation. However 
no analysis of the election revealed the pattern discussed earlier in 
this chapter that public support for a test ban was quite strong if the 
proposal emphasized that any such agreement would be bilateral, not 
unilateral. The Eisenhower administration did not misread the election 
results as a popular vote against a test ban, and after the election 
began to move toward negotiating an agreement with the Soviet Union. At 
the same time, scientists and interest groups that had pressured 
Stevenson to raise the test ban issue ignored the election results and 
continued to pursue their failed political communication strategy which 
emphasized atomic fallout. 
The 1956 election was also important because it provided the 
empirical basis for what became the dominant paradigm in American 
electoral behavior, published as The American Votey. The standard 
interpretation of the 1956 election, based on the American National 
Election Studies (ANES), is that voters shifted their opinion in favor 
of the Republican party for several reasons. Voters favored the party 
on economic issues, believed the Republicans were the best party for 
keeping out of war and handling foreign policy, and strongly approved of 
Eisenhower's personality. 272 Issue voting in this election was 
272 Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1964, 18-32. 
relatively small, and foreign policy I.ssues were dominated by 
Eisenhower's personality as a World War II hero who also ha3 ended the 
Korean war. To quote Thz American Voter: 
In neither year 11952, 19561 did Mr. 
Stevenson make any marked impression on the 
electorate in relation to foreign affairs. 
In view of his great concern with foreign 
policy, the attention he gave to foreign 
issues in his campaign addresses, and his 
travels abroad between elections, this fact 
suggests how deep may be the gulf that 
separates the public's view of a candidate 
and the image he seeks to project. Mr. 
Stevenson probably had had more contact 
with foreigc affairs than :sost presidential 
candidates. Yet this contact failed to 
cross the threshold of public awareness. 
Out of the 1948, 1952, and 1956 electior~s came the Michigan model 
of voting behavior that emphasizes party identification, the importance 
of personality, and the relative unimportance of issues. A second-order 
aspect of the model, which was to be strengthened in later years, was 
that bread and butter economic issues were far more important than 
foreign policy issues in determining voters' preferences. 27 3 
The evidence used b-.- the authors of The American Voter to 
substantiate these conclusions was based in large part on responses to 
"open-ended" questions about respondents' likes and dislikes of each 
candidate. As documented earlier in this chapter, the level of public 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
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interest in issues varies a great deal depending on whether the format 
of the question is open or closed. By using the open format, the ANES 
produced results that were bound to conclude that issue voting was low. 
Similarly, with respect to the importance of foreign policy, some of the 
co~~clusions made by the ANES were a by-product of their survey design. 
The ANES for the 1956 election did not include any question on a major 
foreign policy issue and did not include any question on the primary 
foreign policy issue of the campaign, the test ban. 274 
A review of other survey reseaxch shows that several of the ANES 
conclusions about issue voting and the relative importance of foreign 
policy are wrong. First, when presented with a closed question format 
and a list of various topics, the public demonstrated a moderate 
interest in the test ban issue. Second, surveys record that the public. 
was aware of the different positions taken by Stevenson and Eisenhower 
on the test ban issue. Thus, the problem for Stevenson in 1956 was not 
related to being unable to cross a threshold of public awareness, as 
concluded by The American Voter. The problem was that the public heard 
Stevenson's message--a call for a ullilateral U.S. termination of nuclear 
testing-- and rejected it in favor of Eisenhower's position that any 
test ban agreement had to be bilateral and backed up with strong 
- - - - - - - - - - * - - - -  
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verification. The public did not support Eisenhower solely because he 
was a war hero. Large majorities supported Eisenhower on the test ban 
issue because his political communications message was consistent with 
perceptions held by a majority of the public. The public was not 
uninterested or fixated on symbolic issues, but relatively attentive and 
rationale. Stevenson's failure was due to his development of a 
political communication strategy in complete ignorance of public 
attitudes toward the nuclear testing issue. The ANES conclusion that 
foreign policy was not particularly important in the 1956 campaign was 
an artifact of its reliance on open-ended questions and the lack of 
relevant foreign policy questions on its survey. The conclusion that 
foreign policy was n c ~  impoi-tanc in the 1956 election is directly 
contradicted by results obtained from other national surveys conducted 
at the same period of time. 
Conclusions from the 1956 election have had an important impact on 
the study of American electoral behavior. 275 Both scholars and 
commentators have concluded that elections are won or lost OD domestic 
issues, personality, and party identification, not on foreign policy 
issues. The data and analysis presented in this chapter calls into 
question this basic conclusion. As shown in Chapter 3, public 
attentiveness to foreign policy issues varies with the issue. In some 
instances, interest in foreign issues is quite high. The fact that 
275 In particular, surveys conducted at Michigan's Survey Research 
Center/Institute for Survey Research constitute 40 percent of 
published political science articles that use survey data. See 
Turner and Martin 1984, 99. 
there is a weak relationship between elite political communication and 
voters on many foreign policy issues is the result of inadequate 
knowledge of mass public opinion by elite political actors. This 
phenomena has made it difficult for many politicians to comprehend that 
the logic followed by the public may be different than the logic used by 
policy specialists. In this case, the public did not see the test ban 
controversy as one logically-linked issue, but as two distinct issues: 
unilateral termination of U.S. nuclear testing (which was strongly 
rejected) versus concluding a bilateral test ban agreement (which was 
strongly supported). Concern over fallout did not change these basic 
attitudes because people saw the fallout danger as a future, not a 
current, problem. Since Eisenhower's personality and the perceived 
strengths of the two political parties made many voters inclined to vote 
for Eisenhower, when Stevenson articulated a issue position on a salient 
foreign policy subject that all but a few voters rejected, this action 
reinforced most voter's "choice candidate. " *  76 Thus Stevenson' s inept 
attempt to further rhe test ban issue served to cement voters' electoral 
decision in favor of Eisenhower. Voters were acting perfectly 
logically, given their level of knowledge and interest, their set of 
attitudes, and the political communication received from the two 
candidates. This is true despite the fact that the public actually 
supported a test ban agreement. 
This alternative model of voter decision-making suggests that 
foreign policy issues can play an important role that either reinforce 
voter's party and image predilections or, If a candidate's position 
differs from that of the voter, causes the voter to reconsider his 
decision. However, determining the pattern of voters' preferences on 
issues requires a great deal of polling over an extended period of time. 
C. Negotiations 
Throughout the test ban negotiations, two fundamental issues were 
debated. First, should the U.S. agree to a test moratorium prior to 
concluding a treaty with the Soviet Union? Second, was verification 
technology sufficiently advanced to allow the United States to conclude 
a comprehensive test ban, rather than the partial test ban that was 
eventually negotiated? As was found in Chapter 4 on International 
Control of Atomic Energy, public opinion influenced the negotiations. 
However, it had less of an impact on decisions made at this stage of the 
policy process than in getting on the agenda or ratification. 
After completing a massive test series in 1958 and after the 
successful U.S.-Soviet technical conference in Geneva, President 
Eisenhower publicly proposed a renewable, one year test cessation. 2 7 7 
This presidential decision was opposed by the Department of Defense, the 
Atomic Energy Commission, and the United Kingdon. Foreign policy 
specialists, such as Henry Kissinger, and influential correspondents, 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
277 Divine 1978a, 229-31; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 14. 
such as the military writer for the pew York Times, also opposed this 
decision. With these powerful bureaucratic actors, foreign policy 
elites, and an important ally against this decision, what was the 
primary reason for taking this step? Two scholars have concluded that 
foreign opinion, as opposed to American opinion, was responsible for 
shifting the position taken by the Department of State to support this 
position.278 This shift in the State Department position and 
Eisenhower's own growing support for a test ban can explain this 
decision. 
However, if this Presidential decision was made in the name of 
public opinion, it was mistaken. The American public supported 
continued testing and only weakly supported the idea of a moratorium for 
a relatively short period of time. Thus, President Eisenl-rower initial 
decision was not supported by the public, and this lack of public 
support eventually undermined political support for continuing the test 
moratorium in the Kennedy administration. This example illustrates that 
popular presidents can make decisions which fly in the face of maiority 
opinion, but doing so provides the political opposition with fertile 
ground from which a successful "counter-attack" can be launched. 279 
Initial criticism of the moratorium came from two conservative 
publications--Fortune and U . S .  News and World Report--in mid-1959. 280 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
278 Affelder 1983, 112-4; Jacobson and Stein 1966, 87-8. 
279 Throughout the moratorium period (11/59 to 8/61), President 
Eisenhower's public job approval averaged 64 percent and 
Kennedy's averaged 75 percent. 
280 Divine 1978a, 259-61. 
After President Eisenhower extended the test moratorium for another year 
from August 1959 to August 1960, against the wishes of the military and 
atomic energy bureaucracies, political pressure started to mount to 
resume testing. Republican presidential candidate Nelson Rockefeller 
advocated resumed testing underground and was backed in his proposal by 
former President Truman, Senator Henry Jackson, and Paul Nitze. 281 
After the Soviets bitterly attacked American scientists at technical 
talks, Eisenhower issued an angry statement at the end of 1959 
officially ending the moratorium but pledging not to actual.1~ resume 
testing without prior notice and as long as the test ban talks showed 
progress. With the test ban talks making no progress, Eisenhower 
advised President-elect Kennedy to resume testing in 1960. 282 Thus, 
after making a decision that did not sustain popular support, President 
Eisenhower eventually "reversed" his decision on the moratorium at the 
end of his administration. 
President Kennedy entered office in favor of a test ban, and he 
did not want to resume testing. However, over his first 18 months in 
office, he approved detailed preparations for resumed testing. 2 8 3  Had 
President Kennedy been on strong ground with the public, which he was 
not, he would have been in a better position to resist the bureaucratic 
and partisan political pressure to resume testing. Once the Soviets 
announced that they would resume nuclear testing, public opinion moved 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
281 Divine 1978a. 289-91. 
282 Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 25. 
283 Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 63-75. 
to become virtually unanimous and Kennedy had no choice but to resume 
testing. In a final attempt to mollify public opinion, before the 
United States resumed testing, it proposed a limited test ban agreement 
to the Soviets. Once the Soviet Union rejected this proposal, the U.S. 
then resumed its own testing. 284 In the next six months, the United 
States tested 20 nuclear weapons, all underground. However this did not 
end the controversy associated with the moratorium. Political 
pressure--supported by growing public opinion and the burerucratic power 
of the weapons laboratories, the Department of Defense, and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff--succeeded in forcing President Kennedy to resume 
testing in the atmos~here in the Spring of 1962. 2 8 5 
This short history of the political fight over resuming 
atmospheric testing illustrates several important: points concerning the 
relationship between public opinion and policy formulation. First, 
majority public opinion can easily be ignored by Presidents in the 
foreign policy arena. This occurred when Eisenhower agreed to a test 
moratorium in spite of the fact that majority American opinion 
disapproved of his decision. Second, if a President makes a decision 
that flies in the face of majority attitudes, this provides the 
political foundation for undermining implementation of any such 
de~ision. By itself, majority opinion is not sufficiently strong to 
overture a presidential decision in the foreign policy arena. However, 
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284 Barton and Weiler 1976, 106; Dean 1966, 90; Lepper 1971, 40; 
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in the case of the moratorium, bureaucratic forces, public opinion, and 
Soviet actions forced President Kennedy to resume nuclear testing 
underground. Third, when a President is either unaware of public 
attitudes or chooses to ignore them, his credibility is diminished. 
This leaves him in a weak position to resist organized political 
pressure to force a policy change that goes much farther than the 
original public opinion dnta suggests would be supported by the general 
public. This occurred when President Kennedy was forced to resume 
testing in the atmosphere. 
All three of these examples suggest that majority public opinion 
can be ignored in the short run, but "presidential leadership" is 
limited in the long run and dependent on the President acting in line 
with pre-existing public beliefs. Presidents are not free to make and 
implement policy and then able to convince the public of the wisdom of 
any possible decision. Successful Presidents tailor both the timing of 
their political decisions and their political communication strategies 
to public opinion. Otherwise, as President Kennedy found out, they will 
be pushed by events into making policy decisions that run contrary to 
their original intent. 
The second fundamental issue that was debated throughout the 
negotiation of the test ban treaty concerned verification. Public 
opinion played a minor, but important, role in this aspect of the 
negotiations. Throughout the nuclear age, the American public has been 
skeptical about Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. This 
attitude was been remarkably stable for several decades. 286 This 
generic public belief has provided the attitude foundation for the 
political "requirement" that verification of any arms control agreement 
be stringent and go well beyond the requirements to gather 
intelligence. 2 8 7 
The perception among senior policy makers that it would be 
possible to verify an agreement to stop underground testing provided the 
first breakthrough in the test ban negotiations. Dr. Killian and Hans 
Bethe reported to the National Security Council on a President's 
Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) study that it was feasible to verify 
underground testing using seismic waves. 288 After hearing a brief 
summary of this repnrt and without consulting either the AEC or 
Department of Defense, President Eisenhower instructed Secretary of 
State Dulles to draft and send a letter to the Soviets proposing that 
technical talks be initiated between the two countries. The subsequent 
Geneva conference held in 1958 marked the first time that the test ban 
issue was clearly on the Executive branch agenda. However, given the 
nature of public opinion concerning verification, this Eisenhower 
decision became vulnerable to reversal by organized political interests. 
- - - * - - - - - - - - - - -  
286 See Appendix 7 .  
287 Not only does the public opinioii data support this proposition, 
but one senior actor in the test ban negotiations, as British 
Prime Minister Macmillian, believed that the U.S. position 
concerning on-site inspection was being made to satisfy 
American public opinion. See Dean 1966, 44. 
288 Devine 1978a, 206; Killian 1977, 156. 
Within months of the conference, Senator Gore--a powerful member 
of both the Joint Committee on Atornic Energy and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee--and former AEC member Murray proposed that the 
administration agree to a test ban treaty covering atmospheric tests but 
excluding underground testing.289 Once analysis was completed by the 
RAND Corporation and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory that refuted the 
Bethe study and showed that verification of underground tests was much 
more difficult than characterized at the Geneva techni.ca1 talks, 
momentum built up to conclude a partial or limited, rather than s 
comprehensive, test ban. More importantly, for the remainder of the 
Eisenhower administration, the President remembered that in its initial 
briefing the PSAC had failed to inform him that the Bethe conclusions 
were based on data from a single test series. As a result, President 
Eisenhower became cautious in attempting to pressure the Atomic Energy 
Commission or the Department of Defense to conclude a comprehensive test 
ban. Even though Eisenhower was supportive of the idea of a 
comprehe.~sive test ban treaty, for the rest of his administration he 
propcIsed a limited test ban treaty to the Soviets 
The final stage of negotiations for the Eisenhower administration 
in 1960 came close enough to reaching a treaty that it caused opponents 
of any test ban agreement--the U.K., France, China, and the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy--to force Eisenhower to harden the U.S. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
289 Divine 1978a, 244-5; Jacobson and Stein 1966, 126-9; Seaborg 
and Loeb 1981, 15. 
290 Divine 1978a. 252-60, 330; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 19-22. 
negotiating position concerning verification. This final phase of 
negotiations effectively ended with the U-2 affair.291 During this 
stage in the negotiations, public opinion played a rslatively minor role 
compared to technical factors, the bureaucratic positions taken by 
opponents of a test ban agreement, and the negotiating positions taken 
by several nations (i.e. the U.K., France and China) that wanted to 
preserve their own right to tezt nuclear weapons. By allowing the 
debate to focus on technical issues of verification, advocates of an 
agreement were put into a weak political position. 
New hope for a test ban agreement was found in the 1960 
Presidential campaign. To balance his hawkish criticisms that the 
Eisenhower administration had been weak on defense, candidate Kennedy 
called for upgrading the U.S. organizational capability to conduct arms 
control negotiations and supported a comprehensive test ban 
treaty. 292 The trans ition between administrations brought a 
successful Pugwash meeting which facilitated U.S.-Soviet scientific 
discussion about test ban-related topics, and it also brought many new 
people into the administration who were advocates of a test ban 
agreement. 293 After the Kennedy administration had corn,-leted its 
review of the test ban issue, the President decided to try and complete 
a comprehensive test ban agreement. 294 A review of primary source 
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291 Divine 1978a. 330-1; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 22-24. 
292 Clarke 1979, 15, 19; Lepper 1971, 39. 
293 One key appointment was Glen Seaborg as Chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission. Unlike his predicessors, he supported a 
test ban agreement. However, three of the five commissioners 
continued to be against a test ban. Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 
33-5. 
294 Dean 1966 , 89; Seaborg and Loeb 1981 , 5 7 - 8 .  
documents show that one of the main reasons for taking this position was 
a belief among senior members of the Kennedy administration that the 
United States must be seen in the eyes of the public as working for a 
comprehensive test ban. 235 The change in the U.S. negotiating 
position from che Eisenhower emphasis on a limited test ban treaty was 
due to Kennedy's perception of public opinion, not because any 
scientific facts had presented the verification problem or U.S. testing 
needs in a new light. 
After several unproductive negotiating sessions in 1961 and 
growing U.S.-Soviet tensions over summits and Berlin, the Soviets 
announced an end to their test moratorium and proceeded to conduct 5U 
atmospheric tests in a period of 60 days. 296 in a move taken entirely 
for purposes of public diplomacy, the U.S. and United Kingdom proposed a 
limited test ban treaty (quickly rejected by the Soviets) and then 
resumed their own testing.297 Public opinion had been moving toward 
strongly supporting U.S. resumption to testing. After the Soviet 
action, the public was virtually unanimous in supporting U.S. resumption 
of testing. 
Over the next year, while internal debates over the test ban 
raged, the administration attempted to manage public opinion by resuming 
testing in the atmosphere and, at the same time, publicly calling for a 
test ban. At this stage, President Kennedy made the key decision to 
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proceed with a limited test ban, rather than a comprehensive test ban 
agreement. This position was communicated to the Soviets when test ban 
negotiations resumed in 1962. The United States tabled a detailed draft 
treaty on a limited test ban which was quite close to the final 
agreement concluded in 1963, 298 While the final political impetus to 
conclude a test ban agreement grew out of the Cuban missile crisis, the 
United States was forced to drop any serious attempt to negotiate a 
comprehensive test ban in the face of Congressional opposition and 
Soviet opposition to on-site inspection. 299 
President Kennedy made the key decision to conclude a limited 
agreement without knowing one important fact: had he framed the issue in 
terms of a bilateral agreement with verification provisions he would 
have been on strong grounds with respect to public opinion. However, 
neither his pollster, Louis Harris, nor his National Security Council 
staff were aware of the duality in public opinion in support of a 
tilateral agreement, but in its absence opposed to the moratorium or any 
unilateral constraint on testing. Only after the Cuban missile crisis 
and after the key decision was taken to proceed with a limited agreement 
did President Kennedy come to learn, through the crude measure of crowd 
responses to his speeches, that the public strongly supported a 
bilateral test ban agreement. 300 Only after a limited test ban was 
initialed in July, 1963, did presidential pollster Louis Harris and 
i98 Dean 1966, 20, 40-1, 52-3, 90-8; Lepper 1971, 76-77; Seaborg 
and Loeb 1981, 168-71. 
299 Pope 1982; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 172-5. 300 Interview with former Kennedy administration NSC staffer Dr. 
Karl Kaysen 3 April 1989 and 13 May 1989. 
commercial pollsters begin asking survey questions which revealed the 
depth of public support for a bilateral agreement. 301 This data 
became part of the political competition concerning ratification, but- it 
had no effect on the final stages of the negotiations. 
It is not clear whether President Kennedy would have attempted to 
override strong bureaucratic and allied opposition to a comprehensive 
test ban or whether this would have been successful had he been 
thoroughly briefed on the nature of public opinion. However, several. 
key advisors believe that once the President learned of strong public 
support for arms control, he regretted that he had not negotiated a 
comprehensive test ban. 302 This historical example strongly 
demonstrates the importance of having policymakers fully briefed on the 
nature of public opinion. While successful negotiations require 
managing bureaucratic pol.itics, mastering complicated technical issues, 
and negotiating with both friendly and hostile countries, successful 
negotiations are impossible when key decisionmakers develop political 
strategy without mastering public opinion. 
D. Defining an Issue: The Political Impact of Incorrect Issue 
Definition 
Until the ratification phase of the policy process, advocates of a 
comprehensive test ban treaty focused their political communication on 
301 Harris 1973, 18-20. 
302 Wiesner 1988. 
the issues of fallout or a test moratorium. 303 Opponents of a 
comprehensive test ban focused their political communication on the 
issues of the need to continue U.S. testing or the requirement that- any 
agreement be verified. A review of Table 5-5, shows that by selecting 
their respective communication strategies, opponents of a test ban 
agreement were on much stronger attitude grounds than were supporters of 
a test ban agreement. This was true because until 1963, advocates of a 
test ban agreement did not emphasize in their political communic~tion 
the theme that any test ban agreement explicitly include the Soviet 
Union and also contain verification provisi.ons. 
Public Support for Competing Themes 
Related to the Test Ban Debate 
Table 5-5 
Percent Themes Used by Test Ban Advocates: 1954-1962 
Support for A Test Moratorium 
Concern Over Fallout 
Themes Used by Test Ban Opponents: 1954-1962 
Support for Strong Verification Requirements 
Support for Continued/Resumed Testing 
Themes Used by Test Ban Advocates: 1963 
7 0 Support for a Bilateral Test Ban Treaty 
- - - - - - - - - -  
Norman Cousins organized 30 pro-arms control interest groups to 
lobby for a test ban agreement. However, his efforts formally 
began only in October, 1962 and only produced mass 
communications that explicitly emphasized the bilateral aspect 
of a test ban agreement by the late Spring of 1963. See Lepper 
1971, 61-6, 142-149; Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 180, 207-8; Terchek 
1970. 
The key t o  the  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of the  Limited Test  Ban was framing 
the  p o l i t i c a l  debate i n  terms of a b i l a t e r a l  agreement between the  U.S. 
and Soviet  Union. Once t h i s  occurred,  f o r  the  FIRST time i n  the  nuclear 
age,  advocates of arms con t ro l  were on s t rong  grounds with respec t  t o  
publ ic  opinion.  However, t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  communication s t r a t e g y  was more 
the  produce of luck than the  r e s u l t  of any d e t a i l e d  study of publ ic  
opinion.  
E .  R a t i f i c a t i o n  
Once the  Limited Test  Ban Treaty was signed i n  Moscow on August 5 ,  
1963, it took the  Senate l e s s  than two months t o  r a t i f y  the  document by 
a vote  of 80 t o  1 9 .  Most accounts of the r a t i f i c a t i o n  process a t t r i b u t e  
Pres ident  Kennedy's success t o  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  persuade e l i t e  a c t o r s ,  
such a s  former Pres ident  Eisenhower and the  J o i n t  Chiefs of S t a f f ,  t o  
support  the  t r e a t y .  While these  f a c t o r s  were important ,  t o  be complete, 
t h i s  conclusion needs t o  be supplemented with an ana ly s i s  of the  r o l e  
played i n  the  process by publ ic  opinion.  
The preliminary p o l i t i c a l  f i g h t  over Senate r a t i f i c a t i o n  of a t e s t  
ban began wel l  b-Core  the  agreement was signed.  Throughout 1963, 
Congressional opponents of a comprehensive t e s t  ban made sure  t h a t  
Pres ident  Kennedy was aware t h a t  such an agreement probably would be 
defeated i n  t he  Senate. On d i f f e r e n t  occasions powerful Republican and 
Democratic members of the J o i n t  Committee on Atomic Energy, Senate Armed 
Serv ices ,  and Senate Foreign Relations committees such a s  Rep. Craig 
Hosmer, Senator Pastore ,  Senator Dodd, Senator Jackson, and Senator Gore 
he ld  hear ings  and maae statements c r i t i c a l  of any at tempt t o  negot ia te  a 
comprehensive test ban agreement. 304 In May, Senators Dodd and 
Humphrey introduced a resolution recommending a limited test ban, and a 
private survey of senators showed that a comprehensive test ban would 
fall short, by ten votes, of that needzd for ratification. 305 The 
White House was aware of this information, and when this factor was 
combined with Russian refusal to compromise over verification 
provisions, the decision to pursue a limited agreement was finalized. 
Even acter Kennedy's dramatic speech given at American University 
and Averell Harriman's arrival in Moscow as a Presidential envoy, it was 
not clear to participai.?s that a limited agreement was feasible. 306 
Successful negotiations required extremely tight control of negotiating 
instructions and reporting within the U.S. government, no consultation 
with members of Congress, and strong persuasion by Secretary of Defense 
McNamara and President Kennedy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 307 
After the agreement was initialed, the White House took great pains to 
gain Congressional support. 308 Interest groups were formed to fight 
ra.tification of the agreement, and bipartisan Senatorial opposition was 
expected. 
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308 Examples include refusing to allow Adlai Stevenson to attend 
the signing ceremony in MOSCOW and encouraging members of the 
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What fundamentally changed the dynamics of the ratification fight 
was that at this point several public opinion polls were conducted and 
released that showed that public support for the treaty varied from the 
level of consensus to virtu81 unanimity. A t  this point it became clear 
to Senators who in the past had opposed President Kennedy on various 
foreign policy, weapons procurement, and arms control initiatives that 
there was no political benefit to fighting a life and death battle to 
stop ratification of the Limited Test Ban. 309 
F. Implementation 
The Limited Test Ban Treaty is the only U.S.-Soviet arms control 
agreement negotiated from 1945 to 1980 that has not been the subject to 
controversy over its implementation Two reasons could explain this. 
First, the facts could indicate that no questions of treaty violation 
have been raised because none have occurred. A review of the records 
for U.S. and Soviet underground testing from 1963 to the present 
indicate this explanation does not suffice: many violations of this 
agreement have occurred. 310 
A second reason, which relates to the role public opinion plays in 
the policy process, is much more plausible. Given the strong level of 
public support for the agreement (from consensus to virtual unanimous), 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
309 Twenty three Senators consistently voted against the Kennedy 
administration on related issues. Thus only a dozen additional 
votes would have been needed to defeat the test ban treaty. 
See Terchek 1970, 204-6. 310 Duffy 1988, 25, 5 2 - 5 4 ,  187. 
conservative political actors who were critical of arms control were 
deterred from pressing this verification and compliance issue. When 
this strong public opinion environment was combined with "safeguards" 
granted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff such as a commitment to increase 
testing and to maintain a standby ability to resume atmospheric testing, 
there was little political incentive for conservative Senators to fight 
against ratification. 
IV. Diversity and Dynamics of Public Opinion 
Previous sections of this chapter have described public attitudes 
toward nuclear testing and the test ban and evaluated the impact public 
opinion had on policy-making as various stages. This material has 
demonstrated that the Cohen (1973) no-impact thesis can be clearly 
rejected. Public opinion influenced decisions at every stage of the 
policy process. 
This final section will address the two other hypothesis being 
examined in this dissertation. Has there been a lack of public opinion 
consensus in favor of arms control either because attitudes have been 
volatile or because they have been highly fragmented? Have opinion 
leaders and the attentive public been against arms control, and have 
these elite attitudes eventually changed mass attitudes to be critical 
of arms control through a top-down diffusion of attitudes? 
A. Attitude Consensus 
The first aspect of an attitude consensus has been defined for 
this dissertation as a high level of public opinion (above 60 percent) 
and relative attitude stability over time. The initial graph presented 
in this chapter (Figure 5-1) portrayed attitudes as extremely volatile. 
This finding thus supports conclusions made by Rosi (1967b). However, a 
closer examination of the data reveals that attitudes were relatively 
stable if opinions are divided into different dimensions. The public 
consistently supported continued nuclear testing (Figure 5-2), 
consistently supported a bilateral test ban agreement (Figure 5-3), 
consistently considered the Soviet Union encrustations (Table 5-4), and 
consistently perceived that verification of an arms control Lgreement 
was problematic (Appendix 7). On the two dimensions for which there is 
the most data, variation in attitudes occurred, but in each case the 
standard deviation for each series of questions was relatively small, 
approximately 10 percent. 311 In addition, public awareness of nuclear 
testing, fallout, and a test ban agreement was relatively stable. The 
only area that showed a clear change was in the increased level of 
detailed knowledge about atomic fallout. 
Not only were public attitudes relatively stable, but for the main 
policy questions concerning continued testing and a bilateral test ban 
agreement, attitudes were at relatively high levels-- either a consensus 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
311 The standard deviation for questions that most precisely 
measure support for continued testing was 12.6 and 10.7 for a 
bilateral test ban agreement. 
or preponderance. Thus, one is able to conclude from a comprehensive 
review of data that a public consensus existed on issues relating to the 
test ban controversy. Again, the Almond and Lippmann mood or volatility 
theories are not supported by the evidence 
B. Attitude Fragmentation 
The second aspect of an attitude consensus relates to the relative 
homogeneity or fragmentation of attitudes along political or demographic 
lines. To address this issue, quantitative analysis was performed on 15 
national and 2 state surveys that were conducted over the entire period 
of the test ban controversy. By using a seven-point fragmentation scale 
discussed in Chapter 2, this analysis found that attitudes showed very 
low to moderate fragmentation along partisan, ideological, or 
demographic lines. 312 These findings with respect to questions that 
measured public support for continued testing are presented in Table 5-6 
(below). Several interesting conclusions can be reached by reviewing 
this table. First, while little fragmentation is found along party 
identification, ideological, voting, or presidential job performance 
lines for most of the time period, when nuclear testing issues were 
hotly debated in the 1956 election, attitudes became sharply split along 
poli,tical lines. This finding supports concepts originally discovered 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
312 As described in Chapter 2 (Table 2-5), the seven-point 
fragmentation scale is as follows: 1 None (0.0-2.9%), 
2 Very Low (3.0-5.9%), 3 Low (6.0-8.9%), 4 Medium (9.0-11.9%), 
5 High (12.0-14.9%), 6 Very High (15.0-17.9%), 7 Extreme 
(18 .a%+) . 
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Abbreviations: (see next page) 
Table 5-6 (con't) 
Abbreviations : 
A 2/1946 MINN 31; B 4/1946 AIPO 368; C 4/1954 AIPO 529; D NORC 370; 
E 1/1956 NORC 382; F 10/1956 AIPO 573; G 10/1956 MINN 154; 
H 11/1956 NORC 399; I 6/1961 AIPO 647; J 11/1961 AIPO 652; 
K 1/1962 AIPO 654; L 3/1962 AIPO 656. 
-+ The sub-group in the population was more supportive of continuing 
nuclear testing than the mean for the general public; each number 
represents a unit on the fragmentation scale, reviewed in Chapter 2, 
Table 2-5. 
The sub-group in the population was less supportive of continuing 
nuclear testing than the mean for the general public. 
College (4 year degree/attended some college but did not graduate); 
Region: the most extreme difference from any region in the country. 
by Brody and Page (1975): when political leaders take clear stands on 
foreign policy issues, voters perceive these differences and take them 
into account when evaluating candidates. 
Second, the direction of attitudes--either in relative support or 
opposition to nuclear testing-- followed expected patterns with respect 
to many independent variables. For example, doves, women, and 
isolationis2s were relatively more critical of nuclear testing while 
hawks, men, internationalists, and veterans were more in favor of 
continued nuclear testing. With rPspect to the gender gap, given the 
large literature on the gender gap, the only surprising fact was that 
the gap was so small. 
Third, by all measures of attentiveness (interest, college 
education, upper class status, and occupation), the attentive public was 
more in support of nuclear testing than was the general public. In most 
cases, those with a college degree (averaging less that 10 percent of 
the public throughout this period) were more supportive of testing than 
those who had only attended up to 3 years of college. In i3ddition1 
attitudes held by the attentive public showed the most extreme 
fragmentation with respect to the general population, many times 
registering fragmentation levels from "very high" to "extreme." 
Fourth, several unexpected findings were also discovered. Younger 
adults were as a general rule more critical of nuclear testing until 
the last set of surveys in 1962. Adults from the South were not 
particularly "hawkish" on nuclear testing issues; people in the Rocky 
Mountain states were far more strident in their support for nuclear 
testing, and those on the Pacific Coast were the most critical. 
However, regionel fragmentat,ion was not extreme. 
All in all, this data tends to support a weak version of the 
fragmentation hypothesis advocated by scholars such as William 
Schneider. There was some fragmentation of attitudes with respect to 
nuclear testing issues, but the degree of fragmentation, except during 
the 1956 election, was rather moderate. However, in comparison with 
data presented in Chapter 4, there was relatively more fragmentation of 
attitudes than was evident for the international control of atomic 
energy in the 1940s. Thus, attitude fragmentation seems to have been 
increasing prior to the war in Vietnam. 
This quantitative analysis of public opinion data also reveal an 
interesting relationship between the structure of public opinion and the 
impact public opinion has on policy makers. Since President Eisenhower 
and President Kennedy were on weak grounds with the public in their 
agreeing to a test moratorium with the Soviet Union, political and 
public opinion pressure built up which contributed to reversing the 
decision. The people who were the most critical of President Kennedy on 
the testing issue were strongly Republican, conservative, and hawkish. 
However, they did not change their view of Kennedy once he resumed 
testing in the atmosphere. Thus, by initially acting against mass 
public cpinion on the moratorium issue but then being forced to reverse 
his decision, President Kennedy neither neutralized his critics nor 
strengthened his support among his natural constituency. Kennedy's 
failure to understand the true nature of public opinion was one factor 
that was responsible for not concluding a comprehensive test ban 
agreement. There is also some limited evidence from polling conducted 
shortly before Kennedy's assassination that this failure to correctly 
read public opinion also could have cost him [:he 1964 election. 313 
C, The Attentive Public and Top-Down Attitude Change 
Evidence presented to date (Table 5-6) clearly shows that 
attitudes held by the attentive public on the nuclear testing issue were 
313 A survey completed just prior to Ken~edy being assasinated 
indicates that he was in trouble with the electorate. See 
11/1963 ORC 466. 
quite distinct from attitudes held by the general public. However, is 
there evidence that mass attitudes change moving from the attentive 
public to the general public in a top-dsm fashion? The data clearly 
indicate that the top-down model in not correct. In its place one finds 
evidence for a "'wo-worlds" model. 
There is no evidence that the attentive public eventually 
persuaded the general public to share its perceptions with respect to 
nuclear testing or the test ban treaty. Quite to the contrary, the 
public consistently supported nuclear testing and did not adopt this 
attitude after it trickled down from the elite. The same can be said 
about attitudes concerning a bilateral test ban treaty. Throughout the 
entire period, when the public was asked about the desirability of a 
bilateral test ban treaty, they consistently approved. A consensus of 
the public supported a bilateral test ban agreement prior to discussion 
of nuclear testing in the 1956 election campaign, before anti-nuclear 
interest groups were organizing around the fallout issue, before 
influential columnists had voiced support for a test ban, before 
President Eisenhower supported a bilateral test ban, and before the 
attentive public support a test ban agreement. As shown on Table 5-7, 
when relevant questions were first asked in 1.955 and 1956, it was the 
attentive public, not the general public, who opposed a test ban 
agreement. Mass attitudes were relatively volatile while public 
attitudes were relatively stable. It seems that the attentive public 
changed its mind in 1957 after President Eisenhower began speaking out 
Fragmentation ~f Attitudes Concerning 
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A 3/1955 NORC 370 
B 1/1956 NORC 383 
C 4/1957 AIPO 582 
D 1/1958 AIPO 594 
E 6/1963 AIPO 676 
+ The sub-group in the population was more supportive of a nuclear 
test ban agreement than the mean for the general public; each 
number represents a unit on the fragmentation scale, reviewed in 
Chapter 2, Table 2-5. 
The sub-group in the population was less supportive of a nuclear 
test ban agreement than the mean for the general public. 
on the desirability of such an agreement. After this switch, the 
attentive public supported the test ban agreement at levels higher than 
those held by the general public. It seems that the attentive public 
did not led public opinion, but that it "caught up with" mass support 
for a test ban agreement. 
A "two-worlds" model better explains mass and elite attitude 
change and the conditions under which public opinion has an impact on 
the policy process. With respect. to the "first" world, my two worlds 
model posits that mass attitudes are usually relatively stable, full of 
common sense, and are formed in relation to real world events. Mass 
public opinion is relatively immune to pressure generated by political 
activities of the "opinion and policy elite" and the "attentive 
public." This is true in large part because most of the time the public 
chooses not to listen to or engage in the political debate. 
The "second" world consists of the attentive public and the 
opinion and policy elite. Opinions among people in this more elite 
segment of soci.ety change often in relation to media coverage and 
variation in government policy. 314 Rather than being true "leaders, If 
people who live in this second world often become followers of cultural 
fads and changes in government policy. Even though attitudes held by 
this group do not change mass attitudes, perceptions among members of 
this elite are extremely important because most of the time government 
leaders mistake attitudes held by people in this second world with those 
314 My research is supported by conclusions reached by Gamson and 
Modiglini 1966. 
of the general public. In many instances, foreign policy decisions are 
made without reference to mass opinion and rely imprecisely on attitudes 
held by me5bers of of this second world. 3 15 
The two world can be linked, but this requires that elite 
policymakers or political activists understand the true nature of public 
opinlon and develop a political communication strategy that discusses 
policy issues using a vocabulary that is compatible with preexisting 
mass attitudes in the "first world." More often than not, elites 
develop political communications strategies without taking the time to 
understand public opinion. As a result, many political communications 
strategies are almost guaranteed to reach only a very small hrtentive 
audience, not to the general public. For many issues, this lack of 
genuine communication between the two worlds does not create a problem 
However, for arms control, communications between these two worlds holds 
the key to success. Powerful bureaucratic actors are able to stop arms 
control unless arms control activists inside and outside of government 
are capable of mobilizing public support. To mobilize public support, 
these political actors do not need to chan_ge public opinion but they 
need to tap into existing attitudes which are sympathetic to the goals 
of arms control. However, this is not an easy thing to do. In this 
chapter, neither Adlsi Stevenson nor John Kennedy understood the true 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
315 This part of the model agrees with Almond's idea that policy 
makers listen to the attentive public. However, Almond was 
wrong both on the ability of the attentive public to change 
mass attitudes, and on the impact mass attitudes can have on 
policy-making. 
nature of public opinion with respect to nuclear testing and a bilateral 
test ban agreement. As a result, until the Spring of 1963, themes which 
they used reached relatively few people. As can be seen in Table 5-8, 
when arms control activists framed specific messages in the context of 
stopping nuclear testing, up to approximately 15 percent of the public 
could be sympathetic depending on the exact message. However, if arms 
control political communication :gas framed in terms of a bilateral 
agreement, up to 30 percent of the public could be receptive. Tile mere 
mention of a bilateral agreement was not sufficiently strong to 
guarantee majority public support, but by focusing on stopping testing, 
arms control advocates precluded reaching beyond the nuclear and arms 
control "issue public." In the late 1950s, arms control activists 
sensed that they were "breaking through." Membership in interest 
groups, participation in mass demonstrations, and vocal protest against 
nuclear testing was very much in evidence. However, arms control 
activists exaggerated the scope of this activity (because they did not 
look beyond the second world), and they incorrectly attributed it to 
public concern over fr.llout, rather than to genuine support for a 
bilateral test ban treaty. 
The findings from this chapter are quite robust because they have 
been picked up by multiple public opiaion indictors from several survey 
organizations which have polled over several years. If this research 
design had not been used, one might not have discovered the fact that 
Framing the Issue and 
The Size of the Attentive Public 
Table 5-8 
Size Date Linked Attitudes 
16% 4/46 The U.S. should not conduct the Bikini test, and the 
U.S. and Russia can get along. (AIPO 368) 
17% 3/55 Correctly defined the term "fallout." (AIPO 544) 
3 - 5% 3/55 The U.S. should stop nuclear testing, and (1) there 
is a chance that hydrogen bombs will be used against 
the United States, or (2) the U.S. should not send 
troops to defend Formosa (NORC 370) 
8 - 11% 3/55 All countries, including Russia should stop testing, 
and (1) and (2) from above. (NORC 370) 
6 - 12% 10/56 H bomb testing is a major campaign issue; the U.S. 
should not continue nuclear testing; and support 
Stevenson on his anti-testng position (MINN. 154) 
11/61 The U.S. should not resume atmospheric testing, and 
Khrushchev's test ban proposal is not just a bluff. 
(AIPO 652) 
Bilateral Test Ban 
9 % 1/56 A bilateral test ban agreement should be concluded, 
and tactical nuclear weapons should not be used 
against Formosa. (NORC 382) 
293 1/56 A bilateral test ban agreement should be concluded, 
and H-bombs should not be used against Chinese 
cities. (NORC 382) 
29% 4/57 A bilateral test ban agreement should be concluded, 
and fallout constituted a danger. (AIPO 582) 
the public saw the test ban controversy as two distinct issues. If one 
had only examined one set of questions asked by one survey organization 
(the traditional approach to studying public opinion) the essential 
nature of public opinion would have been missed and the complicated 
relationship between public opinion and the policy process probably 
would have remained hidden. 
Deployment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) System 
and the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT I) Talks: 
Pyrrhic Victory, 1960 - 1972 
Chapter 6 
I Summary 
Conventional accounts of the controversy over dep1oymr:nt of the 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and negotiation of SALT I paint a picture 
of increasing public opposition to building the anti-missile system as a 
"great" national debate unfolded between proponents (the Pen1:agon and 
conservative Congressional allies) and opponents (grass roots activists, 
scientists, former Johnson administration officials, and liberal members 
of Congress). According to this traditional view, public opi~iion played 
an important role in forcing Congress to attempt to limit the deployment 
of the ABM and pressuring the Nixon administration to initiate strategic 
arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. 
Contrary to most academic accounts of this case, the structure of 
mass public opinion and the process of attitude change was quite 
different than perceived by many participants in the controversy. A 
plurality supported deployment of the ABM system, and a consensus 
favored negotiating arms control with the Soviet Union. The structure 
of public opinion was much like it had been during the test ban 
controversy. Public attitudes changed as a result of the ABM debate 
only among the "opinion and policy elite." Before the 1969 televised 
Congressional hearings, elite attitudes were more in favor of ABM 
deployment than the general public. After the hearings, the highly 
educated were much more critical of ABM deployment than the general 
public 
Public opinion had an impact on some, but not all, stages of the 
policy process both concerning deployment of the ABM and negotiation of 
SALT I. However unlike the previous two cases, neither t h ~  arms control 
advocates nor critics were particularly well informed on the true nature 
of public opinion. Limited grassroots activity, concentrated television 
news coverage, and interest group pressure successfully created the 
false impression that "the public" was against deployment of the ABM. 316 
Against the backdrop of the war in Vietnam and increasingly critical 
public attitudes toward military spending, it is understandable that 
many Congressional leaders, Executive branch officials, and political 
activists incorrectly perceived public opinion as anti-ABM. 
Chapter 6 illustrates an additional element of the two worlds 
model discussed in Chapter 5. When neither "second world" side in a 
policy debate is well informed about attitudes in the "first" world of 
the mass public, and when neither side employs a cogent communication 
strategy, decisions are strongly influenced by bureaucratic politics, 
activities of interest groups, and attitudes of the opinion and policy 
elite who all reside in the "second" world. This second-world dominated 
decision-making system closely approximates the system described in the 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
316 Many scholars also have made this same mistake. The original 
work on agenda setting written by Cobb and Elder (1972) 
examined the ABM case and reached several incorrect 
conclusions. 
current mainstream literature on American foreign policy. Most of the 
time it is correct. However, in important instances, the current 
literature is totally wrong. 
However, public opinion had a powerful influence on policy in the 
last stage of the policy process: implementation. The ABM treaty was in 
reasonably good shape until Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. Contrary to the impressions of policy specialists and the 
"opinion and policy elite," President Reagan's initiative was presented 
to an already very sympathetic mass audience. Reagan did not change 
public attitudes, but tle isolated the dimension of the issue for which 
would produce the strongest level of public support, and he communicated 
to the public in language ttley could understand. This had the political 
effect of mobilizing political resources to support several Reagan 
policy positions such as defeating the nuclear freeze movement, 
strengthening his bargaining position vis a vis the Soviet Union, and 
"creating" a major strategic program which previously had been a 
disconnected set of research projects. 317 Ronald Reagan, supported by 
a professional team of survey researchers and communications experts, 
understood the relationship between public opinion and the policy 
process and used it to its fullest. His arms control opponents, 
following a long and noble path, did not even understand what the "game" 
was all about. 
- - - - * - - - - - - - - - -  
317 If one measures the impact in terms of books, seminars, and 
discussions, Reagan's SDI initiative can be considered an 
intellectual revolution. Large segments of the defense 
"intellectual" community had to switch grears &nd focus on SDI 
and nuclear issues on Reagan's terms. 
I1 Public Attitudes on ABM Deployment and SALT I 
A. The Great Debate? 
Participants in the debate over deployment of the ABM and the 
negotiation of SALT I often refer to the period as "the great 
debate. "318 In the process of reviewing the extensive academic 
literature on the ABM deployment decision it became clear that a 
substantial political debate over U . S .  strategic offensive and defensive 
programs took place before the Congress and in the press. Table 6-1 
summarizes press coverage of the debate in the New York Times from 1966 
to 1969. One can see that by reviewing a variety of "indicators" 
reported in the New York Times, it might seem logical to conclude 
New York Times Coverage of the ABM and SALT I Debate 
Table 6-1 
Year 
A) Total number of articles about the ABM system and SALT 
I negotiations; B )  Number of letters to the editor; 
C) Number of editorials; D) Number of columnists' 
articles; E) Number of paid advertisements; F) Number 
of book reviews; G) Number of references to interest 
sroup activities; H) Number of cartoons; I) Number of 
references to local protest activities; J )  Number of 
texts of speeches that were reproduced; K) Number of 
days with multiple articles either on the ABM or SALT. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
318 Rathjens 1983. 
that a great debate took place. The total. number of relevant press 
stories rose substantially from 1966 to 1969, increasing numbers of 
letters to the editor were published, activity of interest groups 
increased, local protest activity was reported, and especially during 
1969 many multiple press stories on the ABM/SALT I debate were published 
on the same day. To the extent that all of these indicators measure the 
political activities of elites, one can clearly conclude that elite 
political activity associated with the ABM deployment decision reached a 
very high level. 
B. Public Awareness, Knowledge, and Interest 
Does survey research on public awareness, knowledge, and interest 
concerning the ABM show that a "great" debate took place among the 
general public over this issue? The short answer is "No." Evidence 
both from the New York Times coverage and from survey research reveal 
that the "opinion and policy elite" became engaged in a debate over 
United States strategic nuclear weapons, but this debate did not extend 
down to the general public. From the limited survey data available, one 
can determine that awareness of the ABM system was relatively high, at 
the level of consensus or preponderance (69-72 percent). 319 However, 
in comparison with data on public awareness toward nuclear weapons in 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
319 4/1969 AIPO 777; 5/1969 AIPO 780k; 7/1969 AIPO 784k. All 
survey questions and data about the ABM and SALT I are 
reproduced in Appendix 8. 
general, presented in Chapter 3, public awareness of the ABM system was 
lower than awareness of several other nuclear weapons systems. Also, 
public awareness of the ABM was lower than public awareness of the 
Limited Test Ban. In contrast to this moderate level of awareness of 
the ABM system, there was very low awareness of the SALT I negotiations 
and treaty. 320 Even in the context of the contemporary 1980s debate 
over President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, awareness of the 
ABM treaty continues to be quite limited, with only approximately only 
one-third of tho public aware of the agreemenC. 321 This survey data 
suggests that from the point of view of the general public, there was no 
"great" debate over deployment of the ABM, and there was even less 
public focus on the SALT I treaty. 322 
Survey data about SALT I reconfirm two conclusions reached earlier 
in this dissertation. First, an "opinion and policy elite" exists for 
nuclear and arms control issues. Second, this elite group constitutes 
less than 10 percent of the public. Relatively few people had any 
-
detailed knowledge of the ABM system. For example, in the mid-1960s 
before the "great" debate, only a handful of people (5 percent) were 
aware that a nuclear warhead would be the primary "kill" mechanism in 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
320 6/1971 ORC/Nx. Surveys conducted by the Opinion Research 
Coproration followed 5y the "Nx" abbreviation were sponsored by 
the Nixon White House and were originaly considered 
confidential. 
321 2/1985 Finkelstein; 9/1985 M&K. 322 For comparison, as summarized in Chapter 3, approximately 70 
percent of the public were aware of the LTBT, 50 percent aware 
of the nuclear freeze, and 40 percent the Acheson-Lilienthal 
plan. 
any of the then proposed ABM systems; only 6 percent knew the U.S. had 
no anti-missile defense; and only 2-6 percent rated America's 
non-existent defenses against bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs as poor. 323 
After the ABM issue became the topic of elite political discussion and 
substantial media coverage in 1968 and 1969, detailed public knowledge 
of the anti-missile system did not increase above the 4-8 percent 
level. 324 
One factor that can account for low levels of public awareness and 
knowledge of the ABM system and SALT I treaty relates to the pattern of 
mass interest about national problems. From the mid-1960s to the early 
1970s, when these strategic nuclear weapons issues were debated among 
the experts, the public focused its entire foreign affairs attention on 
the war in Vietnam, not on nuclear weapons issues. After the war, 
economic issues became the dominant "most important problem." As a 
result, the period from the end of the test bar1 debate (1963) untii the 
late 1970s can be characterized as the "quiet nuclear age. "325 Low 
or moderate public interest about the ABM system and SALT I is 
consistent with the quiet nuclear age proposition. Throughout this 
period when the opinion and policy elite focused on strategic nuclear 
weapons issues (and as the Soviet Union gained parity in nuclear weapons 
with the United States), the public was focused not on these symbolic 
3 2 3  6/1964 NORC SRS 640. 
324 6/1968 ORC/N; 5/1969 ORC/Nx. 
325 Aspen Strategy Group 1989, 55; Graham 1985. For data on 
public perceptions of the most important problem during this 
period of time, see T. W. Smith 1985. 
i s s u e s ,  b u t  on t h e  r e a l  war i n  Southeas t  Asia .  This  i s  a  very  important  
f i n d i n g  because arms c o n t r o l  advocates i n  t h e  1970s and 1980s o f t e n  
assume t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  has  some b a s i c  unders tanding of t h e  ABM debate  
t h a t  took p lace  from 1968 t o  1972. 
When asked s p e c i f i c a l l y  about  t h e  ABM system, only  a  moderate 
number of  people (approximately 40 pe rcen t )  were s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n t e r e s t e d  
t o  have an  opin ion  on t h e  i s s u e .  326 When survey respondents  were 
asked about  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  about  a  number of i s s u e s  of t h e  day ,  most 
people  showed l i t t l e  i n t e r e s t  about  t h e  ABM m i s s i l e  defense  
program. 327 A d d i t i o n a l ,  i n d i r e c t ,  evidence suppor t s  the  conclus ion  
t h a t  t h e  ABM deployment i s s u e  was n o t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s a l i e n t  t o  most of 
t h e  p u b l i c .  Since most people be l i eved  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  a l r e a d y  
had an  e x i s t i n g  a n t i - m i s s i l e  system and were g e n e r a l l y  s a t i s f i e d  wi th  
t h i s  s t a t e  of  a f f a i r s ,  i t  i s  l o g i c a l  t o  sugges t  t h a t  most people were 
n o t  i n t e n s e l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  b u i l d i n g  a  nuc lea r  defense  system. 3 2 8  
Pub l i c  i n t e r e s t  about  SALT I i s  impossible t o  judge because no s u r r e y  
d a t a  e x i s t s  t o  measure mass i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  arms c o n t r o l  t r e a t y .  
However, given t h e  extremely low l e v e l s  of  mass awareness of  t h i s  
agreement,  it would be l o g i c a l  t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  
f i r s t  s t r a t e g i c  arms c o n t r o l  t r e a t y  w i t h  t h e  Sov ie t  Union was a l s o  
r e l a t i v e l y  low. 
The d a t a  on p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  and knowledge about  ABM/SALT I provide  
a d d i t i o n a l  suppor t  f o r  t h e  conclus ion  reached i n  Chapter 3 t h a t  t h e  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
326 4/1969 AIPO 777; 5/1969 AIPO 780; 7/1969 AIPO 784. 
327 10/1969 H a r r i s  1970. 
328 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 5/1969 ORC; 4/1979 H a r r i s  792106. 
p u b l i c  i s  bo th  more aware and more i n t e r e s t e d  i n  nuc lea r  weapons 
sys tems,  such a s  t h e  A B M  system, than  they  a r e  concerning arms c o n t r o l ,  
l i k e  SALT I .  This  bimodal and h i e r a r c h i c a l  p a t t e r n  of  p u b l i c  knowledge 
and i n t e r e s t  about  s t r a t e g i c  nuc lea r  i s s u e s  is i n  sha rp  c o n t r a s t  wi th  
i n t e n s e  i n t e r e s t  demonstrated by a smal l  number of anti-ABM and pro-arms 
c o n t r o l  a c t i v i s t s  who mobil ized p r o t e s t s  i n  h a l f  a  dozen c i t i e s  
throughout  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
C .  Generic F e a s i b i l i t y  of Building An Active Defense System 
From t h e  beginning of the  atomic age ,  t h e  American p u b l i c  has  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  be l i eved  t h a t  i t  i s  t e c h n i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e  t o  b u i l d  an a c t i v e  
defense  a g a i n s t  nuc lea r  weapons. 329 This  a t t i t u d e  has  p e r s i s t e d ,  a t  
t h e  l e v e l  of ma jo r i ty  o r  consensus,  from 1945 through t h e  1980s.  3 30 
Data summarized i n  Table 6 -2  shows c l e a r l y  t h a t  even a f t e r  t h e  " g r e a t  
debate"  those  who d i d  not b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  would be p o s s i b l e  t o  b u i l d  an 
a c t i v e  defense  a g a i n s t  nuc lea r  weapons were i n  a  d i s t i n c t  minor i ty .  The 
1969 ABM debate  seems t o  have changed t h i s  a t t i t u d e  and inc reased  the  
numbzr of people who were s k e p t i c a l  of  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  of  b u i l d i n g  a 
- - - * - - - - - - - - - - -  
329 10/1945 AIPO 357; 6/1946 PSY CORP 173;  6/1946 SRC; 8/1946 
PSY CORP 178;  8/1946 SRC; 2/1947 MINN 42; 11/1949 AIPO 449; 
12/1963 NORC SRS 330; 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N; 
4/1969 H a r r i s  1926; 5/1969 ORC. For s i m i l a r  d a t a  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  of  t h e  S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i t i a t i v e ,  s e e  Graham 1986. 
330 Only one survey q u e s t i o n  o u t  of t h e  dozen asked on t h i s  t o p i c  
from 1945 t o  1969 i n i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  r e a l i z e d  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  of  b u i l d i n g  a defense i n  t h e  nuc lea r  age .  However 
t h i s  unusual q u e s t i o n ,  12/1945 NORC 42T, c o n t a i n s  a  s t a t emen t  
i n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i t s e l f  t h a t  s e n i o r  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c i a l s  and 
s c i e n t i s t s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  no defense  is  p o s s i b l e .  Th i s  q u e s t i o n  
wording d i f f e r e n c e  is  very  impor tant .  
defense system from approximately 20 percent to approximately 30 
percent. However, at no point did this attitude become a majority 
opinion. 331 This consistent public attitude that defense is possible 
is noteworthy for three reasons. First, this generic positive attitude 
toward defense is in sharp contrast with the professional opinion of 
most independent, non-government scientists who are experts in the 
relevant technologies that would be needed to produce an effective 
defense system. Despite the massive academic and professional 
literature that has been written on the technical difficulty of building 
an anti-missile system, the persistence of this mass attitude that 
defense is possible suggests that little or no "top-down" learning has 
Active Defense Not Possible in the Nuclear Age 
Table 6-2 
Date Survey Level 
AIPO 357 
PSY CORP 173 
SRC 




NORC SRS 330 (0-2 on 10 point scale) 
NORC SRS 640 (0-2 on 10 point scale) 




- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
331 Changes in question wording make it impossible to calculate the 
exact magnitude of this probable attitude change. On a 
separate issue, when open-ended questions were asked on this 
issue, -20 percent believed that a defense was impossible, but 
the percent who were not sure increased. See 6/1946 and 6/1946 
SRC . 
occurred in this area. Second, the stability of this attitude--before 
the ABM became controversial, during the 1969 ABM debate, and today in 
the context of SDI--suggests that public attitudes can be extremely 
stable over long periods of time. In this area, attitudes have not 
demonstrated a volatile characteristic that would be consistent with the 
Almond and Lippmann mood theory. Third, this public attitude that 
defense in the nuclear age is feasiblz contradicts the fundamental 
premise of the dominant school in nuclear strategy that stability is 
created by deterrence and the dominance of the offense over the 
defense . 332 As will be shorn later in this chapter, divergent 
attitttdes between elite nuclear scientists and strategists and the 
public on this very issue became quite important in the context of the 
political fight over deployment of the ABM system. 
D. Building a Defensive System Was Popular 
Contrary to much of the academic literature on the ABM issue which 
characterized the public as increasingly opposed to ABM deployment, 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, more people su~norted building an ABM 
system than opposed such B system. 333  While the exact level of public 
approval of an ABM system varied from the level of preponderance to 
plurality depending on the survey question wording, this data refutes 
the conventional wisdom that the public opposed depl~yment of the ABM in 
the late 1960s. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
332 Brodie 1946; Freedman 1981. 
333  12/1963 NORC SRS 330; 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 2/1966 NORC SRS 
876; 6/1968 ORC/N; 12/1968 Harris 1900; 4/1969 AIPO 777; 
4/1969 Harris 1926; 5/1969 ORC/Nx; 5/1969 AIPO 780; 7/196? 
AIPO 784; 3/1972 MIS/N; 7/1972 Fiel5/LMH; 5/1974 Field/W. 
A great deal can be learned about public attitudes on different 
dimensions of this subject by comp~ring the level of public support for 
the ABM depending on varicus survey question wording and formats. When 
the entire public was asked about the desirability of building an 
anti-missile defensive system throughout the 1960s, support was recorded 
at the level of consensus or above. 334 This finding was reached by 
several different survey organizations whose research was sponsored by 
various groups. 335 When the focus of the question asked about support 
for building a limited ABM system, the public approved such an action at 
the level of preponderance. 336 No question asked during this entire 
time period (e,.cept those that emphasized cost) found a plurality or a 
majority w! 1st deployment of the ABM. Public support for the ABM was 
approximately 10 percent higher when the question asked about building 
an ABM system around American cities ( a  virtually unanimous attitude) 
than when the question asked about building an ABM around a respondent's 
own city (a preponderant attitude). 337 At least a majority supported 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
334 12/1963 NORC SRS 330; 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N; 
12/1968 Harris 1900. 
335 Several surveys- -conducted by NORC, ORC and MIS- -were 
commissioned by partisans in the public debate, such as the 
Department of Defense or the Nixon White House. However, their 
basic results agree with surveys conducted by independent 
organizations such as the Gallup Organization and Louis Harris 
and Associates. 
336 5/1969 ORC/Nx. 
337 Two questions were asked on this topic in 6/1964 NORC SRS 640. 
This survey data would foreshadow the localized opposition to 
-4BM deployiiient thst vould develop in 1968. Other questions 
asked in 6/1964 (NORC SRS 640) and 6/1968 (ORC/N) showed an 
approximate 15 percent drop in support for living in "defended" 
ci.ties. 
building an ABM even when people were presented with the following 
critical arguments against building such an anti-missile system: if 
radar might cause television reception problems, if local opposition was 
shown, if land values went down, or if there was a possibility of 
accidents. 338 At least a plurality supported building an ABH even if 
it would be only partially effective in defending agaimL..inc~ming 
Soviet nuclear weapons. 339 After respondents were given various 
arguments for and against building an ABM, there was only a slight 
reduction in the level of support for building the anti-missile system, 
and this drop took place primarily among those who initiaily were 
extremely in favor of building a defensive system. 340 After reviewing 
data from all of these survey questions one can firmly conclude that 
more people supported deployment of the ARM than opposed it. The lowest 
level of support for the ABM was found when a series of filter questions 
asked respondents whether they had heard of the ABM and whether they had 
an opinion on the subject. Using this filtered format, the level of 
support for building the ARM was reduced to a small plurality. 34 1 
However, for all of these surveys throughout the entire period, those 
who O R D O S ~ ~  building an ARM were in a distinct minority that varied from 
5 to 25 percent. 342 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
338 6/1964 NORC SRS 640. 
339 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N. Support for a total 
defense registered 89 percent and 68 percent for the two 
respective surveys. Support for a partial defense registered 
78 percent and 42 percent for the 1964 and 1968 surveys. 
340 6/1964 NORC SRS 640. 
341 4/1969 AIPO 777; 5/1969 AIPO 780; 7/1969 AIPO 784. 
342 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 4/1969 AIPO 777; 6/1969 Harris 1926; 
5/1969 AIPO 780; 5/1969 ORC/Nx; 7/1969 AIPO 784. 
Throughout t h e  1960s and 1970s, a t t i t u d e s  toward the  ABM were 
q u i t e  s t a b l f . .  Only two dimensions of  p u b l i c  opin ion  toward b u i l d i n g  an 
ABM showed some change. F i r s t ,  when people were asked whether they  
would r a t h e r  l i v e  i n  a defended c i t y  v e r s u s  an  undefended c i t y ,  i n  1964 
a consensus (65 p e r c e n t )  chose a defended c i t y .  When t h i s  q u e s t i o n  was 
r epea ted  i n  a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  form i n  1968, on ly  a p l u r a l i t y  (49 
p e r c e n t )  s e l e c t e d  t h e  defended c i t y .  Those who opt ,  3 f o r  l i v i n g  i n  an  
undefended c i t y  inc reased  from 13 pe rcen t  t o  23 pe rcen t  over  t h i s  fou r  
yea r  p e r i o d .  343 Second, t h e r e  was some change i n  pe rcep t ions  over  
what l o c a t i o n s  should be defended. When f i r s t  asked i n  1964, t h e  p u b l i c  
wanted t o  defend m i l i t a r y  f a c i l i t i e s ,  i n d u s t r i e s  and then  c i t i e s - - i n  
t h i s  o r d e r .  When s p e c i f i c  c i t i e s  were mentioned, Washington, D . C .  
headed t h e  l i s t  a s  t h e  c i t y  people most wanted t o  defend.  344 By 1 9 7 2 ,  
t h e  p u b l i c  wanted t o  defend c i t i e s  and only  some m i l i t a r y  b a s e s .  345 
By t h e  1980s, people d i d  not want t o  defend m i s s i l e  s i t ~ s ,  m i l i t a r y  
f a c i l i t i e s  and Washington, D . C .  346 
E .  S e c u r i t y  Impl i ca t ions  I f  An ABM Is Deployed 
Many c r i t i c s  of t h e  ABM took t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  deployment would 
i n c r e a s e  the chance of  war, t r i g g e r  an  arms r a c e ,  convince t h e  S o v i e t s  
t h a t  t h e  U . S .  was i n t e r e s t e d  i n  developing a f i r s t - s t r i k e  c a p a b i l i t y ,  
and wreck chances f o r  concluding an  agreement t o  l i m i t  s t r a t e g i c  
- - - * - - - - - - - - - - -  
343 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N. 
344 6/1964 NORC SRS 640. 
345 3/1972 MIS/N. 
346 9/1985 M h K .  
offensive weapons. Also, one of the most persuasive anti-ABM arguments 
stated that a defensive system could be ~verwhelme~d by an enemy who 
simply and cheaply builds more offensive weapons. 347 While public 
attitudes did not reject all of these arguments, on balance they did not 
present anti-ABM activists with a sympathetic audience. The public was 
evenly split on the question whether deployment of the ABM would 
increase the chance of war. 348 However, at least a majority rejectsd 
the proposition that American deployment of ABM defenses would threaten 
the Soviet Union and make the Russians think there was a greater chance 
of war. 349 The public rejected the argument that an ABM system woul0 
be overtaken by new offensive weapons. 350 People did not perceive the 
ABM system as a full proof defensive system that would replace nuclear 
deterrence, but they saw it as a supplement to strengthen our nuclear 
forces which would in turn make an enemy less likely to attack. 351 
Relatively few people believed that deployment of an ABM in their city 
would make them a target in a nuclear war. 352 Finally, the public was 
sympathetic to the "bargaining chip" theory that the United States 
needed to deploy an ABM system to increase pressure on the Soviets to 
begin discussions and then to conclude an arms control agreement. 3 5 3  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
347 Both supporters and critics of the ABM cite the Garwin and 
Bethe article (1968) and Panofsky testimony (1969) as the most 
influerltial presentation of this argument. 
348 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N. 
349 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N. 
350 Those who agreed with this Panofsky critique increased from 13% 
in 1964 to 21% in 1968. Unfortunately, this question was not 
repeated after his 1969 testimony before Congress. See 6/1964 
NORC SRS 640 and 6/1968 ORC/N. 
351 6/1964 dORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N. 
352 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N. 
353 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 4/1969 Harris 1926. 
F. Soviet ABM Development 
Just as the public believed that the United States had an existing 
ABM system, at least a consensus of the public believed the Soviets had 
an anti-missile system. 354 When questions included the idea that the 
Soviets had an ABM system, support for building an American nuclear 
defense system varied from a majority to a consensus. 355 The most 
persuasive "anti-Soviet" argument in favor of building an ABM focused on 
the development of Soviet offensive, not defensive, nuclear 
weapons. 356 
G. Limited Public Criticism of the ABM 
The public accepted only two of the msjor propositions argued by 
critics of the ABM. First they believed that building an anti-missile 
system would irxrease the arms race with the Soviet Union. 3 5 7 
However, in contrast to public attitudes evident two decades later about 
the Strategic Defense Initiative, the intensity of public concern with 
the arms race aspect of building an ABM was relatively low. This was 
probably due to the lack of public attention given to strategic nuclear 
issues during the late 1960s. As a result, there was a big gap between 
elite knowledge that the Soviets were gaining nuclear parity with the 
U.S. and public attitudes which did not focus on the Soviet nuclear 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
354 However, only 30 percent of the public believed that China had 
an ABM system. 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N; 5/1969 
ORC/Nx . 
355 4/1969 Harris 1926; 7/1969 Harris 1939. 
356 When this elements was added to the question, public support 
reached levels approaching preponderance. See 4/1969 Harris 
1926. 
357 6/1964 NORC SRS 640. 
build-up until the late 1970s. Second, as the ABM debate heated up ar.d 
as generic support for military spending began to decline in the context 
of the war in Vietnam, the issue of cost eventually turned the public 
against spending additional money to deploy the ABM. 358 In 1964 and 
1968, cost was not a major criticism of the ABM. 359 After President 
Nixon announced his decision to build the Safeguard ABM system, one 
survey recorded increased public concern over the cost issue. However 
this 1969 Harris poll still did not show that a majority opposed 
deployment of the ABM in the context of its financial cost. 360 
However, by 1971 the issue of cost had become the main criticism of the 
ABM.~~' By this time a plurality wanted to spend less money on the 
ABM. 362 
H. Arms Control Agreement to Limit ABMc 
Data about the last dimension of public opinion on the ABM issue 
reveal a pattern very similar to the one found in public attitudes 
concerning the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Even though there was public 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
358 For an evaluation of public attitudes toward Vietnam, see J .  
Mueller 1973. For a comprehensive description and analysis of 
American attitudes towards military spending, see Graham and 
Hartley 1989. 
359 6/1964 NORC SRS 640; 6/1968 ORC/N. In these surveys, only 
between 17 and 23 percent of the public opposed the ABM system 
when the issue of cost was introducted into the survey 
question. When the cost was listed as $ 5 billion, opposition 
was recorded at 13 percent. When the cost was listed as $ LO 
billion, opposition rose LO 23 percent. 
360 4/1969 Harris 1926. 
361 1/1971 Harris 2055; 3/1972 MIS/N; 9/1972 Harris 2234. 362 However spending on the ABM was more popular than spending for 
the military in general. See 9/1972 Harris 2234. 
support for deployment of the ABM, throughout the late 1960s and 1970s 
there was extremely strong mass support for concluding a bilateral arms 
control agreement to limit (not ban) ABMs, provided that both the United 
States and the Soviet Union were parties to the treaty. Support for an 
arms control agreement to limit ABMs never dropped below a majority. In 
the 1960s, public support for an agreement varied, depending on question 
wording, from a majority to virtual unanimity. 363 By the early 1970s, 
support for an ABM agreement was recorded at the level of consensus or 
higher. 364 However, it rook many years for the public to support a 
total ban on ABMs. In 1972, one survey recorded 59 percent of the 
public in favor of an agreement to limit ABMs, but only 39 percent 
favored a total ban on anti-missile systems. 365 By 1978, a plurality 
of 49 percent supported a total ban on these nuclear defensive 
sys terns. 3 6 6 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
363 6/1968 ORC/N; 4/1969 Harris 1926; 7/1969 Harris 1939. 
364 6/1971 Harris 2124; 2/1972 Harris 2154; 3/1972 MIS/N; 
6/1972 Harris 2216; 6/1973 Harris 2330; 11/1973 Harris 2351 
365 3/1972 MIS/N. 
366 12/1978 MIS/N. 
I11 Re la t ionsh ip  Between Publ ic  Opinion and Pol icy  Making 
Determinfng whether p u b l i c  opin ion  played a  c r u c i a l  r o l e  i n  
g e t t i n g  t h i s  arms c o n t r o l  case  s tudy  onto  t h e  Executive branch agenda i s  
complicated by t h r e e  f a c t o r s .  F i r s t ,  two i s s u e s - - t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  deploy 
t h e  ABM and t o  n e g o t i a t e  SALT I - -  have t h e i r  own h i s t o r i e s  and thus  have 
t o  be  eva lua ted  s e p a r a t e l y  even though t h e  s u b j e c t s  a r e  i n e x t r i c a b l y  
l i n k e d .  Second, two d i f f e r e n t  admi .n is t ra t ions  (Johnson and Nixon) made 
d i s t i n c t  d e c i s i o n s  on bo th  of  t h e s e  i s s u e s ,  thereby t ransforming a  
s i n g l e  q u e s t i o n  about  t h e  r o l e  played by p u b l i c  opin ion  i n  g e t t i n g  t h i s  
c a s e  onto  t h e  agenda i n t o  four  s e p a r a t e  ques t ions  summarized i n  Table 
6 - 3 .  T h i r d ,  a  key d i s t i n c t i o n  must be made between " p o l i t i c a l l y  a c t i v e "  
opin ion  and p u b l i c  op in ion .  During 1968-1972 a t t i t u d e s  h e l d  by a  slnall  
group of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i s t s ,  a  t i n y  minor i ty  of the  popula t ion  t h a t  was 
engaged i n  t h e  ABM deba te ,  were q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from a t t i t u d e s  he ld  by 
t h e  gene ra l  p u b l i c .  For t h i s  reason,  a t t i t u d e s  of  the  former group w i l l  
be r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  "popular"  opin ion  i n  c o n t r a s t  wi th  a t t i t u d e s  h e l d  by 
t h e  gene ra l  p u b l i c  which w i l l  be r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  " p o l i t i c a l . l y  a c t i v e "  
opin  Lon. 
Publ ic  Opinion In f luence  on ABM/SALT I Decis ions :  
Table 6 - 3  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  Decision Degree of  In f luence  
Johnson 's  Decision To Deploy t h e  S e n t i n e l  ABM High 
Johnson 's  Decision To I n i t i a t e  SALT I Moderate 
Nixon's Decis ion  To Deploy t h e  Safeguard ABM Moderate 
Nixon's Decision To I n i t i a t e  SALT I Moderate 
A. The ABM Issue Fron the Eisenhower thru the Johnson 
Administrations: Getting on the Agenda and Implementation 
With respect to the deployment of the ABM, for over a decade 
public opinion played virtually no role in causing President Eiserlhower 
or President Kennedy to focus on the issue. From 1956 to 1966 
sufficient bureaucratic pressure was exerted by the Army, the Air Force, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Congressional hawks to keep the ABM 
issue on the agenda and thereby require annual Presidential budget 
decisions to determine whether various version of the Nike system should 
be deployed. In this period successive Presidents were able to defer a 
deployment decision and satisfy their bureaucratic problems by funding 
significant ABM research and development. 367 Despite scattered press 
stories that argued the Soviets were ahead of the U.S. in ABM 
development, neither the 1960 nor 1964 Presidential campaigns focused on 
a defensive, as opposed to an offensive, strategic weapons "gap. ,, 368 
On occasion, such as after Sputnik. or after President Kennedy's 1963 
refused to deploy an ABM in the face of growing Soviet defensive 
capabilities, Congress or its committees added more money to the ABM 
research budget than was requested by the administration. However this 
367 The most comprehensive review and analysis of this early period 
of the ABM issues is contained in Jayne 1969, 46-7, 58-60, 
105-13. 
3t8 Jayne 1969, 92, 103-4, 251; Newhouse 1973, 48, 61. 
action did not trigger a major political fight over the ABM issue. 3 6 9 
In 1964 and 1965--despite growing Soviet ABM capabilities paraded in 
Moscow, China's nuclear test, technical improvements in U.S. ABM-related 
phased array radar, and successful testing of the American Sprint 
missile--President Johnson supported Secretary of Defense McNamara's 
recommendation to delay an ABM deployment decision because an ABM was 
neither cost-effective nor strategically wise. 370 
This basic political calculus, and the influence of public opinion 
on decision-making, changed in 1966 and 1967. President Johnson became 
concerned that the Republicans would run their 1968 Presidential 
campaign on the theme of an "ABM gap" and that this might be a 
succsssful political strategy. 371 In addition, an increasingly 
impatient Congress added subs~antial money ( $  167.9 million) for 
"preproduction" of the Nike-X ABM system. 372 As a result of these 
political pressures, which were consistent with public opinion, 
Secretary McNamara had to change his complex maneuvers to delay AB1.I 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
369 President Eisenhower impounded the "extra" AHM money in the FY 
1957 budget and neutralized post-Sputnik political pressure 
with respect to the ABM by unifying all ABM research into 
ARPA. In 1963, the Senate Armed Services Committee's effort to 
add $ 196 million to the defense authorization bill to deploy 
Nike-Zeus was defeated by the full Senate 56::16 after a secret 
session. See Flanagan 1979, 99; Jayne 1969 184-186. 
370 Jayne 1969, 251 - 65, 284- 97 ; Kaplan 1983, 320- 324 ; Newhouse 
1973, 73-5; G. Smit,~ [I9801 1985, 94. 
371 President Johnson's guess about public attitudes is consistent 
with the public opinion data presented earlier in this 
chapter. For Republican efforts to focus on the "ABM gap," see 
Flanagan 1979, 100-101; Halperin 1972, 83; Jayne 1969, 
336-338. 
372 Cahn 1971, 80, 241; Flanagan 100; Jayne 1969, 312-317. 
deployment. He obtained President Johnson's approval of a compromise 
strategy where the administration would propose funding pre-production 
tooling and procurement of Nike-X, but not deploy the system until the 
U.S. was able to negotiate a limit on extensive area defense ABMs with 
the Soviet Union. 373 The basic reason for making this decision was 
domestic politics, of which public opinion played an important part. 
President Johnson's letter to Premier Kosygin proposing arms control 
talks explicitly mentioned Congressional and mblic o~inion pressure on 
the administration to deploy an ABM system. 374 since ~ecrecary 
McNamara was willing to resist the bureaucratic pressure of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, but not break with LBJ on the ABM issue, President 
Johnson's evaluation of the political situation overrode McNamara's 
logical, technical, and strategic objections to the anti-missile 
sys tem . 375 
Despite President Johnson's step towards deploying an ABM, 
domestic political pressure mounted on the administration in early 1967 
to go farther. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Wheeler, publicly called for immediate ABM deployment, and the Senate 
approved standby funding for ABM deployment if arms control talks 
failed. 376 Against this background, the inability of McNamara to 
convince Kosygin that an agreement on ABMs would be in the mutual 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
373 Halperin 1972, 84; Jayne 1969, 333-48; Kahan 1975, 121-122; 
Kaplan 1983, 338-348; Newhouse 1973, 81-86. 
374 Flanagan 1979, 104. 
375 Halperin 1972, 80-81 
376 Finney 1967a, 2; 1967b. 1. 
interest of the United States and the Soviet Urlion led President Johnson 
to inform McNamara that some type of ABM deployment would have to be 
made prior to January 1968. 377 After the failure of the June 1967 
Johnson-Kosygin "summit" in Glassboro, N.J., Congressional pressure 
increased for immediate ABM deployment, and Republican Presidential 
candidate Nixon called for deployment of an anti-missile system at any 
cos t . 378 As a result of these political pressures, in September 1967, 
Secretary McNamara announced deployment of a $ 5 billion "thin" ABM 
system which would be directed against an attack from China. 379 
Implementation of this decision Lappened quickly as the Senate approved 
the required funding within one mont'n and ten possible ABM sites were 
announced by the army. 380 
There is no academic debate over these events or over the general 
proposition that Johnson's decision was based primarily on political, 
rather thhn on strategic, grounds. 381 However, no previous scholar 
has shown explicitly that President Johnson and his Republican 
challengers read public opinion correctly. More people supported 
deployment of an ABM system than opposed it. While some commentators 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
377 Cahn 1971, 242; Flanagan 1979, 106; Halperin 1972, 87; 
Kaplan 1983, 346; Jayne 1969, 368-371; Rathjens 1983, 381 
378 Cahn 1971, 243; Flanagan 1979, 106. 
379 Cahn 1971, 113; Flanagan 1979, 107; Jayne 1969, 388-403; 
Kaplan 1983, 346-8; McNamara 1968; Newhouse 1973, 95-7. 380 Barton and Weiler 1976, 178; Cahn 1971, 45-46, 188; Halperin 
1972, 89. 381 Most (60%) anti-ABM scientists believed this decision was 
political (Cahn 1971), and former Johnson aid R.N. Goodwin 
confirmed this idea in the September 30, 1967 "News and 
Comments" section of the New Yorker. 
have implied that Johnson's actions were unnecessarily "political," I 
would argue that they were entirely rational. 382 Thus, the 
fundamental reason for President Johnson's 1967 decision LO deploy the 
ABM was due to public opinion with additional pressures coming from 
Congress, the Republican party, and bureaucratic actors. Since public 
opinion was not at overwhelming levels (consensus or higher) it is 
conceivable that President Johnson could have successfully Implemented a 
no-deployment strategy. However to do this, he would have to develop an 
alternative ~olitical strategy, not just rely on the logical policy 
analysis that was provided to him by McNamara. There are no indications 
from documents written at the time that any anti-ABM advisors were even 
aware of relevant p~blic opinion. It is clear from the existing 
academic literature that none of these advisors took the additional step 
of attempting to develop an alternative political strategy that would 
have been needed to sustain continued delay in deploying the ABM. 
B. The ABM Issue During the Nixon Administration: Getting on the 
Agenda and Implementation 
By the time Richard Nixon took office, the A 5 M  issue was clearly 
already on the Executive branch agenda, and unlike the 1956-1966 time 
period, the issue was framed in broader terms than just the Defense 
Department budget. In the 1968 Presidential election, Richard Nixon 
campaigned on restoring American nuclear "superiority," negotiating 
strategic nuclear reductions from a position of strength, and also 
supported ABM deployment. Thus the issue for him was not whether or not 
to build an ABM, but what type of system to deploy. Once in office, 
after a month-long review conducted by Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Packard, the administration announced plans to d~ploy a modified ABM 
system which would focus on the Soviet threat to American lCBMs as well 
as provide limited protection for cities from a Chinese nuclear attack 
The renamed Szfeguard system also was initially designed to be cheaper 
than the Democratic Sentinei syster~,. 383 
Public opinion played only a moderate role in influencing Nixon's 
deployment decision. First, pdblic attitudes influenced Nixon's 
campaign statements on strategic nuclear issues. This set up the 
problem in his mind as not "whether" but "what type" of ABM should be 
deployed. 384 Second, the desire to limit the expense of an ABM u3s 
also due in Dart to public attitudes which were growing increasingly 
critical of military spending. 385 This aspect of the problem, 
reinforced by Congressional cuts in the administration's defense budget, 
was emphasized by Henry Kissinger. 386 The electoral and budget 
influences on Nixon's ABM deployment decision had very important 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
383 Kissinger 1979, 205, 207-9; Newhouse 1973, 151-2. 384 This perspective is clearly shown in the television news 
interview with David Packard shown on CBS for February 18, 
i969. See Vanderbilt Television News Index and Abstracts. 
385 Graham and Hartley 1989. 
386 Kissinger 1979, 199-201, 204, 212-215. For the definitive 
study which shows the relationship between public opinion about 
military spending and Congressional action to cut, add, or 
maintain the size of the defense budget, see Jacobson 1984. 
components of public opinion in them. However, my analysis suggests 
that public opinion played less of a role in influencing Nixon's ABM 
deployment decision than it had in the Johnson administration. The key 
change from the Sentinel to Safeguard system involved protecting U.S. 
ICBMs. This latter decision was the product of strategic thinking of 
conservative analysts such as Senator Jackson, Deputy Secretary Packard, 
and Albert Wholstetter. There is no indication from public opinion data 
that the public had clear-cut opinions on this subject, and no Nixon 
administration documents indicate that this aspect of the deployment 
deci~ion was made on grounds other than the "logic" of nuclear strategy, 
as seen by conservatives. 
However, once Nixon's decision was announced, a major political 
controversy developed over implementing his ABM program. Some accounts 
of the ABM debate of 1969 imprecisely attributed it to increasing public 
opposition to deployment of an ABM. 387 However, the reviev of public 
opinion data presented earlier in this chapter clearly shows that the 
general public remained supportive of ABM deploynent. If this is true, 
what accounts for the political pressure generated in 1963 which almost 
led the Senate to defeat funding for the AEM? Several factors can 
explain the growth, but ultimate failure, of this political opposition 
to ABM deployment. In short mobilized "politically active" opinion, as 
opposed to mass "public" opinion al~ost defeated implementation of 
Nixon's ABM deployment plans. However, despite the intensity of 
- - - - - - - - - - - . . - - -  
387 Cahn 1371. 
attitudes held by this group, all indications show that this group was 
quite small in numbers (less than 10 percent of the public) and never 
grew beyond the "opinion and policy elite." The inability of elite 
advocates of arms control to communicate with the general public on 
important nuclear issues has been a consistent pattern discovered in 
this dissertation. 388 What makes the ABM/SALT I case unique is that 
one can clearly document that this failure in comm~znications was not due 
to lack of press (print) or media (television) coverage. The fai.l.ure 
was due to elite politics? actors developing their political strategy in 
ignorance of actual public opinion. Anti-ABM leaders allowed their 
perceptions to be strongly influenced by politically active opinion such 
as interest group activity, letters to the editor, or protest 
demonstrations. This political strategy used by ABM critics succeeded 
in convincing twelve additional Senators that ABM deployment was 
futile. However, all of this political effort did not mike a dent in 
attitudes of the general public and ultimately did not provide the 
political foundation to stop the ABM. 
What factors can explain why the ABM debate became such a large 
political issue among the opinion and policy elite? First, with a shift 
in administrations, influential Democrats such as former Secretary of 
Defense Clifford were no longer in a position to have to defend ABM 
funding so that the United States could negotiate with the Soviet Union 
from a position of streugth. 389 A second, but related, factor was 
388 The same problem also occurs for many tigrassroots" groups which 
often have leaders who are quite elitist. 
389 Grose 1968, 1. 
t h a t  many former mid- level  Kennedy and Johnson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f f i c i a l s  
wi th  r e q u i s i t e  t e c h n i c a l  and s t r a t e g i c  backgrounds were d ismissed  from 
t h e i r  adv i so ry  p o s i t i o n s  by t h e  incoming Republican a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and 
were now f r e e  t o  express  t h e i r  anti-ABM o p i n i o ~ ~ s  i n  p u b l i c .  Th i s  f a c t o r  
accounted f o r  many anti-ABM " i n n e r n  s c i e n t i s t s .  390 Th i rd ,  l o c a l  
p r o t e s t  a c t i v i t y  i n  h a l f  of  t h e  c i t i e s  wi th  proposed A B M  s i t e s  took 
p lace  i n  1968 ~ n d  i n  1969. 391 However, s e v e r a l  of t h e s e  f a c t o r s  had 
been p r e s e n t  i n  1967 and 1968 and had n o t  c r e a t z d  t h e  major p o l i t i c a l  
i s s u e  t h a t  came t o  pass  i n  1969. A f o u r t h  f a c t o r  brought  a l l  of t hese  
d i s p a r a t e  i n f l u e n c e s  toge the r  t o  c r e a t e  t h e  " g r e a t  d e b a t e . "  I t  was 
p r i s s  and media coverage.  A s  reviewed e a r l i e r  i n  Table 6 - 1 ,  p r e s s  
coverage of  t h e  ABM debate  was exte.nsive.  I n  add i t io r i ,  coverage of t h i s  
s u b j e c t  on t h e  mass media- - t e l e v i s i o n -  -was a l s o  e x t e n s i v e .  392 A 
review of  Table 6 -4  on p r e s s  coverage i n  t h e  New York Times f o r  1969 
c l e a r l y  shows t h a t  " p o l i t i c a l l y  a c t i v e "  opin ion  was s t r o n g l y  a g a i n s t  
deployment of  t h e  ABM. L e t t e r s  t o  t h e  e d i t o r  and book reviews ran  2 t o  
1 a g a i n s t  t h e  ABM. E d i t o r i a l s ,  co lumnis t s ,  adver t i sernents ,  i n t e r e . s t  
groups ,  and l o c a l  p r o t e s t  a c t i v i t y  were even s t r o n g e r  a g a i n s t  deployment 
of  t h e  A B M . ~ ' ~  
'Rie importance of  a l l  of t h i s  anti-ABM p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  t o  t h e  
g e n e r i c  i s s u e  of t h e  p o l i t i c s  of arms c o n t r o l  i s  t h a t  a c t i v i s t s  who were 
engaged i n  t h e  A B M  debate  and s c h o l a r s  who have s t u d i e d  t h i s  case  have 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
390 Cehn 1971, 58. 391 Cahn 1971, 50, 71,  189-192, 244; Cobb and Elder  1972, 71-75.  392 See Vanderb i l t  T e l e v i s i o n  Index and A b s t r a c t s  f o r  1968 and 
1969. 
393 I t  is  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  blamed a  
"b iased"  p r e s s  on i t s  d i f f i c u l t y  t o  s e l l  t h e  ABM. 
New York Times Coverage of the 1969 ABM Debate 
Table 6-4 
total number of nytimes articles on abm systems 
nurnber of letters to the editor (hawk/dove) 
number of nytimes editorials (hawk/dove) 
number of columnists (hawk/dove) 
number of advertisements (hawk/dove) 
number of book reviews (hawk/dove) 
references of interest groups (hawk/dove) 
cartoons 
references to local protests/marches (hawk/dove) 
number of texts/transcripts reproduced in nytimes 
number of days with multiple articles on related subjects 
total number of nytimes articles on icbm/mirv systems 8 7 
number of letters to the editor (hawk/dove) 1 /6  
number of nytimes editorials (hawk/dove) 1/11 




references to local protests/marches (hawk/dove) 
number of texts/transcripts reproduced in nytimes 1 
number of days with multiple articles on related subjects 15 
c total number of nytimes articles on strategic arms control 160 
c-1 number of letters to the editor (hn,wk/dove) 2/5 
c-2 number of nytimes editorials (hawk/dove) 0/14 
c-3 number of colunnists (hawk/dove) 0/4 
c-6 references of interest groups (hawk/dove) 0/5 
c-9 number of texts/transcripts reproduced in nytimes 5 
c-10 number of days with multiple articles on related subjects 32  
mistaken "politically active" opinion for public opinion. By using 
false "indicators" of public attitudes such as letters to the editor, 
participation at rallies, and press editorials, arms control advocated 
(who were ABM critics) fooled themselves into thinking that they had 
really broken through and communicated with the general public, Actual 
evidence from public opinion polls shows this did not happen in this 
arms control case, or in any other examined in this dissertation. For 
the ABM case, politically active opinion diverged radically both in 
intensity and in content from actual public opinion. 
The anti-ABM forces achieved the relative success that they did in 
part because the Nixon administration was far less professional and 
sophisticated in its understanding snd use of public opinion than 
several previous administrations. It conducted relatively little of its 
own confidential polling, and its crude efforts to publicize the results 
of one of its surveys--rather than use that knowledge in the development 
of a cogent communication strategy- -backfired. 394 As important as 
public opinion is to the workings of the political system, a more 
important factor is the use of public opinion by political activists. 
On chis score, both anti-ABM and pro-ABM advocates were relatively 
uninformed and unprofessional. 3 9 5 
C. Getting SALT I on the Agenda: The Johnson Administration 
In contrast to the complicated story associated with the ABM 
deployment decision, getting SALT I on the agenda was relatively 
simple. As reviewed in Table 6-3 (above), I argue that public opinion 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
394 The Niron White House conducted anly 2 surveys on the ABM/SALT 
I issue: 1969 ORC/Nx; 6/1971 ORC/Nx. For the controversy over 
activities associated with dissemi~~ation of these polling 
results by the Citizens Committee for Peace with Security, see 
the New York Time, June 6, 1969, p.1; June 13, 1969, p. 69; 
August 4, 1969, p. 1. 
395 Defense Department public relations efforts, while expensive, 
were also relatively crude, and as the polling data show, 
ineffective. See Cahn 1971, 244; Fulbright 1970, 1-16. 
only played a moderate role in this process. The primary advocate of 
beginning arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in the Johnson 
administration was Secretary of Defense McNamara. He not only wanted to 
start strategic arms control talks with the Soviets to help him delay 
deployment of the ABM system, but he hoped to transform the 
action-reaction arms race cycle into a more stable and secure 
relationship. 396 Only a small part of McNamara's desire to initiate 
arms control talks with the Soviets revolved around domestic politics. 
The same was not true for President Johnson. He wanted to balance arms 
control talks with the Soviets with deployment of an ABM to presknt the 
electorate with images of peace and scrength at the same time. 397 In 
this context, publi- opinion influenced the decision to attempt to 
negotiate talks with the Soviets. However, it was not the only factor 
in the decision, nor as in the case of the decision to deploy the ABM 
was it running contrary to strong bureaucratic pressure. For these 
reasons, I conclude that public opinion had only a moderate impact on 
this decision to initiate the SALT talks. 
Evec though public opinion had some influence on the Johns n 
administration's SALT decision, neither the President nor Robert 
McNamara comprehended the preponderant level of public support for arms 
control negotiations with the Soviets. Neither of them did sufficient 
research on the political aspect of this problem to realize that success 
in starting arms control negotiations might be sufficiently popular to 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
396 KcNaaara 1968. 
397 Halperin 1972, 85. 
obviate the need to deploy the ABM. In the context of public attitudes 
of the time, the survey data suggest this was a potentially successful 
political strategy. In all of the staff work conducted by the small 
group of people working on this subject in the Pentagon and State 
Department before and after President Johnson's December 6, 1966 
decision, no review of relevant public opinion data was conducted, nor 
was any independent polling initiated. 398 As is often the case inside 
the foreign policy community in the Executive branch, staff time was 
concentrated on tecnnical .letails, bureaucratic politics, and diplomatic 
discussions. 399 However, all of McNamaraf s and Johnsonf s hopes for 
initiating arm control talks with the Soviets were dashed on August 20, 
1968, when the U.S.S.R. invaded Czechoslovakia, ending all serious 
efforts to reach an agreement on mutual restraint in the Democratic 
administration. 
D. Getting SALT I on the Agenda: The Nixon Administration 
Similar to President Johnson's decision to initiate arms control 
talks with the Soviet Union, in the case of Richard Nixon, public 
opinion played only a moderate role in influencing the administration. 
Not only was politically active opinion of arms control advocates 
pressuring Nixon to start the SALT talks immediately upon entering 
office, but by this time European governmental, bureaucratic (ACDA and 
- - - - - - - - e m - - - - -  
398 Kissinger 1979, 148; Newhouse 1973, 86-7, 111-1.15, 122, 
127-130; Smith [I9801 1985, 27. 399 This pattern is particularly true in Democratic 
administrations. 
State), press, and Congressional pressure all were pushing in the same 
direction to get the administration to begin arms control talks. 400 
Public opinion was thus one of several pressures which were being 
exerted on the Nixon administration By the time President Nixon made 
his decision to initiate strategic arss control talks with the Soviet 
Union in June, 1969 one publicly released Harris survey recorded strong 
public support for such negotiations. 401 To the Nixun administration, 
initiating the SALT talks was important not so much to reach an 
agreement with the Soviets but to provide a "bargaining chip" rationale 
for deploying the ABM system and for fending off Congressional cutn in 
military spending. As reviewed earlier in this chapter, public opinion 
supported this concept. 
By the beginning of the Nixon administration arms control with the 
Soviet Union was "permanently" on the Executive branch agenda. From the 
end of the Johnson administration through the Carter administration, 
arms control negotiations can be considered a given, with most political 
cor~troversy focused on the negotiation and ratification stages of the 
policy process. When President Reagan took strategic arms control off 
the agenda in the early 1980s and began talking about war fighting, the 
American political system erupted, and the administration was forced to 
resume START talks to undermine the nuclear freeze movement. This 
latter example demonstrates the important, but subtle, influence that 
public opinion has on arms control decision making. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
400 Kissinger 1979, 73, 137-8, 145, 403-4. 401 Harris 1900 was reported in the New York Tines February 4, 1969 
on page 18. 
E. Negotiating SALT I 
During the negotiations to limit strategic offensive and defensive 
systems, public opinion played a limited, but important, role in 
influencing several American decisions. Early on in the SALT 
negotiations the Soviet Union agreed to limit, but not ban, ABMs. 402 
Polling data show that the American public supported this position: 
limit ABM;, but do not ban them. The U.S. negotiating position quickly 
accepted this position, and the rest of the ABM focus of the 
negotiatioiks emphasized the number of sites and their location. 
Asymmetrical Soviet ABM deployment (protecting Moscow) and American 
public opinion caused a key problem for U.S. negotiators. Congress and 
the public were reluctant to spend additional money to defend Washington 
D.C., and this made it impossible to negotiate a symmetrical ABrl 
agreement. 403 For several years the Nixon administration grappled 
with this public opinion-caused problem before reaching an agreement to 
limit ABM deployment to two sites, only one of which could defend ICBM 
bases. 
A second crucial aspect of the SALT I negotiations focused on 
multiple-independently retargetable vehicles (MIRVs). Many arms control 
advocates believed the inability of SALT I to limit this system was the 
major failure of the negotiations. 404 While many factors rTere 
responsible for placing no restraints on this system (not the least of 
402 Barton and Weiler 1976, 89; Newhouse 1973, 165, 170-176; 
Smith [I9801 1985, 75-99. 
Flanagan 1979, 163, 201, 217-219; Kissinger 1979, 538-545, 
813, 822 
Greenwood 1975. 
which was Soviet reluctance to control MIRVs), it is worth mentioning 
that the negotiating position supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was 
clearly in line with public opinion. The JCS agreed to place a MIRV ban 
on the agenda provided that the Soviets agreed to on-site inspection. 405 
At the same time, arms control advocates called for unilateral U.S. 
deferral of missile flight testing which would have been needed to allow 
negotiation of a verifiable MIRV ban. This position was not supported 
by ~ h e  public. While public opinion did not determine this arms control 
outcome with respect to MIRVs, when the public opinion dimension is 
added to the analysis of decision-making, it provides one additional 
explanation why the position taken by the JCS prevail.ed over the 
position taken by those who advocated controls. Arms control advocates 
can not hope to win their preferred policy positions when they are 
opposed both by powerful bureaucratic actors and also by public opinion. 
The final element in the eventual SALT I agreement was to combine 
limited constraints on offensive systems with a near-ban on ABM 
systems. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger attribute this decision to 
public opinion and Congressional pressure which throughout the 
negotiations was constantly cutting funding for various U.S. strategic 
programs. 406 These three examples demonstrate that the basic 
405 Kissinger 1979, 540, 545; Smith [198O: 1985, 117-120. For 
relevant public opinion data on attitudes toward verification, 
see Appendix 7. 
Flanagan 1979, 208-214; Kissinger 1979, 725, 799-803, 
819-822; Newhouse 1973, 217. 
negotiating position taken by the United States was influenced, in part, 
by public opinion. 
F. Ratification of SALT I 
By the time a treaty was signed by the United States and Soviet 
Union in May, 1972 public opinion surveys showed that the agreement was 
very popular. In August the agreement was approved by the Senate by a 
vote of 88 to 2. 407 The lack of political controversy surrounding 
approval of this agreement is often associated with President Nixon's 
conservative credentials and strong public support. My research 
reinforces this conclusion, but this analysis misses the fact that the 
entire spectrum of the American public supported this arms control 
agreement, and the small (iO percent) segment of conservatives who 
supported the agreement because it was negotiated by Richard Nixon were 
not essential to its ratification. 
G. Implementation of SALT I 
Public opinion had a powerful influence during the last stage of 
the policy process: implementation. The ABM treaty was in reasonably 
good shape until Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative 
in 1983. Contrary to the impressions of policy specialists and the 
"opinion and policy elite," President Reagan's initiative was presented 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
407 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1982, 139. 
to an already very sympathetic mass audience. Reagan did not change 
public attitudes, but he isolated the dimension of the issue which would 
produce the strongest level of public support, and he communicated it to 
the public in language they could understand. This had the political 
effect of mobilizing political resources to support Reagan's pro-SDI 
policy positions. In the process he killed the nuclear freeze movement, 
strengthened his bargaining position vis a vis the Soviet Union, 
"created" a major strategic program which previously had been a 
disconnected set of research projects, and brcught heavy political 
pressure to bear to withdraw from the ABM treaty. Since arms control 
advocates and virtually the entire expert defense community were totally 
unaware of the broad public support for building defensive systems 
(because they exclusively followed "politi.cally active" opinion during 
the ABM debate), Reagan's speech and the quick confirmation that the 
public supported it (through now ubiquitous, media-funded public opinion 
polls) gave further credence to the "great communicator" image of the 
President. This also led to speculation among pundits, unsupported by 
any opinion data, that mass attitudes on nuclear issues are volatile. 
This elite "logicw perceived the public as becoming scrongly 
"anti-nuclear" as a result of the nuclear freeze movement and tbe ! i  
becoming "isolationist" in its desire for a utopian defensive shield of 
SDI. Ronald Reagan, supported by a professianal team of survey 
researchers and communications experts, understood the complete meaning 
of public opinion and used this superior knowledge to its fullest. His 
arms control opponents, following a long and noble path of failure 
neither understood the meaning nor importance of public opinion. As has 
been true throughout the nuclear age, most arms controllers have not 
even realized what the "game" was all about. 
IV Diversity andDynamics of Public Opinion 
Previous sections of this chapter have described public attitudes 
towzrd the ABM and SALT 1 and have evaluated the impact public opinion 
has had on decision-making as various stages of the policy process. 
This final section will address the two other hypothesis being 
examined in this dissertation. Has there been a lack of public opinion 
consensus in favur of arms control either because attirudes have been 
volatile or because they have been highly fragmented? On a second 
issue, have opinion leaders and the attentive public been against arms 
control, and have these elite attitudes changed mass atti~udes t c  be 
criticel of arms control through a top-down diffusion of attitudes? 
A. Attitude Ccnsensus 
The first aspect of an atcitude consensus has been defined for 
this dissertetion as a high level of public opinion (above 60 percent) 
and relative attitude stability over time. On two very importarit 
dimensions of the ABM/SALT I case, public atcitudes have achieved a 
consensus. Over a forty year period, the public has believed that it is 
feasible to build an active defense against nuclear weapons. On the 
second dimension, there has been consensus or preponderant support for 
reaching an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union to limit ABM 
systems. In a third area, while public opinion has not always reached 
the le,;rel of consensus, at least a plurality has supported building an 
ABM system, and some surveys came close to recor?ing a consensus on this 
i ssue . 
In all of these areas, public attitudes llave been relatively 
stable, not moody or volatile as characterized Ly Almond and Lippmann. 
Atticude change took place on only two cspects of ABM/SALT I pubiic 
opinion. On the question whether people wanted to live in a defended or 
undefended city, from 1964 to 1968 sixteen percent fewer people wanted 
to live in a defended city. In a second area, over a longer period of 
time from 1964 to the 19805, the public changed its mind on the 
desirability of defending Washington, L.C. In the context of the 
general decliae in support fol institutions that took place from the 
1960s to the 1980s, and the constant anti-Washington rhetoric from 
Presidents Carter and Reagan, attitude change against protecting 
Washington, D.C. is not surprising. 408 However, in these two areas 
where attitude change took place, there was na sign that the change was 
unusual or that attitudes went back and forth in a volatile pattern. As 
- - - .  - - - -  - - - - - - .  
408 For a review of declining public support for most inntirvtions, 
see Lipset: and Schneider 1983. 
in all the previous chapters, I have found that attitudes on differ4nt 
dimensions of various arms control cases have been quite clear and 
relatively stable. 
B. Attitude Fragmentation 
The second aspect of an attitude consensus relates to the relative 
homogeneity or fragmentation of attitudes along poLitica1 or demographic 
lines. To address this issue, quantitative analysis was performed on 9 
national surveys thht were conducted over the entire period of the 
ABMISALT I case. By using a seven-point fragmentation scale discussed 
in Chapter 2, this analysis found that attitudes st~owecl low 
fragmentation along some partisan and demographic lines but medium to 
high fragmentation along other !.ines. 409 These findings are reviewed 
ir. two tables on attitudes toward building an ABM system (Table 6-5) and 
attitudes about the SALT I treaty to limit PBMs (Table 6-6). 
On the issue of building an ARM, there was low fragmentation along 
regional, party, gender and voter lines. These results are a bit 
surprising in that women were not strongly opposed t-o LuiLding ctn ABM, 
and people in the South were not strongly in favor of the systen until 
the 1970s. However, there was medium to high fragmentation along 
oducz.tiona1, income cnd presidential job performance lines. Attitudes 
of the highly educated show an extremely interesting pattern where those 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
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Region (Southfles t) 
Party ID (Dem/Rep) 




A Harris 1900 
B Harris 1926 
C Harris 1939 
D Harris 2055; this survey focused on spendiilg more money for an 
ABM . 
+ The sub-group was more supportive of building the ABM than the 
mean for the general public; each number represents a unit on the 
fragmentation scale. reviewed in Chapter 2, Table 2-5 
The sub-group was less supportive of building the ABM than the 
mean for the general public. 
College degree (post graduate college work/a bachelors college 
degree); Income of the highest 3-5 percent OF the public; Party 
Identification (Democratic/Republican); Presidential job 
approval (excellent/good); Voted in the last Presidential 
election (yes/no). 
with post-graduate education initially were more supportive of building 
the anti-missile system than the general public; but as a result of the 
ABM debate, these people who one could consider in the "opinion and 
policy elite" changed their attitude to become strongly against building 
an ABM. This evidence clearly shows that those who participated in the 
"great ABM debate" and the massive print and media coverage of the issue 
helped to change attitudes of an important segment of the public. 
However, t h i s  segment of  s o c i e t y  c o n s t i t u t e s  only  about  5 percen t  of the  
e n t i r e  populat ioi l .  Not only  does survey re sea rch  r e v e a l  t h a t  a t t i t u d e s  
o f  che "opin ion  and p o l i c y  e l i t e "  were anti-ABM, bu t  o t h z r  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  
e l i t e  a t t i t u d e s  such a s  l e t t e r s  t o  t h e  e d i t o r s ,  i n t e r e s t  group a c t i v i t y ,  
and e d i t o r i a l s  also show a  similar anti-ABM p a t t e r n .  As d i scussed  
e a r l i e r  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t hese  a t t i t u d e s  h e l d  by t h e  minor i ty  op in ion  
and p o l i c y  e l i t e  convinced anti-ABM advocates  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  was on 
t h e i r  s i d e .  
People wi th  only a  c o l l e g e  degree s t a r t e d  c ~ t  b e f o r e  the  ABM 
debate  a s  s k e p t i c a l  about  b u i l d i n g  an ABM and remained s o ,  a t  low 
l e v e l s ,  throughout .  A s  one moves i n t o  t h e  l a t e  1960s through t h e  1980s 
wi th  t h e  exp los ion  i n  t h e  number of  people who have a t t e n d e d  c o l l e g e ,  i t  
has  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  important  t o  t r a c k  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  a t t i t u d e s  no t  
j u s t  of those  wi th  a  c o l l e g e  degree b u t  those  wi th  more than  a  bache lo r s  
degree .  I t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  a t t i t u d e s  of t h e s e  two groups can  d ive rge  i n  
impor tant  ways. The ABM debate  was the  f i r s t  time such a  p a t t e r n  has 
been d iscovered  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  a t t i t u d e s .  
Another i n t e r e s t i n g  s h i f t  i n  a t t i t u d e s  r e l a t e s  t o  a t t i t u d e s  of 
those  who approved t h e  performance of  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  When P r e s i d e n t  
Johnson was i n  o f f i c e ,  people who s t r o n g l y  approved h i s  performance were 
s l i g h t l y  a g a i n s t  - b u i l d i n g  an  ABM. When Nixon came t o  o f f i c e ,  t hose  who 
s t r o n g l y  approved h i s  job  performance were s t r o n g l y  s u ~ ~ o r t i v e  of an 
ABM. This  shows t h a t  Johnson 's  e f f o r t s  t o  b u i l d  a n  ABM, which were 
d i r e c t e d  a t  s t r eng then ing  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n ,  a c t u a l l y  s p l i t  h i s  own 
base  and s t r eng thened  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of  h i s  opponent,  Richard Nixon. 
Had the Johnson administration conducted detailed polling on tt.is issue 
before he made his decision to deploy the ABM, this information might 
have bolstered Secretary McNamara's position. However, when foreign 
policy makers and pollsters live in separate worlds, this type of 
information does not get intc the decision-making stream. 
On the related issue of public support for the SALT I treaty 
(Table 6-6, below), attitude fragmentation was low with respect to 
party, gender, and voting participation. One unusual aspect of this 
finding is that women, while slightl; less supportive of building the 
ABM, were slightly more "hawkish" with regards to supporting the SALT I 
treaty. This pattern is explained by the fact that through the 1970s, 
women expressed "No Opinion, Not Sure, or Don't Know" in higher 
proportion than did men. Thus on many foreign policy issues, women do 
not fit the classic "dove" model assumed by many feminist theorists. 
At the same time, fragmentation along education, income, and 
region was moderate to high. Those with high levels of education and 
with high incomes were strongly supportive of SALT I. Thus, one can 
conclude that the attentive public was strongly in support of SALT I. 
For the first time in analysis of surveys on arms control, respondents 
from the South became more conservative. It seems that Southerners may 
not necessarily be more supportive of building nuclear weapons systems 
than those in other parts of the country, but they are much more 
cautious in dealing with the Soviet Union than are people from other 
regions. 
One change took place in attitudes toward SALT I which is worth 
noting. Initially, those who strongly supported Richard Nixon's job 
performance were very anti-SALT I. However, Nixon was able to convince 
this group, over time, that SALT I was his initiative and was a good 
thing. This data confirms the conventional wisdom that a conservative 
President is better situated politically to negotiate with the Soviets 
SALT I Agreement to Limit ABMs: Attitude Fragmentation 
Table 6-6 
College (p/d) +7/+1 
Income (highest) + 2 
Region ( S / W )  - 5/+1 
Party ID (D/R) +I/- 1 
P. job apprvl (e/g) - 5/- 1 
Sex (f/m) 
Voted (y/n) - 1/+2 
Abbreviations 
A Harris 1939 
B harris 2037 
C Harris 2124 
D Harris 2154 
E Harris 2216 
F Harris 2351 
+ The sub-group was more supportive of building the ABM than tile 
mean for the general public; each number represents a unit on the 
fragmentation bcale, reviewed in Chapter 2, Table 2-5 
- The sub-group was less supportive of building the ABM than the 
mean for the general public. 
College degree (post graduate college work/a bachelors college 
degree); Income of the highest 3-5 percent of the public; 
Region (Southpest); Party Jdentification 
,Democratic/Republican); Presidential job approval 
(?xcellenr/good); Voted in the last Presidential election 
(yes/no>. 
and to get completed agreements ratified. However, few scholars have 
noted that while this phenomena exists, it is limited to approximately 
10 percent of the population. Thus, having conservative Republican 
presidents is not the only way to successfully negotiate and ratify arms 
control agreements. 
C. The Attentive Public and Top-Down Attitude Change 
Evidence cited above shows that the attentive public were critical 
of developing an ABM and strongly supportive of the SALT I treaty. This 
case study provides the most definitive evidence possible to refute the 
top-down attitude change model. Throughout the nuclear age scholars and 
strategists have believed that it is blot possible to build an active 
defense against nuclear weapons. The general public has consistently 
disagreed with this idea. During the ABM debate, the "opinion and policy 
elite" became convinced that building an ABM was neither feasible or 
desirab1.e. The public did not follow their lead. This was true despite 
the fact that there was more press and media coverage of this subject 
than there had been of any other nuclear subject since Sputnik. 
At the same time, this chapter provides a clear example of the 
phenomena that when competing groups of political activists are not well 
inPormed abouc mass public opinion, the political system can easily be 
influenced by politically active opinion. This happened in terms of 
influencing the Senate to almost terminate funding for the ARM, 
However, when the political system operates in such a manner, it becomes 
vulnerable to oeing dominated by a political actor who accurately 
evaluates the true nature of public opinion and then uses that knowledge 
to develop a cogent communication strategy. While it took several years 
for this to occur, this is exactly what happened when Rouald Reagan 
created the Strategic Defense Initiative "out of thin air." He did an 
end-run around both liberal and conservative elites who had been overly 
influenced by politically active, rather than public, opinion. Reagan 
proposed and then sustained SL)I as a population defense which neither 
liberal arms control supporters of MAD nor conservative supporters of 
defense of ICBMs wanted. What is even more remar'.able is that President 
Reagan accomplished this feat without many people learning the secret of 
his success. This, like so many other of his accomplishments, was not 
primarily due to his smooth manner on television, but to Reagan's feel 
for public opinion which was supplemented by superior survey research. 
In this instance, Ronald Reagan--much like Franklin D. Roosevelt three 
decades earlier--illustrate how and under what circumstances public 
opinion can have a decisive influence on foreign policy making. 
Concluding Comments and SALT 11, 1973-1980 
Chapter 7 
I SALT I1 and Public Opinion Theory 
The current mainstream academic literature on public opinion and 
foreign policy, reviewed in Chapter 2, argues that public opinion has 
little or no impact on foreign policy decisions. Not only is this 
proposition dominant in universities, but seuior foreign policy markers 
often spend little or no time understanding public attitudes because 
they assume public opinion plays a limited role in the entire policy 
process, with a possible exception during the treaty ratification 
stage. In addition, academic theory posits that public attitudes are 
volatile (Almond) and, after the trauma of Vietnam, highly fragmented 
along demographic and partisan lines (Schneider). Both an older 
generation of scholars and many contemporary foreign policy-makers 
believe in the top-down model of attitude change which asserts that a 
President can influence public attitudes un foreign policy issues by 
takine A high profile position and giving numerous speeches. 
SALT I1 provides a useful ending of this dissertation because it 
demonstrates that existing public opinio~ theory with respect to foreign 
policy is inadequate, and in some cases totally wrong. In addition, a 
review of the politics of SALT I1 reveal the consequences for actual 
political outcomes when one set of policy makers (those in the Carter 
administration) are largely unaware of both relevant public attitudes 
and the conceptual role public opinion plays in the policy process. 
Throughout this dissertation public opinion has been shown to have 
an important impact on all stages of the policy process from getting on 
the agenda, to negotiation, ratification, and implementation. Evidence 
from the arms control cases of the international control of atomic 
energy, the Limited Test Ban, and ABM/SALT thus refutes the no-impact 
theory put forth by scholars such as Bernard Cohen. The degree to which 
public opinion influences international security and foreign policy 
decisions is directly related to three factors: 1) the level of public 
attitudes, 2) the awareness of the different dimensions of pub1.i~ 
opinion by competing political activists, and 3) the sophistication of 
communication strategies utilized by competing political factions. 
With respect to the various levels of public opinion and the 
policy process, public attitudes that maintain plurality support (under 
50 percent) rarely influence decision-makers. Popular presideuts can 
make foreign policy decisions that fly in the face of majority opinion 
(50-59 percent), but doing so provides the political opposition with 
fertile ground from which a succesoful "counter-attack" can be 
launched. Consensus level public opinion (60-69 percent) successfully 
influences the policy process even though opposing powerful bureaucratic 
interests may er.ist. Prepoitderant public opinion (70-79 percent) not 
only "causes" the political system to act according to its dictates, but 
it also deters political opposition from challenging the s2ecific 
decision. Virtually unar~imous opinion ( $ O X + )  dominates the entire 
political system and sweeps all political opposition away. 
By t h e  time SALT I1 was i n i t i a t e d  i n  November, 1972--only  s i x  
months a f t e r  SALT I was s igned and only  a few weeks a f t e r  i t  had en te red  
i n t o  fo rce - -a rms  c o n t r o l  had become permanently on t h e  agenda. 410 Few 
s c h o l a r s  of  t h e  arms c o n t r o l  p r o c e s s ,  and almost  no policy-makers ever  
b o t h e r  t o  a s k  why t h i s  i s  t r u e .  They j u s t  assume t h a t  because the  
i s s u e s  of  n u c l e a r  war and peace a r e  s o  v i t a l ,  arms c o n t r o l  should be 
cons idered  a g iven .  However, many important  p u b l i c  po l i cy  i s s u e s  nevez 
make it onto  t h e  execu t ive  branch agenda. S t r a t e g i c  arms c o n t r o l  i s  
permanently on t h e  agenda because preponderant  l e v e l  p u b l i c  opin ion  (70 
pe rcen t )  suppor t s  t h e  idea  of n e g o t i a t i n g  arms c o n t r o l  wi th  t h e  Sov ic t  
Union. 411 Publ ic  opin ion  p ressu re  i s  s o  s t r o n g  i t  d e t e r s  opponents of 
arms c o n t r o l  from a t t empt ing  t o  keep negot ia t i .ons  from tak ing  p l a c e .  As 
a r e s u l t ,  opponents of arms c o n t r o l  focus  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  a t  l i m i t i n g  t h e  
scope of  any agreement and a t tempt  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  bureaucratic f o r c e s  
t h e t  oppose arms c o n t r o l  agreements.  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p u b l i c  
op in ion  and arms c o n t r o l ' s  permanent s t a t u s  on the  agenda is shown by 
survey .:esearch c i t e d  above, and it is a l s o  i l l u s t r a t e d  by r e c e n t  
p o l i t i c a l  h i s t o r y .  When t h e  Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  took s t r a t e g i c  arms 
c o n t r o l  o f f  t h e  agenda i n  t h e  e a r l y  1980s and began t a l k i n g  about  
n u c l e a r  war f i g h t i n g ,  t h e  American p o l i t i c a l  system e rup ted  wi th  t h e  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
410 T a l b o t t  1979, 31. 
411 A l l  survey qucrc ions  and d a t a  on SALT I1 a r e  reproduced i n  
Appendix 9. For i n d i c a t o r s  of p u b l ! ~  suppor t  f o r  arms c a n t r o l  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  s e e :  9/1972 (Gallup/Potomac), 6/1973 ( H a r r i s ) ,  
11/1973 ( H a r r i s ) ,  12/1974-11/1982 (Harris/CCFR & Gallup/CCFR), 
8/1976 ( H a r r i s ) ,  3/1977-5/1979 ( H a r r i s ) ,  4/1?77-11/1978 
(CBS/NYT), 1/1978-10/1979 (NBC/AP), 6/1978-6/19" (CBS/NYT), 
1/1979 (CBS/NYT), 11/1980 ( H a r r i s ) ,  1/1981 (YSW), 5/1981 (YSW) 
nuclear freeze "movement." When the administration put nuclear arms 
control back onto the agenda, resumed negotiations with the Soviets, and 
toning down his rhetoric, these actions mollified public opinion and in 
turn deflated the nuclear freeze movement. 
The negotiating process for SALT I1 was under the firm 
bureaucratic and intellectual control of highly trained professional 
legal and policy experts in the Executive branch. A review of the 
negociating history oE this agreemen? reveals that public opinion played 
a very limited role durin; this policy stage. As has bean demonstrated 
with ay earlier arms control cases, public opinion often plays less of a 
role during this policy stage than it does when getting an issue onto 
the agenda or ratification. However, several factors about SALT I1 make 
the extremely limited influence public opinion had over the negotiations 
somewhat surprising. First, during the time of its negotiation and 
unsuccessful ratification, more survey research was conducted on this 
arms control subject than existed on any other arms control or nuclear 
issue in the atomic age. 412 Unlike in the previous cases, virtually 
all of this polling was made public, and much of it was extremely 
sophisticated from the methodological perspective. Thus, at relatively 
low cost in terns of staff time, policy-makers and participants in this 
arms control debate could be relatively well informed on public 
attitudes about strategic a r m  control. Second, by the time SALT I1 was 
412 One hundred and twelve surveys included questions on strategic 
arms control and SALT 11. They were conducted 'by 11 different 
survey organizations from 1972 to 1987. Ninety eight surveys 
were conducted when SALT was an active issue from 1970 to 1980. 
negotiated, an office in the State Department regularly monitored public 
opinion and reported its findings to relevant decision-makers inside the 
Executive branch. 413 Thus, relevant policy-makers were advised of 
pertinent public attitudes. Third, during the Carter administration, 
presidential pollster Pat Caddell conducted his own surveys which 
included questions on SALT. Not only did President Carter read these 
surveys, but he also believed Caddell's polls to be accurate. 414 If 
all of these factcrs were true, why didn't public opinion have more of 
an impact on decisions made at the negotiation stage? 
The key to explaining the lack of public opinion impact lies in 
the perceptions of elite policy makers toward the nature and importance 
of public opinion. Understanding the nature of public opinion toward 
SALT I1 revolved around a dispute over interpreting survey data. 
Several researchers, such as Pat Caddell, Louis Harris and Dan 
Yankelovicl~, believed that strong public support for arms control 
negotiations, recorded from 1972 to 1981, meant that the public would 
strongly support SALT 1 1 . ~ ~ ~  Other public opinion experts such as 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - *  
413 From October, 1976 to December, 1980 eleven memoes on public 
opinion toward SALT were sent to various offices in the 
Department of State, ACDA, DOD and the White House. See U.S. 
Department of State 1976; 1977a; 1977b; 1978a; 1978b; 1978c; 
1979a; 1979b; 1979c; 1979d; 1980. 
414 Carter 1982, 114 cited in Caldwell 1989. 
415 Pat Caddell's memoes on this subject are dated May 10, 1978 and 
February 15, 1979 and are cited by Caldwell 1989. Conclusive 
evidence that the pablic saw support for d,rms control 
negotiations and for SALT I1 as distincely different is sho\n 
in five public opinion surveys conducted by NBC/AP from 
3/1979-10/1979 which included both a generic arms control and a 
SALT question on each survey. 
Bernard Roshco and A1 Richmand (in the State Department) and Bud Roper 
(President of the Roper Organization) explicitly rejected this 
interpretation and pointed to polls which showed only a plurality 
favored SALT 11. They believed that support for arms control 
negotiations and support for SALT I1 were two totally distinct issues 
with respect to public opinion. Rarely are these type of debates 
answered conclusively. However, in this case one survey organization 
asked two different types of questions on the same survey. One question 
followed the format of questions used by Pat Caddell and Lou Harris and 
asked about public support for strategic arms control in general. A 
second question asked about public support for SALT I1 specifically. 
These results showed that generic support for arms control negotiations 
remained stable at the ~e.:el of 70 percent throughout the SALT I1 era. 
However, support for SALT I1 was much lower and declined over time. 
This survey research demonstrated that opinion asserted by public 
opinion experts in the State Department, not Pat Caddell, were correct. 
The public supports arms control negotiations at the level of 
preponderance, but they do not necessarily support a specific arms 
control agreements at thsse high levels. However, this early positive 
polling data which documented support for arms control, supported by Pat 
Caddell's interpretation, reinf~rced a proclivity inside the small group 
of SALT decision-makers to focus on negotiating details and to take 
public opinion seriously only after the agreement was near completion. 
At a more abstract level, policy-makers in the Carter 
administration were working implicitly with conceptc~al models of public 
opinion derived from the mainstream academic theories from the foreign 
policy field. Upon entering office, many believed that public opinion 
doesn't and shouldn't play an important role in the process of 
negotiating strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union. According 
to this perspective, good policy would be made by negotiating a "solidw 
agreement that did not incorporate the ambiguous language such as key 
provisions in SALT I. These officials believed that ambiguous languege 
was responsible for the political controversy over Soviet verification 
controversies which in turn undermined public support for arms 
control. 416 In academic terms, senior Carter administration 
decision-makers agreed with the Cohen no-impact hypothesis. They 
believed public opinion was not important until the ratification process 
at which time it could be "dealt with." Senior policy-makers also 
implicitly believed in the top-down model of attitude change. While 
this dissertation has demonstrated again and again that the no-impact 
hypothesis and the top-down attitude change model are incorrect, Carter 
administration officials accepted these major tenants from the old 
paradigm concerning public opinion and foreign policy. 
The senior SALT decision-making community ignored both State 
Department public opinion experts' warnings and political forces which 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
416 My reading of arms control policy-maker's attitudes toward 
public opinion is derived from four years working as a Foreign 
Affairs Officer for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency from 1977 to 1981. 
were building outside of the bureaucracy and did not take public opinion 
into account at the beginning of the policy process. 417 Thus, by the 
time preparations for ratification were made lnside the administration, 
the effort was doomed. The public education strategy used by the State 
Department was based on the top-down, elite-led model of attitude 
change. It assumed that sending hundreds of executive branch officials 
around the country to give speeches to locab "opinion leaders" would 
mobilize public support for SALT. The public education strategy also 
assumed that President Carter and several cabinet secietaries could take 
a high public profile and give numerous speeches for several months 
after an agreement was concluded, and this could win-over the public to 
support SALT. 418 
The fact that public opinion on foreign policy and arms control is 
relatively stable--a key finding of this dissertation not known to 
Carter adminlstration officials. Two other conceptual ideas were also 
unknown to those who planned the SALT I1 public education effort. 
First, as shown in this dissertation, mass attitudes are not greatly 
influenced by attitudes of the "opinion and policy elite." Second, only 
popular presidents (over 50 percent in job approval rating) can lead 
public opinion, and this has a limited effect of changing mass attitudes 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
417 Such a proposal was advocated early on in the administration by 
Senator Hart and his principle assistant Larry Smith and others 
members of Congress. 
418 The most comprehensive review of the administration's political 
communication strategy is outlined in an "eyes only" memo from 
Jerry Rafshoon to President Carter dated December 6, 1978. I 
am greatful to Profesor Dan Caldwell for drawing my attention 
to this document. 
by a maximum of 10 to 15 percent. 419 At the time SALT I1 was signed, 
Jimmy Carter was well below this threshold giving him no ability to 
exert a positive influence over mass attitudes toward SALT 11. 420 
The political communication strategy adopted for selling SALT 
seems to have been developed independently of relevant findings from 
survey research. Many of the assertions made about public opinion and 
attitude change in the key planning memo written by Jerry Rafshoon to 
Jimmy Carter were inaccurate. In addition, the content of speeches by 
senior officials such as Paul Warnke and Cyrus Vance made sense only to 
the small group of people who can be considered part of the "opinion and 
policy elite. "421 Just as occurred with previous arms concrol cases 
such as ABM/SALT I, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and international 
control of atomic energy, this political communiation strategy was 
destined to influence a very small group in the population. Evidence 
from survey research shows that a very small group, approximately 6 
percent of the public, heard the detail-dominated message and supported 
the logic of arms control and SALT 11. 422 
Mass public support for SALT, for whatever reason, started at a 
maximum of about 40 percent. This level of public approval was quite 
low compared to previous arms control agreements. To make matters worse 
- - -  
419 Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987. 
420 This point, without elaboration or any reference to research 
completed by Page a. d., is made by Caldwell 1989. 
421 Warnke 1979a, 1979b. 
422 See polling conducted by the Gallup Organization 3/1979 to 
10/1980. It shows that an average of 6 percent of public were 
able to name advantages of SALT which equated even remotely to 
the purpose of the treaty. 
for arms control advocates, public support for SALT I1 declined over a 
two year period to a point where a slight plurality opposed the treaty 
by September or October 1979. 423 What can explain this declining 
support for the SALT I1 agreement? I would argue the drop in public 
approval for SALT I1 was related dlrectly to two factors: the degree of 
knowledge 01 public attitudes by competing political activists and the 
sophistication of the political communication used by competing 
political actors. Advocates of strategic arms control were relatively 
unaware of public attitudes and had a poor, detail-dominated message 
which was focused on the logical reasons for supporting the SALT I1 
agreement. This message had the ability to reach only a very small 
national audience. In addition, on balance the message was delivered 
sporadically over a limited period of six months In sharp contrast, 
opponents of SALT I1 had a clear message which was in tune with 
preexisting public attitudes. Their message was targeted to specific 
audiences among both the elite and general public, and it was delivered 
in a sophisticated manner. It did not focus on the details of the SALT 
I1 agreement but on the need for increased U.S. military spending and 
the growing threat of Soviet nuclear superiority.424 Some scholars 
have argued that the conservative opposition to SALT, such as the 
423 4/1975-1978 CSR/C; 11/1977-8/1978 Roper; 5/1978 YSW; 
11/1978-11/1980 Roper; 3/1979-10/1979 NBC/AP; 3/1979-10/1980 
AIPO . 424 Pat Caddell also picked up these public attitudes and feared 
that SALT would not get a fair hearing on its merits. However, 
he failed to follow his own logic and design a political 
communications strategy capable of keeping this from happening. 
Committee on the Present Danger, actually changed public opinion into 
becoming anti-SALT and more pro-defense. 425 Evidence from survey 
research reveals that mass attitudes were moving in a more hawkish 
direction before these conservative groups were organized. If one plots 
public opinion data on a graph, the "slope" of attitudes on generic 
issues such as military spending demonstrate no appreciable change 
before or after major political efforts were undertaken by these 
anci-SALT groups. Thus, it is probably inaccurate to attribute mass 
attitude change on the broad subjects of defense and foreign policy 
issues to conservative groups. However, conservative groups like the 
Committee on the Present Danger was able to frame the SALT I1 debate in 
ways that strengthened their anti-arms control policy position by 
linking it to broader national security issues for which the public had 
already become relatively conservarive by 1976. By framing the debate 
in this fashon--combined with the totally inept political comm~nication 
generated by supporters of SALT 11--the Committee on the Present Danger 
may have been partially responsible for declining public support for 
SALT 11. The magnitude of this change was relatively small, 10 percent 
at most. However, in politics these relatively small changes can be 
very important. 
The key point is that opponents of SALT I1 had a better 
understanding of public attitudes than did SALT supporters, and they 
used this knowledge to framc political communication which would be 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
425 Kupperman 1980; Sanders 1983, 342; Tyroler 1984, xx. 
accepted by an already sympathetic mass audience. In addition, no 
competing pro-arms control group refuted the Committee's claim that it 
was responsible for the declining public support for SALT. As a result, 
among members of the opinion and policy elite, this further strengtheneu 
the political power of the Committee on the Present Danger, and the 
whole process in turn strengthened the anti-SALT political position of 
conservative interest groups. All of this happened even though the 
Committee was responsible for changing public attitudes a very small 
amount, if they are the cause of attitude change at all. The key to the 
Committee's success was accurately framing the issue in a way which 
would elicit public support and give them the appearance of leading 
public opinion. 
In contrast, by attempting to change public attitudes to become 
moie supportive of SALT 11, rather than by searching survey data to find 
the best way to frane the public debate over strategic arms control, 
administration experts showed that they had little understanding of 
either the nature of public opinion, the process by which attitudes 
charlge, or the conceptual relevance of public opinion to the policy 
process. For example, SALT I1 required the Soviets cu destruy several 
hundred ICBMs, but the agreement did not require the United States to 
dismantle any ICBMs. This aspect of the selling SALT public campaign 
was not emphasized because, consistent with the dictates of policy 
experts, Soviet destruction of so few missiles has no strategic 
consequences. as a result, it was not considered important. However, 
from the public opinion point of view, analysis of survey data clearly 
showed that public criticism of SALT was closely related to confidence 
in the U.S. negotiating team. 426 Emphasizing the fact that the 
Soviets had to destroy missiles but the U.S. did not have disarm at all 
could have been used to demonstrate that U.S. "ne~otiators had not been 
"taken to the cleaners" by the cleaver, devious Soviet Union. Howevsr, 
the mere fact that the agreement entailed Soviet redlictions was left to 
the bottom paragraphs in speeches written to "sell" SALT IJ. 
One final point concerning public attitudes toward SALT I1 must be 
disc~ssed because it related to the fragmentation hypothesis posited by 
William Schneider and evaluated throughout this dissertation. During 
the SALT I1 debate, attitudes had become relatively more fragmented in 
line with theories advocated by William Schneider. However, 
fragmentation of attitudes is neither responsible for the 30 percent gap 
in support for strategic arms control negotiations versus support for 
SALT I1 nor does it explain the reason for declining support for SALT. 
Thus, while it is accurate to note the increase in attitude 
fragmentation that occurred during the SALT era, this is not the 
fundamental reason for the failure of SALT 11. 
I1 An Alternative Two Worlds Model 
Evaluation of public attitudes toward SALT I1 reinforces several 
conclusions reached in previous chapters of this dissertation concerning 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
426 Moore (1979) has shown that public attitudes toward U.S. 
negotiators were strongly correlated with support for the SALT 
I1 agreement. 
the relationship between public opinion and the policy process. If 
public opinion has an impact at all stages of the policy process 
(refuting the Cohen hypothesis), if attitudes are relatively stable 
(refuting the Almond/Lipprnann volatility hypothesis), if attitudes do 
not chance in a top-down manner, and if attit:udes have become 
increasingly fragmented (supporting the Schneider hypothesis) but are 
not the cause of arms control's mixed record of success, what model can 
explain the entire process with respect to arms control decision-making 
and public opinion? 
A "two-worlds" model is needed both to explain mass and elite 
attitudes change and to delineate the conditions under which public 
opinion has an impact on the policy process. The "first" world 
constitutes the polity, or in survey research terms, the general 
public. Since public attitudes rarely vary much between the general 
public and the voting public, the first world in this model also can be 
thought of as the voting public. 
With respect to "first" world foreign policy attitudes, public 
opinion is usually relatively stable. Opinions relate to general goals 
and values, not to specific details which dominate expert discussions. 
First world attitudes are formed and change in relation to real world 
events which are communicated to most people directly by the mass media, 
not through the prestige press such as the New York Times or through a 
top-down process dominated by elites. First world public attitudes are 
relatively immune to pressure generated by policy-makers or members of 
the "opinion and policy elite." 
Contrary to established views in the public opinion field reviewed 
in Chapter 3, the public is not uniformly uninterested or uninformed 
about foreign policy issues such as arms control. However, people are 
selective in their attention, and this selectivity over time forms 
patterns in public awareness, knowledge, and interest. Most of the time 
the general public disengages from the foreign policy and arms control 
debate just as they disengage from active participation in politics on 
most occasions. When an event occurs which is perceived as interesting, 
important, and different from what has proceeded it, people "plug into" 
the foreign policy debate for a short period of time. Even though 
public attentio~ comes in short bursts and is uneven, members of the 
general public are capable of making subtle distinctions on complex 
foreign policy issues. Inattentiveness most of the time should not be 
confused with ignor-,ice or apathy. 
The lessons the public learn from a real world event may be quite 
different from those learned by policy makers or those in the "opinion 
and policy elite." For this reason, it is important for policy makers 
to conduct regular survey research end to evaluate the results from the 
point of view of the public, not from their own elite perspective. 
Understanding public attitudes on any particular foreign policy subject 
requires examining a great deal of survey research which focuses n s t  
only on attitudes but also measures public awareness, knowledge, and 
interest. When all of this data is put together, the picture that 
emerges is usually quite logical, even if it the "logic" is quite 
different from that taken for granted by policy makers or those in the 
opinion and policy elite. 
The "second" world consists of a small group of people, less than 
ten percent of the public, who constitute the opinion and policy 
elite. "' Opinions among this elite segment of society change 
relatively easily in relation to media coverage, variation in government 
policy, and intellectual fads. As demonstrated by Gamson and Modigliani 
two decades ago, elite attitudes can take on a "follower" 
characteristic. Elite attitudes often follow changes in government 
policy, not the reverse. Perceptions among tho opinion and policy are 
extremely important because most of the time government leaders mistake 
attitudes held by these politically active people in the "second" world 
as general public opinion. 
In many instances, foreign policy decisions are made without 
reference to aass opinion in the first world and rely imprecisely on 
attitudes held by members of the opinion and policy elite in the second 
world. Virtually all interest group activity, correspondence in 
newspapers, and participation at "mass" demonstrations reflect opinions 
of people in this second world. However, attitudes held by people in 
this second world can differ substantially from those who reside in the 
first world. As a result, relying on indicators of second world opinion 
to develop political strategy is dangerous. If a policy issue remains 
de-politicized, then decisions can be made without much influence by 
mass public opinion. However, if one competing group of political 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
427 While I emphasize terms coined by Gabriel Almond, many of the 
theoretical concepts developed in this part of my model are 
derived from work completed by Russ Neuman 1985. 
actors can strengthen their position by broadening the scope of the 
political conflict, then public opinion of the first world will likely 
play an important role. 4 2 8 
The first and second world can be linked, but this requires that 
elite policy-makers or political activists understand the difference 
between the first and second worlds, discover the nature of mass public 
opinion through survey research, and develop a political communication 
strategy that discusses policy issues using a vocabulary that is 
compatible with pre-existing mass attitudes. More often than not, 
members of the opinion and policy elite develop political communications 
strategies without taking the time to understand mass public opinion. 
As a result, many political communications strategies are almost 
guaranteed to reach like-minded people in the second world. For many 
issues, this lack of genuine communication between the two worlds does 
not create a problem. however, for arms control, communications beheen 
these two worlds holds the kev to success. Powerful bureaucratic actors 
are able to stop arms control unless arms control activists inside and 
outside of government are capable of mohilizing public support. To 
mobilize public support, "second world" political actors do not need to 
change mass public opinion but they need to tap into the correct 
dimensions of existing public opinion which is sympathetic to the goals 
of arms control. 
428 On the relationship between the scope of the conflict and 
policy outcomes, see E. E. Schattschneider 1960. 
When neither side in a policy debate (who all reside in the 
"second world") is well informed about mass attitudes in the "first" 
world, and neither side employs a communication strategy designed with 
public opinion in mind, decisions are strongly influenced by 
bureaucratic politics, activities of interest groups, and attitudes of 
the small segment of elites in the "secondn world. This decision-making 
structure closely approximates the current main-stream literature on 
American foreign policy decision-making. 
However, at various times--especially when public attitudes are at 
the virtually unanimous or preponderant level--public opinion has a 
fairly direct impact on the policy process. With attitudes at the level 
of 70 percent or above, public opinion dominates the policy process. At 
lower levels, when public opinion constitutes a consensus (60 percent 
range), successful initiation and implementation of foreign policy 
initiatives require that the two worlds be joined. When public opinion 
is at the level of majority (50 percenc range), only extremely 
sophisticated understanding of public opinion, excellent political 
communications, or no organized opposition is needed for public opinion 
to influence policy decisions. When attitudes are below a majority (50 
percent), public opinion does not have sufficient strength to influence 
the policy process. This was the case with public opinion about SALT 
11. Even though a plurality supported SALT 11 for 18 months, this was 
not sufficient to carry the day. 
The "two worlaoU modal is extremely relevant for arms control. 
Despite forty years of political fighting between advocates of arms 
control and advocates of building nuclear weapons, virtually no advocate 
of arms control has ever developed a detailed picture of public opinion 
an relevant issues. Arms control advocates usually rely imprecisely on 
attitudes of people who reside in the second world of elites. As a 
result, political strategies designed to further arr,ls control have often 
been developed in a hurried manner, and the result has been that the 
arms control message has diffused out to a maximum of about 10 percent 
of the pq~blic who are members of the opinion and policy elite. This 
segment of the population has been fully mobilized to support the 
Limited Test Ban, to oppose ABM deployment, and to support SALT 11. 
However, in a democracy which requires two-thirds of the Senate to 
approve any arms control treaty, achieving success in arms control 
requires working within the parameters of the two world model. This 
means developing consensus-level public support by defining arms control 
issues in terms that can receive broad public support and in the limited 
cases when attitudes can be changed, "educating the public." 
Accomplishing this is possible even for liberal Democratic presidents, 
but it requires developing political strategies from the bottom up and 
implementing them at the beginning of the policy process. 
APPENDIX 2 
A HIERARCHY OF AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE: 




Read o r  heard about atomic bombing of Japan 
Know of the atomic bomb 
Know of the  atomic bomb 
Heard o r  read about atomic bomb 
Heard o r  read about hydrogen super-bomb 
Knew about Bikini  atomic t e s t  
Know about Chernobyl accident  
Heard enough t o  have opinion on Soviet  
cheat ing 
Heard of Chernobyl accident  
Heard enough t o  have opinion on Soviet  
cheat ing 
Heard of TMI nuclear accident 
Know of atomic weapons t e s t i n g  a t  Bikini  
Heard o r  read of neutron bomb 
Heard o r  read about MX 
Heard o r  read of S t a r  Wars 
Know both US and USSR have thousands of 
nuclear  weapons f o r  use aga ins t  each o ther  
Heard of I s r a e l i  r a i d  on I raq  reac tor  
Heard o r  read about MX 
Heard o r  read about hydrogen bomb 
Heard o r  read about neutron bomb 
Know US pol icy has NOT forezlosed use 
of nuclear  weapons under any condit ions 
Heard o r  read about MX miss i le  
Heard o r  read about MX miss i l e  
Heard o r  read of hyrdogen bomb 
Heard o r  read about SALT I1 
Heard o r  read about SALT I 1  
Heard o r  read about SALT I1 
Heard o r  read Car ter  decis ion h a l t  8 - 1  bomber 
Heard o r  read about hyrdogen bomb 
Heard I s r a e l i  r a i d  on I raq  reac tor  
Year Survey 
M I N N  25 
PSY CORP 173 
PSY CORP 178 
A I P O  353 
M I N N  79 












ABC/WP 76  






A I P O  1131G 
A I P O  1138G 
A I P O  1139G 
AIPO 979k 
A I P O  510k 
CBS/NYT 
Appendix 1 
Leve 1 Issue 
Know - 
ledge 
Paying attention to SALT I1 
Heard about US-USSR arms control talks 
Heard or read about neutron bomb 
Could name targets at Bikini [post test] 
Heard of comprehensive test ban proposal 
Heard or read nuclear power plant construction 
Know that 1/85 US-USSR meeting to set date 
Heard or read about SALT I1 
Know of Reagan plans to deploy the MX 
Know Russians walked out of INF talks 
Know about US plan for Bikini atomic test 
(Japanese pop) knew Japan not have nuc weapons 
Heard Stevenson's call unilateral test ban 
Heard or read about Reagan decision to produce 
the neutron bomb 
Heard or read about Limited Test Ban Treaty 
Believe Russia had atom bombs [post announce] 
Heard or read about neutron bomb 
Recall local public fallout shelter 
Heard or read about Limited Test Ban Treaty 
Heard or read about test ban discussions 
Heard about SALT I1 
Heard or read about ABM program 
Aware USSR spends more than US on civil def 
Heard or read about fall-out 
Heard about Reagan INF proposal 
Heard or read about hydrogen bomb 
Heard of proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons 












PSY CORP 173 




















Heard o r  read about SDI/Star Wars 
Heard o r  read about A B M  program 
Heard o r  read about nuclear  power controversy 
Heard about SALT I1 t r e a t y  
Heard o r  read about A B M  program 
Followed S t a r  Wars debate very o r  f a i r l y  
c l o se ly  [ 3  p t  s c a l e ]  
Heard of comprehensive t e s t  ban proposal 
Read a r t i c l e s  r e  nuclear  war o r  f a l l o u t  s h e l t e r  
( O f  Ca tho l ics )  Aware of U.S. Catholic bishops 
l e t t e r  on nuclear  arms i s sues  
Could conceive of impact of a nuclear  war 
Aware US c i t i z e n s  accused of atomic spying 
Heard proposal  t o  c u t  nuclear  weapons by 50% 
Heard I k e ' s  Atoms f o r  Peace proposal 
Heard o r  read about S t a r  Wars 
Heard Reagan dec i s ion  t o  bu i l d  neutron bomb 
Knew Russia ab le  t o  make atom bomb [pos t  t e : s t ]  
Read a lot/some about Geneva t a l k s  ( 3  p t  s c ]  
Heard Gorbachev proposal  e l iminate  nuc weapons 
Familiar  with SDI/Star Wars 
Paying a t t e n t i o n  t o  SALT I1 
Described the H-bomb 
Knew US-USSR not  agree t o  i n t e rna t i ona l  con t ro l  
Heard o r  read about S t a r  Wars 
Knew t a r g e t s  before  Bikini  nuclear  t e s t s  
Heard o r  read about nuclear  energy w/in month 
Could descr ibe  the  neutron bomb 
Could descr ibe  the  neutron bomb 
Se l f  descr ibed a s  having great/some knowledge 
on nuclear  arms i s sues  [ 4  p t  s c a l e ]  
Heard o r  read about f a l l - o u t  





AIPO 7 7 7  
AIPO 1249G 
LR/NS I C 













A I P O  452k 
NORC 158 
ABC/WP 179 
PSY CORP 173 
SIND/GE 
A I P O  l l O l G  
A I P O  1181G 
P&S/CPD 
A I P O  582k 
ABC/WP 
Appendix 1 
Leve 1 Issue 
Know - 
ledge 
Aware US citizens accused of atomic spying 
Know US & USSR are negotiation arms control 
Identified purpose of SALT from list 
Knew Reagan's meeting w Gorbachev was his 1st 
Heard or read about SALT I1 
Aware controversy over AEC and Lilienthal 
Heard of CTB proposal & verification 
Heard or read about nuclear weapons freeze 
Correctly identified the term fallout 
Heard or read about nuclear weapons f~eeze 
Knew US was trying international nuc control 
Had good idea of what to do if a nuclear 
bomb hit in this area 
Heard of 50% nuclear cuts proposal & 
verification requirements 
Heard or read of INF agreement 
Heard a lot/some re Star Wars [4 pt scale] 
Heard or read about nuclear weapons freeze 
Seen movie on TV about nuclear war or fallout 
Knew US was trying international nuc control 
Described feasible ways a nuclear weapon 
could be delivered 
Heard or read about Atoms for Peace 
Heard idea bacernent fall.out shelter 
Informed on US-USSR aria:; talks [3 pt scale] 
Heard great deal/fair amount re MX [4 pt sc] 
Identified radius of destruction of A-bomb 































Issue Year Survey 
Seen local public fallout shelter 2/1966 NORC SRS 876 
Heard Gorbachev [50% cuts] arms control 
proposal 10/1985 P&S/CPD 
Know a lot/moderate re START talks [ 4  pt sc] 7/1985 YSW/Time 
Knew US did not ratify SALT I1 6/1986 Gallup 
Know nuclear power plants exist in Japan 3/1982 Harris 822104 
Have sufficient info on SDI to have opinion 10/!986a R/USNWR 
Correctly named 2 nations involved in SALT 5/1986 SIRC 
Named Rosenbergs as atomic spies 4/1951 NORC 302 
Know less than 10 nations have nuclear weapons 9/1985 M&K 
Knew that missiles in Europe would be 
eliminated in the INF agreement 12/1987 ABC/WP 
Heard of Baruch plan 2/1947 NORC 148 
Could describe Star Wars/SDI 9/1985 M&K 
Identified radius of destruction of H-bomb 1/1953 AIPO 510k 
Know US-USSR have treaties that limit 
nuclear weapons 1/198Sa CBS/NYT 
Heard US armed-forces limitation proposal 12/1951 NORC 314 
Heard or read about Acheson report 5/1946 NORC 142 
Heard of the term nuclear winter 7/1987 Nehn/Pitt 
Correctly identified 2 nations involved SALT 11/1979 CBS/NYT 
Very/fairiy familiar re SS-20 debate [ 4  pt sc] 3/1983 YSW/Time 
Know a lot/something about MX [3 pt scale] 1/1983 Roper 83-2 
Remember Kennedy for Cuban missile crisis 11/1983 Harris 832112 
Correctly identified 2 nations involved SALT 10/1981 ABC/WP 42 






Heard Ike's Open Skies proposal 
Knew enough about the neutron bomb 
to have an opinion [ 2  pt sc] 
Correctly identify countries in SALT 
Heard a lot re neutron bomb [3 pt scale] 
Said could name materials make atomic energy 
Heard of '82 UN Special Session on Disarmament 
Knew budget for conventional forces is larger 
than budget for nuclear weapons 
Heard Carter's speech on SALT 
Aware U.S. has no ballistic missile defense 
Know of local civil defense organization 
Heard or read of INF zero option proposal 
Heard a lot re neutron bomb [ 3  pt scale] 
Could describe neutron bomb 
Identified materials used for atomic energy 
Correctly identified 2 nations involved SALT 
Know Reagan opposed to nuclear weapons freeze 
Knew Canada 6 UK helped Manhattan project 
Heard or read about Baruch plan 
Heard or read about SALT I 
Knew US had no international nuclear 
cooperation immediately after WW I1 
(US pop) know Japan not have nuclear bombs 
Knew how much basement bomb shelter protect 
Knew location of nearest fallout shelter 
Heard UN disarmament talks 
Know location of nearest bomb shelter 
Heard a lot re neutron bomb [3 pt scale] 
Heard/read a lot re-Star Wars [ 4  pt scale] 
Correctly identified 2 nations involved SALT 
Know approximate percent of defense budget 
spent on nuclear weapons [less than 20%] 
Know it is US policy to use nuclear weapons 
if Soviets invade Europe w conventional force 
Know location of nearest fallout shelter 
Heard a lot re START talks [3 pt scale] 
Know location of nearest bomb shelter 
Heard great deal re MX [ 4  pt scale] 








































Issue Year Survey 
Know approximate percent of defense budget 
spent on nuclear  weapons [ l e s s  than 20x1 
Know US does not  have a " n o - f i r s t  usen pol icy 
I d e n t i f i e d  the  term " f a l l o u t "  
Knew about A B M  t r e a t y  
Read a book about nuclear war o r  f a l l o u t  
Know US pol icy i s  NOT t o  use nuclear weapons 
only i f  a l l i e s  a r e  a t tacked f i r s t  with them 
Had c l e a r  idea of Baruch plan 
Know US pol icy i s  NOT t o  use nuclear  weapons 
only i f  US is a t tacked f i i s t  with them 
Knew - per  cent  nuclear generated e l e c t r i c i t y  
Knew - per  cec t  x c l e a r  generated e l e c t r i c i t y  
Had f a i r l y  c l e a r  idea of Baruch plan 
Heard UN AEC had stopped discuss ion 
Know it is US pol icy t o  use nuclear weapons 
anytime we o r  our a l l i e s  a r e  threatened 
Named Rosenbergs a s  atomic sp i e s  
Know t h a t  both US & USSR signed SALT I 1  
Know a l o t  about SDI [ 3  p t  s c ]  
Cer ta in  they knew countr ies  signed SALT 
I d e n t i f i e d  Les l ie  R .  Groves 
Heard g r ea t  deal  r e  SALT [4 p t  s c a l e ]  
Know the US has fewer nuclear weapons today 
than 15 years  ago 
Know g rea t  deal  r e  nuclear arms [4  p t  s c a l e ]  
Know the  US nuclear s tockpi le  is l e s s  
de s t ruc t i ve  than 15 years ago 
Know a l o t  r e  MX [ 3  p t  s c a l e ]  
Well informed on arms con t ro l  [ 3  p t  s c a l e ]  
Remember Kennedy f o r  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  
High l e v e l  of knowledge r e  nuclear winter  
Very f ami l i a r  r e  Soviet  INF [ 4  p t  s c a l e ]  
F u l l  understanding of Limited Test  Ban Treaty 
Correct ly  def ine  term preventat ive  war 
Know a l o t  r e  Geneva arms t a l k s  [4  p t  s c a l e ]  
Know good deal  about SALT I1 [ 4  p t  s c ]  























Harr is  832112 
Nehn/Pi t t 
YSW/Time 






A Hierarchy of Awareness end Knowledge: Foreign Policy Issues 
Heard or read about plan to send food overseas 
Heard or read about plan to send food overseas 
Heard of United Nations 
Knew US was a member of NATO 
Knew UK was a member of NATO 
Heard of John Foster Dulles 
Identified abbreviation UN 
Heard or read of trouble over Suez canal 
Heard or read of Truman's request to aid Greece 
Heard or read about f-rouble in Formosa area 
Heard or read of civil war in China 
Heard or read of loan to England 
Heard or read of Marshall plan 
Heard or read of Big Four summit conference 
Heard of war in Indo-China 
Heard or read of Marshall plan 
Heard or read of summit meeting attended by Ike 
Heard or read of trouble with USSR over Berlin 
Heard or read of NATO 
Heard of communist takeover in Czechoslovakia 
Heard or read of good neighbor policy 
Heard or read of Big Four summit conference 
Heard or read of Marshall plan 
Heard or read of Truman's request to aid Greece 
Heard or read of FDR-Churchill plan 
Heard or read of Truman's request to aid Greece 
Heard of the United Nations 
Heard or read Dean Acheson appointed Sec State 
Heard of the United Nations 
Heard/read Truman speech on world food shortage 
Heard or read of Big Four sumnit conference 
Heard of read of Great Power conference 
Heard of the United Nations 
Know 'JS supports the Contras vs Nicaraguan govt 




































Appendix 2 - 314 - 
Heard o r  r ead  of  changed S o v i e t  l e a d e r s h i p  
Heard of  r e a d  of  C h u r c h i l l ' s  I r o n  C u r t a i n  speech 
Knew B r i t a i n  c o n t r o l s  G i b r a l t e r  
Heard o r  r e a d  o f  Geneva f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s  meet ing 
Heard o r  r e a d  of  B r i t i s h - E g y p t i a n  t r o u b l e s  
C o r r e c t l y  i d e n t i f i e d  Dean Acheson's j o b  
C o r r e c t l y  i d e n t i f i e d  Nasser 
I d e n t i f i e d  job  h e l d  by Joseph  Goebbels [from l i s t ]  
Heard o f  war i n  Indo-China 
Heard o r  r e a d  o f  t r o u b l e  a t  Suez c a n a l  
Heard/read about  f o r e i g n  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t  program 
Heard/read Wallace c r i t i c i s m  of  Truman f o r  p o l i c y  
Heard o r  r e a d  of  P a r i s  peace conference  
Knew Lindberg ' s  views on a i d  t o  B r i t a i n  
Could d e f i n e  t h e  term u n i f i e d  comand  
Heard o f  General  Dynamics DOD c o s t  over runs  
Could d e f i n e  term i s o l a t i o n i s t  
Heard o r  r e a d  Ike  speech urge  I s r a e l  withdraw1 
Heard o r  r e a d  of  NATO 
Knew France and Cornmunists f i g h t i n g  i n  Indochina 
Heard o r  r e a d  of  f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s  conference  
Heard of  r e a d  of  I s r a e l - A r a b  c o n f l i c t  
Knew USSR was n o t  a member o f  NATO 
Knew o f  people t o  people  exchanges w i t h  USSR 
Named Prime M i n i s t e r  of  UK 
Knew Dean Acheson's j ob  
Knew B r a z i l  i s  l a r g e s t  count ry  i n  South America 
Heard o f  Quemoy & Matsu n e a r  China 
Could d e f i n e  t h e  term Cold War 
Knew John F o s t e r  Du l l e s '  job  
Heard/ r e a d  d i s c u s s i o n  r e  send  t r o o p s  t o  Europe 
Could d e f i n e  t h e  term Cold War 
Heard of Quemoy & Matsu n e a r  China 
Heard o r  r e a d  of French-Alger ian  f i g h t i n g  
Knew China has  a  Communist government 
Heard o r  r e a d  o f  NATO 
Heard o f  t h e  United Nations 
Heard o r  r e a d  of  USSR m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  r e d u c t i o n  
Heard o r  r e a d  of  NATO 
Heard of  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Court o f  J u s t i c e  
Heard o f  d ip loma t i c  conference  i n  Rio de J a n e i r o  
Knew John F o s t e r  Du l l e s '  job  
Heard o r  r e a d  about  Voice of  America 
Heard o r  r e a d  o f  f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s '  meet ing 
Named c a p i t a l  o f  Spa in  
Heard o r  r e a d  of f o r e i g n  a i d  b i l l  b e f o r e  Congress 
Knew cause  of  t r o u b l e  i n  I r a n  due t o  o i l  
Knew l o c a t i o n  o f  Manchuria 
Knew of  t h e  Johnson a c t  
Heard o r  r e a d  o f  Lindberg ' s  r a d i o  speech 




















































Heard o r  r e a d  of  Marsha l l  p l a n  [ f i r s t  su rvey ]  
Understood l e n d - l e a s e  s u p p l i e s  must be  p a i d  back 
Heard o r  r e a d  o f  Corde l l  H u l l ' s  t r a d e  t r e a t i e s  
Could d e f i n e  t h e  term t a r i f f  
Could d e f i n e  t h e  term Cold War 
Heard o r  r ead  of f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s '  conference  
Knew US t r a d e  p o l i c y  favored  open markets  
Knew meaning o f  t h e  term 38th p a r a l l e l  
Heard o f  f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s '  meet ing 
Knew US backed o p p o s i t i o n  t o  Nicaragua 
Heard o r  read  o f  f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s  meet ing 
Heard o r  r ead  about  t h e  Marsha l l  p l a n  
Heard o r  r e a d  of  C o r d e l l  Hul l  f o r  p o l i c y  r e p o r t  
Knew England recognized  Communist China 
Heard o r  r ead  p roposa l  send US t roops  t o  Europe 
Heard o r  r ead  of United Nat ions  meet ing i n  NY 
Heard o r  r e a d  of NATO 
Knew Quemoy/Matsu i n  non-communist hands 
I d e n t i f i e d  Clement A t t l e e ' s  j ob  
I d e n t i f i e d  Chiang Kai-Shek's  j ob  
Heard o r  r e a d  of  US arms l i m i t a t i o n  proposa l  
Heard/read C o r d e l l  Hul l  t a l k  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
Knew good neighbor p o l i c y  was about  L a t i n  America 
Knew what Voice o f  America i s  
Heard o r  r e a d  of  SEAT0 
Heard o r  r e a d  of  term peace fu l  c o - e x i s t e n c e  
Could d e f i n e  job  of  t h e  S t a t e  Department 
Could d e f i n e  t h e  term f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
Heard o f  I s r a e l ' s  answer t o  Ike  re withdraw1 
Could d e f i n e  term I r o n  C u r t a i n  
Could d e s c r i b e  f u n c t i o n  of  t h e  UN 
Heard o f  John F o s t e r  Du l l e s  
Knew Khruschev had met Ike  b e f o r e  7/59 
C o r r e c t l y  i d e n t i f i e d  Nasser 
Heard o r  r e a d  of  Connally f o r  p o l i c y  r e s o l u t i o n  
C o r r e c t l y  names f i r s r :  c i t y  where UN o r g a ~ i i z e d  
Nauii-.s 21 L 4 ~ovctr.lllr\c~.:.ts occupying Germany 
Knew Turkey was a  member of  NATO 
Heard o f  t h e  Four PL-eedoms 
Heard o r  r e a d  o f  Bandung conference  
Heard o r  r ead  o f  SEAT0 
Knew d e t a i l s  of  Big Four summit conference  
I d e n t i f i e d  Jawaha r l a l  Nehru's job  
Heard o r  r e a d  of  St.Lawrence seaway p r o j e c t  
Knew US was send ing  m i l i t a r y  s u p p l i e s  t o  Greece 
Heard o f  US f o r e i g n  s e r v i c e  
Named coun t ry  where Waterloo was fought  
Heard o r  r e a d  o f  r e c i p r o c a l  t r a d e  agreements 
I d e n t i f i e d  Marsha l l  T i t o ' s  j ob  
Heard of UNESCO 
Heard o f  UNESCO 
Knew t h e  term b i - p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
AIPO 400k 
NORC 235 






























G/IISR 1 2  
AIPO 602k 
OPOR 19 
AIPO 5 4 ! , ' ! ,  
A 1  k?U !, :.,I\ 
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Knew l o c a t i o n  of  Formosa 
C o r r e c t l y  d e f i n e  term world government 
Could d e f i n e  r e c i p r o c a l  z rade  t r e a t y  
Knew Swedec us:: i , r : t  8 mmber of NATO 
Knew US s u p , r c ~ r t =  E l  S ~ L v a d o r  government 
Heard or r e a d  o f  m i l i t a r y  a i d  t o  P a k i s t a n  
Knew l o c a t i o n  of  I r a n  
Reca l l ed  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
Heard o r  r e a d  of  Truman's p o i n t  f o u r  program 
Heard o r  r ead  of  t h e  A t l a n t i c  Cha r t e r  
S t r o n g l y  agre  . ,at  they  have good unders tanding  
o f  n a t i o n a l  & i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s  
Knew spy Jonathan  P o l l a r d  worked f o r  I s r a e l  
Heard/read of  B r i c k e r ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  amendment 
Knew j o b  o f  US f o r e i g n  sez;-ice 
Knew n a t i o n a l  language o f  B r a z i l  
Defined r e c r i p r o c a l  t r a d e  t r e a t y  
Knew t h e  term A t l a n t i c  Pac t  
Could d e f i n e  main purpose of  UNESCO 
Defined r e c i p r o c a l  t r a d e  t r e a t y  
Could def  i.ne t h e  term peace fu l  c o - e x i s t e n c e  
Could d e f i n e  t h e  main purpose of UNESCO 
Knew approximate s i z e  of f o r e i g n  a i d  r e q u e s t  
Knew purpose of  Truman p o i n t  f o u r  program 
Named occas s ion  of  Khruchev-Ike meet ing 
Knew purpose o f  Trumzn p o i n t  f o u r  program 
Consider  s e l f  w e l l  informed on Marsha l l  p l a n  
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Repeated Questions 
8/1945- 90 you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put 
10/1946 under the control of the new United Nations Security Council, 
or should the United States and England keep this secret to 
themselves? (AIPO 3541, 357T, 368K&T, 379K&T) 
Security Council 19 24 2 5 18 
U.S. and England 7 3 6 4 6 8 7 5 
No opinion 8 12 7 7 
+ slight variation in wording which excluded England 
12/1945- Do you think the world organization should pass a law and be 
3/1946 given the power to enforce it so that no country in the world 




12/1945- It has been suggested that the world organization have 
3/1946 inspectors who could search any property in any country at any 
time to see if anybody was making atomic bombs, All inspectors 
would work in teams, having one Russian, one Englishman and one 
American working together. Do you think there should be such 
an inspection or not? (NORC 42T, 140) 
Should 
Should not 
Don ' t know 
2/1946- In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with our 
2/1947 government's policy on the atomic bomb? (NORC 139, 148j 
Satisfied 
Dissatisfied 
Don' t know 
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Repeated Questions 
6/1946- Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be 
8/1946 put under the control of the United Nations Organizationlor 




US should keep 
No opinion 
Qualified answers 
6/1946- Which of these three statements comes closets to what you 
8/1946 think the U.S. should do? a) The U.S. should go on making 
atomic bombs and not depend on systems of international control 
of the bombs; b) We should go on making atomic bombs for the 
time being, but try to work out a system of international 
control to prevent any nation, including our own, from using 
atomic bombs; c) We should stop making atomic bombs right now 
and try to work out a system of international control to keep 





6/1946- As far as you know, is the secret of how to make atomic bombs 
8/1946 known only by the U.S. or do you think some other countries 
also know how to make atomic bombs? (Psy Corp 173t, 178t) 
Only US 
Known to others 
Don't know 
6/1946- (Asked of the 60%, 56% who answered known to others) What 
8/1946 other countries do you think know how to make atomic bombs? 











6/1946 - (Asked of the 402, 44% who answered only US or Dk above) How 
8/1946 long do you think it will be before another country learns how 
to make atomic bombs? (Psy Corp 173t, 178t) 
Soon 3 4 
Within 2 years 8 8 
3 to 5 years 10 10 
6 to 10 years 4 5 
More than 10 years, very long time 3 2 
No opinion 12 15 
6/1946 - (Asked of the 40%, 44% who answered only US or Dk above) What 
8/1946 other country do you think will learn to make atomic bombs 
first? (Psy Corp 173t, 178t) 






6/1946- Do you think a system of international supervision and 
8/1946 control can prevent all countries from making atomic bombs and 






2/1947- Would you favor international control of atomic energy if it 
10/1949 meant that . . . after the system of control had been agreed 
to and set up? (NORC 148, 152, 170) 
2/47 10/47 10/49+ 
F O D k  F O D k  F O D k  
A .  We had to stop making atomic 
bombs? 53 33 14 59 31 10 68 22 10 
B. We had to destroy all the 
bombs we have on hand 39 49 12 40 52 8 57 32 11 
C. We, as well as al? other 
countries, had to let United 
Nations inspectors see if each 
country is living up to its 
agreements? 67 19 14 79 14 7 77 13 10 
D. We had to place all our 
atomic factories under the 
control of an international 
agency? 51 31 18 55 33 12 54 30 16 
E. We had to give t.he 
international agency all 
the information it needs 
about atomic energy? 40 44 16 41 48 11 45 40 15 
+ slight variation in wording added "and all other countries" 
(asked after announcement of Russia's atomic test). 
10/1947- Do you think all countries, including our own, should agree at 
6/1950 the present Lime to the international control of atomic 





8/1945 It has been suggested that the new United Nations Security 
Council use the atomic bomb to help keep peace by putting it 
under control of a special international air force. Would 
you favor such a plan or should the United States try to keep 
control of this weapon7 (AIPO 354K) 
U.N. Air Force 
U.S. Control 
No Opinion 
Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put 
under the control of the new United Nations S~.curity Council, 
or should the United States and England keep this secret to 
themselves? (AIPO 354T) (trend see repeated questions) 
Security Council 
U.S. and England 
No opinion 
In order to defend itself, do you think our country should 
rely more: on our own ability to make better atomic bombs 
than any other country--OR--on the ability of the world 
organization to prevent any country, including our own, from 
ever using such bombs in another war? (NORC 237A&B) (similar 
question see 9/1946 NORC) 
Our own ability 
World organization 
DK 
If the world organization does try to prevent any country 
from ever using atomic bombs in another war, which one of 
these two ways do you think would have the best chance or 
working? (NORC 237A&B) 
World police force 
Pass law, use an FBI 
DK/NA 
Do you think the United States should try to keep the secret 
of how to make atomic bombs as long as we can, or do you 
think we shou1.d let some other countries also know how to 
make them? (NORC 237A&B) 
Try to keep secret 
Let others know 
DK 
Appendix 3 
9/1945 Most s c i e n t i s t s  ag ree  t h a t  w i t h i n  10 y e a r s  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  
w i l l  f i n d  o u t  by themselves how t o  m;ke atomic bombs, even i f  
we d o n ' t  t e l l  them. Do you t h i n k  t h e  United S t a t e s  w i l l  be  
a b l e  t o  keep f o r  j u s t  i t s  own use  t h e  s e c r e t  o f  how t o  make 
a tomic  bombs, o r  w i l l  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  be a b l e  t o  f- ind o u t  by 
themselves how t o  make them? (NORC 2378) 
Able t o  keep s e c r e t  
O the r s  w i l l  f i n d  o u t  
Don' t know 
Do you t h i n k  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  keep f o r  j u s t  
i t s  own use  t h e  s e c r e t  o f  how t o  make atomic bombs, o r  w i l l  
o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  be  a b l e  t o  f i n d  o u t  by themselves how t o  make 
them? (NORC 237A) 
Able t o  keep s e c r e t  
O the r s  w i l l  f i n d  o u t  
DK 
(Asked o f  t h e  81% who s a i d  o t h e r s  w i l l  f i n d  o u t )  About how 
long  a  t ime would you guess  i t ' l l  t a k e  b e f o r e  some o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  f i n d  ou t  a s  much about  atomic bombs a s  we know now? 
(NORC 23711) 
Under 1 y e a r  
1 t o  5 y e a r s  
6 t o  10 y e a r s  
11 t o  50 
Over 50 y e a r s  
Don' t  know 
Do you t h i n k  t h e  s e c r e t  o f  making atomic bombs should  be p u t  
under t h e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  new United Nations S e c u r i t y  Counci l  
o r  should  the  United S t a t e s  keep t h i s  s e c r e t  t o  i t s e l f ?  (AIPO 
357K) 
S e c u r i t y  Council  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  
No Opinion 
10/1945 Do you t h i n k  the  s e c r e t  o f  making atomic bombs should  be p u t  
under t h e  c o n t r o l  of  t h e  new Uni ted  Nat ions  S e c u r i t y  Counc i l ,  
o r  shou ld  t h e  United S t a t e s  and England keep t h i s  s e c r e t  t o  
themselves? (AIPO 357T) 
S e c u r i t y  Counci l  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  and England 
No Opinion 
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10/1945 Do you t h i n k  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  can  keep t h i s  s e c r e t  t o  i t s e l f  
o r  do you t h i n k  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  w i l l  develop atomic bombs? 
(AIPO 357K) 
Can Keep 
Othe r s  Develop 
No Opinion 
I t  took t h e  United S t a t e s  abou t  5 y e a r s  t o  develop t h e  f i r s t  
a tomic  bomb. About how long  do you t h i n k  it  w i l l  be  b e f o r e  
some o t h e r  coun t ry  w i l l  develop one i f  we d o n ' t  g ive  them any 
h e l p  a t  a l l  on i t ?  (RFOR 50) 
Less t h a n  5 y e a r s  
About 5 y e a r s  
More t h a n  5 y e a r s  
Never 
Don' t know/NA 
Which n a t i o n  o r  n a t i o n s  do you t h i n k  w i l l  b e  l i k e l y  t o  be t h e  
f i r s t  t o  develop t h e  atomic bomb? (RFOR 5 0 )  
Russ ia  40 
Germany 2 9 
Grea t  B r i t a i n  9 
Japan  7 
Other  2 
No n a t i o n  w i l l  e v e r  develop atomic bomb 5 
Don' t know/NA 19 
The Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  England and Canada a r e  now t h e  only  
c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  know how t o  make t h e  a tomic  bomb. Do you 
t h i n k  we should  s h a r e  t h i s  s e c r e t  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  United 
Na t ions ,  o r  should  we t r y  t o  keep it t o  o u r s e l v e s ?  (NORC 135) 
Share  w i t h  o t h e r s  
Keep i t  o u r s e l v e s  
No op in ion  
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10/1945 (Asked of the 72% who answered keep to ourselves) Do you think 
we should share the secret, if the United Nations organization 
could control the bomb, so that no country could use it to 
start a future war? (NORC 135) 
Yes, share 
No, don't share 
No opinion 
10/1945 If we did share the secret with the other United Nations, do 
you think it would be possible for the world organization to 
control the bomb, so that no country could use it to start a 




10/1945 Do you think it will be possible to keep the secret 
permanently, or will other countries be able to find out for 
themselves how to make the bomb? (NORC 135) 
Can keep permanently 
Others will find out 
No opinion 
10/1945 About how long do you think it will take other countries to 
discover the secret--a year or two, around five years, around 
ten years, or longer? (NORC 135) 
Year or two 
Around five years 
Around ten years 
Longer 
No opinion 
12/1945 Do you think Russia will have her own atomic bombs within the 




12/1945 (Asked of the 23% who answered no) How many years do you think 
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12/1945 It has been suggested that the world organization have 
inspectors who could search any property in any country at any 
time to see if anybody was making atomic bombs. All inspectors 
would work in teams, having one Russian, one Englishman and one 
American working together. Do you think there should be such 
an inspection or not? (NORC 42T) 
Should 
Should not 
Don' t know 
12/1945 Do you think the world organization could set up such a system 
of inspection so that it will always be able to tell if any 




12/1945 Do you think the world organization should pass a law and be 
given the power to enforce it so that no country in the world 
can make an atomic bomb, or don't you think so? (NORC 42T) 
(trend see repeated questions) 
Should pass 
Should not pass 
DK 
12/1945 (Asked of the 19% who said should not) Well, how would you 
answer if you were positively convinced that Russia would have 
her own atomic bombs within three years and that there is no 
possible defense against these bombs? Then would you be for or 
against the world organization having a law that no country can 




12/1945 If the world organization did pass a law that no country could 
make atomic bombs, do you think people who break this law 
should be punished hy the world organization or by their own 




Appendix 3 - 327 - 
12/1945 Suppose Russia's price for letting inspectors into her country 
was for the US and other countries to tell the world 
organization now all they know about atomic bombs. Would you 
want to pay this price or not? (NORC 42T) 
Would 
Would not 
Don' t know 
2/1946 Do you think it will be possible to keep the secret of how to 
make the htomic bomb permanently, or will other countries be 
able to find out for themselves how to make the bomb? (NORC 
139) (similar question 10/1945) 
Can keep permanently 
Others will find out 
DK 
2/1946 (Asked of those 85 % who answered others will find out) About 
how long do you think it will take other countries to discover 
the secret--a year or two, around five years, around ten years, 
or longer? (NORC 139) 
They know already (vol) 
Less than a year (vol) 
Year or two 
Around five years 
Around ten years 
Longer 
DK 
2/1946 In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with our 




Don' t know 
2/1946 As far as you know, what is the policy of our government on 
sharing the secret of how we make the bomb? Are we going to 
tell other countries how we make it, or are we going to keep 
this information to ourselves? (NOEC 139) 
Tell others 
Keep to ourselves 
Don' t know 
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2/1946 How about  ou r  p o l i c y  toward c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  bomb? Are we going 
t o  t r y  t o  con t inue  t o  keep c o n t r o l  i n  ou r  own hands ,  o r  a r e  we 
going t o  work wi th  o t h e r  United Nat ions  toward i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o n t r o l  of  t h e  bomb? (NORC 139) { s e e  2/1947 f o r  a  s i m i l a r  
q u e s t i o n )  
Keep i n  o u r  own hands 
Work w i t h  o t h e r s  
DK 
2/1946 Gene ra l ly  speaking ,  a r e  you w e l l  s a t i s f i e d  o r  n o t  s o  w e l l  
s a t s i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  way ou r  government is h a n d l i n g  t h e  atomic 
bomb problem? (MINN 31) 
S a t i s f i e d  
Not s a t i s f i e d  
Don't  know enough about  p l a n s  
2/1946 How long  s o  you t h i n k  we can keep t h e  atomic bomb s e c r e t ,  n o t  
v e r y  long ,  f o r  a  few y e a r s ,  a s  long  a s  we wish? (MINN 31) 
Not ve ry  long  
For a  few y e a r s  
A s  l ong  a s  we wish 
No op in ion  
3/1946 Do you t h i n k  t h e  world o r g a n i z a t i o n  should  pas s  a  law and be 
g iven  t h e  power t o  en fo rce  i t  s o  t h a t  no coun t ry  i n  t h e  world 
can  make atomic bombs, o r  d o n ' t  you t h i n k  so?  (NORC 140) ( f o r  
t r e n d  s e e  r e p e a t e d  q u e s t i o n s )  
Should 
Should n o t  
DK 
3/1946 (Asked of  t h e  72% who answered shou ld )  I f  p a s s i n g  a  law t h a t  
no coun t ry  can make atomic bombs meant t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  
would n o t  on ly  have t o  s t o p  making more, b u t  would a l s o  have t o  
d e s t r o y  a l l  a tomic bombs now on hand, t hen  would you be f o r  o r  
a g a i n s t  p a s s i n g  t h i s  law? (NORC 140) 
For 
Agains t  
Don' t know 
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3/1946 It has been suggested that the world organization have 
inspectors who could search any property in any country at any 
time to see if anybody was making atomic bombs. All inspectors 
would work in teams, having one Russian, one Englishman and one 
American working together. Do you think there should be such 





3/1946 (Asked of the 75% who answered should be inspection) Would you 
be willing for these inspectors to search Americ~n property if 
it meant that they would find out how we make atomic bombs, or 
would that be going too far? (NORC 140) 
Willing 
Going too far 
Don' i: know 
4/1946a Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put 
under the control of the United Nations Security Council, or 
should the United States keep this secret to itself? (AIPO 




4/1946b Do you think any other country(ies) is already making atom 
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No opin ion  
Did you h e a r  o r  r ead  anyth ing  about  t h e  r e p o r t  on t h e  c o n t r o l  
of  atomic energy,  which was publ ished by t h e  S t a t e  Department a  




I f  every  o t h e r  country i n  t h e  world would t u r n  over  t o  a  world 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  a l l  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  informat ion  and s e c r e t s ,  and 
a l low continuous i x ~ s p e c t i o n ,  would you be w i l l i n g  f o r  the  
United S t a t e s  t o  go a long on t h i s ?  (RCOM 24) 
Yes 
No 
Don't  know/No answer 
Would you be w i l l i n g  t o  have the  U.S. t u r n  over  c o n t r o l  of  a l l  
h e r  armed f o r c e s  and war weapons, i nc lud ing  atomic bombs, t o  a  
world par l iament  o r  congress ,  provided t h a t  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  




6/1946- s e e  r epea ted  ques t ions  (PYS Corp 173k&t,  178k&t) 
8/1946 
7/1946 I n  g e n e r a l ,  a r e  you s a t i s f i e d  o r  d i s s a t i s f i e d  wi th  t h e  progress  
t h a t  t h e  United Nations has  made s o  f a r ?  (NORC 143) 
S a t i s f i e d  
D i s s a t i s f i e d  
Don't know 
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7/1946 (Asked of the 40% who were dissatisfied) Why? (NORC 143) 
General lack of progress 2 5 
Too many disagreements 2 0 
Countries too selfish 9 
Russia won't cooperate 2 6 
England not doing all it should 5 
US not doing all it should 5 
Handling of peace treaties, territorial adjustments 3 
Handling of atomic bomb 1 
Handling of miscellaneous specific issues 1 
Objections to veto power 2 
Isolationist objections 4 
Miscellaneous criticism 2 
No answer 4 
Do you think there should eventually be some sort of 
international control of atomic bombs and atomic energy, or 
should each country remain free to make its own bombs and carry 
on its own experiments? (NORC 143) 
International control 
Each country free 
Dk 
(Asked of those 58% who answered international control) If 
international control of the bomb meant chat the US eventually 
had to turn over our atomic factories to an international 




Do you think it would be possible for the world organization co 
control the atomic bomb, so that no country could use it to 




Have you heard or read anything about the official American 
plan for control of atomic energy, which Bernard Baruch 




7/1946 (Askcd of the  29% who s a i d  yes)  Was t h e r e  anyth ing  you d i d n ' t  
l i k e  about  t h e  plan? (NORC 143) 
Yes, d i d n ' t  l l k e  
No 
DK/No answer 
(Asked of t h e  29% who s a i d  yes)  How do you f e e l  about  t h e  p lan  





(Asked of t h e  29% who s a i d  yes )  According t o  t h e  p l a n ,  would 
it s t i l l  be p o s s i b l e  f o r  some n a t i o n  t o  make atomic bombs 




(Asked of t h e  29% who s a i d  yes)  Suppose some n a t i o n  d i d n ' t  
l i v e  up t o  t h e  p l a n ,  once i t  was adopted.  Would t h e  United 
Nations have t h e  r i g h t  t o  punish t h a t  n a t i o n  immediately, o r  
would t h e  country have t h e  r i g h t  t o  prevent  any a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  
i t s e l f ?  (NORC 143) 
UN could  punish 
Country could prevent  
DK 
A s  you know, t h i s  country i s  s t i l l  making atomic bombs. Do you 
t h i n k  we should cont inue  t o  make them a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t ime,  o r  
should we s t o p  making them now? (NORC 143) 
Continue making 
Stop making 
Don' t know 
(Asked of  those  94% who had hea rd  of t h e  B i k i n i  atomic t e s t )  
How long do you t h i n k  we can keep t h e  atomic bomb s e c r e t -  n o t  
v e r y  long ,  f o r  a  few y e a r s ,  o r  a s  long a s  we wish? (MINM 36) 
Not very  long 
For a  few y e a r s  
A s  long a s  we wish 
I s n ' t  s e c r e t  now ( v o l )  
No opin ion  
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9/1946 (Asked of Veterans) Here is a list of some things the government 
in Washington might try to do in the next year. Which two things 
on the list would you pick as the most import~nt to make an 
immediate start on . . .  (RCOM 25) (data not presented in order 
asked) 
Make better housing available 
Prevent inflation 
Pay a cash bonus tb veterans 
Arrange for international control of the atomic bomb 
Regulate labor unions more strictly 
Make more jobs available 
Reduce taxes 
Tell more people abroad sbout our way of life in this 
Regulate business more strictly 
Other (vol) 












9/1946 If the US could do only one of these two things during the next 
few years, which one do you think would give us the best chance 
of keeping peace in the world? Should we try to keep ahead of 
other countries by making more and better atomic borilbs and 
rockets? OR Should we try to make the United Nations 
organization strong enough to prevent all countries, including 
the US, from making atomic bombs and rockets? (NORC 144) 
Trying to keep ahead 
Making the United Nations strong 
Don ' t know 
10/1946 Do you think the secret of making atomic bombs should be put 
under t\e control of the new United Nations Security Cc~uncil, 
or should the United States keep this secret to themselves? 
(AIPO 379K&T) (for trend see repeated questions) 
Security Council 
U.S. and England 
No opinion 
11/1946 Do you think that the United States should stop making atom 
bombs an3 destroy chose already made to prove our good 
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11/1946 Do you believe that this (ceasing production of atomic bombs 
and destroying those already made) would help in bringing about 
an agreement with Russia regarding international control of 




11/1946 Do you think the United States should stop making Atom Bombs 




11/1946 Suppose the United States stopped making Atomic Bombs and 
destroyed those already made. Do you think Russia would then 
agree to let a United Nations Committee check to see that 




11/1946 As you know, the countries are now trying to work out a way to 
put atomic bombs under international control. While they're 
trying to do this, it has been suggested that the US stop 
making atomic bombs-- for say one year. Do you think we should 
do this or not? (NORC 146) 
Yes, stop making for one year 
No, keep making 
Don't know/No answer 
2/1947 Here's a list of some things that have been in the news 
lately. During the last week or so, have you been talking 
about any of these subjects with your friends? (NORC 148) 
(not in the order asked] 
The housing shortage 
Sending food & relief to Europe 
How to settle labor problems 
Budget for the Federal government 
How we should deal with Russia 
How to control atomic bomb 
What's going on in China 
Our military bases in Pacific 
Peace treaty with Germany 
Tariffs and foreign trade 
None/Donlt know/Donlt remember 
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2/1947 Do you think all countries, including our own, should agree ~t 
the present time to have all production of atomic energy 
controlled by a special agency of the United Nations 




2/19fr7 As far as you know, is the United States trying to get other 
countries to agree to the international control of atomic 
energy or not? (NORC 148) (see similar question 2/1946) 
Yes, is trying 
No, is not trying 
Don' t know 
2/'1947 Have you heard or read anything about the official American 
plan for international control of atomic energy--often called 
the Baruch plan? (NORC 148) (see similar question 6/1946) 
Yes 
N 0 
2/1947 (Asked of those 55% who answered yes) Do you feel you have a 
fairly clear idea of the plan in general, or not? (NORC 148) 
Yes, have clear idea 
No 
DK 
2/1947 (Asked of those 55% who answered yes) Do you think this plan 
has a good chance of being agreed to by the United Nations 
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2/1947 Would you favor international control of atomic energy if it 
meant that . . . after the system of control had been agreed 
to and set up? (NORC 148)tfor trend see repeated questions) 
Favor Oppose No 
Op in 
A. We had to stop making atomic bombs? 53 3 3 14 
B. We had to destroy all the bombs we 
have on hand 3 9 4 9 12 
C. We, as well as all other countries, 
had to let United Nations inspectors see 
if each country is living up to its 
agreements? 6 7 19 14 
D. We had to place all our atomic 
factories under the control of an 
international agency? 5 1 3 1 18 
E. We had to give the international 
agency all the information it needs 
about atomic energy? 4 0 4 8 11 
2/1947 Which one of these statements comes closest to summing up your 
opinion about international control of atomic energy? (NORC 
148) 
A .  International control of atomic energy has a 
very good chance of working, and I think we should 
try it 2 8 
B. International control has only a fair chance of 
working, but I think we ought to try it 3 2 
C. International control has only a fair chance of 
working, and I don't think we ought to risk it 15 
D. International control can't possibly work, and 
there's no use trying it 13 
E. Don't know 12 
2/1947 In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with our 
government's policy on the atomic bomb? (NORC 148) (for trend 
see repeated questions) 
Satisfied 
Dissatisfied 
Don' t know 
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2/1947 (Asked of those 63% who answered satisfied or dissatisfied) 
Why? (NORC 148) 
They have not properly guarded the secret, and not 
protecting American interests 4 8 
They are trying too hard to keep the secret, aren't 
working with other countries toward control 10 
They don't have any policy; aren't getting anywhere, 
too much politics 8 
They should stop making bombs, forget about it, never 
should have been invented or used 15 
Should put more emphasis on constructive peaceful uses 2 
Don't know/no answer 17 
6/1947a Do you think any other nation or nations are now making their 
own Atom Bombs? (AIPO 398K&T) 
Yes 
No 
Qualified, yes trying to 
No Opinion 
6/1947a (Asked of those 65% who answered yes) Which nation or 








6/1947 If a world commission were set up by the United Nations to 
control atomic energy, do you think the United States should or 






6/1947 (Asked of those 71% who said should not) Would you still feel 
that way if Russia agreed to cooperate with the commission by 
permitting regular inspections inside Russia, the same as in 




Appendix 3 - 338 - 
6/1947 Do you think that any other nations besides the United States 








Don' t know 
7/1947 In your opinion, shotild there be international control of 
atomic bombs and atomic energy, or should each country remain 
free to make its own bombs? (NORC 151) 
International control 
Each country free 
DK 
Qualified answer 
10/1947 As far as you know, is the United States trying to get other 
countries to agree to the international control of atomic 
energy or not? (NORC 152) 
Yes, is trying 
No, is not trying 
Don't know 
10/1947 Do you think all countries, including our own, should agree at 
the present time to the international control of atomic 




10/1947 What do you think are the chances that such a system of 
international control will be set up within the next year or 
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10/1947 Would you favor international control of atomic energy if it 
meant that . . . after the system of control had been agreed 
to and set up? (NORC 152) (for trend see repeated questions) 
Favor Oppose No 
0 P 
A .  We had to stop making atomic bombs? 59 3  1 10 
B .  We had to destroy all the bombs we 
have on hand? 4 0 5 2 8 
C. We, as well as all other countries, 
had to let United Nations inspectors 
see if each country is living up to its 
agreements? 7 9 14 7 
D. We had to place all our atomic 
factories under the control of an 
international agency? 5 5 3  3  12 
E .  We had to give the international 
agency all the information it needs 
about atomic energy? 41 48 11 
10/1947 Do you believe that the United States should agree to stop 
making atomic bombs before an international control agency is 
set up? (NORC 152) 
Yes 
No 
Don' t know 
4/1948 Would you favor or oppose having the U.N. adopt a plan for the 
control of atomic energy which would permit the U.N. to 
inspect atomic plants in the U.S. and any other country at any 




No opinion/No answer 
4/1948 Would you favor or oppose having the United Nations adopt a 
plan for control of atomic energy which would permit the 
United Nations to inspect atomic plants in the United States 




6/1948 Do you think all countries, including our own, should agree at 
the present time to the international control of atomic 
energy? (NORC 158) (for trend see repeated questions) 
Yes 
No 
Don ' t know 
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6/1948 As far as you know, have the United States and Russia been 
able to reach an agreement on international control of the 
atomic bomb? (NORC 158) 
Yes they have 
No, they haven't 
Donf t know 
6/1948 (Asked of the 63% who answered US and USSR had been unable to 
agree on international control) What are some of the points 
about the control of the atomic bomb that they have not been 
able to agree on? (NORC 158) 
Russia wants the secret, we won't give it to them 2 0 
They disagree about inspection of atomic activities 7 
They disagree about supervision and control of atomic 
activities 9 
Russia wants us to destroy our bombs and 
we wonf t agree 6 
Russia wants to outlaw atomic bombs as a weapon and 
we won't agree 1 
They disagree about the use to make of it 6 
Exchange of information 3 
Miscellaneous 2 
Don't know/No answer 5 5 
(Multiple answers) 
6/1948 (Asked of the 63% who answered the US and USSR had been unable 
to agree on international control) What do you think are the 
chances that a system of internationel control of the atom 
bomb will be set up within the next year or two - -  Are the 





6/1948 (Asked of the 63% who answered the US and USSR had been unable 
to agree on international control) Have you heard or read 
anything about the recent decision of the Atomic Energy 
Commission of the United Nations to stop its discussi.ons for 
the time being? (NORC 158) 
Yes 
No 
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6/1948 (Asked of the 63% who answered the US and USSR had been unable 
to agree on international control) Do you think the United 
States should co~ltinue to try to get the Russians to agree to 
our plan of international control of atomic energy, or do you 




6/1948 (Asked of 63% who answered the US and USSR had been unable to 
agree on international control) Some people say we should now 
take certain steps in order to make an agreement with Russia 
more likely. Would you favor or oppose the United States 
a Announcing to the world we will not use the atom bomb 
except in self defense; 
b Destroying all our atomic bombs (NORC 158) 
Favor 
Oppose 
Don' t know 
6/1948 We'd like to know how much interest the public takes in a 
number of questions. For example, do you yourself take a 
great deal of interest, a mild interest, or practically none 
at all in . . . (NORC 158) 
a News about our relations with Russia 
b News about the cost of living 
c News about our policy toward Palestine 
d News about the coming election for President 
e News about increasing our armed forces 
f News about control of the atomic bomb 
A great deal of interest 45 83 24 49 55 44 
A mild interest 43 14 50 39 35 41 
Practically none 10 2 24 10 8 13 
Don' t know 1 1 2 - 7 2 2 
9/23/49 President Truman announced that Russia had tested an atomic 
bomb. 
10/1949 Do you think all countries, including the United Stzites, 
should agree at the present time to the international control 
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10/1949 Would you favor international control of atomic energy if it 
meant that after the system of control had been set up. . . 
(NORC 170) (for trend see repeated questions) 
Yes No DK 
A. We, and all other countries, had to 
destroy all the bombs we have on hand? 5 7 32 11 
B. We, and all other countries, had to 
stop making atomic bombs? 6 8 22 10 
C. We, as well as all other countries, 
had to let United Nations inspectors see 
if each country is living up to its 
agreements7 7 7 13 10 
D. We, and all other countries, had to 
place all our atomic factories under the 
ownership and control of an international 
agency? 54 30 16 
E .  We, and all other countries, had to 
give the international agency all the 
information it needs about atomic energy? 45 40 15 
10/1949 Now that Russia may have the atomic bomb, what do you think 
are the chances that a system of international control of 
atomic energy will be set up within the next year or two - -  





10/1949 Asked of those 55% who answered good or poor) Why do you feel 
that way? (NORC 170) 
Good Russia will be more willing now, will accept 
control 4 
U.S. will be more willing now, will press harder 
for control 1 
Both Russia and U.S. will be more willing now, 
mutual fear 4 
Control is inevitable now, all know or will 
know, world will force it 8 
Poor Russia will be even less willing now, more 
conscious of its power 9 
Russia doesn't want control, won't share 
information, admit inspectors 13 
Russia is treacherous, doesn't want peace 
can't be trusted 13 
Russia won't agree, won't cooperate, will 
never change 2 7 
U.S. & Russia both distrustful, world not ready 15 
Don't know/No answer 7 
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10/1949 Here are some things our government is doing now, in order to 
meet the Russian problem. I'd like to know whether you 
approve or disapprove of each one. For instance, do you 
approve or disapprove of . . . (NORC 170) 
a Sending economic aid to western Europe under the Marshall 
Plan? 
b Sending military supplies to strengthen the countries of 
western Europe? 
c Spending money on radio broadcasts to explain our point of 
view to the people of Russia and other countries? 
d Increasing the number of our atomic bombs? 
e Strengthening our armed forces in other ways? 
Approve 
Disapprove 
Don' t know 
10/1949 Suppose we can not get any agreement with Russia for an 
effective system on international control of atomic energy, 
would you approve or disapprove of the United States making an 
agreement to destroy all the atomic bombs we have on hand, if 




Don' t know 
12/1949 The United Nations is talking about a world organization to 
take over control of atomic energy work all over the world. 
Would you be willing to have that kind of organization take 
over control of this country's atomic energy work, or would 
you be opposed? (MINN 77) 
Would be willing 
Would be opposed 
No opinion 
If Russia will agree to control, too 
Other qualified 
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12/1949 Ale t h e r e  any world problems t h a t  you f e e l  a r e  more important  
than  t h e  ques t ion  of  world c o n t r o l  of atomic energy a t  t h i s  
with? (MINN 7 7 )  
No, none more important  
No opin ion  
Yes, b u t  d o n ' t  know o r  no answer given 
Yes, world peace 
Yes, communists 6 communist c o u n t r i e s ;  Russia  6 our 
r e l a t i o n s  wi th  Russia 
Yes, t a k i n g  c a r e  o f  our  own people f i r s t  
Yes, t h e  s t andard  of l i v i n g ,  hous ing ,  food,  poverty 
Yes, h e l p i n g  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  g e t  s e t t l e d  
Yes, t h e  German s i t u a t i o n ;  u n i f i c a t i o n  
Yes, economic problem 
Yes, o t h e r  problems 
2/1950a Do you t h i n k  we should t r y  aga in  t o  work ou t  an agreement wi th  
Russia t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  Atom bomb be fo re  we t r y  t o  make a  
Hydrogen bomb? ( A I P O  452 K) 
Should 
Should n o t  
No opin ion  
2/1950 P r e s i d e n t  Truman announced the  U.S. w o ~ l d  develop the  hydrogen 
bomb 
2/1950b Do you t h i n k  we should t r y  aga in  t o  work ou t  an  agreement with 
Russia t o  c o n t r o l  the  Atom bomb and the  Hydrogen bomb? (AIPO 
452 TPS) 
Should 
Should n o t  
No opin ion  
2/1950 Do you t h i n k  such an a t tempt  t o  work ou t  an agreement: wi th  
Russia would be s u c c e s s f u l ,  o r  not?  ( A I P O  452 K & 452 TPS) 
Would 
Would n o t  
On opin ion  
3/1950 Do you t h i n k  our government should do any more than  i t  i s  
doing t o  reach  an  agreement wi th  Russia on t h e  atomic bomb? 
(NORC 276)  
Yes, should do more 
No, doing enough 
Don' t know 
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3/1950 (Asked of those 25% who answered should do more) What more 
should our government do to reach an agreement with Russia on 
the atomic bomb? (NORC 276) 
Call a conference, send representatives over there 2 9 
Outlaw the bomb, use atomic energy only for peace 15 
Soften our policy a little, be more willing to 
compromise 5 
Get through, threaten them, force them into line 7 
V ~ r k  through UN 3 
Come to terms, make peace, reach an agreement 12 
Don't know/no answer 2 9 
Do you think all countries, including the US, should agree at 
the present time to the international control of atomic 




(Asked of those 31% who answered no) Why not? (NORC 282-83) 
US should not share, it should be kept for ourselves 15 
You can't trust other countries, they might use it, 
might not stand by their word, might use it ap!ainst us 25 
You can't trust Russia, Russia might information or 
communists might get it 15 
We should keep it for our own defense, increase or 
preserve our own strength, keep our advantage 16 
It's safer with us, US not aggressive, would use it 
only for defense 6 
It wouldn't work, not feasible, too soon to try it 10 
Isolationist sentiment 2 
Miscellaneous 5 
Don't know/No answer 4 
(Asked of those 58% who answered yes) As you know, the 
Russians have so far refused to agree to the United Nations 
plan for international control of atomic energy and have 
walked out of the UN discussion on this problem. Do you think 
the US should invite Russia and other countries to a special 
conference in an attempt to get agreement on international 





6/1950 (Asked of  those  6 5 %  who answered yes )  Do you t h i n k  t h e r e ' s  a 
good chance t h a t  such a  conference might b r i n g  about  an 
agreement wi th  Russia on atomic energy? (NOKC 2 8 2 - 3 )  
Yes 
No 
Don' t know 
Would you favor  o r  oppose a  p l a n  f o r  t h e  5 ,n te rna t iona l  c o n t r o l  
of  atomic energy (atom bombs) which would a l low t h e  UN t o  
i n s p e c t  atomic p l a n t s  i n  a l l  member c o u n t r i e s ,  i nc lud ing  
Russ ia  and t h e  United S t a t e s ?  (AIPO 514K) 
Favor 
Oppose 
No opin ion  
Now h e r e  i s  a  l i s t  of t h i n g s ,  some of which t h e  United Nations 
now has  t h e  power t o  do ,  and some it  could do wi th  a  change i n  
i t s  c h a r t e r .  A s  you may know, t h e  c h a r t e r  r e v i s i o n  conference 
is due nex t  y e a r .  Going down t h e  l i s t ,  would you l i k e  t o  have 
t h e  United Nations go ahead and f i n d  a  way t o  . . . Control  
atomic energy,  o r  do you t h i n k  it  s h o u l d n ' t  have t h e  power t o  
do t h a t ?  (RCOM 80) 
United Nations should go ahead and do 
UN s h o u l d n ' t  have power 
Don' t know 
APPENDIX 4 
Use of Atomic Weapons Against Japan: 
P~blic Attitudes, 1985 - 1945 
7/1985 Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Dropping atomic 
bombs on Japan in World War Two was morally wrong. Do you 






Don ' t know 
7/1985 (Asked the American public) Can you tell me what comes to mind 











7/1985 (Asked the American public) These days, do you think most 
Japanese people hold it against the United States for dropping 
atomic bombs on Japan, or don't they hold it against us, or 
don't you k~iow enough about it to have an opinion? (CBS/NYT) 
Hold it against US 
Don't hold it against US 
Don't know 
7/1985 (Asked of Japanese public) These days, do you hold it against 
the United States for dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, or do you not hold it against them, or don't you know 
enough about it to have an opinion? (CBS/NYT/Tokyo 
Broadcasting) 
Hold it against US 
Don't hold it against US 
Don't know 
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7/1985 Do you ag ree  o r  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t :  One of che major 
r ea sons  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  was w i l l i n g  t o  drop  the  atomic 
bombs on Japan  was t h e  Japanese  people  a r e  n o t  w h i t e .  Do you 
ag ree  s t r o n g l y ,  ag ree  somewhat, d i s a g r e e  somewhat o r  d i s a g r e e  
s t r o n g l y  w i t h  t h a t ?  (CBS/NYI'/Tokyo Broadcas t ing )  
US Japan  
Agree s t r o n g l y  
Agree somewhat 
Disagree  somewhat 
Disagree  s t r o n g l y  
Don' t know 
1/1971 By t h e  way, do you f e e l  i t  was neces sa ry  and proper  f o r  t he  US 
t o  drop  atomic bombs on Japan  d u r i n g  World War 11, o r  do you 
t h i n k  we were wrong t o  drop t h e  bombs? ( H a r r i s  2053) 
Necessary and proper  
Wrong t o  drop bombs 
Not s u r e  
6/1965 A s  an  American, have you o f t e n ,  sometimes, o r  h a r d l y  ev r  f e l t  
bad ly  because . . . t h e  U.S. was t h e  f i r s t  coun t ry  t o  drop tlie 
atom bomb? ( H a r r i s  1531) 
Of t e n  
Sometimes 
Hardly e v e r  
Never ( v o l )  
Not s u r e  
9/1948 A s  you look back on i t ,  how do you f e e l  about  ou r  u se  of t h e  
atom bomb i n  t h e  war? Do you t h i n k :  (RFOR 70) 
A .  We should  have used more of them than  
we d i d ,  o r  1 5  
B .  That we used them i n  j u s t  about  t h e  
r i g h t  way, o r  5 1 
C .  That  we should  have dropped oce f i r s t  
on some unpopulated p l a c e  a s  a  w a r ~ r i n g ,  o r  1 4  
D .  That  we should  n o t  have dropped any a t  d l l ~ ?  1 2  
E .  Don't  know 8 
Appendix 4 - 349 .. 
10/1945 How much longer  do you t h i n k  t h e  Japanese would have h e l d  out 
i f  I t  had n o t  been f o r  t h e  atomic bomb? (RFOR 50) 
No longer  
1 month l e s s  
2 -  5  months 
6 months 
7 - 1 1  months 
1 yea r  
Over a yea r  
Don ' t know 
10/1945 Which one of t h e s e  comes c l o s e s t  t o  d e s c r i b i n g  how you f e e l  
about  our  use of t h e  atomic bomb? (RFOR 50) 
A .  We should n o t  have used any atomic b o ~ b s  
a t  a l l  5 
B .  We should have dropped one f i r s t  on some 
unpopulated r e g i o n ,  t o  show t h e  Japanese  i t s  
power, and only dropped t h e  secend on a c i t y  
i f  they  h a d n ' t  sur rendered  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  one 14 
C .  should have used t h e  twc bombs on c i t i e s ,  
j u s t  a s  we d i d  54 
D .  "e should have qu ick ly  u s ~ d  many more of them 
be fo re  Japan had a chance t o  su r render  2 3 
E .  Don't  know 6 
9/1945 I f  you had been the  one t o  dec ide  whether o r  no t  t o  use the  
atomic bomb a g a i n s t  J apan ,  which one of t h e s e  four  t h i n g s  do 
you t h i n k  you would have done? (NORC 2 3 7 A  6 B )  
Refused t o  use 
Where no people 
One c i t y  a t  t ime 
Wiped o u t  c i t i e s  
DK 
8/1945 (Asked of 96% who had heard of t h e  atomic bomb) Do you 
approve o r  disapprove of us ing  t h e  new atomic bomb on Japanese 
c i t i e s ?  (AIPO 353K&T) 
Approve 
Disapprove 
No Opinion/No answer 
APPENDIX 5 
Perceptions of the Soviet Union, 1942- 1987 
World War I1 through International Control of Atomic Energy 
2/1942- Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate with us after 
10/1945 the war/when the war is over? (NORC, OPOR, AIPO) 
2/42a 4/42b 6/42c 7/42d 
NORC OPOR OPOR OPOR 
Yes 3 8 3 9 4 1 5 0 
N 0 3 7 3 9 3 3 3 0 
Don' t know 2 5  2 2 2 6 2 0 
1/43e 4/43f 10/43g 11/43h 12/43i 
AIPO AIPO OPOR AIPO AIPO 
Yes 4 6 4 4 5 1 4 7 5 1 
N 0 2 9 3 4 2 7 2 7 2 7 
No opinion 25 2 2 2 2 2 6 2 2 
1/44j 6/44k 11/441 
AIPO AIPO AIPO 
Yes 40 4 7 4 7 
N o 3 7 3 6 3 5 
No opinion 23 17 18 
2/45m 5/45n 8/450 10/45p 
AIPO AIPO AIPO AIPO 
Yes 5 5 4 5 5 6 3 8 
No 3 1 3 8 2 8 4 5  
No opinion 14 17 16 17 
see bibliographic notes next page 
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Buckley (B) l i s ts  a s  2/14/42; Capspary (C) l i s t e d  a s  3/42; C a n t r i l  & 
Strunk (C&S). 
OPOR 813. C l i s ts  a s  AIPO 3/42; B and C&S l i s t s  c o r r e c t l y  a s  
3/26/42 OPOR; Codebook d a t e s  3/26/42 wi th  in t e rv iew d a t e s  4/42. 
OPOR 817k. B and C&S a s  6/17/42; in t e rv iew d a t e s  6/42. 
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OPOR 18.  Codebook d a t e  10/14/43, in t e rv iew d a t e  10/43 
AIPO 306T. B, C, C&S Gallup 1972 p .  419. 
AIPO 308 & 308k. B and C6S.  
AIPO 310k. B and C&E. 
AIPO 320k&t. B ,  C ,  C&S, and Gallup 1972 p .  453. 
A I P O .  B ,  C ,  and C6S. 
A I P O  341k&t. B ,  C ,  C&S, and Gallup 1972 p .  492. 
AIPO 347k&t. B ,  C and C&S. 
AIPO 353 t .  B, C, C&S, and Gallup 1972 p .  523-4. 
AIPO 358k. B and C&S. 
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5/1942- Do you think Russia can be depended upon to cooperate with us 






Don' t know 
Yes 
No 
Don' t know 
+ slightvariation in question wording 
Key a Buckley (B) as 5/6/42; Caspary (C) as 5/42; Cantril 
& Strunk (C&S) 
B and C&S as 7/1/42; c as 7/42 
B and C&S as 7/18/42; C as 7/42 
B and C&S as 8/21/42; C as 8/42 
B and C as 9/42 
B and C&S as 11/19/42; C as 11/42 
B and C&S as 11/27/42; C as 11/42 
B and C&S as 6/18/43; C as 6/43 
B and C&S as 11/15/43; C as 11/43 
B and C&S as 4/8/44 
C; NORC 133; "now that the war is over" 
C; NORC 135; "now that the war is over" 
10/1945- Do you think Russia will cooperate with us in world affairs? 
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2/1946- Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate with us during 
3/1947 the next year or two? (NORC 139, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147, 49T)  
Yes, she will cooperate (41) 34 3 3 30 2 8 
Fairly sure 2 5 
Not certain 16 
No, she won't cooperate (46) 45 5 2 5 5 5 8 
Fairly sure 3 0 
Not certain 16 
Eon' t know 12 2 1 14 15 14 
Yes 
No 
Don' t know 
+ slight variation in question wording 
+ significantly different question wording 
2/1947- Do you think we can count on Russia to meet us half-way 
10/1949 in working out problems together? (NOKC 148, 151, 152, 154, 
158, 160, 1G1, 163, 166. 167, 168, 169, 170) 
Yes 3 3 2 5 2 2 16 
N o 52 6 2 6 '7 7 3 
Don' t know 15 13 11 11 
Yes 2 5 2 0 16 
No 64 7 0 7 6 
Don't know 11 10 8 
Yes 19 2 4 2 2 2 4 20 19 
No 7 2 6 6 6 7 6 7 6 9 6 9 
Don' t know 9 10 11 9 11 12 
+ slight variation in question wording 
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Limited Test Ban Treaty 
3/1951- Version A: Do you, yourself, think it is posible or impossible 
11/1964 for the United States to reach a peaceful agreement with 
Russia? (AlPO 472) 
Version B: Do you believe it is possible or impossible to 
reach a peaceful settlement of differences with Russia? (AIPO 
622k, 639, 654KB, 674K, 676k, 686, 701) 
Version C: Do you believe that it is possible or impossible to 
reach a peaceful settlement of differences between Russia and 
the West? (AIPO 666) 
Version 
Possible 43 6 7 5 0 5 3 
Impossible 47 2 2 28 3 4 
No opinion/NA 10 11 2 2 13 
Version 
Possible 6 1 49 4 4 4 7 5 7 
Impossible 3 2 3 7 3 9 3 9 2 6 
No opinion/NA 7 14 11 14 18 
2/1961- Looking ahead to 1970, which country do you think will 
2/1967 be the greater threat to world peace- Russia or Communist 









ABM/SALT I and SALT I1 
10/1953- You will notice that the 10 boxes on this card go from the 
5/1987 highest position of plus 5-- or something you like very much/have 
a very favorable opinion of-- to the lowest position of minus 5-- 
or something you dislike very muchfiave a very unfavorable 
opinion of. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would 
you rate the following nations . . . Russia/Soviet Union (AIPO, 
Gallup & NORC) 
10/53 8/54 9/54 12/56 12/66 12/67 
AIPO AIPO AIPO AIPO AIPO Gallup 
521 5 3 5 537 576 738 
Favorable 2 5 2 5 17 19 
Unfavorable 9 1 8 9 8 8 88 7 6 7 7 
No opinion 7 6 10 7 7 4 
Very Favorable 0 1 0 1 1 2 
Favorable 2 4 2 4 16 17 
Unfavorable 16 13 11 14 2 8 2 7 
V Unfavorable 75 7 6 7 7 7 4 48 50 
No Opinion 7 6 10 7 7 4 
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10 Pcint  Scale ( c o n ' t )  
3/83 9/83 3/85 3/86 5/87 
NORC AIPO NORC NORC Gallup/ 
GSS 1224G GSS GSS TM 
Favorable 2 3 9 2 1 3 2 2 5 
Unfavorable 7 3 8 8 7 3 6 3 7 1 
No opinion 4 3 6 4 4 
Very Favorable 2 6 3 2 2 
Favorable 2 1 3 18 3 0 2 3 
Unfavorable 3 2 2 1 30 3 1 3 8 
V Unfavorable 4 1 6 7 4 3 3 2 3 3 
No Opirlion 4 3 5 4 4 
Abbreviations 
a When contbined, the  frequencies f o r  the  f i r s t  four ca tegor ies  
equal led 1%. For A I P O  521, out  of & sample s i z e  of 1488, the  
following number of individuals  s e l ec t ed  the  f i r s t  four 
ca t ego r i e s :  3 ,  3 ,  7 ,  and 1. For AIPO 537, out  of a sample s i z e  
of 1466, the following number of individuals  s e l ec t ed  the f i r s t  
four  ca tegor ies :  2 ,  1, 3 ,  6 .  
b When combined the  frequencies f o r  the  f i r s t  three  ca tegor ies  
equal led 2%. For A I P O  535, out  of a sample s i z e  of 1626, the  
following number of i nd iv i t ua l s  s e l ec t ed  the  f i r s t  th ree  
ca tegor ies :  11 ,  3 ,  and 11. For AIPO 576, out  of a sample s i z e  of 
1539, t he  following number of individuals  s e l ec t ed  the  f i r s t  three  
ca tekor ies :  4 ,  8 and 15.  
c [ -4 , -51  equals  very unfavorable. 
d [ - 3 , - 2 , - 1 1  equals unfavorable. 
e [+1 ,2 ,3 ]  equals favorable .  
f [+4,5]  equals very favorable.  
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1/1955- Do you think the United States should continue its hydrogen 
2/1956 bomb tests, or should we stop them now? (NORC 366, 370, 382) 
Continue 
Stop 
Don' t know 
3/1955- (Those who answered continue tests were then asked) Do you 
2/1956 think it would be a good idea, or a bad idea, if all countries, 
including Russia and the United States, would sign an agreement 
to stop any further H-bomb tests? (NORC 370, 382) 
( asked of) 8 0 8 3 
Good idea 
Bad idea 
Don' t know 
3/1955- Would you tell me what is meant by the "fallout" of an 
11/1961 H-bomb? (AIPO 544, 652) 
Correct 
Incorrect, vague 
Don' t know 
6/1956- As things look now, what do you think is likely to be the one 
10/1956 most important issue in the Presidential election this year'? 
(RCOM 63, 64, 68) 
Disamament, stop A-bomb tests * 2 
* less than 0.5% 
6/1956- Can you name one or two other issues you think will also be 
10/1956 important? (RCOM 63, 68) 
Disarmament,, stop A-bomb tests 
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Repeated Questions 
4/1957- Have you heard or read anything about the "fallout" of 
4/1958 radio-active matter in H-bomb tests? (AIPO 582K, 598k) (see 
3/'1955 and 11/1961 for related questions) 
Yes 
No/no answer 
2/1959- What do you think is the most important problem facing this 
9/1959 country today? (AIPO 610, 612, 616, 618) 
2/59 4/59 7/59 9/59 
Nuclear testing, danger 
from atomic explosions 1 1 1 3 
7/1963- Do you approve of the limited Test ban Treaty? {Approximate 






Must end tests 
End risk of atomic war 
Stop world suicide 
Step to world peace 
Halt cost of testing 
Qualified Approval 
If Russia keeps word 
Only with inspection 
If on our terms 
Opposed 
Russia will break it 
Hurts U.S. defense 
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Repeated Quest ions 
8/1963- T h e U n i t e d S t ~ t e s ,  G r e a L B r i t a i n ,  a n d t h e  S o v i e t u n i o n h a v e  
10/1963 s igned a  t r e a t y  i n  which each country agrees  no t  t o  t e s t  
nuc lea r  weapons i n  the  a i r ,  under w a t e r ,  o r  i n  o u t e r  space .  Do 
you t h i n k  the  t e s t  ban will o r  w i l l  no t  s t rengthen world peace? 
(MINN 226, IOWA/IAPO 172) 
8/63 10/63 
Minn Iowa 
W i l l  7 8 5 6 
W i l l  n o t  14 2 1 
No opinion 6 2 3 
Depends on Kussia;  r e s e r v a t i o n s  about Russia 2 * 
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2/1946 This summer our Navy plans to make tests at sea to find out how 
effective the atom bombs would be in naval warfare. Do you 
think that representatives of other nations should or should 




2/1946 Do you approve or disapprove of giving other nations a 
complete report of the results of the [U? atomic] tests? (AIPO 




2/1946 Next July, the United States is planning to bombard a fleet of 
old battleships with atomic bombs. Do you think it is a good 




2/1946 Who do you think should have more to say about the conduct of 






2/1946 Do you think that representatives of the United Nations should 




4/1946a Do you think the United States should carry out the atom bomb 
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4/1946a Some persons  say  t h a t  animals  should n o t  be used i n  making 
atomic bomb t e s t s  a t  B ik in i  I s l a n d .  Do you ag ree  o r  




4/1946b From what you have heard o r  r e a d ,  what do you t h i n k  i s  the  
main purpose f o r  t h e  atom bomb t e s t s  which a r e  t o  be h e l d  i n  
t h e  P a c i f i c ?  (AIPO 369K6T) 
To s e e  what it w i l l  d o t f i n d  o u t  d e s t r u c t i v e  power 
To s e e  what i t  w i l l  do t o  a  Nevy s h i p ,  s e a  war fa re  
Fur the r  exper imenta t ion ,  defense  r e sea rch  
Show t h e  world i c s  power t o  f r i g h t e n  o the r  c o u n t r i e s  
To show how powerful we a r e ,  prove US s t r e n g t h  
To prevent/outlaw war 
To prepare  f o r  nex t  war 
Experiment For i n d u s t r i a l  use 
Tes t  e f f e c t s  on s e a  l i f e ,  l i v i n g  t h i n g s  
Miscel laneous 
No answer 
6/1946 Do you happen t o  know whether t h e r e  is any p lan  t o  t e s t  t he  
atomic bomb i n  t h e  nea r  f u t u r e ?  (Psy Corp 173k6t)  
Yes 
No/Donlt know 
6/1946 (Asked of those  75% who answered y e s )  W i l l  you t e l l  me what 
t h e  t a r g e t s  a r e  going t o  be i n  t e s t i n g  t h e  bomb? (Psy Corp 
173k&t)  
Cor rec t  
I n c o r r e c t  
6/1946 - (Asked of  those  75% and 89% who had heard of a  r e c e n t  t e s t )  Do 
8/1946 you t h i n k  t h e  t e s t  w i l l / h a s  show(n) t h a t  t h e  Navy w i l l  need 
more o r  fewer men i n  t h e  f u t u r e  than  you have s a i d  t h e  Navy 




Don' t know 
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7/1946 Did the  atomic bombs i n  the  recent  t e s t s  do more damage or  less  





8/1946 Were you g rea t l y  i n t e r e s t e d ,  moderately i n t e r e s t ed  o r  not  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  the Bikini  atom bomb t e s t ?  (Minn 36) 
Great ly  i n t e r e s t ed  
Moderately i n t e r e s t ed  
Not i n t e r e s t ed  
Don't know about the  t e s t s  
8/1946 (Asked of those 95% who had heard of the  Bikini  t e s t s )  Where 
d id  you ge t  most of your information on the  atom bomb t e s t s -  




Talking with o ther  people 
Other 
Don't know 
8/1946 (Asked of those 95% who had heard of the  Bikini  t e s t s )  Now t h a t  
the  atom bomb t e s t s  have been made, do you think the  
information gained should be kept i n  the  United S t a t e s ,  or  
shared with the  other  United hat ions  countr ies?  (MINN 36) 
Kept s e c r e t  
Shared 
Undecided 
8/1946 (Asked of those 95% who had heard of the Bikini  t e s t s )  From 
repo r t s  of what happened a t  B ik in i ,  do you consider the  atom 
bomb a more o r  l e s s  t e r r i b l e  weapon than you had thought before 
t he  t e s t s  took place? (Minn 36) 
More t e r r i b l e  
Less  t e r r i b l e  
About the  same 
Don't know 
8/1946 Do you happen t o  know whether the re  has been anv t e s t  of the  
atomic bomb recent ly?  (Psy Corp 178k&t) 
Yes 
No/Don't know 
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8/1946 (Asked of  those  89% who had hea rd  of  a  r e c e n t  t e s t )  Will. you 
t e l l  me what t h e  t a r g e t s  were used i n  ~ e s t i n g  t h e  bomh? (Psy 
Corp 178kdt) 
Cor rec t  
Incor rec t /Don l t  know 
8/1946 (Asked of  those  89% who had heard  of  a  r e c e n t  t e s t )  Did t h e  
a t o g i c  bombs i n  r e c e n t  t e s t s  do more damage o r  l e s s  than  you 
thought  they  would? (Psy Corp 178kdt)  
More damage 
Less damage 
Same ( v o l )  
No op in ion  
6/1953 Some people say  t h a t  t h e  r e c e n t  heavy r a i n s  and tornadoes i n  
v a r i o u s  p a r t s  of t h e  count ry  have been caused by the atomic 
exp los ions  i n  Nevada. Do you b e l i e v e  t h e r e  is something t o  
t h i s ,  o r  not?  (AIPO 516k) 
Yes 
No 
No opin ion  
4/1954 Some people say  t h a t  t h e  US should c a l l  o f f  t h e  r e s t  of the  
hydrogen bomb t e s t s  t h a t  have been p lanned.  how do you 
f e e l - - s h o u l d  we c a l l  o f f  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  t e s t s ,  o r  should we go 
ahead wi th  them? (AIPO 529K) 
C a l l  o f f  
Go ahead 
No opin ion  
1/1955 Do you t h i n k  the  United S t a t e s  should con t inue  i t s  hydrogen 
bomb t e s t s ,  o r  should we s t o p  them now? (NORC 366) ( s e e  
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1/1955 Here ' s  a  l i s t  o f  t o p i c s  t h a t  have been i n  t h e  pape r s  l a t e l y .  
During t h e  l a s t  week o r  s o ,  have you t a l k e d  abou t  any of t h e s e  
t h i n g s  w i t h  your f r i e n d s ?  (NORC 366) ( m u l t i p l e  answers;  d a t a  
n o t  p r e s e n t e d  i n  o r d e r  a sked )  
Danger o f  World War I11 
Crime and j u v e n i l e  de l inquency  
Communists i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  
Atom o r  hydrogen bombs 
No, None of  them, Don' t  know 
3/1955 Do you t h i n k  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  shou ld  con t inue  i t s  hydrogen 
bomb t e s t s ,  o r  should  we s t o p  them now? (NORC 370) ( s e e  
r e p e a t e d  q u e s t i o n s )  
Continue 
S top  
Don ' t Know 
3/1955 (Those 80% who answered con t inue  were then  asked)  Do you t h i n k  
i t  would be  a  good i d e a ,  o r  a  bad i d e a ,  i f  a l l  c o u n t r i e s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  Russ ia  and t h e  United S t a t e s ,  would s i g n  an  agreement 
t o  s t o p  any f u r t h e r  H-bomb t e s t s ?  (NORC 370) ( s e e  r e p e a t e d  
q u e s t i o n s )  
Good i d e a  
Bad i d e a  
Don' t Know 
3/1955 How much i n t e r e s t  do you t ake  i n  . . . - -  a g r e a t  d e a l  of  
i n t e r e s t ,  some i n t e r e s t ,  o r  p r a c t i c a l l y  none? (NORC 370) ( d a t a  
n o t  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  o r d e r  a sked )  
A .  The Uni ted  Nations o r g a n i z a t i o n ?  20 59 19 2 
B .  Our r e l a t i o n s  wi th  C e n t r a l  and 
South America? 23 42 32 3 
C .  The rearmament of  Germany? 29 44 24 3 
D .  The Formosa s i t u a t i o n ?  36 4 1  20 3 
E .  The h v d r o ~ e n  bomb t e s t s ?  46 4 1  11 2 
3/1955 s e e  Repeated Ques t ions  (AIPO 544) 
2/1956 Do you t h i n k  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  should  con t inue  i t s  hydrogen 
bomb t e s t s ,  o r  shou ld  we s t o p  them now? (NORC 382) ( s e e  
r e p e a t e d  q u e s t i o n s )  
Continue 
S top  
Don' t Know 
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2/1956 (Those 83% who answered con t inue  were then  asked)  Do you t h i n k  
i t  would be a  good i d e a ,  o r  a bad i d e a ,  i f  a l l  c o u n t r i e s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  Russ ia  and t h e  United S t a t e s ,  would s i g n  a n  agreement 
t o  s t o p  any f u r t h e r  H-Bomb t e s t s ?  (NORC 382) ( s e e  r e p e a t e d  
q u e s t i o n s )  
Good i d e a  
Bad i d e a  
Don' t Know 
6/1956 See Repeated Ques t ions  (RCOM 63) 
9/1956 s e e  Repeated Ques t ions  (RCOM 64) 
10/1956 Now a  q u e s t i o n  about  t h e  hydrogen bomb. Have you hea rd  o r  r ead  
any th ing  about  Ad la i  S tevenson ' s  p roposa l  t h a t  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  t a k e  t h e  l e a d  i n  o f f e r i n g  t o  s t o p  any f u r t h e r  hydrogen 









10/1956 Some people  s a y  t h a t  t h e  US should  c a l l  o f f  Hydrogen Bomb t e s t s  




No op in ion  
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10/1956a A. Of course, there are lots of problems and issues in this 
years presidential campaign, but which one are you personally 
most concerned about? (RCOM 65) 
B. Are there any other problems or issues that are also 
important to you? (RCOM 65) (data not presented in order asked) 
Maintaining peace; keeping us out of war 
H-bomb issue. testing of nuclear weaDons 
Farm problem 
Segregation/Integration, racial issues 
civil rights 
Foreign affairs 
Electing the right candidate 
Taxes 
Economic, business welfare, prosperity 
Draft issue 
Education, improving schools 
High cost of living, inflation 
Labor problems, Taft-Hartley law 
Higher wages 
Social security 
Nixon, Ike's health 
10/1956b See Repeated Questions (RCOMa-c 68) 
11/1956 As you may know, Adlai Stevenson proposed that the US take the 
lead in oifering to stop any further hydrogen bomb tests, 
assuming Russia and England will do the sane. In general, do 
you approve or disapprove of this idea? (NORC 399) 
Approve 
Disapprove 
Don' t know 
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11/1956 Now on a different subject. The question of hydrogen-bomb 
tests has been discussed quite a bit in the election campaign 
this Fall. Do you think our government should or should not 
continue making H-bomb tests? (Minn 154A&B) 
Should Continue 
Should Not continue 
No opinion 
Other 
11/1956 Is the H-bomb test matter one of the major election issues this 
fall, as far as you personally are concerned, or not? (Minn 
154A&B) 
Yes, it is a major election issue 
No, it is not a major election issue 
No opinion 
11/1956 In the debate over H-bomb testing, do you agree more with Adlai 
Stevenson, or ulore with Eisenhower? (Minn 154A6B) 
Agree with Stevens~n 
Agree with Eisenhower 
No opinion 
Other 
Russia had proposed that all nations with atomic weapons call a 
halt to any further tests of H-bombs or A-bombs, for an 
indefinite period. If we agree to stop the tests, do you think 
we could count on Russia's halting her tests, or not? (MINN 
160) 
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4/1957 In the next set of questions I would like to ask about science 
stories you may have read or heard about. Just so we are thinking 
of the same things, let me tell you what I have in mind when I 
speak of science. It includes everything scientists discover 
about nature- it would be the discoveries about the stars, or 
atoms, about the human body or the mind- any basic discovery about 
how things work and why. But science also includes the way in 
which this information is used for practical uses- it might be a 
new way of curing a disease, the invention of a new auto engine, 
or making a new fertilizer. 
Here are some examples of science stories that you might see or 
hear about. As I read each one, would you tell me how interested 
you would be in reading or hearing such a story- very much 
interested, somewhat interested, or not very interested? (ISR 4 2 3 )  
(data not presented in the order asked) 
Very Some- Not NA 
much what very 
a New ways of treating disease/can 
science protect you against 7 0 
heart disease 
e The causes of depressions and hard 
times in the United Stateshow you can 
protect your family against hart times 6 3 
c The effects of atomic bombs on human 
beings/will atom bomb tests affect 
your health 6 0 
i New scientific ways to prepare food/ 
food that won't ever spoil 50 
g The psychology of how to raise 
children/will today's children be 
smarter than their parents 4 4 
d How molecules are held together/new 
chemical cheory doubles mileage 2 9 
of gasoline 
f The discovery of ancient 
civilization/discovery of ruins 
confirms Biblical story of Ruth 2 7 
h Rocket ships and space travel/test of 
new rocket for first flight to moon 
announced 2 2 
b The discovery of a new star/newly 
discovered star gives clue to how 
world began 19 
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4/1957 Have you heard of radioactive fallout or dust from atomic 
bombs? As you understand it, what is radioactivity like? (ISR 
423) 
Yes, but only misinformation 2 
Yes, but no answer or don't know what 1 2  
Yes, vague statements 2 5 
Yes, non-technical facts 2 1 
Yes, more or less technical facts 6 
No, not heard anything about radioactive fallout 3 3 
No answer 1 
4/1957 Have you heard or rsad anything about the "fallout" of 




4/1957 Do you think there is recl danger from "fallout" of 
radio-active matter from the testing of H-bombs and A-bombs now 




4/1957 If all other nations, including Russia, agreed to stop making 
anymore tests with nuclear weapons and H-bombs, should the US 
agree to stop, or not? (AIPO 532K) 
Should agree to stop 
Should not 
No opinion 
7/1957a Do you think it is time to call another meeting, such as the 
Geneva conference two years ago, to discuss world disarmament? 




7/1957a I f  such a conference is held, would you like to have Eisenhower 
suggest a ban on H-bomb tests among all nations, including the 
United States and Russia? (AIPO 585k) 
Yes, would 
No, would not 
No opinion 
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7/1957b Do you favor  o r  oppose s topp ing  hydrogen bomb t e s t s  a t  t h i s  
time? (AIPO 586K) 
Favor 
Q u a l i f i e d  f avor  
Oppose 
Q u a l i f i e d  oppose 
No opin ion  
7/1957b Some a u t h o r i t i e s  say  t h a t  any new bombs t h a t  w i l l  be t e s t e d  
would have l e s s  and l e s s  r a d i o a c t i v e  " f a l l - o u t . "  Do you t h i n k  
t h i s  is a good argument o r  a  poor argument f o r  con t inu ing  
hydrogen bomb t e s t s ?  (AIPO 586K) 
Good argument 
Poor 
No opin ion  
7/1957b Some a u t h o r i t i e s  say  t h a t  t h e  t e s t i n g  of hydrogen bombs must be 
cont inued i f  we a r e  t o  develop n u c l e a r  power f o r  peaceful  
u s e s .  Do you t h i n k  t h i s  i s  a good argument o r  a  poor argument 
f o r  con t inu ing  hydrogen bomb t e s t s ?  (AIPO 586K) 
Good argument 
Poor 
No opin ion  
7/1957 The Russians have proposed t h a t  a l l  n a t i o n s  agree  t o  s t o p  a l l  
hydrogen and atomic bomb t e s t s  f o r  two o r  t h r e e  y e a r s ,  and have 
o f f e r e d  a p l a n  t o  supe rv i se  t h e  agreement t o  make s u r e  i t ' s  n o t  
broken. Do you yourse l f  f e e l ,  now, t h a t  we can count on Russia 
t o  l i v e  up t o  such an  agreement,  o r  t h a t  we cannot? ( M I N N  162) 
Feel  we can 
Feel  we cannot  
No opin ion  
Other  
1/1958b I n  a  r e c e n t  note  t o  t h e  US, Bulganin,  t h e  Russian Prime 
M i n i s t e r ,  made t h e s e  sugges t ions  t o  improve re1,at ions between 
t h e  Eas t  and West. Do you t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  US and i t s  Western 
a l l i e s  should  o r  should n o t  ag ree .  . . To ban atomic and 
hydrogen weapon t e s t s  f o r  a t  l e a s t  2 t o  3 y e a r s  i f  Russia  a l s o  
ag rees?  (AIPO 594K) 
Should 
Should n o t  
No opinion  
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3/1958 Some people t h i n k  the  A-bomb and H-bomb t e s t s  i n  d i f f e r e n t .  
p a r t s  of t h e  world a l r eady  have made c e r t a i n  changes i n  the  
weather .  Other people d i s a g r e e .  What is your op in ion-  Do you 
t h i n k  bomb t e s t s  have o r  have n o t  had an e f f e c t  on t,he weather? 
(MINN 169) ( s e e  6/53 and 2/1963 f o r  s i m i l a r  q u e s t i o n s )  
Have e f f e c t  
Have n o t  
No op in ion  
4/1958 Do you t h i n k  t h e  United S t a t e s  should s t o p  making t e s t s  wi th  
n u c l e a r  weapons and H-bombs? (AIPO 598K) 
Yes 
N 0 
No opin ion  
4/1958 Have you heard  o r  read anyth ing  about  t h e  " f a l l o u t "  of 
r a d i o - a c t i v e  matter i n  H-bomb t e s t s ?  (AIPO 598K) ( s e e  repeated  




4/1958 I f  t hese  t e s t s  a r e  no t  s topped,  do you t h i n k  " f a l l o u t "  i s  





5/1958 Our government has  scheduled a s e r i e s  of hydrogen-bomb t e s t s  
o u t  i n  t h e  P a c i f i c  t h i s  y e a r ,  b u t  s i n c e  R u s s i a ' s  l a t e s t  
proposal  t h a t  a l l  n a t i o n s  c a l l  a  h a l t  t o  H-bomb t e s t i n g ,  some 
people t h i n k  we should s t i l l  cance l  our  t e s t s .  Other  people 
t h i n k  we should s t i l l  c a r r y  o u t  our  p l a n s .  What i s  your 
opin ion-  do you t h i n k  our government should make t h e  t e s t s ,  o r  
cance l  them? (MINN 170) 
Should make t e s t s  6 2  
Cancel them 24 
No opin ion  11 
Cancel them i f  we're  s u r e  Russia w i l l  keep h e r  
agreement 3 
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5/1958 (Asked of those 88% who expressed an opinion) For what reason, 
mainly? (MINN 170) 
(Those who favored holding the tests) 
Don't know why; no special reason 
We must be prepared; we need a good defense 
Russia can't be trusted 
Russia has completed her tests; Russia is ahead of us 
We must keep up with advances in science 
We should experiment for a "cleaner bomb" 
We must keep up with Russia 
We should make 0v.r own decisions, go ahead with our 
own ~lans 
Other 
(Those in favor of cancelling the tests) 
Don't know why; no special reason 4 
There's too much danger of fallout; harmful to 
nature, people's health 4 4 
The tests effect the weather, disturb the elements 6 
We should strive to cooperate; we're tempting 
Russia to war 1 3  
I disapprove of the H-bomb; atomic warfare should 
be outlawed 10 
Spending a lot of money; too expensive 7 
Other 1 5  
7/1958 (Elite poll) Should the U.S. halt testing? (approximate 
question wording) (Gallup) 
Should not halt: testing 
Should halt testing, even if unilateral 
Approve halt testing in principle if get 
assurances from the Russians 
9/1958 The United States and Great Britain are going to meet this Fall 
with Russia to talk about putting an end to atom-bomb and 
Hydrogen-bomb testing. Do you feel the three countries will or 
will noc succeed in reaching an agreement to stop the tests? 
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9/1958 (Asked of those 88% who expressed an opinion) Why do you feel 
that way? ( M Z N N  174) 
(T~oss 21% who said WILL succeed) 
We have to succeed; it's either success or complete 
destruction 6 3 
Russia is getting more cooperating; even Russia 
wants to avoid war 17 
Other 12 
Don' t know 8 
(Those 67% who said will NOT succeed) 
Russia won't agree; Russia will stop all agreement; 
the 3 countries won't agree 64 
Russia can't be trusted; they will agree but won't 
follow through 16 
None of the countries really wants to stop; 
the 3 countries don't trust each other 9 
Other 8 
Russia (no further explanation) 1 
DOE' t know 3 
9/1958 What would you say we gain by continuing our A-bomb and H-bomb 
tests? (MINN 174) 
Scientific knowledge in general; find out new things 2 5 
!lothing will be gained 2 3 
Improve weapons for war/defense; protect our country 2 2 
Keep ahead/up to Russia 12 
Develop peacetime uses for nuclear power 5 
Other 1 
Don ' t know 11 
2/1959- What do you think is the most important problem facing this 
9/1959 couctry today? (AIPO 610, 612, 616, 618) 
2/59 4/59 7/59 c / 5 9  
Nuclear testing, danger 
from atomic explosions 1 1 1 3 
Appendix 6 - 376 - 
11/1959 The United States and Russia have made an agreement to stop 
testing H-bombs until the end of this year. Would you like to 




3/1960 For more than a year our government has not carried out any 
A-b~mb or H-bomb tests, nor set off any nuclear explosions. Do 
you feel there would be advantages in our STARTING again to 
carry out nuclear tests? What advantages? (MINN 190) 
Advantages 
Disadvantages 
No; no advantages; none 2 5 
Con only learn by testing; tests are necessary 
to find out how much progress is being mado; can't 
make improvements uvless you know what's wrong 8 
Keep up with Russia; keep up with other countries 7 
Other 1 
Don' t know 8 
3/1960 Do you feel there would be disadvantages if we were to start 
nuclesr tests again? What disadvantages? (MINN 190) 
Fall-out; radio-activity; dangerous to our health 15 
No; no disadvantages; none 12 
Waste of money; too expensive 5 
Other countries would lose fsith in us; we'd 
lose allies; it would anger others; world 
opinion would he against i.t 5 
Other countries wuuld also start testing 4 
Affects the weather; bad effect on the weather 1 
Dangerous, scary, damaging 1 
Other 1 
Don ' t know 7 
3/1960 Taking everything into account, do you yourself think it would 
be a good idea or a poor tdea for the United States to start 
making nuclear tests again this year? (MINN 190) 
Good idea 2 8 
Poor idea 5 1 
No opinion 18 
Should start tests again, only if ocner countries do 2 
Other 1 
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1/1961 Two yehrs  ago,  t h e  United S t a t e s  s topped i t s  t e s t i n g  of nuc lea r  
weapons-- t h e  A-bomb and H-bomb-- i n  t h e  hope of  workitkg o u t  a  
t r e a t y  wi th  Russia t o  cance l  a l l  such t e s t s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
However, no t r e a t y  has  y e t  been s igned .  I n  view of  t h a t ,  do 
you f e e l  t h e  United S t a t e s  should o r  should  n o t  resume t e s t s  of 
n u c l e a r  weapons t h i s  year?  (MINN 201) 
Should 
Should n o t  
No op in ion  
0 t h e r  
S ince  November, 1958, t h e  US and Russia have been t r y i n g  t o  
reach  a  permanent agreement on t h e  c o n t r o l  and i n s p e c t i o n  of 
nuc lea r  bomb t e s t s .  During t h i s  pe r iod  each count ry  
v o l u n t a r i l y  agreed  n o t  t o  conduct any t e s t s ,  b u t  no permanent 
agreement has  been reached.  Do you t h i n k  t h e  US should resume 
t e s t s  a t  t h i s  t jme ,  o r  not?  (AIPO 647K) 
Snould resume t e s t s  
Should no t  
No opin ion  
Over two y e a r s  ago,  t h e  United S t a t e s  s topped i t s  t e s t i n g  of 
t h e  A-bomb and H-bomb, and o t h e r  n u c l e a r  weapons i n  t h e  hope of 
working ouc a  t r e a t y  wi th  Russia t o  cance l  a l l  such t e s t s  i n  
the  f u t u r e .  However, no c r e a t y  has  y e t  been s igned .  I n  view 
of t h a t ,  do you f e e l  the  United S t a t e s  should  o r  should n o t  
resume t e s t s  of nuc lea r  weapons t h i s  year?  (MINN 206) 
Should 
Should n o t  
No opin ion  
Other 
(Asked i n  New York, Chicago & Los Angeles) Whst do you t h i n k  
:.le U.S. should do now- s t a r t  tests a g a i n ,  o r  con t inue  h e r  
ban on H-bomb t e s t s ?  (Gallup)  
3 US c ~ t i e s  
Great  Br! t a i n  
New Delhi  
Fav9 r Oppose No opin ion  
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9/1961 (Asked i n  New York, Chicago & Los Angeles) Do you th ink  t h a t  
r e c e n t  American a c t i o n s  a r e  o r  a r e  n o t  i n  any way t o  blame f o r  
Russia resuming t e s t s ?  (Gallup s p e c i a l )  
Considerably A L i t t l e  Not a t  A l l  No 
t o  blame t o  blame t o  blame Opinion 
3 US c i t i e s  5 
Great  B r i t a i n  16 
New Delhi  2 6 
9/1961 A f t e r  going more than two yea r s  without  t e s t i n g  nuc lea r  bombs, 
Russia r e c e n t l y  began such t e s t s  aga in .  Why do you t h i n k  Russia 
d i d  so? (MINN 208) ( d a t a  no t  presented  i n  o rde r  ob ta ined)  
To f r i g h t e n  o r  b l u f f  u s ;  t o  make us  t h i n k  they a r e  
more powerful than they a r e  2 8 
Propaganda e f f e c t ;  t o  remind the  world of t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  
power; t o  prove t h e j r  s t r e n g t h ;  t o  show o f f  19 
To c a t c h  up wi th  the  U S ;  they thought they were behind 
so  had t o  c a t c h  up;  w a n ~ e d  t o  g e t  ahead of us  1 7  
To t e s t  and p e r f e c t  t h e i r  weapons; they had a l a r g e  
s t o c k p i l e  of  weapons and needed t o  t e s t  t h e i r  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  1 2  
Cold War maneuver; t o  c r e a t e  t ens ion ;  t o  f r i g h t e n  smal l e r /  
n e u t r a l  nations i n t o  s i d i n g  wi th  Russ ia ;  t o  ga in  i n  
B e r l i n  c r i s i s  8 
To prepare  f o r  war 6 
They have bee11 t e s t i n g  a l l  a long ,  making underground t e s t s  2 
Other 5 
Don' t know 12 
The United S t a t e s  began t e s t i n g  nuc lea r  weapons aga in  soon 






11/1961 Russia has  been t e s t i n g  nuc lea r  bombs i n  the  atmosphere above 
ground, while t h e  US has  been t e s t i n g  underground. Do you 
t h i n k  t h e  US should o r  should no t  s t a r t  t e s t s  i n  t h e  
atmosphere? (AIPO 652K) 
Should 
Should n o t  
No opinion 
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11/1961 Mr. Khrushchev has s a i d  t h a t  he w i l l  ag ree  t o  a ban on t h e  
t e s t i n g  of  H-bombs i f  t h a t  ban is p a r t  of  a  program f o r  t o t a l  
disarmament. Do you t h i n k  Mr. Khrushchev i s  b l u f f i n g  o r  do you 
t h i n k  he s i n c e r e l y  wants t o t a l  disarmament? (AIPO 652K) 
B l u f f i n g  
Wants t o t a l  disarmament 
DK 
11/1961 A s  you probably know, f a l l o u t  i s  r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t t e r  than  comes 
from t h e  t e s t i n g  of n u c l e a r  bombs i n  t h e  atmosphere. Do you 
t h i n k  t h e r e  i s  enough f a l l o u t  i n  t h e  a i r  r i g h t  now t o  be a 
danger t o  people ,  o r  not?  (AIPO 652K) 
Yes 
N 0 
No opin ion  
1 1 1 9 1  What do you t h i n k  a r e  t h e  e f f e c t s  of f a l l o u t  on human beings?  
(AIPO 652K) ( d a t s  n o t  presented  i n  o rde r  o b t a i n e d )  
Causes d i s e a s e ,  s i c k n e s s ,  s t e r i l i z a t i o n  
W i l l  e f f e c t  f u t u r e  g e n e r a t i o n s ,  misformed c h i l d r e n  
Causes cance r ,  leukemia 
W i l l  be disastrous, t h e r e  would be no one l e f t  a l i v e  
No e f f e c t s  
W i l l  r u i n  t h e  land s o  food would be ru ined 
Make children's bones s ~ f t  
Fea r ,  pan ic  
Miscel laneous 
No opin ion  
11/1561 Have your f e a r s  about  nuc lea r  war o r  f a l l o u t  had any e f f e c t  on 
your out look on l i f e  o r  your p lans  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e ?  ( A I P O  652K) 
Yes, i n  what ways 
N 0 
No answer 
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11/1961 (Asked of the 15% who answered that fallout has had an effect 
on their outlook) In what way? (AIPO 552k) (data not presented 
in the order obtained) 
Dread, fear, general 
Shelters: planning to, thinking about, building a 
fallout shelter; making changes in home to 
protect against nuclear attack 
Don't have any plans; it is hard to plan for 
the future; I can't make any plans at this time 
Pessimistic outlook; I think "What's the use?" 
I don't know whether or not I will wake up 
alive each day 
Future generations, children growing up, worry 
about children growing up, fear of their future 
Live life fully; eat, drink and be merry; I try to 
get all I can from life each day, appreciate and 
live life to the full 
Moving: thinking of moving away to another state 
or to the beach; getting out of this area 
Bringing children into the works; thinking about, 
afraid to bring children into the world; will cut 
down on our family 
Will not live; I think I wiil not be able to live 
out my full life 
Miscellaneous 
Don't know/no answer 
11/1961 How do you feel &out the United States resuming nuclear bomb 
testing in the atmosphere. Do you think the U.S. should resume 





11/1961 (Asked of those 55% who answered should resume testing ) Why do 
you feel this uay? (IOWA/IAPO i66) (data not presented in order 
obtained) 
Should keep up with other countries 
Russia has been testing 
For our own protection 
Improve our own knowledge of bomb 
Other 
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11/1961 (Asked of those 32% who answered should n c t  resume t e s t i n g )  Why 
do you f e e l  t h i s  way? (IOWA/IAPO 166) (da t a  not  presented i n  
order  obta ined)  
Fear danger e x i s t s  i n  t z s t i n g  ( f s l l o u t )  3 6 
Test ing is not necessary 2 1 
I f  we d o n ' t ,  o thers  might q u i t  15  
Too much expense involved 9 
Test ing should be done underground 5 
Other 14 
11/1961 I f  t he  United S t a t e s  resumes nuclear  bomb t e s t i n g ,  do you f e e l  
the re  w i l l  be more chance o r  l e s s  chance of war i n  the  fu ture?  




12/1961 Congress begins a new sess ion  i n  January.  What problem would 
you l i k e  t o  see Congress deal  with f i r s t ?  ( M I N N  210) ( d a t a  not 
presented i n  order asked) 
Peace 
The farm problem 
Economic problems i n  U.S. 
Taxation 
Old age a s s i s t ance  
School p ro t len~s  
Nuclear weapons- atom bornb tescine, 
Mi l i t a ry  defense 
C iv i l  defense 
C iv i l  r i g h t s  
Foreign a i d  
Red i s t r i c t i ng  
Be t te r  con t ro l  over welfare bene f i t s  
Other 
Don't know 
1/1962 Last  f a l l  Russia resumed t e s t i n g  of nuclear bombs with a s e r i e s  
of t e s t s  i n  the atmosphere (above ground). The US then resumed 
t e s t i n g  of nuclear bombs, but  a l l  of the  t e , i t s  have been 
underground. Do you think the  US should o r  should not resume 
t e s t s  i n  the atmosphere? (AIPO 654 KB) 
Should 
Should not  
No opinion 
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3/1962 Here is a question about the resumption of nuclear bomb tests 
in the atmosphere (above ground). What is your opinion--do you 
think the US should or should not resume tests in the 




4/1962 How do you feel about the United States resuming nuclear bomb 
testing in the atmosphere. Do you think the U.S. should resume 




4/1962 (Asked of those 61% who answered should) Why do you feel this 
way? (IOWA/IAPO 167) (data not presented in order obtained) 
Should keep up with other countries 
Russia has been testing 
For our own protection 
lmprove our own knowledge of bomb 
4/1962 (Asked of those 23% who answered should not resume testing) Why 
do ycu feel this way? (IOWA/IAPO 167) {data not presented in 
order obtained) 
Fear danger exists in testing (fallout) 
Too m c h  expense involved 
Testitlg is not necessary 
If we don't, others might quit 
Testing should be done underground 
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11/1962 - Of the many problems facing this country, which one gives 
12/1962 you the greatest worry or concern at this time? (AIPO 665, 
666) (data not presented in the order obtained) 
The Cubaa situation 
Threat of war, cold war, atomic war 
Russia 
Threat of Communism 
Economic problems, inflation, high taxes 
Berlin situation 










Don't know/no answer 
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2/1963 Some people t h i n k  t h e  A-bomb and H-bomb t e s t s  a r e  changing t h e  
weather .  Other  people say  t h e  bomb t e s t s  have no r e a l  e f f e c t  
on t h e  weather .  What is your op in ion -  Do you t h i n k  t h e  bomb 
t e s t s  a r e  o r  a r e  n o t  changing t h e  weather? (MINN 221) ( s e e  
s i m i l a r  q u e s t i o n  3/1958) 
Are changing 
Are n o t  
No op in ion  
Other  
3/1963 Have you hea rd  o r  r ead  about  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  r ega rd ing  t h e  
banning o r  p r o h i b i t i n g  o f  n u c l e a r  weapon t e s t s ?  (AIPO 569K) 
Yes 
No 
3/1963 (Asked of t hose  72% who answered yes)  Do you t h i n k  t h e  day 
w i l l  come when we have a n u c l e a r  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  wi th  Russ i a ,  
o r  no t?  (AIPO 669k) 
Yes 
N 0 
3/1963 (Asked of  those  49% who answered y e s )  When do you t h i n k  t h i s  
w i l l  b e - - w i t h i n  one y e a r ,  w i t h i n  t e n  y e a r s ,  o r  l r ~ t e r  than  t h i s ?  
(AIPO 669k) 
Within 1 
Within 10  
L a t e r  
Don' t know 
3/1963 I f  a t e s t  ban t r e a t y  were p u t  i n t o  e f f e c t ,  do you t h i n k  Russia  
would l i v e  up t o  h e r  p a r t  of  t h e  agreement ,  o r  n o t ?  (AIPO 669) 
Yes 
N 0 
No opinion/no answer 
7/1963 See Repeated Quest ions ( H a r r i s )  
8/1963 On t h e  nex t  s u b j e c t ,  have you hea rd  o r  r ead  about  t h e  adreement 
wi th  Russ ia  t o  have a p a r t i a l  ban on t h e  t e s t i n g  of  n u c l e a r  
weapons? (AIPO 676K) 
Yes 
No 
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8/1963 (Asked of those 77% who had heard or read about the agreement) 
Do you think the Senate should vote approval of this ban, or 
not? (AIPO 676k) 
Yes, should 
No, should not 
No opinion 
8/1963 (Those 63% who answered that the treaty should be approved by 
the Senate were asked) Why do you say this? (AIPO 676k) (data 
not presented in order obtained) 
A move toward peace, a first step, may break tensions 
become friendlier, may lead to other agreements 
Atmosphere has become contaminated, too much fallout 
Don't approve of nuclear bombs or testing 
Approve, but I don't trust Russians; must be cautious 
There has been too much testing already; bomb 
already big enough, effective enough; nuclear 
weapons spreading too East, dangerous 
May be able to get all nations to comply, stop 
spread of weapons 
Approve, but must not reduce our safety, military 
preparedness 
Approve, but Senate should study carefully 
~iscellaneous 
Don; t know/no answer 
8/1963 (Those 17% who answered no) Why do you say this? (AIPO 676k) 
(data not presented in order obtained) 
Don' t trust Russians, they are unreliable, their 
word is not good 6 0 
It's in Russia's favor, noti ours; to her 
advantage not ours 7 
It's in Russia's favor, not ours; to her 
advantage not ours 7 
Should be prepared for war; treaty will reduce 
preparedness 5 
Miscellaneol~s 20 
Don't know/no answer 7 
8/1963 (Those 20% who answered No opinion) Why do you say this? (AIPO 
676k) (data not presented in order obtained) 
Can't trust the Russians 8 
I haven't had an opportunity to study; not well 
enough informed yet to state an opinion 5 
Miscellaneous 5 
No answer/No opinion 8 2 
Appendix 6  - 386 - 
8/1963 The United S t a t e s ,  Great  B r i t a i n ,  and the  Sovie t  Union have 
signed a  t r e a t y  i n  which each country agrees  no t  t o  t e s t  
nuc lea r  weapons i n  t h e  a i r ,  under water ,  o r  i n  outex space .  Do 
you th ink  the  t e s t  b ~ n  w i l l  cr w i l l  not  s t r eng then  'world peace? 
(MINN 2 2 6 )  
W i l l  
W i l l  n o t  
No opinion 
Depends on Russia;  r e se rva t ions  about Russia 
8/1963 I n  p a s t  y e a r s ,  Russia worlld no t  accept  t h e  terms t o  s t o p  
nuc lea r  t e s t i n g  t h a t  she does now. Why 60 you th ink  Russia was 
w i l l i n g  t o  s i g n  such a  t r e a t y  a t  t h i s  time? (MINN 226)  ( d a t a  
no t  presented i n  the  order  ob ta ined)  
Russia is a f r a i d  of Red China; wants West t o  be 
on h e r  s i d e  a g a i n s t  China 2 8 
Russia c a n ' t  be t r u s t e d ,  has u l t e r i o r  motiVves; 
is us ing t h i s  r r e a t y  t o  have own advantage some way; 
wants t o  put  up good f r o n t ;  wants t o  r e l a x  west 
temporar i ly ;  i s  s t a l l i n g  f o r  time 18 
Russia th inks  US i s  ahead of h e r ;  i s  a f r a i d  US has 
more weapons 15 
Russia d o e s n ' t  bant  war, wants t o  be f r i e n d s  with US 1 2  
Russia has done a l l  t h e  t e s t i n g  she needs t o  do;  
has a l l  the  information she wants 9 
Domestic problems: a g r i c u l t u r e ,  Khrushchev is i n  t roub le  
a t  tome, economy i s  s t r a i n e d  3 
Increased r a d i o a c t i v i t y ;  concerned about f a l l o u t  2 
Russia is  a f r a i d  1 
Other 5 
I)cn' t !<now 1 7  
8/1963 Any of the  coun t r i e s  s i g n i ~ g  the  t r e a t y - -  inc luding the  
United S t a t e s . -  can drop o u t  of  the  t r e a t y  by g iv ing  t h r e e  
months n o t i c e  t o  the  s t h e r  s i g n e r s .  Do you l i k e  o r  d i s l i k e  
t h a t  provis ion?  ( I I INN 2 2 6 )  
Like i t  
Dis l ike  it 
No opinion 
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8,4963 As far as the United States is concerned, the treaty still must 
be approved by the U.S. Senate before it becomes formally 
effective. Do you think the Senate should approve the treaty, 




8/1963 Of all the things that have happened during his first term 
in office, which do you think will help to win votes for 
President Kennedy in the 1964 election? (MINN 226) 
Which of the things that happened in his first term do you 
think will take votes away from President Kennedy in the 
1964 election? (MINN 226) (items in parenthesis are the 
negative versions) 
Help Hurt 
Civil rights; his stand on integration 18 3 0 
Cuba; stood up to the Russians in Cuba; 
(Bay of Pigs invasion) 17 18 
Nuclear test ban treaty 10 1 
Peace; easing of tension with Russia; good 
relations with other countyies 6 
Nothing; he won't win any more votes 
than he did in 1960; (won't loose votcs) 6 8 
Medicare; attempts to pass old-age 
hospitalization bill; concerned for old 
people; (Socialized medicine) 3 1. 
Tax cut 3 
Personality; young, eager, religious, 
sincere, family man; (too much publicity 
about family) 3 1 
Strong leadership; decisive, effective; 
(weak leadership; indecisive; can't put 
his programs across) 2 2 
Goodwill tour; traveling; meeting people 2 
Labor policies; has helped laboring class, 
poor people, less unemployment; helped settle 
strikes; (interference in dS steel dispute) 2 2 
Separation of church and state; has not shown 
favoritism to his religion; (being Catholic) 1 2 
Vague 1 * 
Too many Kennedy's in office 2 
(Farm program) 2 
(Spending too much money) 4 
Other 8 6 
Don't know; can't think of anything 19 2 2 
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9/1963 See Repeated Quest ions ( H a r r i s )  
10/1963 The United S t a t e s ,  Great  B r i t a i n  and t.he Sov ie t  Union have 
s igned  a  t r e a t y  i n  which each count ry  ag rees  n o t  t o  t e s t  
nuc lea r  weapons i n  t h e  a i r ,  under w a t e r ,  o r  i n  o u t e r  space .  Do 
you t h i n k  t h e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  w i l l  o r  w i l l  n o t  s t r e n g t h e n  world 
peace? (IOWA/IAPO 172 
W i l l  
W i l l  n o t  
No opin ion  
10/1963 Do you favor  o r  oppose t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  s i g n i n g  t h e  nuc lea r  
t e s t  ban t r e a t y  t h a t  p r o h i b i t s  t e s t i n g ?  (IOWA/IAPO 2 7 2 )  
Favor 6 9 
Oppose 13  
No opin ion  18 
10/1963 (Asked of  those  69% who favored  t h e  t r e a t y )  Why do you f e e l  
t h i s  way? (IOWA/IAPO 172) ( d a t a  n o t  p resen ted  i n  the  o rde r  
ob ta ined)  
Promote world peace 
Should e l i m i n a t e  a l l  nuc lea r  weapons 
El iminate  f a l l o u t  
Prevent  war 
Shows U.S. i.s l e a d e r  i n  world peace 
Have enough informat ion  about  nuc lea r  weapons 
Spend money f o r  o t h e r  worth while  t h i n g s  
B e n e f i c i a l  t o  U .  S  . 
Other 
10/1963 (Asked of chose 1 3 %  who opposed t h e  t r e a t y )  Why do you f e e l  
t h i s  way? (IOWA/IAPO 172) ( d a t ~  n o t  p resen ted  i n  t h e  o rde r  
o b t a i n e d )  
Don't t r u s t  Russia  
U.S. must be prepared  
I n d e f i n i t e  
U.S. should cont inue  t o  t e s t  
Won't do any good 
Miscel laneous 
Other  
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11/1963 Are there any accomplishments of the Ke~rnedy administration 
which are important to you? What are they? (ORC 466G) 
No accomplishments 3 6 
Aid tu the aged 6 
Civil Rights 4 
Cuba 4 
Tax-cut efforts 4 
Good economic performance 4 
General approvtil of JFK 4 
Cold War, Communism, Russia & Berlin 2 
Nuclear agreement/test ban 2 
Draft bill/increase military pay 2 
Domestic issues 2 
Other answer 12 
Don't know/No answer 18 
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11/1963 Please tell me whether you think the Kennedy administration is 
doing a very good job, a fairly good job, not so good a job, or 
a poor job on each of these . . . the nuclear test ban treaty? 
(ORC 466G) (data tiot presented in the order asked) 
VG FG NSG P DK 
The Nuclear Test Ban Treatv 
Aid to education 
Handling of strikes and 
labor problems 
Handling of Cuba 
Improving US prestige throughout 
the world 
Providing medical care for aged 
Helping depressed areas in 
this country 
Winning the cold war with Russia 
Dealing with the problem of 
segregation 
Keeping employment high 
Relations w our European allies 
Making country more prosperous 
Developing a good tax program 
Making government more efficient 
Relations with business generally 
Berlin and the Berlin Wall 
Holding down living costs 
Handling of foreign aid 
Handling the country's farm prog 
Assistance on the problems of 
big cities 
Getting the Administration's 
legislative program passed 
by Congress 
Handling the situation in 
Vietnam and Laos 
Balancing the Federal budget 
Reducing the outflow of gold 
from the US 
Holding down unnecessary 
government spending 
a Data for the two categories not so good and poor combined 
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11/1963 Would you please look over this list of issues that we have 
just been through and pick out those that you are most 
concerned about. Just give me the letter. (ORC 466G) (data not 
presented in order obtained} 
Holding down the living costs 
Dealing with the problem of segregation 
Keeping employment high 
Providing medical care for aged 
Developing a good tax program 
Aid to education 
Holding down unnecessary government spending 
Helping depressed areas in this country 
Winning the cold war with Russia 
Handling of Cuba 
Making the country more prosperous 
The Nuclear Test Ban Treatv 
Handling of strikes and labor problems 
Making government more efficient 
Balancing the Federal budget 
Improving US prestige throughout the world 
Handling of foreign aid 
Relations with our European allies 
Reducing the outflow of gold from the US 
Berlin and the Berlin Wall 
Handling the country's farm program 
Handling the situation in Vietnam and Laos 
Relations with business generally 
Getting the Administration's legislative 
program passed by Congress 
Assistance on the problems of big cities 
11/1963 Since Russia agreed to a test ban on atomic testing, some 
people think Khrushchev has become more peace-minded. Do you 
think Russia is now really more for peace than before, or do 
you think there has been no real change? (Harris 1285) 
Really more for peace 
No real change 
Not sure 
11/1963 I want to read you some stands on issues that have been 
identified with Senator Goldwater. Do you tend to agree more 
or disagree more with Senator Goldwater on . . . 
This country should not have signed the test ban treaty with 
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11/1963 How would you rate the job Presidenc Kennedy has done on 
. . . . --excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Harris 
1285) 
a) getting Russia to agree to an atomic test ban; 
b) handling Khrushchev; 
c) working for peace in the world; 
d) standing firm in Berlin; 
e) selling wheat to Russia; 
f) keeping the military defense of the country strong; 
g) (the standard job performance question) 
Excellent 2 7 2 1 2 8 30 14 2 7 18 
Pretty good 3 9 4 2 43 44 3 7 4 9 3 8 
Only fair 14 2 3 18 13 14 13 2 5 
Poor 7 9 5 4 17 8 15 
Not sure 13 5 6 9 17 8 4 
Positive 6 6 6 3 7 1 74 5 1 7 6  5 6 
Negative 2 1 3 2 2 3 17 3 1 2 1 4 0 
12/1963 A few weeks ago Russia and the United States signed an 
agreement about the testing of atom bombs. Did you happen to 
read or hear about that? (ISR 729) 
Yes 
N 0 
Don't know/No answer 
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12/1963 (Asked of the 73% who had heard of the agreement) As you 
understand it, what did they agree to do? (ISR 729) 
Gives evidence of full understanding or knowledge 
of treaty's provisions and makes a specific 
mention that underground testing is not 
included in the treaty 
Gives evidence of full understanding or knowledge 
of treaty's provisions but does NOT mention 
that underground testing is not included 
in the treaty 
Gives evidence of some or fragmentary understanding 
of the treaty and makes a specific mention that 
underground testing is not included 
Gives evidence of some or fragmentary understanding 
of the treaty but does NOT mention that 
underground testing is not included 
Some accurate information, some misinformation 
Gives misinformation; no understanding 
Mentions agreement on controls, inspection only 
Other 
Don ' t know 
12/1963 (Asked of the 73% who had heard of the agreement) Would you 
say it was generally a good idea or a bad idea for our country 
to sign that agreement? (ISR 729) 
Good idea 5 1. 
Good idea with qualifications; on whole more good 
than bad 13 
Pro-con; good in some respects, bad in others 2 
Bad idea with qualifications; more unfavorable than 
favorable aspects 2 
Bad idea 15 
Depends 1 
Don't know/No answer 14 
12/1963 (Asked of the 73% who had heard of the agreement) Some peopie 
think the agreement to stop testing will have a good effect on 
business conditions in this country. Others think it will have 
a bad effect. How about you, do you think it will have any 
effect on business conditions? (ISR 729) 
Good effect 14 
Good effect with qualifications 2 
Pro-con; better is some respects, worse in others 1 
Bad effect with qua.lif ications 1 
Bad effect 5 
Will have no effect on business 5 1 
Don't know/No answer 2 7 
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12,/1963 (Asked of those 19% who answered that it would have a good or 
bad effect? Why is that- what kind of effect? (ISR 729) 
Good effect 
Reduction in tensions, worries, and uncertainties 
as a favorable implicacion for business and 
consumers 
Lower taxes, less government spending 
More consumer spending 
Other good effect 
Bad effect 
Cut in defense spending, fewer jobs 
Increase in unemployment 
Makes business worse 
Other bad effect 
Don't know/No answer 
Let me read you a list of things some people have said they 
remember most about President Kennedy. From this list of 
things, which one or two do you most remember him for . . . ?  
(Harris 832112) 
The missile crisis in Cuba 
The Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba 
His stand on civil rights 
His inauguration speech 
The first Catholic to be elected to the White House 
His winning the 1960 election 
His standing firm on the Russian threat to Berlin 
The way he handled live news conferences 
His starting the Peece Corps 
His negotiating the first nuclear 





9/1984 How much effect, if any, do you think the following 
government actions have had or will have to reduce the 
chance of nuclear war? A great deal, a moderate amount, 
almost no effect? (ABT 4) 
A. Past US-USSR agreement of SALT I banning deployment of 
anti-ballistic missiles 
R. Future ratification of the SAL'I' I1 US-USSR agreement 
slightly reducing the number of offensive nuclear missiles 
C. Past US-USSR agreement not to test nuclear bombs in the 
atmosphere? 
D. Future agreement on a freeze of future testing, 
production or deployment of nuclear weapons? 
E. Past US-USSR agreement of SALT I that placed a cap on 
the number of nuclear missiles each side could build 
F. Future US build-up of our conventional forces to reduce 
dependence on nuclear weapons 
G. Future agreement over no-first-use of nuclear weapons 
H. Future agreement to ban anti-satellite weapons 
I Future agreement to ban chemical weapons 







SALT I off 
SALT I1 
SALT I/ABM 
Great Moderate Almost Don' t know 
Deal Amount No effect No answer 
APPENDIX 7 
Perceptions Concerning Verification of Arms Control Agreements, 
1945 - 1988 
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2/1947- Would you favor international control of atomic energy if it 
10/1949 meant that we had to stop making atomic bombs after the system of 
control had been agreed to and set up? (NORC 148, 152, 170) 
A. We had to stop making atomic bombs? 
B. We had to destroy all the bombs we have on hand? 
C. We, as well as all other countries, had to let United Nations 
inspectors see if each country is living up to its agreements? 
D. We had to place all our atomic factories under the control of 
an international agency? 
E. We had to give the international agency all the information 
it needs about atomic energy? 
2/47 101'47 10/49+ 
Favor Oppose DK Favor Oppose DK Favor Oppose Dk 
+ slight variation in question wording 
3/1958- Would you favor or opprse setting up a worldwide organization 
11/1981 which would make sure, by regular inspections, that no nation, 
including Russia and the United States, makes hydrogen bombs, 




+ slight variation in question wording 
7/1953- Do you think we could count on Russia to live up whatever 





+ variation in question wording and asked of a sub-population 
Appendix 7 
Repeated Questions 
10/1978- For the  pa s t  few years ,  the  United S t a t e s  and Russia have hrd a 
10/1985 po l icy  of t r y ing  t o  reach agreements which w i l l  r e l ax  tensions 
between them. Do you think the  Russians can be t r u s t e d  t o  l i v e  
up t o  such agreements o r  don ' t  you think so? (NBC/AP 33, 
35/107; 40/113; 45/121; NBC/WSJ, NBC/WSJ, NBC/WSJ) 
Can be t r u s t ed  2 1 2 4 2 6 2 1 1 7  
Cannot be t r u s t e d  6 9 6 6 6 4 7 1 74 
Not sure  10 10 10 8 9 
Can be t r u s t ed  2 6 3 2 
Cannot be t r u s t ed  6 4 5 9 
Not sure  10 9 
+ v a r i a t i o n  i n  question wording 
3/1982- I f  the  United S t a t e s  and the  Soviet  Union were t o  reach 
11/1985 agreement on nuclear weapons, do you think the  Soviet  Union 
could be t r u s t ed  t o  keep i t s  p a r t  of the  bargain ,  o r  n o t - - o r  
haven ' t  you heard enough about t h a t  y e t  t o  say? (LAT 51, 58 ,  
93, 100) 
Could be t r u s t ed  1 7  1 7  2 3 24 
Could not be t r u s t ed  66 6 8 6 8 6 6 
Haven't heard enough 9 8 
Not sure  7 7 9 10 
Refused 1 - - 
4/1982- I ' m  going t o  read a few statements t h a t  dea l  with a nuclear 
9/1983 f r eeze .  For each,  I ' d  l i k e  you t o  t e l l  me whether you agree 
with i t ,  o r  d isagree ,  o r  i f ,  perhaps, you have no opinion on 
t h a t  statement.  . . . The Soviet  Union would t r y  t o  cheat  on 







4/1984- Do you believe that the Soviet Union is adhering to or 




5/1984- Because the Soviets will not keep their end of the bargain, we 
7/1988 should not sign any agreements limiting nuclear arms. 
5/84 10/87+ 7/88+ 




+ slight variation in question wording 
1/1985- Do you think it is possible to negotiate a fair arms control 




+ slight variation in question wording 
1/1985- Some people say that, before the US enters into any nuclear 
11/1985 weapons agreement with the Russians, we must have ways to find 
out if they are living up to their part of the bargain, but 
other people say there is no such thing as absolute 
verification and to insist on it would result in no agreement 
at all. To what extent would you be willing to give the 
Russians the benefit of the doubt about complying with a 
nuclear weapons agreement? Would you want to be 100 percent 
certain they were complying, or 75 percent certain, or 50 
percent certain, or would you be willing to give the Russians 
the benefit of the doubt if you were less certain than that? 
(LAT 93, 100) 
100 percent certain 







2/1985- If such an agreement [to limit nuclear weapons] were reached, 
11/1985 do you think the Soviet Union would honor it, or don't you 
chink so? (NBC) 
Would honor 
Would not honor 
Not sure 
10/1985- What is more important to your view-- negotiating new arms 





1/1988- Do you think Gorbachev is a person we can trust a great deal, 
7/1988 somewhat, or not at all? (MOR/ATS, DYG/ATS) 
A great deal 
Somewhat 
Not at all 
Don't know/Refused 
1/1988- Do you think we can trust Gorbachev more, less, or about the 
7/1988 same as past Soviet leaders? (MOR/ATS, DYG/ATS)) 
More 
About the same 
Less 
Don't know/refused 
5/1988- Does the fact that the Soviets are actually withdrawing troops 
8/1988 from Afghanistan - -  after promising to do so - -  make you trilst. 
them more, less, or about the same? (M&K/ATS) 
More 
Less 
About the same 
Not sure (vol) 
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10/1945 Russia has asked this country for a loan of 6 million dollars 
to help Russia get back on its feet. Would you approve or 
disapprove of the United States making such a loan? [28% 
approved, 59% disapproved, 13% no opinion] If we lend Russia 
this money, do you think we will be repaid, in part, in full, 
or not at all? (AIPO 357K6T) 
In part 
In full 
Not at all 
No opinion 
12/1945 It has been suggested that the world organization have 
inspectors who could search any property in any country at any 
time to see if anybody was making atomic bombs. All inspectors 
would work in teams, having one Russian, one Englishman and one 
American working together. Do you think there should be such 
an inspection or not? (NORC T42) 
Should 
Should not 
Don' t know 
12/1945 Do you think the world organization could set up such a system 
of inspection so that it will always be able to tell if any 




3/1946 It has been suggested that the world organization have 
inspectors who could search any property in any country at any 
time to see if anybody was making atomic bombs. All inspectors 
would work in teams, having one Russian, one Englishman, and 
one American working together. Do you think there should be 
such an inspection, or not? (NORC 140) 
Should be 
Should not 
Don' t know 
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3/1946 (asked of those 75% who answered should be) Wou1.d you be 
willing for these inspectors to search American property if it 
meant that they would find out how we make atomic bombs, or 
would that be going to far? (MORC 140) 
Willing 
Going too far 
Don't know 
7/1946 (Asked of those 29% who had heard of the Baruch plan) 
According to the [Baruch] plan, would it still be possible for 
some nation to make atomic bombs secretly? (NORC 143) 
Yes 
No 
Don' t know 
7/1946 (Asked of those 29% who had heard of the Baruch plan) Suppose 
some nation didn't live up to the plan, once it was adopted. 
Would the United Nations have the right to punish that nation 
immediately, or would the country have the right to prevent any 
action against itself? (NORC 143) 
UN could punish 
Country could prevent 
Don' t know 
11/1946 Suppose the United States stopped making Atom Bombs and 
destroyed those already made. Do you think Russia would then 
agree to let a United Nations Committee check to see that 




11/1946 (Asked of those 7 3 %  who agreed the U.S. should reduce the size 
of its army and navy if other countries agree) Would you favor 
or oppose a system of inspection--where a group of inspectors 
from the United Nations organization could go into any country, 
including the US, to see if it actually was keeping down the 
size of its armed forces? (NORC 146) 
Favor 
Oppose 
Don' t know 
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(asked of those 2'1.  who did not favor reducing the army and 
navy) Would you favor such an agreement if al' the 
governments, including the US, agreed to let inspectors from 
the United Nations organization come into their countries to 
see if they actually were keeping down the size of their armed 
forces? (NORC 146) 
Yes, would favor them 
No 
Don' t know 
Do you think all countries would agree to reduce their armed 
forces and to let inspectors in? (NORC 146) 
Yes 
N 0 
Don' t know 
(asked of the 22% who answered yes)  Do you think such an 
inspection system would really work? (NORC 146) 
Yes 
N 0 
Don' t Know 
(Asked those 71% who would favor a mutual reduction in armed 
forces) Would you favor or oppose a system of inspection- 
where a group of inspectors from the United Nations 
organization could go into any country, including the United 
States, to see if it actually was keeping down the size of its 
armed forces? (NORC 147) 
Favor 
Oppose 
Don' t know 
see Repeated Questions (NORC 148) 
see Repeated Questions (NORC 152) 
see Repeated Questions (NORC 170) 
(Asked of those 73% who approved an agreement not to use 
nuclear weapons if other counties don't) If all the countries 
signed such an agreement, do you' think they would live up to 
it, and not use their atomic bombs if war broke out? (NORC 273) 
Yes, they would 
No, they wouldn't 
DK 
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4/1953 Would you f a v o r  o r  oppose a  p l an  f o r  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  
of  atomic energy (atom bombs) which would a l low t h e  UN t o  
i n s p e c t  atomic p l a n t s  i n  a l l  member c o u n t r i e s ,  i nc lud ing  Russia 
and the  United S t a t e s ?  (AIPO 514K) 
Favor 
Oppose 
No opin ion  
7/1953 (Asked of  t h e  85% who thought  l e a d e r s  of  t h e  US, U K ,  France,  
and Russ ia  could  reach  agreement on any of  t h e  b i g  problems of 
t h e  day) Do you t h i n k  we could count  on Russia t o  l i v e  up t o  




4/1954 The United S t a t e s  and Russia have both  sugges ted  p l a n s  f o r  
out lawing t h e  atom and hydrogen bombs a s  weapons of war. 
However, they  h a v e n ' t  been a b l e  t o  ag ree  on how t o  i n s p e c t  each 
o t h e r ' s  supply of atomic m a t e r i a l .  Which ONE of t h e s e  i d e a s  
comes c l o s e s t  t o  your own opinion? Please  c a l l  o f f  your answer 
by number. (AIPO 529K) 
1. The United S t a t e s  should go f a r r h e r  than  
eve r  i n  t r y i n g  t o  reach  an  agreement- even 
i f  i t  means g i v i n g  i n  on some of our  demands 
f o r  s t r i c t  i n s p e c t i o n  
2 .  We should  keep on t r y i n g  t o  reach  an  
agreement- b u t  no t  accep t  any p l a n  t h a t  
d o e s n ' t  meet our  demands f o r  s t r i c t  
i n s p e c t i o n  6 9 
3 .  We should g ive  up t r y i n g  t o  reach an 
agreement a l t o g e t h e r  13 
4 .  No op in ion  8 
4/1954 (Asked of  t h e  60% who thought  t h e  U . S .  should  ag ree  clot t o  use 
atomic weapons) Do you t h i n k  t h e  Russians would l i v e  up t o  




1/1955 Russia has  proposed t h a t  a l l  c o : ~ n t r i e s  should s i g n  an  agreement 
promising never  t o  use atomic o r  hydrogen bombs. Do you t h i n k  
t h e  Russians would l i v e  up t o  t h e i r  promise i f  such an  




Appendix 7 - 405 - 
6/1955 Do you think we could count on Russia to live up to whatever 
agreements may result from this conference of the heads of 




6/1955 (Asked of those 40% who thought the U.S. should agree not to 
use nuclear weapons but who also thought the U.S. could not 
count on the Russians living up to agreements.) Well, I notice 
on the other question you felt we probably couldn't count on 
Russia to live up to its agreements. I'm interested now in why 
you feel we should sign this agreement with then noc to use 
atomic bombs. (NORC 372) 
Agreement be in writing, there would be 
guarantees 
If all countries sign, Russia more likely 
to keep agreement 
If Russia & other countries sign, we have 
to also, can't refuse 
Russia is likely to keep this agreement, 
poison gas agreement worked 
It would show our desire for peace 
If they break the agreement, we car) to 
It's worth trying, its better than nothing 
Atomic & hydrogen bombs should never be 




(multiple coding permitted) 
6/1955 (Asked of those 54% who thought the U.S. should not sign an 
agreement not to use nuclear weapons) Do you think we should 
agree to such a promise, if there were some kind of 
international control to see that all countries live up to the 




8/1955 Do you think we would count on Russia to live up to whatever 
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$/I955 At Geneva, President Eisenhower offered to let Russian planes 
take photographs of our military bases in the United States, if 
the Russians 1.et American planes take similar photographs in 
Russia. In general, do you approve or disapprove of this idea? 




10/1955 President Eisenhower has offered to let Russian planes take 
photographs of our military bases in the US, if the Russians 
let American planes take similar photographs in Russia. In 




10/1955 Would you approve or disapprove of letting teams of 
international inspectors visit our military bases, if Russia 




10/1955 If our side were free to inspect military bases in Russia, do 
you think this would make a surprise attack on the US almost 
impossible, or somewhat less likely, or wouldn't it help at 
all? (NORC 3 7 6 )  
Almost impossible 
Less likely 
No help at all 
DK 
10/1955 Do you think we could count on Russia to live up to whatever 





12/1955 President Eisenhower has offered to let Russian planes take 
photographs of our military banes in the US, if the Russians 
let American planes take similar photographs in Russia. Do you 
think this kind of inspection system would make a surprise 
attack on the US less likely, or more likely, or wouldn't it 






12/1955 In general, do you think we can count ion Russia to live up to 





2/1956 (Asked of those 62% who thought the US should agree to limit 
the size of our armed forces) Would you favor or oppose a 
system of inspection--where a group of inspectors from the 
United Nations organization could go into any country, 
including the UniCed States, to see if it; actually was keeping 




2/1956 (Asked of those 31% who thought the U.S. should not agree to 
limit our armed forces or didn't know) Would you favor such an 
agreement if all the governments, including the United States, 
agreed to let inspectors from the United Nations organization 
come into their countries to see if they actually were keeping 




10/1956 Have you heard or read anything about President Eisenhower's 
offer to let Russian planes take photographs of our military 
bases in the US, if the Russians let American planes cake 
similar photographs in Russia? (NORC 3981) 
Yes 
N 0 





4,4957 Russia had proposed that all nations with atomic weapons call a 
halt to any further tests of H-bombs or A-bombs, for an 
indefinite period. If we agree to stop the tests, do you think 
we could count on Russia's halting her tests, or not? (MINN 
160) 
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7/1957 The Russians have proposed that all nations agree co stop all 
hydrogen and atomic bomb tests for two or three years, and have 
offered a plan to supervise the agreement to make Gure it's not 
broken. Do you yourself feel, now, that we can count on Russia 
to live up to such an agreement, or that we cannot? (MINN 162) 
Feel we can 
Feel we cannot 
No opinion 
Other 
1/1958b In a recent note to the US, Bulganin, the Russian Prime 
Minister, made these suggestions to improve relations between 
the East and West. Do you think that the US and its Western 
allies should or should not agree . . . 
To set up an aerial and ground inspection system extending 500 
miles either side of the Iron Curtain as a measure against 




3/1958 Would you favor or oppose setting up n worldwide organization 
which would make sure, by regular inspections, that no nation, 
including Russia and the United States, makes hydrogen bombs, 
atom bombs, and missiles (AIPO 596 K I&II) {see repeated 




3/1958 If this inspection organization were set up, would you favor or 
oppose making it each person's duty to report any attempt in 
their country tc secretly produce hydrogen bombs, atom bombs, 




3/1958 If you, yourself knew that someone in the United States was 
attempting to secretly make forbidden weapons, would you report 
this to the office of the worldwide inspection organization in 
this country? (AIPO 596K I&II) 
Yes, would 
No, would not 
No opinion 
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3/1963 I f  a t e s t  ban t r e a t y  were p u t  i n t o  e f f e c t ,  do you t h i n k  Russia 




1/1976 Do you f e e l  t h a t  t h e  Russians have l i v e d  up t o  t h e  terms they 
agreed  t o  under t h e  f i r s t  S t r a t e g i c  A r m s  L i m i t a t i o n  Trea ty  
(SALT Trea ty )  wi th  t h e  US, o r  d o n ' t  you chink t h e  Russians have 
done so? ( H a r r i s  7588) 
Russians l i v e d  up t o  agreement 
Not l i v e d  up t o  agreement 
Not s u r e  
2/1978 I f  t h e  United S t a t e s  and Russia s i g n  an  agreement t o  l i m i t  t h e  
number and sp read  of s t r a t e g i c  weapons, do you t h i n k  . . . 
Russia/  t h e  United S t a t e s  w i l l  l i v e  up t o  i t s  p a r t  of t h e  
agreement? (ORC) 
Russ ia  US 
Yes 
No 
No opin ion  
6/1978 I f  t h e  United S t a t e s  and Sov ie t  Union were t o  s i g n  an  agreement 
t o  l i m i t  nuc lea r  weapons, do you t h i n k  t h e  Sov ie t  Union would 
l i v e  up t o  i t s  s h a r e  o f  t h e  agreement? (CBS/NYT) 
Yes 
no 
No op in ion  
6/1978 Do you t h i n k  t h e  United S t a t e s  would l i v e  up t o  i t s  s h s r e  of 
t h e  agreement? (CBS/NYT) 
Y e s  
No 
DK,/NA 
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8/1978 see Repeated Questions (NBC/AP 33) 
10/1978 see Repeated Questions (NBC/AP 35) 
3/1979 see Repeated Questions (NBC/AP 40) 
5/1979a China has offered to let us put special electronic monitoring 
devices in that country to take the place of the monitoring 
equipment we had to take out of Iran. Would you favor or oppose 





5/1979 (I'm going to read some statements about world affairs and I'd 
like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with each.) 
The next statement is: "There are no conditions under which we 






5/1979 Next month in Vienna, President Jimmy Carter and the Russian 
leader, Leonid Brezhnev, will sign a second Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty called SALT. Do you think the Russians will 
honor this agreement and cut back on their nuclear weapons, or 
do you think they will secretly try to end up with more 




5/1979 How concerned are you that the United States may not be able to 
verify whether the Russians are living up to their part of the 
arms limitation--are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, 
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6/1979 If a SALT treaty is approved, do you think the Sovidt Union 





6/1979 If the Soviet Union tried to cheat on the treaty, do you think 





9/1979 see Repeated Questions (NBC/AP 45/121) 
3/1981 Here are some arguments that have been made in favor of 
stressing military strength and relying less on negotiation and 
economic tools. Which two or three, if any, do you find most 
convincing? (Roper 81-4) 
a. The only thing our enemies understand is 
military power 3 2 
b. The oaly way we can get the respect of our 
allies and neutral countries is if they think 
we are the strongest militarily 3 7 
c. We've been pouring money into other countries 
and it has gotten us nowhere. It's time to 
atop international welfare and concentrate on 
defense 45 
d. Arms control and other agreements with the 
Russians are a waste of time, because the Russians 
never hold up their end of the bargain 3 8 
e. None 12 
f. Don't know 9 
5/1981 How likely do you think the Soviet Union would be to abide by 
such an agreement [not to build any more nuclear weapons]-- 
very likely, fairly likely, or not at all likely? (AIPO 1173G) 
Very likely 
Fairly likely 
Not at all likely 
No opinion 
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5/1981 How likely do you think the Soviet Union would be to abide by 
such an agreement [to destr~y all nuclear weapons that have 
already been built]-- very likely, fairly likely, or not at all 
likely? (AIPO 1173G) 
Very likely 
Fairly likely 
Not at all likely 
No opinion 
9/1981 Would you favor or oppose setting up a worldwide organization 
which would make sure, by regular inspection, that no nation, 
including the Soviet Union and the US, makes nuclear weapons? 




11/1981b If an arms agreement between the US and the Soviet Union is 
reached, would you favor or oppose setting up a worldwide 
organization which would make sure, by regular inspection, that 
neither the US nor the Soviet Union violates this arms 




3/1982 In general, how much or little trust do you have in the Russian 
government to honor its treaties and other international 
agreements . . . great deal of trust, fair amount of trust, 
only a little trust, or no trust at all? (A&S/Merit) 
Great deal of trust 
Fair amount of trust 
Only a little trust 
No trust at all 
No opinion 
3/1982 see Repeated Questions (IAT 51) 
3/1982 The major problem in arms control is the difficulty in 
verifying whether the other side is complying with the 
agreement. Some people feel that verification is essential for 
such an agreement. Others feel that it is more important for 
the United States to halt the growth of its nuclear arsenal 
even if we cannot be sure the other side is doing the same. 
Which is more important in your view? (Gallup/NW) 
Verification 
Halting growth 
Don' t know 
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4/1982 see Repeated Questions (ABC/WP) 
5/1982 (Asked of those 79% who favored a nuclear freeze or didn't 
know) What if either the US or the Soviet Union could cheat on 
the number of its nuclear weapons without being detected by the 





5/1982 (Asked of those 28% who opposed a nuclear freeze or didn't 
know) What if both the US and the Soviet Union could catch the 
other country if it were cheating on the agreement--would you 




7/1982 see Repeated Questions (LAT 58) 
11/1982 Do you think it would or would not be possible to set up a 
system for verifying or checking whether the Soviet Union is 
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4/1983 (Asked of split samples) Here are some arguments that have been 
made against an immediate nuclear freeze (Card shown raspondent.) 
For an argument to be convincing it has to be both important and 
true. If it isn't important, or isn't true, it isn't convincing. 
Would you tell me for each of those arguments whether you find it 
a very convincing argument against an immediate nuclear freeze, or 
somewhat convincing, not very convincing, or not at all 
convincing? . . . (Roper 83-5) 
1. An immediate nuclear freeze would reduce international tensions 
and the threat of nuclear war. 
2. A freeze would cause Soviet foreign policies to become more 
reasonable and moderate. 
3. A freeze would cause the U.S. foreign policies to become more 
reasonable and moderate. 
4. A freeze now would establish a stable nuclear arms balance 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
5. A nuclear freeze now would encourage the Soviets to agree to 
nuclear arms reduction later. 
6, A freeze on nuclear weapons would enable the U.S. to spend more 
on domestic social and economic programs. 
7. An immediate nuclear freeze would remove Soviet incentives to 
negotiate for reductions in nuclear arms in the current Geneva 
talks. 
8. The Soviet Union can not be trusted to live up to the terms of 
a nuclear freeze agreement. 
9. A freeze now would leave the Soviet Union ahead of the U.S. in 
nuclear capability. (Roper) 
10. A freeze would prevent the U.S. from modernizing its aging 
weapons and introducing more reliable, less vulnerable nuclear 
weapo.:s systems. 
11. A freeze would be a real gamble because neither side would 
know whether the other side was living up to the agreement. 
12. We should not sign a nuclear freeze agreemenr with the Soviet 
Union as long as it pursues expansionist policies against other 
countries abroad, such as Afghanistan. 
Pro-freeze results 1 2 3 4 5 6 Average 
Very convincing 23 11 12 14 9 29 16 
Somewhat convincing 35 26 35 27 27 35 31 
Not very convincing 22 34 31 27 29 17 28 
Not at all convincing 14 21 13 23 24 11 18 
Don' t know 5 8 9 9 11 8 8 
Anti-freeze results 7 8 9 10 11 12 Average 
Very convincing 13 40 30 24 27 39 29 
Somewhat convincing 33 26 30 31 26 27 29 
Not very convincing 30 16 19 23 23 16 21 
Not at all convincing 12 10 9 11 12 10 11 
Don' t know 12 7 12 11 13 8 11 
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5/1983 Do you think the Soviet Union will or will not agree to on-site 
inspection of nuclear weapons in their nation? (AIPO 1214G) 
Will agree 
Will not agree 
No opinion 
9/1983 see Repeated Questions (ABC/WP) 
9/1983 If the U.S. and the Soviet Union did come to a new agreement to 
reduce both nations' nuclear arms, how confident or not are you 
that the Russians wouid live up to this agreement? . . . very 




Not too confident 
Not at all confident 
No opinion 
11/1983 If there were such an agreement to freeze nuclear weapons do 
you think the Soviet Union would cheat on that agreement or 
not? (ABC/WP) 
USSR would cheat 
USSR would not cheat 
Don' t know 
11/1983 Do you think the United States would cheat on such a nuclear 
weapons freeze or not? (ABC/WP) 
US would cheat 
US would not cheat 
Don' t know 
4/1984 How important is verification in any arms control 




Not very important 
DK 
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If the Soviet side of a nuclear freeze agreement with the US 





Do you think the Soviets can be trusted to honor an agreement 




Do you believe that the Soviet Union is adhering to or 




see Repeated Questions (P&S/CPD) 
Because the Soviets will not keep their end of the bargain, we 
should not sign any agreements limiting nuclear arms. (PAF) 




Unless the Soviets agree to on-site inspection, we should 




Because of our satellites in space, we really don't need 
on-site inspection to know if the Russians cheat on arms 




The Soviets have cheated on just about every treaty and 
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5/1984 The degree to which the Soviets cheat on arms control treaties 
is overstated by Americans who oppose negotiating with them in 




5/1984 In a dangerous world, there are times when all countries must 
take risks- make decisions without knowing for sure how they'll 
turn out. I'll read you some things the U.S. might do, hut all 
of them involve some risk. For each, please tell me whether 
you think it's an acceptable risk for the U.S. to take or not. 
Sign an arms control agreement with the Soviets even if 
foolproof verification can't be guaranteed--is that an 




7/1984c If a nuclear arms treaty were made between the Soviet Union and 
the United States, do you think the Soviet Union would be 
likely to live up to this agreement, or not? (AIPO 1238G) 
Yes, would 
No, would not 
No opinion 
11/1984b One of the problems in any nuclear arms control agreement 
between the U.S. and Russia is the question of verification-- 
how to be sure each side is living up to what has been agreed 
upon. Do you think it is possible or not to come to a nuclear 
arms control agreement with the Russians, under which each side 
would be able to accurately determine if the other is living up 




11/19&4b Some Reasan Acrlninistration arms negotiators now believe it is 
possible to come to a nuclear arms control agreement with the 
Russians without setting up a foolproof means of verifying 
whether the agreement is being lived up to. The two sides 
would just agree to reduce nuclear arms according to a 
timetable. Does this kind of approach make sense to you, or 
not? (Harris) 
Make sense 
Does not make sense 
Not sure 
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1/1985 If t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  ( t h e  United S t a t e s  and Sov ie t  Union) d i d  
ag ree  t o  l i m i t  t h e i r  nuc lea r  arms do you t h i n k  t h e  Sov ie t  Union 
would c h e a t  on t h a t  agreement? (ABC) 
Would chea t  
Would n o t  c h e a t  
No Opinion 
1/1985 The United S t a t e s  should n e g o t i a t e  a n u c l e a r  arms l i m i t a t i o n  
agreement even i f  t h e r e  i s  a r i s k  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  would chea t  




1/1985a I f  t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  Sov ie t  Union were t o  s i g n  an 
agreement t o  l i m i t  nuc lea r  weapons, do you t h i n k  t h e  Sov ie t  
Union would l i v e  up t o  i t s  s h a r e  of  the  agreement? (CBS/NYT) 
Yes 
No 
Don' t Know 




No opin ion  
1/1985a Do you t h i n k  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a f a i r  arms c o n t r o l  
agreement t h a t  t h e  Sov ie t  Union w i l l  l i v e  up to?  (CBS/NYT) 
( s e e  r epea ted  q u e s t i o n s )  
Yes 
N 0 
No op in i  
1/1985a Do you t h i n k  t h e  Sov ie t  Union has v i o l a t e d  t h e  arms t r e a t i e s  i t  
h a s  had wi th  t h e  US? (CBS/NYT) 
Yes 
No 
No opin ion  
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1/1985a (Asked of those 67% who thought the  Soviets  had v io l a t ed  arms 
con t ro l  t r e a t i e s  with the  US) Do you think those v io l a t i ons  
have given the  Soviet  Union any important advantages over the  
US, o r  haven ' t  they made much d i f fe rence?  (CBS/NYT) 
Advantages 
Haven't made d i f fe rence  
No opinion 
1/1985 see  Repeated Questions (LAT 33) 
1/1985 I f  the  US and the  Soviet  Union were t o  reach agreement on 
nuclear  weapons con t ro l ,  do you think the  Russians could be 
t r u s t e d  to  keep thel . r  p a r t  of the  bargain ,  o r  not? (LAT 93) 
( see  repeated ques t ions )  
Trusted 
Not t r u s t  
Not sure  
2/1985 see  Repeated Questions (NBC) 
7/1985 Do you think the  Russians w i l l  o r  w i l l  no t  l i v e  up t o  any 
agreements t h a t  they may make a t  the  (nuclear  arms con t ro l )  
t a l k s  i n  Geneva? (YSW/Time) 
W i l l  l i v e  up t o  agreements 
W i l l  not  l i v e  up t o  agreements 
Not sure  
9/1985 Now I ' m  going t o  read some p a i r s  of statements descr ibing 
opposite viewpoints on d i f f e r e n t  nuclear weapons i s s u e s .  
Please l i s t e n  t o  each s e t  of opposite opinions ,  and t e l l  me 
which one you agree with more s t rongly .  . . . a )  The Soviet  
Union almost always cheats  on the  t r e a t i e s  i t  s igns  with u s ,  
even though the  U.S. abides by them, o r  b )  the  t r u t h  i s ,  both 
the  U . S .  and Soviets  cheat  on t r e a t i e s  t o  some e x t e n t - -  i t ' s  
j u s t  p a r t  of the  game. (M&K) 
Soviets  chea t -  much 
Soviets  cheat-  somewhat 
Both cheat-  somewhat 
Both cheat-  much 
Not. su re  
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If an agreement is reached at the [November 1985 
Reagan-Gorbachev] summit meeting, do you think we can trust the 




Do you think the Soviet Union can be trusted to honor future 
arms control agreements or not? (P&S/CPD) 
Can be trusted 
Can' t be trusted 
Don' t know 
Should the U.S. insist on on-site inspection to verify Soviet 
compliance with arms control agreements or do satellites offer 




Should the United States continue to abide by arms control 




see Repeated Questions (P&S/CPD) 
see Repeated Questions (NBCDJS) 
Do you think it's possible to negotiate a fair arms control 
agreement that the Soviet Union would live up to? (CBS/NYT) 




Suppose the US and the Soviet Union did come to an agreement to 
limit nuclear weapons. Do you think the Soviet Union would try 
to cheat on a nuclear arms agreement and get an advantage over 
the US or not? (ABCDP) 
Yes, Soviets would try to cheat 7 5 
No, Soviets would not try to cheat 17 
No opinion 6 
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11/1985 If the  US and the  Sovie t  Union were t o  reach agreement on 
nuclear  weapons con t ro l ,  do you th ink  the  Americans could be 
t r u s t e d  t o  keep t h e i r  p a r t  of the  ba rga in ,  o r  no t?  (LAT 100) 
Trusted 
Not t r u s t e d  
Not su re  
11/1985 see  Repeated Questions (LAT 100) 
11/1985 Here a r e  some impressions people have repor ted about 
Gorbachev. For each one, t e l l  me whether you agree ,  d i sagree ,  
o r  have no impression of your own: He may say he wants t o  reach 
an agreement with us on a r m s  con t ro l  and o the r  i s s u e s ,  bu t  he 




Not su r e  
11/1985 see  Repeated Questions (NBCDSJ) 
6/1986 (Asked of those 67% who had heard/read about SALT 11) Do you 
th ink  the  Sovie t  Union has o r  has not  l i ved  up t o  the  terms of 




7/1986 (Asked of 93X who knew about Chernobyl nuclear  acc iden t )  Did 
the  way the  Sovie ts  handled the  accident  give you more t r u s t  
t h a t  they would ca r ry  out  arms agreements hones t ly ,  l e s s  t r u s t  
o r  no t  change your mind? (P&S/CPD) 
More t r u s t  
Less t r u s t  
No change 
Donf t know 
7/1986 Do you be l i eve  t h a t  the  Sovie t  Union is adhering t o  o r  
v i o l a t i n g  e x i s t i n g  nuclear arms con t ro l  agreements? (P&S/CPD) 
Adhering 
Vio la t ing  
Donf t know 
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Do you think that the Soviet Union can be trusted to honor 
future arms control agreements or not? (P&S/CPD) 
Can be trusted 
Can' t be trusted 
Don' t know 
Do you agree or disagree with these statements ab~ut the summit 
meeting? . . . It's just as well that an agreement was not 
reached at the Summit because you can't trust the Soviet Union 




In the past, the United States and the Soviet Union have had a 
policy of trying to reach agreements to relax tensions between 
them. Do you think the Russians can be trusted to live up to 
such agreements, or don't you think so? (NBCDSJ) (see repeated 
questions for trend) 
Can be trusted 
Cannot be trusted 
Bit sure 
see Repeated Questions (NBCDSJ) 
see Repreated Questions (NBCDSJ) 




Don' t know 
Do you think Soviet leader Gorbachev is more trustworthy, less 
trustworthy or about as trustworthy as the Soviet leaders who 




Don ' t know 
Would you favor or oppose such an agreement (eliminating 
medium-range missiles in Europe if it left the Soviets with an 




Don' t know 
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4/19137 The United States has proposed very detailed procedures for 
verifying Soviet compliance with the agreement, which the 
Soviets are considering. If the Soviets reject the proposed 
U.S. verification procedures, should the agreement be signed 
without them or not be sighed? (P&S/CPD) 
Should be signed 
Should not be signed 
Don't know 
4/1987 Do you think that the Soviets are reluctant to agree to 
effective verification because such measures are unnecessary, 
or because, without effective verification, they know they 
could violate the agreement without the West knowing? (P&S/CPD) 
Verification is unnecessary 
Violate 
Don' t know 
4/1987 see Repeated Questions (P&S/CPD) 
5/1987 In your opinion, which is the greatest risk to peace - -  
trusting the Russians to live up to their side of an arms 
agreement or being too suspicious of the Russians so that we 
never get an arms agreement with them? (Gallup/TM) 
Trusting Russians greatest threat 
Being too suspicious is greatest threat 
Can't say/donlt know 
10/1987 I am going to read some statements that have been made 
recently. Please tell me whether you are inclined to agree or 
disagree with each statement . . . (M&K/ATS) (see repeated 
questions) 
Agree Disagree DK 
Because the Soviets will not keep their 
end of the bargain, we should not sign 
any agreements limiting nuclear arms 50 4 5 5 
1/1988 A. Do you think the Soviet Union is a country that we can 
trust a great deal, somewhat, or not at all? (MOR/ATS) 
B. Do you think Gorbachev is a person we can trust a great 
deal, somewhat, or not at all? (MOR/ATS) (see Repeated 
Questions) 
USSR Gorbachev 
A great deal 
Somewhat 
Not at all 
Don't know/Refused 
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1/1988 I n  reaching agreewents on nuc lea r  arms c o n t r o l ,  do you t h i n k  
t h e  Sov ie t  Union can be t r u s t e d  t o  keep t h e i r  p a r t  of  t h e  
b a r g a i n  o r  no t?  (MOR/ATS) 
Can be t r u s t e d  
Can n o t  be t r u s t e d  
Don' t know/refused 
1/1988 Do you t h i n k  we can  t r u s t  Gorbachev more, l e s s ,  o r  about  t h e  
same a s  p o s t  Sov ie t  l e a d e r s ?  (MOR/ATS) ( s e e  r epea ted  q u e s t i o n s )  
More 
About t h e  sane 
Less 
Don't know/refused 
1/1988 Do you t h i n k  t h e  United S t a t e s  can  o r  can n o t  be t r u s t e d  t o  
keep i t s  p a r t  of t h e  agreements i n  t h e  [ I n t e r m e d i a t e  Nuclear 
Forces]  t r e a t y ?  (MOR/ATS) 
Can be t r u s t e d  
Can n o t  be t r u s t e d  
Don't  know/refused 
1/1988 Do you t h i n k  t h e  Sov ie t  Union can  o r  can n o t  be t r u s t e d  t o  keep 
i t s  p a r t  of  t h e  agreements i n  t h e  [ In te rmed ia te  Nuclear Forces]  
t r e a t y ?  (MOR/ATS) 
Can be t r u s t e d  
Can n o t  be t r u s t e d  
Don't  know/refused 
1/1988 If we kep t  our  p a r t  of t h e  agreements i n  t h e  t r e a t y  b u t  t h e  
S o v i e t s  do no t  keep t h e i r s ,  would t h a t  put: t h e  United S t a t e s  
and i t s  European a l l i e s  i n  a dangerous p o s i t i o n  o r  would t h i s  
s i t u a t i m  n o t  be a l l  t h a t  dangerous? (MOR/ATS) 
Dangerous p o s i t i o n  
Not be  a l l  t h a t  dangerous 
Don't know/refused 
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1/1988 Here a r e  some statements t h a t  have been m ~ d e  about the  t r e a t y  
and f o r  each one I ' d  l i k e  you t o  t e l l  me i f  you s t rongly  agree ,  
somewhat agree ,  somewhat d i sagree ,  or  s t rong ly  disagree? 
(MOR/ATS ) 
a This t r e a t y  is a  good way t o  f i nd  out  i f  the  Soviets  can be 
t r u s t e d  before we agree t o  more arms reduct ions;  
b  Signing the  t r e a t y  w i l l  help the  United S t a t e ' s  image around 
the  world; 
c  This t r e a t y ,  l i k e  a l l  t r e a t i e s  with the  Russians,  i s n ' t  
worth the  paper i ~ s  wr i t t en  on; 
d  Pres ident  Reagan I.s well-known f o r  h i s  anti-communism, so i f  
he th inks  t h i s  is  a  good d e a l ,  it must be;  
e  This t r e a t y  represen ts  an important breakthrough f o r  more 
agreements on reducing arms. 
a b c d e  
Scrongly agree 
Somewhat agree 
Depends (vol)  
Somewhat disagree  
Strongly disagree  
Don't know/refused 
2/1988 The next s t e p  of the  t r e a t y  i s  f o r  the  U . S .  Senate t o  r a t i f y  
i t .  As a  p a r t  of t h e i r  approval of the  t r e a t y  the  U . S .  Senate 
can requ i re  t h a t  c e r t a i n  condi t ions  be met before the  t r e a t y  
can take e f f e c t .  For each of the  following please  t e l l  me i f  
you think the  U.S. Senate should o r  should not  requ i re  t h a t  
condi t ion be met before the  t r e a t y  can take e f f e c t .  
A .  That the  conventional fo rces  of the  Soviet  Union and i t s  
a l l i e s ,  which include t h e i r  t roops ,  t anks ,  j e t  f i g h t e r s ,  and 
the  l i k e ,  a r e  roughly equal t o  the  conventional forces  of the 
United S t a t e s  and i t s  NATO a l l i e s  i n  Europe before  the  t r e a t y  
can take e f f e c t ;  
B .  That the  Soviet  Union remove i t s  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on Jews who 
wish t o  leave the  Soviet  Union before the  t r e a t y  can take 
e f f e c t ;  
C .  That Pres ident  Reagan c e r t i f y  t h a t  the  Soviet  Union is 
adherence t o  a l l  pa s t  arms con t ro l  agreements before the  t r e a t y  
can take e f f e c t .  (DYG/ATS) 
Should Should Don't 
Require Not Know 
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2/1988 If the Soviets actually withdrew their troops from Afghanistan, 





5/1988 (Asked of those 85X who answered same or less) If the Soviets 
ended all their involvement in Afghanistan would you then trust 
them more, less, or about the same? (M&K/ATS) 
More 
Less 
About the same 
Not sure (vol) 
5/1988 See Repeated Questions (M&K/ATS) 
7/1988 We've been talking about trusting other countries. As far as 
you're concerned, how important is each of the following things 
in our being able to say we trust another country--absolutely 
essential, important but not essential, not very important, or 
not at all important? (DYG/ATS) (data not presented in the 
order asked) 
A. They abide by their treaty commitments; 
B. They tell the truth in dealing with us; 
C. They would never attack us militarily; 
D. Their citizens enjoy basic human rights 
E. They are fail in their trade policies; 
F. We have foreign policy interests in common with them; 
G. We can lend them money with full confidence that they will 
repay it; 
H. they are a democracy; 
I. They have never been at war with us; 
J. Their customs, culture, and language are similar to ours. 
Absolutely Important Not very Not at all Not sure 
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7/1988 Compared t o  ten  years  ago, do you think we can t r u s t  the  Soviet  




Not sure  
7/1988 (Asked of those 44% who answered can t r u s t  the  Soviets  more) 
Why do you say we can t r u s t  them more? (DYG/ATS) (mul t ip le  
answers ) 
Gorbachev 2 8 
Summits, meetings, improvedcommunicationwithUS 26 
More openness than i n  the  pa s t  2 6 
Basic changes i n  philosophy, idadership  11 
Common i n t e r e s t  i n  world peace 10 
Arms con t ro l  t r e a t y  agreement 8 
7/1988 (Asked of those 6% who answered can t r u s t  the Soviets  l e s s )  
Why do you say we can t r u s t  them l e s s ?  (DYG/ATS) 
Don't,  c a n ' t  t r u s t  Soviets  
They l i e  and a r e  dece i t fu l  
They want t o  dominate the  world 
D i s t ru s t  l e ade r s ,  Gorbachev 
Don't l i v e  up to  t r e a t i e s ,  agreements 
7/1988 (Asked of those 35% who answered can t r u s t  the  Soviets  the  
same) Why do you say we can t r u s t  them the  same? (DYG/ATS) 
Nothing has changed 2 8 
Don't,  c a n ' t  t r u s t  Soviets  19 
S t i l l  a r e  communists, have same philosophy 13 
They l i e  and a r e  dece i t fu l  8 
They warit t o  dominate the  world 7 
Don't l i v e  up t o  t r e a t i e s ,  agreements 6 
7/1988 I am going t o  read you some statements t h a t  have been made 
recen t ly .  Please t e l l  me whether you s t rongly  agree ,  somewhat 
agree ,  somewhat d i sagree ,  o r  s t rong ly  disagree  . . . Because 
the  Soviets  w i l l  not  keep t h e i r  end o f  the  barga in ,  we should 
no t  s i gn  any more agreements l im i t i ng  nuclear  arms. (DYG/ATS) 
( s e e  repeated quest ions)  
Strongly agree 
Somewhat agree 
Somewhat disagree  
Strongly disagree  
Not sure  
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7/1988 What do you think the Soviets could do to make the United 
States trust them more? (DYG/ATE) (multiple answers) 
Keep their word, honor treaties, agreements 15 
More openness, open policy and society 14 
Free and open borders, freedom to emigrate 12 
To tell the truth and be honst 10 
Disarm, eliminate nuclear weapons 10 
Give citizens more freedom and civil rights 8 
7/1988 We've been talking about trust. When it comes to arms 
agreements, some people have said there are three levels of 
trust we can have. Which of those levels of trust comes 
closest to your view of how much we should trust the Soviet 
Union. (DYG/ATS) 
A. We have no reason to trust the Soviets to keep any kind of 
agreement; we shouldn't negotiate arms agreements with them 
even if they're willing to negotiate; 
B. We should negotiate arms agreements with them, hut not take 
any big risks; we should require proof that they are doing what 
they agreed to do; 
C. We'll never be able to have 100% "proof" that arms 
agreements are being kept, but we should take some risks and 
sign these agreements expecting that the Soviets will honor 
them in good faith; 
D. Don't know/not sure (vol) 
7/1988 See Repeated Questions (DYG/ATS) 
8/1988 Does the fact that the Soviets are withdrawing their troops 
from Afghanistan--after promising to do so--make you trust them 
more, less or about the same? (M&K/ATS) 
More 
About the same 
Less 
Not sure (vol) 
8/1988 See Repeated Questions (M&K/ATS) 
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Repeated Questions 
12/1963- On some of these cards are written things you personally might 
3/1972 very much like to happen. On other cards are things you might 
like less, and on still others may be things you would dislike 
very much. Please take the cards from the first pocket and sort 
them into this row of pockets-- on the line that is next to 
it. Sort them into this row according to how much you want the 
thing written on the card to happen. The pockets in each row 
have numbers written on them. Minus three stands for something 
that you would dislike very much. Plus three stands for those 
things which you would very much want to happen. Zero stands 
for those situations that you don't particularly care about one 
way or another. You may usc any of these seven pockets you 
wish. (NORC SRS-330, NORC-SRS 640,  NORC-SRS 876, MIS/N) (The 
introductory wording varied slightly over time.) 
12/63 Desirability of ballistic missile defense 
6/64 In addition to shelters and existing defense against 
bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic 
missiles around our large cities and military 
installations. 
2/66 The United States will have anti-missile missiles that 
will be so effective in shooting down enemy missiles 
that no enem) would think of attacking us. 
3/72 Protecting most of our big cities and important 
nilitary bases with anti-missile missiles (ABM'sj 
+ 3 +2 +1 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 DK Total Total 
+ 
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Repeated Questions 
6/1968- 6/68 Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial 
3/1972 disarmament agreements that the United States could make 
with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you 
Lhink each one would be. 
Reach an agreement with Russia to limit the number of ABMS 
(ORC/N 
3/72 Now using the same desirability card as we did earlier, I 
would like to ask you s few questions on disarmament. I f  
our government decided to sign general disarmament treaty, 
there are probably some conditions that you would want our 
country to insist upon. Taking one condition at a time, 
how desirable is it that it be met before our country 
actually signs a treaty? 
Reach an agreement with Russia to limit the number of 
anti-missile missiles (ABM's) (MIS/N) 
-t 3 +2 + 1 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 DK T~tal Total 
+ 
4/1969- (Of those [69%, 72%, 69%) who had heard of ABM) Do you happen 
7/1969 to have an opinion about the ABM progrsm as submitted to 
Congress by President Nixon? (AIPO 777, 780k, 784k) 
Yes, have opinion 40 4 1 42 
N 0 2 7 3 1 2 7 
Not heard 3 3 2 8 3 1 
4/1969- (Of those [40%, 412, 42x1 who had heard of and had an opinion of 
7/1969 the ABM) Do you favor or oppose the ABM program submitted by 
Nixon? (AIPO 777, 780k, 784k) 
Favor 
Oppose 
Not heard/No Opinion/NA 
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Repeated Questions 
3/1972- 3/72 Now using the same desirability card as we did earlier, I 
12/1978 would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. I f  
our government decided to sign general disarmament 
treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would 
want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition at 
a time, how desirable is it that it be met before our 
country actually signs a treaty? (MIS/N) 
Agree with Russia to have no anti-missile missiles 
(ABM's) at all 
12/78 Now using the same desirability card as we did just now, 
I would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. 
If our government decided to sign general disarmament 
treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would 
want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition nt 
a time, how desirable is it that it be met before our 
country actually signs a treaty? (MIS/N) 
Agree with Russia to have no anti-missile missiles 
(ABM's) at all? 
+3  +2 +1 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 DK Total Total 
+ 1 
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10/1945 Do you t h i n k  we can develop a  way t o  p r o t e c t  o u r s e l v e s  from 
atomic bombs i n  case  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  t r i e d  t o  use  them a g a i n s t  




12/1945 A s  you may have hea rd ,  General Arnold and many s c i e n t i s t s  say  
t h a t  t h e r e  is  no r e a l  defense  a g a i n s t  a  s u r p r i s e  a t t a c k  by f a s t  
long-range  a i r p l a n e s  and r a c k e t s  c a r r y i n g  atomic bombs. Do you 
t h i n k  t h e r e  is a  r e a l  defense  o r  no t?  (NORC 42T)  
Yes 
No 
Don' t know 
6/1946 Do you t h i n k  t h e  US w i l l  be a b l e  t o  work o u t  an e f f e c t i v e  
defense  a g a i n s t  t h e  atomic bomb be fo re  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  could  use 




6/1946 Do you t h i n k  we w i l l  be a b l e  t o  work o u t  a  defense  a g a i n s t  t h e  
bomb be fo re  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  l e a r n  how t o  make i t ?  (SRC) 
Yes 
Yes, w i th  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
Undecided, Don't know 
No, wi th  Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  
No 
Opinions n o t  a s c e r t a i n e d  
Not know what atomic bomb was 
8,/1946 Do you t h i n k  t h e  US w i l l  be a b l e  t o  work o u t  an  e f f e c t i v e  
defense  a g a i n s t  t he  atomic bomb b e f o r e  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  could  use 
it a g a i n s t  us? (PSY CORP 178k&t) 
Yes 
N 0 
No O p i ~ i o n  
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8/1946 Do you think we will be able to work out a defense against the 
bomb before other countries learn how to make it? (SRC) 
Yes 
Yes, with qualification 
Undecided, Don't know 
No, with Qualifications 
No 
Opinions not ascertained 
Hot know what atomic bomb was 
2/1947 Do you believe scientists will find some defensive weapon 
against the atomic bomb, or do you think no defense against 
atomic bombs will be found? (MINN 42) 
Will find defense 
Won't find defense 
Undecided 
11/1949 Do you think scientists will be able to develop any defense 





12/1963 Now here are some cards. On these cards are printed various 
possible future situations which may exist in our civil 
defense. On this folder are pockets which show how likely 
something is. As before, the zero pocket on the bottom of the 
folder stands for something that is impossible or nearly 
impossible. The top pocket-- lo-- stands for something you 
consider certain or just about certain to happen. Five means 
that something is as likely to happen as not-- the chances are 
about fifty-fifty. Would you please put these cards into the 
pockets according to how likely it is that each situation will 
come about in five years or so - -  about 1968? You may use as 
many pockets as you want, and any number of cards may go into 
any pocket. (NORC SRS-330) 
Likelihood of ballistic missile defense 
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12/1963 On some of these  ca rds  a r e  w r i t t e n  th ings  you pe r sona l ly  might 
ve ry  much l i k e  t o  happen. On o t h e r  ca rds  a r e  t h i n g s  you might 
l i k e  l e s s ,  and on s t i l l  o t h e r s  may be t h i n g s  you would d i s l i k e  
ve ry  much. Please  take  the  ca rds  from the  f i r s t  pocket and s o r t  
them i n t o  t h i s  row of pocke t s - -  on the  l i n e  t h a t  is next  t o  i t .  
S o r t  them i n t o  t h i s  row according t o  how much you want the  th ing  
w r i t t e n  on the  ca rd  t o  happen. The pockets  i n  each row have 
numbers w r i t t e n  on them. Minus t h r e e  s t a n d s  f o r  something t h a t  
you would d i s l i k e  very much. Plus  t h r e e  s t a n d s  f o r  those  th ings  
which you would very  much want t o  happen. Zero s t a n d s  f o r  those 
s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  you d o n ' t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c a r e  about  one way o r  
ano the r .  You may use any of  these  seven pockets  you wish.  (NORC 
SRS-330) 
D e s i r a b i l i t y  of  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  defense  
6/1964 Here i s  the  c a r d  with the  s c a l e  on it  a g a i n ,  with numbers from 
zero  t o  t e n .  I ' m  going t o  read  you t h r e e  s t a t ements .  A s  
b e f o r e ,  i f  you th ink  our defenses  a g a i n s t  nuc lea r  a t t a c k  a r e  
ve ry  good o r  almost p e r f e c t ,  use t e n .  I f  you t h i n k  they a r e  
very  bad,  use z e r o .  I f  you th ink  they a r e  somewhere i n  between, 
use  any number between zero  and t e n .  (NORC-SRS 640) 
A .  Now, how good a r e  our defenses  a g a i n s t  enemy bombers? 
B. How good a r e  our defenses  a g a i n s t  guided m i s s i l e s ?  
C. How good a r e  our  defenses  a g a i n s t  submarines? 
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6/1964 Please  s o r t  t h e  c a r d s  you now have depending on how l i k e l y  you 
b e l i e v e  t h e s e  v a r i o u s  c i v i l  defense  s i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  be w i t h i n  
t h e  nex t  f i v e  y e a r s ,  o r  by about  1968. 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  s h e l t e r s  and e x i s t i n g  defense  a g a i n s t  
bombers, t h e r e  w i l l  be defenses  a g a i n s t  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  
around our  i a r g e  c i t i e s  and m i l i t a r y  i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  (NORC-SRS 
640) 
6/1964 Now w i l l  you p l e a s e  s o r t  t h e s e  c a r d s  once a g a i n ,  depending on 
how much you p e r s o n a l l y  want o r  do n o t  want each of  these  c i v i l  
defense  s i t u a t i o n s .  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  s h e l t e r s  and e x i s t i n g  defense  a g a i n s t  
bombers, t h e r e  w i l l  be defenses  a g a i n s t  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  
around our l a r g e  c i t i e s  and m i l i t a r y  i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  (NORC-SRS 
640) 
6/1964 A s  f a r  a s  you know, i s  t h e r e  any defense  p o s s i b l e  a g a i n s t  enemy 




6/1964 (Asked of 45% who s a i d  no o r  d o n ' t  know) Do you t h i n k  any 
defense  a g a i n s t  enemy m i s s i l e s  w i l l  become p o s s i b l e  dur ing  the  




6/1964 (Asked of those  55% who answered y e s )  What k ind  of defense  i s  
t h e r e / w i l l  t h e r e  be a g a i n s t  enemy m i s s i l e s ?  (NORC-SRS 640) 
Answer inc luded m i s r i l e  
Other means 
Don' t know 
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6/1964 (Asked of those 42% who mentioned missiles) Do you happen to 
know how these anti-missiles (would) work? (NORC-SRS 640)  
Mentioned nuclear warhead 5 
6/1964 The kinds of weapons that could be used against enemy missiles 
are called anti-missile missiles. As far as you know, does the 
United States already have these anti-missile missiles ready 
for action? (NORC-SRS 640) 
Yes 
N 0 
Not yet, but will 
Don't know 
6/1964 Does Russia already have these anti-missile missiles ready for 
action? (NORC-SRS 640)  
Yes 
No 
Not yet, but will 
Don' t know 
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6/1964 Here is a kind of scale like one you used before. It shsws how 
desirable or wanted something is. Plus 3 means that something 
is very desirable. Minus 3, that it's extremely undesirable. 
Zero stands for something you don't particularly care about one 
way or another. (NORC-SRS 640) 
A. Using this scale, how desir~ble 
is it to put anti-missile missiles 
around all larger cities in America? 
B. How desirable is it to put anti- 
missile missiles around your city/ 
the city, or cities nearest you? 
C. How desirable is it even if real 
estate values went down a little 
because of it? 
D. Even if it involves some risk 
that these missiles could be fired 
by accident? 
E. How desirable is it to put the 
anti-missile around our cities even 
though the radar to go with these 
missiles may cause poorer television 
reception around here? 
F. How about shelters? How 
desirable is it to put anti-missile 
missiles around our cities if it 
means we must set up shelters for 
everyone? 
G. How desirable is it to go ahead 
even though there might be some 
local opposition to putting anti- 
missile missiles around some cities? 
H. Even if they take up a lot of 
acres that could be used differently, 
how desirable is it to put anti- 
missile missiles around our cities? 
I. If you knew that these anti- 
missile missiles could shoot down 
just about all enemy missiles 
attacking a city, maybe nine out 
of ten, how desirable is it to put 
such weapons around cities 
J. And suppose you knew that they 
could shoot down about one out of 
three enemy missiles? 
6/1964 Now I'll read a few more statements to you. Please tell me 
whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly 
disagree with each statement, or whether you are undecided. 
(NORC SRS 640) S A A D SD N S 
A. If we have anti-missile missiles 
around our cities, there will be 
less need for fallout shelters 7 3 5 3 8 7 12 
B. If we have anti-missile missiles 
around our cities, we will need 
fallout shelters even more than 
we need them now 11 30 4 2 4 13 
C. There is no need for anti- 
missile missiles or for fallout 
shelters 2 5 4 8 34 9 
D. If we have such missiles around 
our cities, we should have shelters 
to protect against fallout because 
some enemy weapons will get through 
the defense anyway 18 6 5 7 
E. Even if cities are defended, enemy 
attacks on them would produce lots 
of fallout, so anti-missile missiles 
make sense only if we have fallout 
shelters for everyone 12 5 1 2 0 
F. Putting anti-missile missiles 
around our cities will make people 
thing that war is more likely 6 4 1 4 0 
G. Such missiles will make the 
Russians think that we are going to 
start a war; therefore, they might 
start one 3 2 1 5 3 
H. These missiles will give Americans 
a false sense of security 3 2 8 5 2 
I. Anti-missile missiles will make 
Americans more anxious 3 3 1 4 9 
J. Anti-missile missiles will lead 
to a stepping up of the arms race 4 4 4 3 3 
K. Such missiles will cost too much 
money to be worth while 3 14 5 8 
L. New offensive weapons will soon 
put anti-missile missiles out of 
date, so it really is not worth 
having them 1 12 5 3 
M. Putting in anti-missile missiles 
makes it more difficult to reach 
agreements on arms control and 
disarmament 2 2 8 4 7 
N. Anti-missile missiles will make 
America stronger, and an enemy 
will be even less likely to attack 
us than without these missiles 15 6 1 13 
0. With such missiles around our 
cities, an enemy will be less likely 
to try to push us around than he 
might otherwise do 14 6 2 13 
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6/1964 Not a l l  c i t i e s  might be defended by a n t i - m i s s i l e  m i s s i l e s .  
Would you r a the r  l i v e  i n  a c i t y ,  o r  near one, t h a t  is defended 
by a n t i - m i s s i l e  miss i l es  o r  i n  a c i t y  t h a t  does not  have any 
such a n t i - m i s s i l e  m i s s i l e s  around i t ?  (NORC-SRS 640) 
In  protected c i t y  
No d i f fe rence  
In  unprotected c i t y  
Don' t know 
6/1964 Now w i l l  you please  t e l l  me whether you s t rongly  agree ,  agree ,  
d i sagree ,  o r  s t rong ly  disagree  with these  statements concerning 
your f ee l i ngs  about l i v i n g  i n  o r  near a c i t y  t h a t  has 
a n t i - m i s s i l e  miss i l es?  (NORC-SRS 640) 
Strongly Agree D i s -  Strongly Un- 
Agree Agree Disagree Dec 
A .  I would f e e l  g u i l t y  t o  be i n  a 
defended c i t y  when other  Americans 
a r e  not  defended a s  well 3 2 9 5 4 5 8 
B .  I would f e e l  t h a t  I want t o  movz 
out  of the  c i t y  1 9 7 1 9 8 
C .  I would f e e l  lucky t h a t  my c i t y  
is  b e t t e r  protected than some o ther  
c i t y  12 6 0 1 7  1 8 
D .  I would f e e l  worried l i v i n g  i n  a 
defended c i t y  when o ther  c i t i e s  a r e  
not  defended by mi s s i l e s ,  because 
t h i s  would mean t h a t  my c i t y  w i l l  
s u r e ly  be a t tacked i n  the  event 
of a war 3 2 6 5 5 5 9 
E .  I would f e e l  angry, because I 
am opposed t o  having an t i -mi s s i l e  
m i s s i l e s  around here  * 5 7 3 14 6 
F. I would f e e l  t h a t  I can do 
nothing about the  miss i l es  5 6 4 19 2 8 
G .  I would f e e l  more secure than 
i f  I were l i v i n g  i n  a c i t y  t h a t  i s  
no t  protected with an t i -mi s s i l e  
m i s s i l e s  8 50 2 8 3 10 
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6/1964 Using the  same card ,  p lease  t e l l  me how much you agree or  
d isagree  with these  statements about l i v i n g  i n  a  c i t y  t h a t  
not  have a n t i - m i s s i l e  defenses when some o ther  c i t i e s  have 
them. (NORC-SRS 640) 
Strongly Agree Dis- Strongly 
Agree Agree Disagree 
A .  I w o ~ l d  f e e l  t h a t  i t  is unfa i r  
t h a t  some c i t i e s  a r e  defended when 
my c i t y  is not  5 3  7 47 2 
B .  I would f e e l  t h a t  I want t o  
move co a  defended c i t y  4  3 1 4 9 2 
C .  I would f e e l  more worried than i f  
I were i n  a  c i t y  t h a t  is protected 
by a n t i - m i s s i l e  m i s s i l e s  3  36 4  8 3  
D .  I would f e e l  more secure l i v i n g  
i n  an undefended c i t y  because t h i s  
would mean t h a t  my c i t y  might not 
be a t tacked i n  the  event of a  war 2 2 2 5 9 6 
E .  I would f e e l  t h a t  I can do 
nothing about the  miss i l es  5 6  7 18 2 
F. I would f e e l  lucky t h a t  I don ' t  
have t o  put  up with miss i l es  around 
here 1 18 6 1 6 
G .  I would f e e l  t h a t  I ought t o  do 
something t o  make sure  t h a t  my c i t y  




6/1964 Now, no matter  how the government might want t o  defend a l l  
American c i t i e s ,  it may be t h a t  only some can be p ro tec ted  by 
a n t i - m i s s i l e  m i s s i l e s .  On t h i s  card a r e  l i s t e d  some of the 
f a c t o r s  t h a t  may go i n t o  these  d i f f i c u l t  dec i s ions .  Please 
look a t  the  kinds of c i t i e s  l i s t e d  on the  ca rd .  A) Which of 
these  kinds of c i t i e s  i s  the  most important t o  defend i f  a l l  of 
them cannot be? B )  Which would be next most important? C )  
Which of those kinds of c i t i e s  would be l e a s t  important t o  
defend,  i f  a l l  of them cannot be? D) And which would be next 
l e a s t  important ,  a s  you see  i t ?  (NORC-SRS 640) 
Most 
1 )  C i t i e s  with the  l a r g e s t  
population 19 
2 )  C i t i e s  with the  most 
industry  24 
3) C i t i e s  with mi l i t a ry  4  3 
e s t a b l i s h e n t s  around them 
4) C i t i e s  t h a t  a r e  important 
i n  American h i s t o r y  1 
5)  Sea and land t ranspor ta t ion  
cen t e r s  9  
6 )  C i t i e s  which a r e  drawn by l o t  
t o  insure  t h a t  a l l  have equal 
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6/1964 One more question along these lines. Here is a list of a few 
American cities. Suppose only seven of these cities could be 
defended. If you were in a position to make the decision right 
now, which of these cities would you say should have 
anti-missile defenses? (If respondent is opposed to t.he whole 
idea-- Even though you are opposed to the idea, please try to 
put yourself in the position of a person who would have to make 
this decision- which seven cities should it be?) (NORC-SRS 640) 
(data not presented in the order asked) 
Washington,D.C. 90 Seattle 3 7 Dallas 11 
New York 88 Philadelphia 29 St. Louis 8 
San Francisco 71 Miami 29 KansasCity 8 
Chicago 6 5 Boston 2 8 Omaha 8 
Los Angeles 5 7 New Orleans 19 Indianapolis 7 
Detroit 4 7 Houston 14 Tulsa 3 
Pit tsburg 3 9 Denver 12 Tuscon 3 
Your own city, unless included on this list 18 
6/1964 I have only two small items left. A while back, we used a 
scale that measures how desirable something is to you, or how 
undesirable it is. Please remember that plus 3 means it is 
very desirable, and minus 3 that it is very undesirable. 
(NORC-SRS 640) 
A .  With some of the information 
that you now have, how 
desirable is it to put 
anti-missile missiles around 
our cities? 5 2 2 0 1 2  4 2 2 5 1 
B. How desirable is it to 
put anti-missile missiles 
around your city/city 
or cities nearest you 40 16 16 7 5 3 10 1 
2/1966 Let me give you a few more cards. On these cards are written 
some [ a ]  possible international situations that may come about 
in about five years or by the early 1970's. We shall use the 
folder again that you already saw when we talked abut the Cold 
War in general. 
Please sort the cards you now have depending on how likely you 
believe these various world situations will be within the next 
five years, or by the early 1970's. 
The United States will have anti-missile aissiles that 
will be so effective in shooting down enemy missiles that no 
enemy would think of attacking us. (NORC-SRS 876) 
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2/1966 Now will you please sort these cards once again, depending on 
how much you personally want or do not want each of these 
international situations to happen. 
The United States will have anti-missile missiles that will 
be so effective in shooting down enemy missiles that no enemy 
would think of attacking us. (NORC-SRS 876) 
6/1968 Do you think there is any defense possible against enemy 
missiles now? (ORC/N) 
Yes 
No 
Don' t know 
6/1968 What kind of defense are you thinking about? (ORC/N) 
Missile 
Other 
Don' t know 
6/1968 How would these missiles work? (ORC/N) 
Correct answer (simple) 
Correct answer (sophisticated) 
Don' t know 
6/1968 Does the U.S. already have some ABM's ready for action? (ORC/N) 
Yes 
N 0 
Don' t know 
Not yet 
6/1968 Does Russia already have some ABM's ready for action? (ORC/N) 
Yes 
No 
Don' t know 
Not yet 
6/1968 How about China? (ORC/N) 
Yes 
No 
Don' t know 
Not yet 
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6/1968 If we had an  A B M  system i n  f u l l  o p e r a t i o n ,  what would our 
n a t i o n ' s  need f o r  f a l l o u t  s h e l t e r s  be? (ORC/N) 
Needed f o r  everyone 
More needed 
About t h e  same needed 
Fewer needed 
Not needed 
Don' t know 
6/1968 Would you r a t h e r  l i v e  i n  o r  nea r  an  a r e a  t h a t  is defended by 
ABM's o r  i n  an  a r e a  t h a t  does n o t  have such p r o t e c t i o n ?  (ORC/N) 
P r o t e c t e d  c i t y  
No d i f f e r e n c e  
Unprotected c i t y  
Don't know 
6/1968 Why would you say  t h a t ?  (ORC/N) 
(Those 49% who answered p r o t e c t e d  c i t y -  f i r s t  response)  
S a f e t y  
P r o t e c t i o n  
Surv iva l  
Don't know/NA 
(Those 23% who answered unprotec ted  c i t y -  f i r s t  response)  
S a f e t y  
Surv iva l  
Not t a r g e t  
Live away from c i t y  
Don't know/NA 
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6/1968 I am going t o  read  you some s t a t e m e ~ . t s  about  ABM's .  I would 
l i k e  t o  know how d e s i r a b l e  o r  wanted each a c t i o n  i s .  Th i s  w i l l  
be t h e  s c a l e  t h a t  you w i l l  u s e .  The minus 3  s t a n d s  f o r  
something t h a t  you would d i s l i k e  very  much. Zero s t a n d s  f o r  
something you d o n ' t  c a r e  one way o r  ano2her abou t .  P lus  t h r e e  
s t a n d s  f o r  something you would very  much want t o  happen. You 
may use any number on t h e  s c a l e  t h a t  b e s t  f i t s  your op in ion .  
(ORC/N 
How d e s i r a b l e  is i t  t o  p u t  
ABMs around a l l  l a r g e  c i t i e s  
i n  America? 4 8 1 1  9  9 3  3  5 1 1  
How d e s i r a b l e  i s  it  i f  they 
on ly  could  shoo t  down about  
oneoutofeverytwomissiles? 23 10 9  3 5  7 2 2  16 
I n  l a t e  1967, t h e  government 
announced t h a t  i t  was s t a r t i n g  
a  l i m i t e d  ABM program c o s t i n g  
about  f i v e  b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  i n  
t h e  nex t  f i v e  y e a r s .  How 
d e s i r a b l e  i s  such a program 
t o  you 39 13 11 10 3  3  7 14 
A b igger  program c o s t i n g  about  
40 b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  has been 
sugges ted .  How d e s i r a b l e  
is such a  program t o  you 26 8  9  16 5 4 14 1 7  
I f  we know t h a t  t h e  Russians 
have an  a c t i v e  ABM program, 
how d e s i r a b l e  would i t  be 
t h a t  t h e  U . S .  have one? 6 6 9 5 5 1 1 3 9  
6/1968 Here a r e  some p o s s i b l e  consequences of  t h i s  hBM program. I 
would l i k e  t o  know f o r  each one whether you s t r o n g l y  a g r e e ,  
a g r e e ,  d i s a g r e e ,  o r  s t r o n g l y  d i s a g r e e  t h a t  i t  might be a  
consequence. (ORC/M) 
SA A D SD bK 
Having ABM's around our  c i t i e s  
w i l l  make people t h i n k  t h a t  war 
i s  more l i k e l y  13 3  7 3 6 6 8 
If we have ABM's, t h e  Russidns 
w i l l  t h i n k  t h a t  we a r e  going t o  
s t a r t  A war 5 2 5 50 9 11 
Having ABMs w i l l  make America 
s t r o n g e r ,  and an  enemy w i l l  be 
l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  a t t a c k  us  2 6  4 8  15 3 9 
New o f f e n s i v e  weapons w i l l  
p u t  ABM1s o u t  of  d a t e ,  s o  i t  
is  r e a l l y  n o t  worth having them 4  17 4  3  9 27  
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,968 Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial 
disarmament agreements that the United States could make with 
other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one 
would be. (ORC/N) 
Reach an agreement with Russia to limit the number of ABMs 
12/1968 Now let me ask about a number of specific areas where it has 
been suggested the U.S. military defenses be strengthened. 
For each, tell me if you think this ought to be done or not? 
(Harris 1900) 
Ought to Should Not 
be Done Not Do Sure 
1. Build up a system of anti-missile 
defenses 60 2 3 17 
2. Increpse the number of airplanes 
which can carry nuclear warheads 4 8 3 3 19 
3. Increase the number of nuclear 
warhead long-range missiles 5 1 2 8 2 1 
4 .  Increase the number of men in 
the U.S. armed forces 3 1 5 2 17 
5 .  Give NATO a real capability 
for waging nuclear warfare 2 5 4 8 2 7 
6. Convert the space program into 
a system of nuclear weapons space 
stations 2 5 49 2 6 
.2/1968 A. Now I want to read you some statements about what some 
people have said they expect President Nixon to do when he gets 
into office. For each one, tell me if you think he probably 
will do it or not. 
B. For each item on that list, tell me is this something you 
would like to see President Nixon do or not? (Harris 1900) 
A - B 
Will Will NS Like Not NS 
Do Not Like 
Do 
He will try to work out a 
peaceful settlement on arms 
control with the Russians 74 10 16 86 5 9 
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4/1969 On the next topic, have you heard or read about the discussion 




4/1969 (Of those [69%] who had heard of ABM) Do you happen to have an 
opinion about the ABM program as submitted to Congress by 




4/1969 (Of those [ 4 2 % ]  who had heard and had an opinion of the ABM) Do 




Not heard/No Opinion/NA 
4/1969 President Nixon recently made a decision to go ahead with 
building the "thin" Sentinel-Safeguard missile defense system. 
At the beginning this would involve putting in the system at 
two of our missile bases in Montana and South Dakota for seven 
billion dollars. Do you tend to approve or disapprove of 
President Nixon's decision to go ahead with the anti-missile 
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4/1969 Let me read some statements about President Nixon's decision to 
go ahead with the Sentinel Safeguard anti-missile system. For 
each one, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree: 
(Herris 1926) 
Agree Dis- Not 
Agree Sure 
Many scientists think the system is a 
mistake because it could not prevent the loss 
of millions of U.S. lives in an atomic attack 40 2 8 3 2 
The Russians have already installed 66 ABM's, 
so we should have some, too 6 0 19 2 0 
By taking this step, President Nixon hurt the 
chances of reaching arms control agreements with 
the Russians 19 5 2 2 9 
President Nixon's decision was a cautious 
first step, not even going as far as President 
Johnson wanted to go 4 6 14 4 0 
We could have used the seven billion dollars 
better for our education, health, housing, and 
poverty needs at home 4 9  3 1 20 
It is better to be over prepared militarily 
than to be caught short without proper defenses 78 9 13 
In a nuclear age, the U.S. should concentrate 
on peaceful arms control rather than building 
more missile systems 4 7 2 9 2 4 
President Nixon has now shown he will follow 
a tough line on military matters 50 18 3 2 
We would be better eliminating the 10% income 
tax surcharge than building the Sentinel 
Safeguard missile system 3 1 40 2 9  
The Russians are developing super-nuclear 
missiles and we need to be defended against them 68 10 2 2 
5/1969 On the next topic, have you heard or read about the discussion 





5/1969 (Of those [ 7 2 % ]  who had heard of ABM) Do you happen to have an 
opinion about the ABM program as submitted to Congress by 
President Nixon? (AIPO 780) 
Yes 
No 
Not Heard and No opinion 
5/1969 (Of those [41%] who had heard and had an opinion) Do you favor 
or oppose the ABM program submitted by Nixon? (AIPO 780) 
Favor 
Oppose 
Not heard/No Opinion/NA 
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5/1969 Do you think i t  is poss ible  t o  bu i l d  a defense system aga ins t  
enemy miss i l es?  (ORC/Nx) 
Yes 
No 
Don' t know 
5/1969 A s  f a r  a s  you know, does the  United S t a t e s  a l ready have some 
ABMs i n  place  and ready t o  use? (ORC/Nx) 
Yes 
No 
Not y e t ,  but  w i l l  (vol)  
Don' t know 
5/1969 Do you th ink  the  United S t a t e s  should have some sort: of ABM 
defense system, o r  should not? (ORC/Nx) 
Yes, should 
No, should not 
No opinion 
5/1969 A s  f a r  a s  you know, does Russia a l ready have some ABMs i n  place 
and ready t o  use? (ORC/Nx) 
Yes 
No 
Not y e t ,  bu t  w i l l  ( v o l . )  
Don' t know 
5/1969 A s  f a r  a s  you know, does China a l ready have some ABMs i n  place 
and ready t o  use? (ORC/Nx) 
Yes 
No 
Not y e t ,  but  w i l l  ( v o l . )  
Don' t know 
5/1969 Pres ident  Nixon has come out  f o r  a l imi ted  ABM system--cal led 
t he  Safeguard System-- which is  supposed t o  p ro t ec t  our a b i l i t y  
t o  s t r i k e  back a t  an a t t a cke r .  Do you th ink  Congress should 
approve t h i s  system, o r  should not?  (C!RC/Nx) 
Yes, should approve it 
No, should not  approve 
Depends 
No opinion 
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7/1969 On the next topic, have you heard or read about the discussion 




7/1969 (Of those [69X] who had heard of ABM) Do you happen to have an 
opinion about the ABM program as submitted to Congress by 




7/1969 (Of those [28%] who had heard and had an opinion) Do you favor 
or oppose the ABM program submitted by Nixon? (AIPO 784) 
Favor 
Oppose 
Not heard/No Opinion/NA 
7/1969 Let me read you some statements which have been made about 
events in the news. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or 
disagree: (Harris 1939) 
Agree Dis- Not 
Agree Sure 
The Safeguard ABM anti-missile system 
is necessary in order for us to keep 
up with the Russians in the nuclear 
arms race 2 4 2 6 
It is better to be over-prepared 
militarily than to be caught short 
without proper defenses 7 9 
In a nuclear age, the U.S. should 
concentrate on peaceful arms control 
rather than building more missile 
systems like the Safeguard ABM 
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10/1969 A. I am going to give you a list of problems t.he United States 
faces at home. For each, tell me if you would like to see a 
great deal of attention paid to it, some attention to it, or 
not much attention paid to it . . . ? (Harris 1970) 
B. If you had to choose, which two or three on the list are 
most important to you personally? 
C. And which two or three do you feel most urgently need 
attention? 
(Data not presented in the order the question was asked.) 
Crime or, the streets 















9/1970 Would you favor or oppose agreement between the U.S. and Russia on 
. . . . (Harris 2037) (data not presented in the order asked) 
Favor Oppose Not sure 
Exchanging scholars and cultural groups 78 11 11 
Getting European countries to pledge 
not to go to war against each other 7 7 8 15 
Joint action to keep Communist China 
from starting wars 7 6 8 16 
Taking joint action if another nation 
threatens to use nuclear weapons 7 3 12 15 
Expanding trade between the 2 countries 73 14 13 
Limiting anti-missile (ABM) svstems 6 9 16 15 
Joint exploration of the oceans 6 9 15 16 
Exploring outer space 6 1 2 7 12 
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1/1971 How would you rate the job Congress has done . . . - -  excellent, 
pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Harris 2053) (data not presented 
in the order the question was asked) 
E PG OF P N S 
Requiring pollution-free car engine 
by 1975 
Banning cigarette advertising on TV 
Giving the vote to 18 year olds 
Extending federal aid to education 
Rejecting the supersonic transport 
(SST) subsidy 
Turning down Haynesworth and Carswell 
for the Supreme Court 
Passing the bill ex~andinp the ABM 
missile defense svstem 
Overriding President Nixon's veto 
of the hospital building bill 
Not passing Pres Nixon's welfare bill 
Passing a new anti-crime bill 6 30 26 14 25 
Not increasing Social Security benefits 2 11 16 54 17 
Not passing the bill on federal-state 
revenue sharing 2 8 14 31 45 
1/1971 Do you favor or oppose the U.S. and Russia coming to an 





1/1971 Would you like to see the federal government increase the 
amount of money spent, cut back, oz not change the amount of 
money spent . . . . (Harris 2055) (data not presented in the 
order asked) 
I CB NC NS 
Programs to control air 6 water pollution 85 3 9 3 
Aid to public schools 6 7 5 25 3 
Aid to cities 5 8 9 25 8 
Support prices for farmers 44 17 28 11 
The space program 17 49 29 5 
The ABM missile svstern 15 40 32 13 
Foreign military and economic aid 10 51 30 8 
The war in Vietnam 6 63 24 7 
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6/1971 Would you favor o r  oppose agreement between the  United S t a t e s  
and Russia on . . . l im i t i ng  a n t i - m i s s i l e  (ABM) systems 




6/1971 Have you heard o r  read anything about the  so -ca l l ed  SALT t a l k s  





6/1971 (Asked of those 29% who answered yes) Do you be l ieve  these 
t a l k s  a r e  now making progress ,  o r  a r e n ' t  they? (ORC/Nx) 
Are making progress 
Are no t  making progress 
No opinion 
2/1972 Would you favor o r  oppose agreement between the  U . S .  and Russia 




3/1972 There a r e ,  of course ,  o ther  important th ings  t h a t  var ious  
people have been t a lk ing  about and suggesting.  Not a l l  of them 
art> l i k e l y  t o  come about,  bu t  regard less  of how like1.y they 
a r e ,  p lease  t e l l  me how much you personal ly  would l i k e  t o  see  
each one happen o r  not  happen. Here is a s c a l e  on which minus 
~ n r e e  i nd i ca t e s  t h a t  you personal ly  would not l i k e  t o  see  t h i s  
happen, zero i nd i ca t e s  t h a t  you a r e  ne i t he r  opposed nor i n  
favor of i t ,  and plus three  ind ica tes  t h a t  you would very much 
l i k e  t o  see  it happen. You may use any number on the  s ca l e  to  
i nd i ca t e  your opinion.  
Stopping a l l  plans t o  put  a n t i - m i s s i l e  miss i l es  (ABM's) 
around some mi l i t a ry  bases and c i t i e s .  (MIS/N) 
Pro tec t ing  most of our b i g  c i t i e s  and important m i l i t a ry  
bases with a n t i - m i s s i l e  miss i l es  (ABM's) (MIS/N) 
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3/1972 Here is another simple card. I would like to ask you a few 
questions abut how much money you think we, as a country, are 
spending on a few program. The card shows the a~proximate 
total amount for one year. 
How much do you think was spent on the anti.-missile missiles 
(ABMs); that is, missiles that could shoot down enemy missiles 
before they could hit us? 
And about how much should we spend on anti-missile missiles 

























3/1972 Now using the same desirability card as we did earlier, 1 would 
like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. If our 
government decided to sign general disarmament treaty, there are 
probably some conditions that you would want our country to 
insist upon. Talsing one condition at a time, how desirable is 
it that it be met before our country actually signs a treaty? 
Reach an agreement with Russia to limit the number of 
anti-missile missiles (ABM1s) (MIS/N) 
+3  +2 +1 O -1 -2 -3 DK 
Agree with Russia to have no anti-missile missiles (ABM's) 
at all. 
+3 +2 +I O -1 -2 -3 DK 
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6/1972 Do you approve o r  disapprove of the  agreement between Russia 
and the  U . S .  . . . t o  l i m i t  t he  manufacture of nuclear 




7/1972- Miss i l es  which can i n t e r cep t  and dest roy enemy rockets  
5/1974 launched aga ins t  t h i s  country before they g e t  near enough t o  
cause se r ious  damage: 
I f  a development l i k e  the  one described above were t o  be put  
i n t o  operat ion,  how much would i t  change your own l i f e ?  
(Field/LMH) 
Very much 
Quite a b i t  
S l i g h t l y  
Not very much 
Not a t  a l l  
Don't know 
7/1972- How much do you think it  (defensive  misz i les ]  would change l i f e  
5/1974 f o r  most people? (Field-ZMH) 
Very much 
Quite a b i t  
S l i g h t l y  
Not very much 
Not a t  a l l  
DK 
7/1972- How sure  do you f e e l  t h a t  t h i s  development would have 
5/1974 bene f i c i a l  r e s u l t s ?  (Field/LMH) 
Absolutely sure  
Quite sure  
Not too sure  
Would have none 
DK 
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7/1972- (Asked of those  54%/56X who were a b s o l u t e l y  s u r e  o r  q u i t e  s u r e  
5/1974 of  b e n e f i c i a l  r e s u l t s )  What do you s e e  a s  t h e  most important  
b e n e f i t s  o r  good t h i n g s  t h a t  might r e s u l t  i f  such a development 
were a c t u a l l y  t o  take  p lace?  ( F i e l d / M l )  
Provide added p r o t e c t i o n ,  p r o t e c t ,  
s a feguard  coun t ry ,  make count ry  
s e c u r e ,  p r o t e c t  us  2 5 
Make us  f e e l  s a f e ,  p r o t e c t e d ,  h e l p  us  
have peace of  mind, l e s s  t e n s i o n ,  f e a r  15  
Would d e t e r  aggress ion ,  enemy would 
n o t  a t t a c k  1 3  
Would save  l i v e s ,  people would 
s u r v i v e ,  keep u s  from be ing  wiped o u t  12 
Always need b e t t e r  de fenses ,  
necessary  f o r  count ry  1 2  
Might h e l p  b r i n g  peace ,  promote 
peace ,  be no sense  i n  war 3 
Would i n t e r c e p t  m i s s i l e s  be fo re  
they  g o t  h e r e ,  be fo re  they do damage 15 
Would make j o b s ,  i n c r e a s e  employment 4  
7/1972- How s u r e  do you f e e l  t h a t  t h i s  development would have a 
5/1974 drawback o r  bad r e s u l t s ?  (Field/LMH) 
Absolute ly  s u r e  
Qui te  s u r e  
Not t o o  s u r e  
Would have none 
DK 
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7/1972- (Asked of those 28%/33X who were absolutely sure or quite sure 
5/1974 of bad results) What do you see as the most important 
drawbacks or bad things that might result if such a development 
were actually to take place? (Field/LMH) 
Cost too much, cost to develop too high 18 8 
Should spend money for other things, 
not weapons 7 10 
It could be misused, used against 
others 3 3 
It could lead to war, annihilation 19 18 
It continues the arms race, they 
have same thing 2 0 20 
All complaints against policy of 
armaments, violence wrong, nations 
should trust each other 2 3 2 6 
Too much potential for error, human 
error, could go wrong 10 11 
All others 2 
7/1972- How much would you like to see or how strongly would you be 
5/1974 opposed to missiles which can intercept and destroy enemy 
rockets launched against this country before they get near 
enough to cause serious damage? (Field/LMH) 
Very strongly opposed to 15 15 
Somewhat strongly opposed to 6 5 
Slightly opposed to 4 4 
Neither opposed to nor would like to see 13 12 
Slightly like to see 14 13 
Somewhat strongly like to see 2 2 16 
Very strongly like to see 3 4 3 7 
DK 1 
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7/1972- Which one or two of the people or groups listed in the question 
5/1974 above DO you think actually has the MOST say in deciding 
whether space stations which would be manned by military 
personnel who can aim rockets and missiles at targets on earth 
should be built? (Field/LMH) 
Technical experts 
Business leaders 
Top government leaders 
Congressmen 
The courts 
Organized consuer groups 
Individual people/the public 
No one 
DK 
7/1972- Which one or two of the people or groups listed in the question 
5/1974 above do you think has the LEAST say in deciding whether space 
stations which would be manned by military personnel who can 




Top government leaders 
Congressmen 
The courts 
Organi~ed consumer groups 
Individual people/the public 
No one 
DK 
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7/1972- Which one o r  txro of  t h e  people  o r  groups mentioned i n  t h e  
5/1974 q u e s t i o n  abcve i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t ,  SHOULD 
have t h e  MOST s a y  i n  d e c i d i n g  whether  space  s t a t i o n s  which 
would be manned by m i l i t a r y  persokinel who can  aim r o c k e t s  and 
m i s s i l e s  a t  t a r g e t s  on e a r t h  should  be b u i l t ?  (Field/IMH) 
Techn ica l  e x p e r t s  
Bus iness  l e a d e r s  
Top government l e a d e r s  
Congressmen 
The c o u r t s  
Organized consumer groups 
I n d i v i d u a l  people / the  p u b l i c  
No one 
DK 
7/1972- ' h i c h  one o r  two of t h e  peonle  o r  groups mentioned i n  t h e  
5/1974 q u e s t i o n  above i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t ,  SHOULD 
have t h e  LEAST s a y  i n  d e c i d i n g  whether  space  s t a t i o n s  which 
would be mann.d by m i l i t a r y  personnel  who can  aim r o c k e t s  and 
m i s s i l e s  a t  t a r g e t s  on e a r t h  should be b u i l t ?  (Field/LMH) 
Techn ica l  e x p e r t s  
Bus iness  l e a d e r s  
Top government l e a d e r s  
Congressmen 
The c o u r t  
Organized consumer groups 
I n d i v i d u a l  peop le / the  p u b l i c  
No one 
DK 
9/1972 Mould yo11 l i k e  t o  s e e  t h e  f ede rL l l  government spend more money, 
l e s s ,  o r  abou t  t h e  same smount o f  money on . . . . ( H a r r i s  
2234) ( d a t a  n o t  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  o r d e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  was a sked )  
Research & development of  new 
weapons systems 
Nuclear  submarines 
U.S. b a s e s  h e r e  i n  t h e  U.S. 
A i r c r a f t  c a r r i e r s  
A n t i - m i s s i l e  svstem 
Nuclear  m i s s i l e  systems 
Defense i n  g e n e r a l  
U.S. bases  ove r seas  
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6/1973 Let me read you some possible areas of agreemerit that might come 
out of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks in Washington this month. For 
each, :ell me if you would favor or oppose :his agreement 
. . . . (Harris 2330) (data not presented ? I the order the 
question was asked) 
A D N S 
Getting Russia to allow Jews to leave 
that country more easily 8 4 4 12 
Undertaking joint exploration of the oceans 75 10 15 
Further limit in^ anti-missile (ABM) svstems 73 10 17 
Taking joint action if another nation threat- 
ens to use nuclear weapons 73 10 17 
Exchanging scientists and other 
technical missions 69 17 14 
11/1973 Let me read you some proposals which have been made for possible 
agreements between Russia and the United States. For each, tell 
me if you would favor or oppose this agreement. . . . (Harris 
2351) 
Jointly recommending East and West European 
countries not to go to war against each other 89 4 7 
Bringing about a Middle East settlement 8 9 3 8 
Undertaking joint efforts to solve the world 
energy shortage 8 8 4 8 
Undertaking joint efforts to curb air and 
water pollution 8 7 5 8 
Gecting Russia to give more freedom to 
its writers and scientists 8 3 5 12 
Getting Russia to allow Jews to leave that 
country more easily 8 1 6 13 
Limiting the number of nuclear submarines 
each country has 76 12 12 
Further limiting anti-missile (ABM) svstems 74 12 14 
Reducing the number of American and Russian 
troops in central and western Europe 74 11 15 
Exchanging scientists and other 
technical missions 72 14 14 
Expanding trade between the U.S. and Russia 71 16 13 
Give Russia favored nation status in trade as 
most Western nations have with us now 48 32 ?.O 
5/1974 see 7/1972 (Field/W) 
1/1976 Do you feel that the Russians have lived up to the terms Cheg 
agreed to under the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
(SALT Treaty) with the United States, or don't you think the 
Russians have done so? (Harris 7588) 
Russians lived up to agreement 
Not 1l.ved up to agreement 
Not sure 
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1/1976 Do you f e e l  t h a t  the  Russians have l i v e d  up t o  the  terms they 
agreed t o  under the  f i r s t  S t r a t e g i c  A r m s  L imi ta t ion  Treaty  
(SALT Treaty)  wi th  the  United S t a t e s ,  o r  d o n ' t  you th ink  the  
Russians have done so? (Har r i s  7588) 
Russians l i v e d  up t o  agreement 
Not l i v e d  up t o  agreement 
Not s u r e  
2/1978 Recently a Russian nuc lea r  s a t e l l i t e  a c c i d e n t a l l y  f e l l  ou t  of 
t h e  sky and exploded i n  western Canada. Some p ieces  of the  
s a t e l l i t e  gave o f f  r a d i a t i o n  where they f e l l .  Did t h i s  f a l l i n g  
of  a nuc lea r  s a t e l l i t e  t o  e a r t h  worry you deep ly ,  only somewhat 
o r  ha rd ly  a t  a l l ?  (Har r i s )  
Worried deeply 
Only somewhat 
Hardly a t  a l l  
Not s u r e  
2/1978 Do you favor  o r  oppose an agreement between the  US and t h e  
Sov ie t  U n i o ~  outlawing the  use of  a l l  nuclear-powered 
s a t e l l i t e s  i n  space? ( H a r r i s )  
Favor 
Oppose 
Not s u r e  
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2/1978 Let me read you some statements about satellites which have 
nuclear-powered plants in them. For each, tell me if you tend 
to agree or disagree. (Harris) 
Agree Disagree Not 
Sure 
Is is good that the US and the Soviet 
Union are able to cooperate fully 
on knowing what nuclear satellites 
are in space and where they are 8 2 
As long as countries like the Soviet 
Union and the US have nuclear weapons, 
nuclear-powered satellites ought to be 
allowed, making sure all safety 
precautions are followed 
It is important to use the most 
efficient fuel possible on satellites, 
and nuclear power is probably the 
cheapest source of power for this 
purpose. 54 
If the Russian satellite had fallen 
in the middle of a deeply populated 
place instead of the northwest woods 
of Canada, it would have caused people 
to be burned from radiation. 8 2 11 
The real worry is that countries can 
have nuclear-powered satellites in space 
that could be crashed deliberately into 
population centers, causing nuclear 
destruction 7 7 12 11 
It was shocking that both the Soviet 
Union and the US knew about the 
nuclear-powered satellites in space 
and kept it a secret froa the world. 60 2 6 14 
12/1978 Now using the same desirability card as we did just now, I 
wollld like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. If our 
goverrlment decided to sign general disarmament treaty, there 
are probably some conditions that you would want our country to 
insist upon. Taking one condition at a time, how desirable is 
it that it be met before our country actually signs a treaty? 
(MIS/N) 
Agree with Russia to have no anti-missile missiles (ABMts) at 
all? 
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4/1979b How effective do you feel our military defense is against a 
Russian missile attack on this country--very effective, only 
somewhat effective, or not very effective? (ABC/Harris 792106) 
Very effective 
Only somewhat effective 
Not very effective 
Not sure 
2/1985 Did you know that the United States has a treaty with the 
Soviet Union not to protect Americans from a Soviet missile 
attack? (Fink) 
5/1985 Would you favor development and an eventual deployment of a 
"Star Wars" defense system for the United States, even if it 
meant that the U.S. would have to renegotiate or withdraw from 





7/1985 Supporters say such weapons could guarantee protection of the 
United States from nuclear attack and are worth whatever they 
cost. Opponents say such weap-rs will not work, will increase 
the arms race, and that the research will cost many billions of 
dollars. How about you: worild you say you approve or 




Don' t know 
7/1985 (For those 41% who approved) Currently the U.S, and the Soviet 
Union have an anti-ballistic missile treaty that prohibits both 
nations from developing certain weapons. Suppose the U.S. had 
to violate or abandon that treaty in order to develop the 
space-based weapons. Would you still favor the development of 
those space-based weapons, or not? (ABC/WP) 
Yes, would still favor 
No, would not still favor 
Don't know or no opinion 
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9/1985 I n  1972, the  United S t a t e s  and the  Sov ie t  Union s igned the  ABM 
t r e a t y ,  which p r o h i b i t e d  e i t h e r  n a t i o n  from t e s t i n g  o r  
deploying a  n a t i o n a l  system of defense  a g a i n s t  long-range 
nuc lea r  m i s s i l e s .  Had you p rev ious ly  been aware of  t h i s  ABM 
t r e a t y ,  a s  f a r  a s  you can r e c a l l ?  (M&K) 
Yes 
N 0 
9/1985 Suppor ters  o f  t h e  A B M  t r e a t y  say  it  has made the  world s a f e r  by 
g i v i n g  both  the  United S t a t e s  and the  Sov ie t  Union the  s e c u r i t y  
of  knowing t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  cannot  use  nuc lea r  weapons 
wi thout  be ing des t royed i n  r e t a l i a t i o n .  A t  some p o i n t ,  
development of  S t a r  Wars w i l l  r e q u i r e  t h e  U.S. t o  e i t h e r  
withdraw from the  A B M  Treaty  o r  v i o l a t e  the  Trea ty .  I f  you had 
t o  choose between developing S t a r  Wars o r  keeping the  ABM 
T r e a t y ,  which would you choose? (K&K) 
Develop S t a r  Wars 
Keep ABM Treaty  
Not s u r e  
9/1985 The Reagan admin i s t r a t ion  is now working on t h i s  program known a s  
S t a r  Wars. I t  w i l l  a t tempt  t o  b u i l d  a  new defens ive  system i n  
o u t e r  space t h a t  could shoot  down nuc lea r  m i s s i l e s  f i r e d  a t  the  
U.S. Since t h e  program is c u r r e n t l y  only a  r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t ,  i t  
i s  impossible t o  p r e d i c t  how complete a  defense  it  w i l l  p rovide .  
I ' m  going t o  read  a  l i s t  of four  p o s s i b l e  S t a r  Wars systems.  For 
each one,  t e l l  me if you would s t r o n g l y  suppor t ,  suppor t ,  oppose, 
o r  s t r o n g l y  oppose b u i l d i n g  each type of  system. ( M M )  
A .  A system t h a t  was p e r f e c t  and could s u c c e s s f u l l y  defend 
a g a i n s t  a l l  incoming nuc lea r  weapons; 
B .  A system t h a t  could p r o t e c t  our  m i s s i l e  s i t e s  and some 
popula t ion  c e n t e r s ,  b u t  could no t  guarantee  the  s a f e t y  of many of 
our  major c i t i e s ;  
C .  A system designed only t o  p r o t e c t  U . S .  m i s s i l e s ,  key m i l i t a r y  
b a s e s ,  and Washington, D.C., b u t  n o t  o t h e r  a r e a s  
D .  A system t h a t  could provide a  complete defense  a g a i n s t  
long-range nuc lea r  m i s s i l e s ,  b u t  cannot  defend a g a i n s t  m i s s i l e s  
f i r e d  from submarines o r  bombers 
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11/1985 There is some question about whether research on Star Wars 
violates a 1972 treaty that the United States signed with the 
Soviet Union in which we promised not to develop, test or 
deploy anti-ballistic missiles. Would you still be in favor of 
going ahead with research on Star Wars even if it was in 
violation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty? (LAT 100) 
Go ahead 
Don' t go ahead 
Not sure 
12/1986 (Asked of those who supported or opposed Star Wars) Why do you 
support/oppose the project? (LAT/Econ) 
US UK FRG 
Support 
It would make the world safer, 
/protect the West 3 7 3 8 3 8 
It allows the US to have/maintain 
its superiority 30 12 16 
It can be used as a bargaining chip 
on arms control 13 2 1 2 1 
A lot of new/useful products, 
technologies will result 7 7 6 
Other reasons 13 2 6 18 
Don' t know na 7 6 
Oppose 
It's expensive, waste of money 3 1 2 5 2 3 
It won't work 2 5 13 16 
It will lead to an arms race in space 17 2 0 4 8 
It blocks a nuclear arms agreement - I 14 14 
Other reasons 2 0 3 2 3 0 
Don' t know na 7 6 
10/1987 At some point, development of Star Wars will require the U.S. 
to either withdraw from or violate the ABM Treaty, which 
prohibits either natlon from testing defense systems against 
long-range nr?clear missiles. If the U.S. had to choose between 
continuing its development of Star Wars or continuing to live 
by the ABM Treaty, which would you choose? (M&K/ATS) (similar 
question asked 9/1985) 
Develop Star Wars 
Keep ABM Treaty 
Not sure 
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6/1972 The United S t a t e s  should go f u r t h e r  i n  nego t ia t ing  with Sovie t  





10/2/72 SALT I en te red  i n t o  fo r ce ;  it was r a t i f i e d  by the  Senate on 
8/3/72 
11/1972 I n  h i s  second term i n  the  White House do you th ink  Pres ident  
Nixon w i l l  . . . , o r  don ' t  you th ink  he w i l l  do t h a t ?  Come to  
f u r t h e r  major agreements with the  Russians on arms con t ro l  
l i m i t a t i o n s .  (Har r i s )  
W i l l  
W i l l  no t  
ho t  su re  
6/1973 Let me read you some poss ib le  a r ea s  of agreement t h a t  might 
come ou t  of the  Nixon-Brezhnev t a l k s  i n  Washington t h i s  month. 
Far each,  t e l l  me i f  you would favor o r  oppose eac:h agreement 
. . . . (Harr is  2330) 
A Reducing the  number of American and Russian troops i n  
c e n t r a l  ~ n d  western Europe; 
B J o i n t l y  recommending t h a t  East  and West European count r i es  
pledge no t  t o  go t o  war aga ins t  each o t h e r ;  
C Taking j o i n t  a c t i on  i f  another na t ion  th rea tens  t o  use 
nuclear  weapons; 
D Agreeing t o  l i m i t  the  number of nuclear  submairines each 
country ha s .  
Favor Oppose Not su re  
11/1973 Now l e t  me read you some proposals  which have been made f o r  
poss ib le  agreements between Russia and the  US. For each,  t e l l  
me i f  you would favor o r  oppose such an agreement. . . . 
(Har r i s  2351) 
A J o i n t l y  recommending East  and West European count r i es  pledge 
no t  t o  go t o  war aga in s t  each o t h e r ;  
B Limiting the  number of nuclear  submarines each country ha s ;  
C Reducing the  number of American and Russian t roops  i n  
c e n t r a l  and western Europe. 
Favor Oppose Not su re  
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12/1974- Here is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United 
11/1982 States might have. For each one, would you please say whether 
you think that should be a very important foreign policy goal 
of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, 
or not an important goal at all . . . (Harris/CCFR-Harris 2536, 
Gallup/CGFR) 
Worldwide arms control 
12/74 12/74 11/78 1/79 11/82 11/82 
Pub Lead Pub Lead Pub Lead 
Very important 6 4 8 6 6 4 8 1 64 8 6 
Somewhat important 23 12 2 3 16 2 5 12 
Not important at all 5 1 5 3 6 2 
Not sure/NA 8 1 8 1 6 0 
12/1974 (For those 87% who answered very or somewhat important) How 
would you rate the job the U.S. is now doing in . . . worldwide 
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12/1974 Looking at this list again, which goal would you say should be 
the most important foreign policy goal of the United States? 
And which would you say should be the least important foreign 
policy goal of the United States? (Harris/CCFR-Harris 2436) 
Most Least 
Important Important 
Protecting the interests of American 
business abroad 1 
Containing communism 7 
Helping to improve standards of living 
in less developed countries 3 
Keeping peace in the world 3 1 
Worldwide arms control 2 
Defending our allies' security * 
Promoting and defending our own security 8 
Promoting the development of capitalism 
abroad * 
Securing adequate supplies of energy 3 
Helping to bring a democratic form of 
goveinment to other nations * 
Protecting weaker nations against foreign 
aggression * 
Protecting the jobs of American workers 6 
Maintaining a balance of power among 
nations 1 
Combating world hunger 5 
Helping solve world inflation 5 
Strengthening the United Nations 1 
Strengthening countries who are f-iendly 
toward L-s * 
Fostering international cooperation to 
solve common problems, such as food, 
inflation and energy 13 
None 1 
Not sure 6 
12/1974 Now 1.et me read you some proposals which have been made for 
possible agreement between the united States and the Soviet 
union. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an 
agreement. . . . (Harris 2436) 
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1/1975- Of course, everyone is more interested in some things being 
1/1980 carried in the news than in others. Is news about . . . the 
proposed arms control or SALT agreement between the US and 
Russia something you have recently been following fairly 
closely, or just following casually, or not paying much 
attention to? (Roper 75-2, 77-10, 78-3, 78-7, 79-2, 79-3, 
79-5, 79-6, 79-7, 79-8, 79-10, 80-2) 
Following closely ,-I 7 3 1 2 7 3 3 
Following casually 46 4 2 4 2 4 1 
No attention/DK 2 7 2 7 3 0 2 6 
Following closely 2 8 3 2 3 2 
Followink casually 46 4 2 4 2 
No attention/DK 2 7 2 6 2 6 
Following closely 2 8 3 3 3 0 3 2 3 4 
Following casually 44 42 42 4 4 4 5 
No attention/DK 2 8 2 5 2 9 24 2 1 
4/1975- Have you heard of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 




4/1975- (Asked of those who had heard of SALT) Do you have a generally 
1978 favorable or unfavorable opinion of such talks? (CSR/C) 
Favorable 3 7 3 3 3 5 39 3 7 
Unfavorable 13 18 17 15 18 
Can' t rate 15 15 13 24 17 
Not heard/not sure 3 5 3 3 3 5 2 2 2 7 
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Now l e t  me read  you some proposals  t h a t  have been made f o r  
p o s s i b l e  agreemnnt between t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  Sov ie t  
Union. For each ,  t e l l  me i f  you would f avor  o r  oppose such an 
agreement.  . . Extend SALT t o  a new t r e a t y  c o n t r o l l i n g  nuc lea r  
warheads each count ry  can possess .  ( H a r r i s  2732, 7588) 
Favor 
Oppose 
Not s u r e  
s e e  4/1975 (CSR/C) 
Now ir ,  t h e  a r e a  of f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  do you favor  o r  oppose 
. . . Trying t o  g e t  agreement wi th  Russ ia  on a r educ t ion  of 
s t r a t e g i c  n ~ c l e a r  arms and m i s s i l e s ?  ( H a r r i s  2G24A-1) 
Favor 
Oppose 
Not s u r e  
s e e  4/1975 (CSR/C) 
Here a r e  some of' t h e  t h i n g s  Jimmy C a r t e r  says  he wants t o  do as 
P r e s i d e n t .  P laase  t e l l  me whether you t h i n k  he w i l l ,  o r  w i l l  
n o t ,  be a b l e  t o  do them? . . . Do you t h i n k  Jimmy C a r t e r  w i l l ,  
o r  w i l l  n o t ,  be a b l e  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a t r e a t y  wi th  t h e  Russians t o  
c u t  back on m i l i t a r y  weapons (CBS/NYT) 
W i l l  
W i l l  no t  
Not s u r e  
Would you favor  o r  oppose t h e  United S t a t e s  and Russia coming 
t o  a new SALT arms agreement? ( H a r r i s )  
3/1977a ( H a r r i s  2732) 
3/1977b 1;Ha.rris 7781) 
5/1978 ( H a r r i s  7882) 
6/1978 ARC/Harris 
1/1979 ( h a r r i s  792102) 
4/1979 (ABC/Harris 792106) 
5/1979a ( H a r r i s  792107) 
Favor Oppose NS 
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3/1977a Now l e t  me read you some s ta tements  t h a t  have been made about 
P res iden t  C a r t e r ' s  s t r o n g  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  the  way the  Russians 
have t r e a t e d  d i s s i d e n t s  i n  t h e i r  cocn t ry .  For each,  t e l l  me i f  
you tend t o  agree  o r  d i sagree  . . . . ( H a r r i s  2732) 
P res iden t  Car te r  is being so c r i t i c a l  of  t h e  Russians t h a t  i t  
w i l l  be hard  t o  j u s t i f y  any agreement he might make wi th  them 
i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
Agree 
Disagree 
Not s u r e  
3/1977a Compared t o  when Henry Kiss inger  was Sec re ta ry  of  S t a t e ,  do you 
t h i n k  the  chances of working o u t  agreements wi th  Russia a r e  
b e t t e r  under P res iden t  C a r t e r ,  worse, o r  no t  much d i f f e r e n t ?  
(Har r i s  2732) 
B e t t e r  
Worse 
Not much d i f f e r e n t  
Not s u r e  
3/1977a Do you f e e l  t h a t  P res iden t  C a r t e r ' s  s taunch and continued 
emphasis on the  human r i g h t s  of Russian d i s s i d e n t s  w i l l  improve 
h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  come t o  agreement with the  Russ ians ,  w i l l  h u r t  
h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  n e g o t i a t e  wi th  them, o r  won't make much 
d i f f e r e n c e ?  ( H a r r i s  2732) 
W i l l  improve h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  each agreement 2 0 
W i l l  h u r t  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  n e g o t i a t e  2 3 
Make ,lo r e a l  d i f f e r e n c e  3 8 
Not s u r e  9 
3/1977b A s  you know, the  Russians f l a t l y  turned down Pres iden t  C a r t e r ' s  
p lan  t o  have the  two coun t i e s  agree  t o  l i m i t  nuc lea r  weapons. 
Do you f e e l  t h i s  was a  major s e t - b a c k  f o r  P res iden t  C a r t e r ,  a  
mincr s e t - b a c k ,  o r  not  a  s e t - b a c k  at: a l l ?  ( I l a r r i s  7781) 
Major se t -back  
Minor s e t - b a c k  
Not a  se t -back  a t  a l l  
Not s u r e  
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3/1977b Now let me read you some reasons which some people have given 
for the US and Russia having failed to come to an agreement in 
their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). For each reason, 
tell me if you tend to agree or disagree. (Harris 7781) 
Agree Dis- Not 
agree Sure 
The Russians don't want to agree 
to any reduction in the number of 
nuclear warhead missiles that 
thay have 70 10 20 
President Carter made a mistake 
in presenting his proposals on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis. 4 0 3 3 2 7 
The Russians only want agreements 
under whict. they can gain an 
adva2tage 7 8 7 15 
President Carter made the mistake 
of announcing publicly what he 
planned to offer the Russians 
before they knew what the offer 
was 49 2 5 2 6 
The Russians didn't want to move 
too fast in coming to an agreement 
with a new President 70 9 2 1 
President Carter hurt his chdnces 
of getting an agreement on SALT 
because he kept talking about how 
the Russians were violating human 
rights 4 6 2 5 2 9 
The US and Russia are still talking, 
so the first Russian turndown of 
Carter's proposals might not have been 
so serious 7 3 5 2 2 
President Carter showed his lack of 
experience in foreign affairs by the 
way he handled the Russians in the 
SALT *.alks. 4 4 2 6 3G 
3/1977b Do you feel the chances of the US and Russia coming to an 
agroement over arms limitations are excellent, pretty good, 






/1977b see 3/1977a (Harris) 
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4/1977- Do you think the US should or should not negotiate a treaty 




+ slight variation in question wording 
5/1977 We are currently engaged in talks to reach an arms agreeloent 
with Russia, and Russia is one of the countries President 
Carter has criticized for denying its citizens human rights. Do 
you think Carter's criticisms will decrease the chances of 
reaching an arms agreement with Russia, or increase the chances 
of reaching an agreement, or won't effect the outcome of the 
talks one way or the other? (Roper 77-5) 
Decreases chances 
Increase chances 
Won't affect outcome 
Don't knc,w/No answer 
6/1977 Would you favor President Carter continuing to speak out on 
human rights violations in Russia and elsewhere even if that 





11/1977- The United States and Russia are trying to come to a new 
8/1978 agreement limiting each country's nuclear weapons. This 
agreement would replace the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
called SALT, that ran out last October. Are you in favor of, 
or opposed to signing a new SALT agreement with Russia, or 
haven't you been paying much attention to this issue? (Roper 
77-10, 78-6, 78-8) (for additional Roper time series with 
different wording, see 11/1978) 
Favor Opposed Not paying It DK 
attention depe~ds 
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./I977 Would you favor o r  oppose a new SALT agreement with Russia i f  
the  agreement leaves the  US and Russia equal ly  s t rong  i n  ove ra l l  
nuclear  weapons - -  with the  US maybe ahead i n  some kinds of 





11/1977- When US o f f i c i a l s  negot ia te  with the  Russians,  how much 
1/1979 confidence do you have t h a t  they w i l l  p ro t ec t  U . S .  i n t e r e s t s  on 
nuclear  arms con t ro l ,  and won't s i gn  agreements t h a t  might 
endanger American s ecu r i t y  - -  a g r ea t  dea l  of confidence,  a 
f a i r  amount of confidence, not  very much confidence, o r  none a t  
a l l ?  (Roper 77-10, 79-2) 
Great deal  
Fa i r  amount 
Not very much 
None a t  a l l  
DK 
11/1977 see  1/1975 (Roper 77-10) 
1977 s ee  4/1975 (CSR/C) 
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1/1978- Do you favor or oppose a new agreement between the United 
9/1979 States and Russia which would limit nuclear weapons (NBC/AP . . . ,  
32/101, 33/103, 35/107, ep, 37/111, 39/112, 40/113, 41/117, 
43/119, 45/121) 
Favor Oppose NS 
+ Wording variation: "DG you favor or oppose agreements 
between the United States and Russia which limit nuclear 
weapons? " 
2/1978 see 1/1975 (Roper 78-3) 
2/1978 How much have you heard or read about the negotiations that the 
United States is conducting with Russia to limit the number and 
spread of strategic weapons-- a great deal, a fair amount, very 




Nothing at all 
No opinion 
4/1978a (As you know), the Russians have sent over a billion dollars 
worth of military weapons and supplies and thousands of Cuban 
troops into Ethiopia in their war with Somalia on the horn of 
Africa. The horn of Africa is important because it stands at a 
key place controlling seas that lead to Egypt, Israel, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, and can affect the shipment of oil to the US 
and other countries. Now, if the Russians and Cubans do not 
get out of Ethiopia, but remain there as a threat to take over 
that part of Africa, would you favor or oppose . . . President 
Carter warning the Russians that we won't agree to negotiating 
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5/1978 see 3/1977 (Harris 7882) 
6/1978 The government is attempting to negotiate a new agreement with 
Moscow called SALT 111 [sic] limiting the number of strategic 
nuclear weapons either country will manufacture. Do you favor 
our signing this kind of agreement with the Russians or do you 




6/1978 Ha-re you heard about the discussions that are taking place 
between the United States and the United States to limit the 
use of nuclear weapons? (CBS/NYT) , 
Yes 
No 
6/1978- Do you favor or oppose the United States and Russia coming to 




+ variation in question wording 
6/1978 If the United States and Soviet Union were to sign an agreement 
to limit nuclear weapons, do you think the Soviet Union would 
live up to its share of the agreement? 
Do you think the United States would live up to its share of 




6/1978 Do you favor cr oppose the United States breaking off arms 
limitation talks with the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union 
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see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 32/101) 
Do you think any such agreement limiting both side's weapons 
would strengthen our national security or weaken it? (NBC/AP 
32/101, 37/111, 39/112, 40/113) 
Strengthen our security 4 5 5 1 5 7 5 0 
Weaken our security 3 6 30 2 7 2 8 
Not sure 19 19 16 2 2 
see 3/1977a (ABC/Harris) 
see 11/1977 (Roper 78-6) 
Do you feel that President Carter's continuing emphasis on the 
Russian violations of human rights of dissidents in that 
country has . . . made it more difficult to reach agreement 





As a result of the Russians convicting Shcharansky and 
Ginsburg, do you think the US should or should not . . . stop 




see 1/1975 (Roper 78-7) 
Some people feel the US should not discuss a nev nuclear 
weapons agreement with Russia as long as the Russians are 
trying to expand their influence in Africa. Others feel that 
signing a new nuclear weapons agreement is mire important than 
what the Rutisitins do in Africa. Which comes closest to your 
view - -  that discussion of a .lew nuclear weapons agreement with 
Russia shoxld or should not depend on what the Russians do in 
Africa. (Roper 78-7) 
Should depend on Soviet actions in Africa 3 5 
Should not depend on Soviet actions in Africa 46 
DK 19 
see 11/1977 (Roper 78-7) 
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8/1978 Do you think that the US should break off negotiations with 
Russia aimed at limiting nuclear weapons because of Russian 
violations of human rights, or do you think negotiations should 
continue? (NBC 33/103) 
Break off negotiations 
Continue negotiations 
Not sure 
8/1978 see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 33/103) 
9/197ba Now let me ask you about some issues and problems that some 
people would like to see the next Congress do something about. 
For each, tell me how important you feel it is for Congress to 
do something about it--the top priority, very important, only 
somewhat important, or hardly important. (ABC/Harris 3948T) 
(for a similar question, see 5/1979b) 
Backing a SALT agreement with Russia to control nuclear 
weapons. 
The top priorj ty 
Very important 
Only somewhat important 
Hardly important at all 
Not sure 
9j1978a- Now, just as far as this Congressional District i.s concerned, 
10/1978 if you had tc choose, who do you feel would do a better job on 
. . - -  ihe Republican or Dem~cratic candidate for Congress? 
(ABC/Harris 38481, 3959) 
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10/1978- For t h e  p a s t  few y e a r s ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  and Russ ia  have had a  
3/1979 p o l i c y  of  t r y i n g  t o  r each  agreements which w i l l  r e l a x  t e n s i o n s  
between them. Do you t h i n k  t h e  Russ ians  can  be t r u s t e d  t o  l i v e  
up t o  such agreements o r  d o n ' t  you t h i n k  so?  (NBC/AP 35/107; 
40/113) 
Can be  t r u s t e d  
Cannot be  t r ~ s t e d  
Not s u r e  
10/1978 s e e  9/1978 ( H a r r i s  3959) 
11/1978- I n  June  1979a979, P r e s i d e n t  C a r t e r  f o r  t h e  US and P r e s i d e n t  
11/1980 Brezhnev f o r  Russ ia  sigrred a  new SALT t r e a t y .  The t r e a t y ,  
which would l a s t  u n t i l  1979a985, l i m i t s  each  count ry  t o  a 
maximum of  2 ,250  long-range  n u c l e a r  m i s s i l e s  arid bombers. As 
you know, t h e r e ' s  a  good d e a l  of  con t rove r sy  about  t h i s  
proposed t r e a t y .  Do you t h i n k  t h e  US Senate  should  v o t e  f o r  
t h i s  new SALT t r e a t y  o r  a g a i n s t  i t ?  (Roper 78 -10 ,  7 9 - 2 ,  7 9 - 5 ,  
7 9 - 7 ,  7 5 9 ,  79 -10 ,  8 0 - 2 ,  80-10)  
For Agains t  Mixed D K 
Fee 1 ings  
( ~ 0 1 )  
+ S l i g h t  v a r i a t i o n  i n  q u e s t i o n  wording: "The U.S and Russian 
n e g o t i a t o r s  have about  reached  agreement on a  SALT t r e a t y .  
The t r e a t y ,  which would l a s t  u n t i l  1979a985, . . . . ( t h e  r e s t  
o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  is t h e  same."  
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On another subject, do you happen to know which countries arc 
taking part in the SALT talks? (Roper 78-10) 
US and Russia only 
US, Russia & others 
Russia only 
US only 
Russia & other only 
Other only 
No/DK 
Actually, the SALT talks involve Russia and {:he US only. To 
the best of your knowledge, which one statement best describes 
the main goal of the SALT talks? (Roper 78-1Cl) 
To limit the number of US ti Russian 
long-range nuclear weapons 
To stop the sale of advanced weapons to 
poor countries 
To increase US trade with Russia 
To reduce the nunrber of US and Russian 
troopn in Europe 
DK 
HJW closely would you say you personally have followed news 
about :he following issues and events-- very closely, somewhat 
closely, or not very closely . . . the negotiations for 
strategic arms? (Gallup/CCFR) 
Very closely 
Somewhat closely 
Not very closely 
Not sure 
Would you favor or oppose . . . an agreement with Russia 
limjting nuclear weapons? (CBS) (see similar questions 4/1977) 
Favor 
Oppose 
see 12/1974 Harris/CCFR (Gallup/CCFR) 
Do you favor or oppose a new agreement between the United 





see 1/1978 (NBC ep) 
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12/1978 Which ONE of the following issues do you think the new Congress 
should act on first? (NBC/AP 37/111) (data not presented in 
the order asked) 
Inflation 
Cuts in federal spending 
Crime 
Nationel health insurance 
Energy 
Tax cuts 
US military strength 
Treaty with Russia to limit nuclear weapot,: 
Something else 
Not sure 
'-2/1978 Which ONE of the following issues do you think the new Congrsss 
should NGT act on in 19791 (NBC/AP 37/111) (data not presented 
in the order asked) 
National t,ealth insurance 
US military strength 








12/1975 see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 37/1?1) 
12/1978 see 6/1978 (NBC/AP 37/111) 
1978 see 4/1975 (CSR/C) 
1/1979 Now l e t  me read you some statements t h a t  some people have made 
about the  United S t a t e s  and Russia corning t o  a new SALT arms 
agreement. For each,  t e l l  me i f  you agrec o r  d i sagree .  (Harr is  
792102) 
Agree Disagree No t  
Sure 
A t  a time when i t  i s  poss ible  f o r  the  US and 
Russia t o  blow each other  up with nuclear weapons 
i t  is v i t a l  f o r  the  two count r ies  t o  rhach an 
agreement t o  l i m i t  nuclear  arms 8 5 11 4 
I f  our m i l i t a r y  and Defense Department 
l eaders  say t h a t  the  SALT agreement with 
the  Russians is  a good deal  f o r  us ,  then 
the  US Senate should r a t i f y  such an 
agreement 
I t  is be tce r  f o r  us t o  fo rge t  nuclear 
arms t r e a t i e s  with the  Russians and bu i ld  
up our m i l i t a r y  s t r eng th  t o  be sure  we 
a r e  super ior  t o  them 
Because the  chances are t h a t  we w i l l  keep 
our end of the  bargain and the  Russians w i l l  
n o t ,  we should not s i gn  any agreement with 
them l im i t i ng  nuclear weapons 
If we don ' t  come t o  an agreement with the  
Russians on con t ro l l i ng  nuclear weapons, 
then one day we w i l l  end up i n  a nuclear war 
t h a t  would dest roy ourselves and the  world 60 3 3 
Even though we w i l l  i n s i s t  on an inspect ion 
system t o  be sure  both s i de s  a r e  ca r ry ing  
out  a SALT agreement, i t  w i l l  a l l  be worthless 
because the  Russians w i l l  f i n d  a way t o  cheat  5 8 34 
1/1979 see  3/1977 (Harr is  792102)  
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1/1979- Now another  s u b j e c t .  Can you t e l l  me k>ich  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  
5/1986 involved i n  t h e  SALT t r e a t y - -  t h e  t r e a t y  t h a t  would l i m i t  
s t r a t e g i c  nuc lea r  weapons? (CBS/NYT) 
1/79 6/79 11/79 10/81+ 5/86-t 
CBS/NYT CBS/NYT CBS/NYT ABC/WP SIRC 
U.S. /v .S .S .R.  2 3 30 3 8 3 7 4 7 
P a r t i a l l y  c o r r e c t  18 14 14 3 
I n c o r r e c t  6 9 4 1 3  1 
No Opinion. 5 3 4 7 44 50 4 9 
+ S l i g h t l y  v a r i a t i o n  i n  q u e s t i o n  wording 
Do you t h i n k  t h e  United S t a t e s  should o r  should n o t  n e g o t i a t e  a 
t r e a t y  wi th  t h e  Russians t o  l i m i t  s t r a t e g i c  m i l i t a r y  weapons? 
(CBS/NYT) ( s e e  s i m i l a r  q u e s t i o n  6/1978) 
Should 
Should n o t  
DK/NA 
Do you t h i n k  a t r e a t y  wi th  t h e  Sov ie t  Union l i m i t i n g  weapons 
w i l l  o r  w i l l  n o t  enable  t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  spend l e s s  money 
for defense? (CBS/NYT) 
W i l l  
W i l l  n o t  
DK/NA 
Do you t h i n k  an  arms t r e a t y  wi th  t h e  Sov ie t  Union w i l l  o r  w i l l  
n o t  reduce t h e  r i s k  of war wi th  Russia? (CBS/NYT) 
W i l l  
W i l l  n o t  
DK/N A 
s e e  1/1975 (Roper 79-2) 
see 11/1977 (Roper 79-2)  
s e e  11/1978 (Roper 79-2)  
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2/1979 Why do you favor such a treaty? Is it because the treaty would 
redu~e the chancas of war, or because it would slow down the 
arms race, or because it would cut defense spending, or because 
it would increase the status of the U~ited States i.n the 
world? (NBC/AP 39/112) 
Reduce chances cf war 
Slow down arms race 
Cut defense spending 
Inczease US status 
Not sure 
2/1979 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "No 
matter what happens--even signing a new agreement limiting 




2/1979 see 1/1978 (NBC/A? 39/112) 
2/1979 see 6/1978 (NBC/AP 39/112) 
2/1979 see 1/1975 (Roper 79-3) 
3/1979- At the present time, the United States and the Soviet Union 
10/1979 are close to reac!ling agreement on a new Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty, usually called SALT 1 1 .  Have you already 
heard or read enough about it to have an opinion? (If yes) Do 
you favor or oppose this new SALT agreement7 (NBC/AP 40/113, 
43/119, 45/121, 48/125) 
Not heard enough to 
have an opinion 7 9 6 4 5 8 54 4 4 
Favor 13 2 6 2 1 2 0 2 5 
Oppose 6 7 17 2 3 2 6 
Not sure 2 3 4 3 5 
+ Slight variation in question wording: "Recently the United 
States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on a new 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, usually called SALT 11. Have 
you . . . (the question is the same from here)" 
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3/1979- Have you heard or read about SALT IT, the proposed nuclear arms 
10/1980 agreement between the United States and Russia? (AIPO 1124G1 
1131G, 1139G, 1149G, 1163G) (see similar question 6/1986) 
3/79 6/79 10/79 3/80 10/80 
Yes 
No 
What do you think would be the 
advantages of such a treaty? 
Reduce nuclear proliferation: 
limit nuclear arms on both sides, 
control nuclear power, cease 
manufacture of atomic weapons, 
more nuclear control. 
Restrict arms/limit arms 
(no mention of nuclear): curtail 
explosive arms race, keep main 
powers at a minimum. 
World peace/keep us out of war: 
more security, world security, 
deterrent to armed conflict, 
lowering tensions. 
None/no advantages/ none for 
the US. Don't trust the Russians, 
all on the Russian side, you can't 
trust everybody, Russia doesn't 
keep its word. 12 19 2 3 
Each would know what the other had: 
they couldn't build any weapons we 
didn't know about and vice versa. 2 2 2 
Advantage in treaties in general: 
keep both sides at the negotiating 
table, to have an agreement with the 
Russians . 2 5 4 
Wi.11 help the economy: less defense 
spending, more money for other things, 
concentrate on our own people 3 3 2 
Dangerous Russian buildup needs to 
be controlled: we have to control 
the Russians. 1 1 1 
No opinion because of lack 
of information 2 3 5 
Equality of defense ability of 
each nation 1 * 1 
Would be good thing/ would be great 1 2 2 
Miscellaneous .k * 
Don't know 15 2 2 2 4 
Not asked - -  haven't heard/read 
of SALT I1 41 18 19 
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3/1979- And what do you think wodd be the the disadvantages of such a 
10/1980 treaty? (AIPO 1124G, 1131G, 1139G, 1149G, 1163G) 
Lack of proof of compliance: 
must have enforcement, 
monitoring of Russia 
Can't trust the Russians: 
Russians will lie, Russians 
are not trustworthy, we 
would always be skeptical 
of what the Russians are doing. 10 
None/no disadvantages 7 
Russia will not abide by 
the agreement/ will take 
advantage of the US: 
Russians would expect us 
to abide by the agreement, 
we will be left holding the bag. 7 
Russia is too much ahead: it 
would surpass the US in power, 
leave US at our existing or 
lower level and permit Russia 
to hold higher level. 
War: a war with communist 
country, if we went into a war 
we wouldn't have enough weapons, 
we're leaving ourselves wide 
open for an attack by any 
other m r ~ j  or power. 
Eliminates only obsolete weapons: 
doesn't eliminate A-bomb and 
hydrogen bomb, still threat of 
nuclear weapons. 1 
False selse of security: some 
people might be lulled into a 
sense of false security. 1 
Miscellaneous 1 
Don' t know 19 
Not asked - -  haven't heard/read 
of SALT I1 41 
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3/1979- (Asked only of those who knew about t r e a t y )  Everything 
10/1980 considered,  would you l i k e  t o  see  the  United S t a t e s  Senate 
r a t i f y  (vote i n  favol o f )  t h i s  proposed t r e a t y ,  o r  not?  
Ra t i fy  5 1 48 3  4 3 9 3  9 
Not r a t i f y  18 2 6 3 5 3  6 3  2 
Don't know 3 1 2 2 3  1 2 5 2 9  
(asked of - X of publ ic )  (59) (82) (81) (77) (77) 
3/1979 The United S t a t e s  is now negot ia t ing  a s t r a t e g i c  arms agreement 
with t he  Soviet  Union i n  what is known a s  "SALT TWO." Which 
ONE of the  followifig statements is c l o s e s t  t o  your opinion on 
these  negot ia t ions :  (GFR/CPD) 
a  I s t rongly  support SALT I1 8 
b  SALT I1 is somewhat disappoint ing,  bu t  on 
balance I would have t o  support it 1 2  
c  I would l i k e  t o  see  more p ro tec t ion  f o r  the  
United S t a t e s  before I would be ready t o  
support SALT I1 4 2 
d  I s t rongly  oppose the  SALT I1 arms agreement 
with the  Russians 9  
e  I don ' t  know enough about the  SALT I1 Treaty 
t o  have an opinion y e t  3 0 
3/1979 I am going t o  mention severa l  U.S. aims i n  fo re ign  po l icy .  
Please t e l l  me which one you think is  most important:  (GFR/CPD) 
(da t a  no t  presented i n  the  order asked) 
A peace t r e a t y  between Egypt and I s r a e l  30 
A S t r a t e g i c  A r m s  Agreement with Russia 18 
A s t a b l e  government i n  I r a n  f r i end ly  t o  the  U.S. 1 7  
Strengthening NATO's a b i l i t y  t o  defend Europe 
aga in s t  poss ib le  Russian a t t a c k  15 
Strengthening t i e s  with Communist China 9  
Don't know/refused 11 
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3/1979 I am going t o  read you s eve ra l  s ta temants  about the  proposed 
SALT I1 Treaty .  Please t e l l  me whether you th ink  each 
statement is t r u e  o r  f a l s e .  (GFR/CPD) 
True False DK 
a .  The Treaty  would requ i re  the  U.S. and 
Russia t o  reduce m i l i t a r y  spending 48 3 8 15 
b .  The Treaty  would r e s t r i c t  the  explos ive  
power of nuclear  warheads on both sides,  65 2 2 13  
c .  The SALT I1 Treaty would requ i re  each 
s i d e  t o  reduce i t s  c a p a b i l i t i e s  f o r  
making a  nuclear  a t t a c k  on the  o ther  5 8 2 9  13 
d .  A l l  arms r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  the  Treaty  w i l l  . 
be sub j ec t  t o  f u l l  v e r i f i c a t i o n  regarding 
compliance 5 8  24 19 
e .  The Treaty  would no t  regu la te  the  number 
of s t r a t e g i c  nuclear  m i s s i l e s  t o  be 
r e t a ined  o r  manufactured by each s i d e  2 7 5 7 16 
3/1979 The Sovie t  Union has  a  modern bomber c a l l e d  the  Backfire" which 
i s  capable of a t t a ck ing  the  U.S. with nuclear  weapons. If the  
proposed SALT Treaty does no t  count the  "Backfire" bomber a s  a  
Sovie t  s t r a t e g i c  nuclear  de l ive ry  system, would you then be:  
(GFR/CPD) 
a .  Def in i t e ly  opposed t o  the  Treaty 
b .  Somewhat inc l ined  t o  oppose the  Treaty 
c .  I n  support  of the  Trea ty ,  never the less  
d .  Don't know/No Opinion 
3/1979 By t he  end of the  proposed SALT Trea ty ,  t h a t  i s -  by 1985, the  
a b i l i t y  of Sovie t  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  t o  des t roy  American 
mi s s i l e  s i t e s  and o the r  protected m i l i t a r y  t a r g e t s  is expected 
t o  be t e n  times t h a t  of U.S. b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s '  a b i l i t y  t o  
des t roy  s i m i l a r  t a r g e t s  i n  Russia.  I n  view of t h i s  
information,  which of the  following s ta tements  comes c l o s e s t  t o  
your f e e l i ngs  abcut  the  SALT Treaty:  (GFR/CPD) 
a .  I am much more inc l ined  t o  oppose the  Treaty  2 7 
b .  I am somewhat more i nc l i ned  t o  oppose t he  Treaty  2 1 
c .  I am somewhat more inc l ined  t o  support  the  Treaty  11 
d .  I a m  much more inc l ined  t o  support  the  Treaty  7 
e .  I t  does no t  change my pos i t i on  2 5 
f .  Don't know/No opinion 10 
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3/1979 If you were convinced that there was no adequate way for the 
United States to check on whether or not the Russians were 
living up to one or more parts of the agreement, how would this 
affect your position on the SALT Treaty? Would you then: 
(GFR/CPD) 
a. Definitely oppose the agreement 
b. Be more inclined to oppose the agreement 
c. Still support the agreement 
d. Don't know/No opinion 
3/1979 With what you now know about the proposed Strategic Arins 
Agreement, if one of your Senators voted against the Treaty, 
which of the following would be your reaction? (GFR/CPD) 
a. I would definitely oppose him for reelection 8 
b. I would be more inclined to oppose him than now 10 
c. I would be more inclined to support him than now 8 
d. I would definitely support him 6 
e. It wouldn't make that much difference; I would 
make up my mind on his overall record 6 1 
f. Don't know/Refused 7 
3/1979 see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 40/113) 
3/1979 see 10/1978 (NBC/AP 40/113) 
4/1979 The government is attem~ting to reach a new SALT I1 agreement 
with Moscow limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons 
which either country will manufacture. Whom do yoi- think will 
benefit the most from this agreement--the United Stazes, the 






4/1979 Do you favor our signing this kind of agreement with the 
Russians, limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons 
either country will manufacture, or do you think it is too 
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4/1979b Do you feel the proposed new SALT arms control agreement with 
Russia will . . . or will not? (Harris 792106) 
Will Will Mot. 
not Sure 
Slow down the nuclear arms build-up by 
both the US and the Soviet Union 
through 1985 4 7 3 8 15 
Make the Russians cut back on the 
number of nuclear missile launchers 
they now have 2 7 60 13 
Make the US cut back on the number of 
nuclear missile warheads we planned 
to produce 4 9 3 8 13 
Limit the number of cruise missiles 
we could launch 48 30 2 2 
Prohibit testing of nuclear missiles 
by either side 3 5 4 8 17 
Make the US and Russia roughly equal 
in nuclear strike capability 5 5 3 1 14 
4/1979b see 3/1977 (Harris 792106) 
5/1979 Of course, two-thirds of the Senate must agree to this treaty 
before it can go into effect. If the Senate should refuse to 
ratify this SALT agreement, do you think the United States 




5/1979a China has offered to let us put special electronic monitoring 
devices in that country to take the place of the monitoring 
equipmenc we had to take out of Iran. Would you favor or oppose 






Now let me read you some statements that some people have made about 
the United States and Russia coming to a new SALT arms agreement. 
For each, tell me if you agree or disagree. (Harris 792107) 
Agree Disagree NS 
At a time when it is nossible for the US and 
Russia to blow each other up with nuclear weapons 
it is vital for the ~ W G  countries to reach an 
agreement to limit nuclear arms 8 5 12 
If our military and Defense Department 
leaders say that the US has ~dequate devices 
to monitor a Russian nuclear arms buildup, 
despite the loss of our monitoring systems 
in Iran, then the US Senate should ratify a 
SALT agreement 6 6 19 
Refusal by the US Senate to ratify a new 
SALT arms agreement could lead to a serious 
nuclear arms build-up both in this country 
and in Russia, which would bring us dangerously 
close LO a nuclear war 6 7 
Because the chances are that we will keep 
our end of the bargain and the Russians will 
not, we should not sign any agreement with 
them limiting nuclear weapons 4 2 
Although the new SALT treaty will say the US 
and Russia will have roughly equal nuclear 
strike capacity, the chances are good the 
Russians will find a way of cheating on the 
agreement 7 2 
Unless President Carter agrees to develop 
the powerful M-X missile and other weapons 
to insue our military strength, then the US 
Senate should not ratify the new SALT agreement 54 
All in all, do you favor or oppose the 
United States and Russia coming to a new 
SALT arms agreement? 7 6 
5/1979a see 3/1977 (Harris 792187) 
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5/1979b I'd like to ask you about some issues and problems that some 
people wculd like to see Cvngress do something about. If you 
had to choose, which one do you feel is most important for 
Congress to do something about? (Harris 792108) 
Keeping inflation under control 3 1 
Passing an energy bill to make the U.S. more 
energy self-sufficient 20 
Helping the elderly and the poor get a 
better break 10 
Kseping the military strength of the U.S. at 
least as strong as that of the Russians 9 
Giving relief to taxpayers 9 
Cutting federal spending 7 
Support.ing stronger measures to control crime 3 
Backing a SALT agreement with Russia to control 
nuclear weapons 2 
Achieve peace in the Middle East 2 
Passing a comprehensive health insurance bill 2 
Not sure 5 
5/1979b- Now let me ask you about :>me specific things President Carter 
10/1979 has done. How would you rate him on . . . - -  excellent, 
pretty good, only fair, or poar7 (Harris 792108, . . . ,  . . . ,  
. . . ,  792114) iexcellent and good coded as positive) 
His working for a SALT arms agreement with the Russian.@ to 
limit nuclear arms 
Positive 4 2 4 3 4 0 3 6 3 3 
Negative 4 6 44 4 6 5 2 60 
Not sure 12 13 14 12 7 
How much would you say you know about the recent SALT (11) 
Agreement:? Would you say you know . . . (ABC) 
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5/1979 As yo11 may know, the Salt I1 Agreements is an agreement between 
the US and the Soviet Union for both to limit their ability to 
fight a nuclear war. Would you say you favor or oppose such a 






5/1979 How important an issue would you say the SALT I1 Agreement is 
to you? It is . . . (ABC) 
Very important 
Somewhat important 
Not at all important 
No opinion/DK 
5/1979 Some people say that the SALT (11) Agreement with the Soviet 
Union will reduce US defense spending. How likely do you think 
this is? (ABC) 
Very likely 
Somewhat likely 
Not likely at all 
No opinion/DK 
5/1979 From what you know about the SALT (11) Agreement (Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty) do you feel it will reduce the chance 
of war . . . (ABC) 
A great deal 
Somewhat 
Only a little 
Not at all 
NO opinion/DK 
5/1979 What effect do you think the SALT (I1 Agreement will have on 
the military power of the two nations? Will the SALT agreement 
. . (ARC)  
Make the US stronger militarily than 
the Soviet Union 
Make the US weaker militarily than 
the Soviet Union, or 
Have no effect on the comparative 
strength of the two nations 
No opinion/DK 
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5/1979 What effect do you think the SALT I1 Agreement will have on the 
techrlological advancement of weapons in the two nations? Do 
you think SALT will . . . (ABC) 
Help the US more 
Help the Soviet Union more 
Affect both the same 
No opinion/DK 
5/1979 Some people worry that the Soviet Union would cheat on a SALT 
11 Agreement. How worried are you about that? (ABC) 
Very worried 
Somewhat worried 
Not at all worried 
No opinion/DK 
5/1979 There might be a risk that the Soviet Union would cheat on the 
SALT I1 Agreement and that the US would not be able to verify 
it. How much of a risk do you think the US should take in 
achieving an arms limitation with the Soviet Union? (ABC) 
A lot of risk 
Some risk 
Very little risk 
No risk 
No opinion 
5/1979 Some people say that after the present SALT I1 Agreement is 
signed, that the US should try to reach further agreements with 
the Soviet Union to limit arms. How do you feel about this, do 






5/1979 see 1/1975 (Roper 79-5) 
5/1979 see 11/1978 (Roper 79-5) 
5/1979a see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 41/117) 
5/1979a see 3/1979 (NBC/AP 41/117) 
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6/1979 Did you happen t o  s e e  o r  h e a r  P res iden t  C a r t e r ' s  speech Monday 
evening on SALT I I ?  (AIPO 1131G) 
Yes 
No 
6/1979 s e e  3/1979 (AIPO 1131G) ( 2  q u e s t i o n s )  
6/1979 The Senate  w i l l  debate  t h e  US t r e a t y  wi th  t h e  Sov ie t  Union 
which l i m i t s  s t r a t e g i c  nuc lea r  weapons--ca l ied  SALT. From what 
you know about  t h i s  SALT t r e a t y ,  do you t h i n k  t h e  Senate  s l ~ o u l d  
v o t e  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  i t ,  o r  d o n ' t  you know enough about  i t  t o  
have an  opinion? (CES/NYT) 
For 
Against  
Don't  know enough 
DK/NA 
6/1979 If a SALT t r e a t y  is approved, do you t h i n k  t h e  Sov ie t  Union 
would o r  would n o t  l i v e  up t o  i t s  s h a r e  of t h e  agreement? 
( CBS/NYT 
Would 
Would n o t  
Don' t know/NA 
6/1979 I f  t h e  Sov ie t  Union t r i e d  t o  chea t  on t h e  t r e a t y ,  do you th ink  
t h e  United S t a t e s  would o r  would n o t  be a b l e  t o  c a t c h  them a t  
i t ?  (CBS/NYT; 
Would 
Would n o t  
No opin ion  
6/1979 Do you t h i n k  t h e  SALT t r e a t y  wi th  t h e  Sov ie t  Union w i l l ,  o r  
w i l l  a.ot reduce t h e  r i s k  of war wi th  Russia? (CFS/NYT) 
W i l l  
W i l l  n o t  
DK/K A 
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6/1979 Here are some things people tell us are important problems 
facing the country. I'd like to know if you think an effective 
President would be able to solve them, or whether they're 
beyond any President's control. 
Would an effective President be able to . . . . ,  or is that beyond 
any President's control? (CBS/NYT) 
Able to Beyond No 
Control Control Opinion 
a. control inflation 45 4 7 8 
b. handle the energy problem 5 7 3 6 7 
c .  control the arms race 48 3 7 15 
6/1979 If there is a SALT treaty with the Soviet Union, do you think 





6/1979 If the SALT treaty is approved, do you think the United States 
would then be superior, would be about equal, or would not be 
as strong as the Soviet Union? (CBS/NYT) 
Superior 
Equal 
Will not be as strong 
No opinion 
6/1979 People are already talking about the 1980 Presidential 
election, and the issues that might affect the way people vote 
for President. These are some i-ssues Presidential candidates 
will be talking about. I'd like to know whether you'd be more 
willing or less likely to vote for someone who took these 
positions, or whether the issue won't make that much of a 
difference to you? Would you be more likely or less likely to 
vote for someone who . . . or won't that issue make much of a 
difference to you? (CBS/NYT) 
A wants a comprehensive government health insurance program; 
B would stop construction of more nuclear power plants; 
C wants to increase defense spending; 
D is in favor of gasoline rationing; 
E supports the SALT treaty with the Soviet Union to limit 
strategic nuclear weapons; 
F supports wage and price controls to limit inflation. 
More likely 4 3 4 3 3 8 3 2 4 8 64 
Less likely 17 2 6 3 3 44 17 20 
No difference 3 2 2 3 2 1 18 2 2 10 
Don' t know/No answer 8 8 8 6 13 6 
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See 6/1978 (CBS/NYT) 
see 1/1979 iTBS/NYT) 
see 1/1975 (Roper 79-6) 
see 11/1978 (Roper 79-6) 
see 5/1979b (Harris 792108) 
see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 43/119) 
see 3/1979 (NBC/AP 43/119) 
see 1/1975 (Roper 79-7) 
see 5/1979 (ABC/Harris) 
If President Carter asked your advice today, would you tell him 
that with all the problems of inflation, energy, SALT and 
others facing the country, he should announce he is not going 
to run for re-election, so that he can concentrate on solving 




see 5/1979 (ABC/Harris) 
In the past month or two, President Carter has taken a number 
of steps. Will you tell me for each of the following, whether 
this particular action made you think more, or less, of 
President Carter, or didn't it make any difference one way or 
the other? . . . His support for a new SALT agreement with 





The government is attempting to reach a new SALT I1 agreement 
with Moscow limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons 
which either country will manufacture. Whom do you think will 
benefit the most from this agreement--the United States, the 
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8/1979 Do you favor signing this kind of agreement with the Russians, 
limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons either country 





8/1979 see 1/1975 (Roper 79-8) 
9/1979 (Asked of the 81% who had heard of Soviet troops in Cuba.) Do 
you think that the Senate should delay action on the 
ratification of the SALT I1 Treaty until these Soviet troops 




(Asked of the 46% who had heard enough of SALT to have an 
opinion) Do you think this (SALT) agreement would strengthen 
our national security or weaken it? (NBC/AP 45/121) 
Strengthen our security 
Weaken our security 
Not sure 
9/1979 see 1/1978 (NBC/AP 45/121) 
9/1979 see 3/1979 (NBC/AP 45/121) 
9/1979 Let me ask you how likely you think it is that President Carter 
will be able to succeed in accomplishing his objectives. Do 
you think he will . . . get the SALT I1 treaty ratified by the 




9/1979 see 10/1978 (Roper 79-9) 
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10/1979 (Asked of the 87% who had heard of Russian troops in Cuba) 
What, if anything, do you think the US should do in regard to 
this situation (the presence of Russians troops in Cuba?) (AIPO 
1140G) (multiple responses) 
Get them out: give ultimatum- get out or else; 
we should insist on their removal, ask them 
to leave 2 1 
Nothing: stay out of the situation, we use the 
base there too, it its right for us its right 
for them 2 1 
Keep eye on them: keep a good watch on troops in 
Cuba; increase surveillance over Cuba; don't allow 
them to expand forces 14 
Strengthen our defenses: build up our armed forces 
escalate defenses; get ready to defend ourselves; 
keep a strong army and nave 6 
Take a stand: we should stand firrn-protect our 
interests, it is necessary to decide something, 
show them we won't back down 6 
Use diplomacy: handle very diplomatically; delegate 
diplomacy which does not include making demands 
we can not expect to be honored, we should find 
out their purpose in being there and then evaluate 
what should be done; someone who knows what they're 
talking about should talk with the Russians, ask for 
a response from the Russian leader 6 
Use military force: blast them out, use force if 
necessary 3 
Economic boycott: if they want our wheat, get their 
troops out, shut down exports to Russia 3 
Not by force: not aggressively, without war 2 
Refuse to ratify SALT treaty: hold up SALT 
Treaty, don't ratify SALT at all. 2 
Blockade 2 
Miscellaneous 2 
Don' t know 10 
10/1979 Do you favor or oppose the US Senate ratifying the new SALT 





Appendix 9 - 502 - 
10/1979 Now l e t  me read you some statements t h a t  some people have made 
about the  United S t a t e s  and Russia coming t o  a new SALT arms 
agreement. For each, t e l l  me i f  you agree o r  d i sagree .  
(Harr is  792114) 
Agree Disagree NS 
A t  a time when it i s  poss ib le  f o r  the  US 
and Russia t o  blow each o ther  up with nuclear  
weapons it  is v i t a l  f o r  the  rwo count r ies  t o  
reach an agreement t o  l i m i t  nuclear  a:rms 8 6 11 3 
The US Senate should r a t i f y  the  SALT I1 t r e a t y  
i f  our m i l i t a r y  and Defense Department l eaders  
say t h a t  the  US has adequate devices t o  monitor 
a Russian nuclear  arms buildup 7 0 
Refusal by the  US Senate t o  r a t i f y  a new SALT 
arms agreement could lead t o  a se r ious  nuclear  
arms bui ld-up both i n  t h i s  collntry and i n  
Russia,  which would br ing  us dangerously c lo se  
t o  a nuclear  war 5 5 
Now t h a t  Pres ident  Car ter  has agreed t o  go 
ahead with the  new MX mobile miss i l e  system 
and t o  r a i s e  the  defense budget by 3 percen t ,  
the  United S t a t e s  should r a t i f y  SALT I1 4 6 
Unless the  Russians agree t o  withdraw t h e i r  
combat troops from Cuba, then the  US Senate 
should re fuse  t o  r a t i f y  the  SALT I1 t r e a t y  6 3 
Although nuclear  arms con t ro l  is  de s i r ab l e ,  
the  SALT I1 t r e a t y  which Pres ident  Car ter  
negot ia ted does not  adequately p ro t ec t  
US s e c u r i t y  5 8 
Although the  new SALT t r e a t y  says the  US and 
Russia w i l l  have roughly equal nuclear s t r i k e  
capac i ty ,  opponents of SALT I1 a re  r i g h t  when 
they claim t h a t  i f  SALT I1 is approved, Russia 
w i l l  have nuclear  supe r io r i t y  by the  middle 
of the  1980s 5 3 
Because the  chances a r e  t h a t  we w i l l  keep our 
end of t he  bargain and the  Russians w i l l  n o t ,  
t he  US Senate should not r a t i f y  the  SALT I1 
t r e a t y  Pres ident  Car ter  signed i n  Vienna 
l a s t  June 50 3 9 11 
10/1979 A l l  i n  a l l ,  do you favor or  oppose the  US Senate r a t i f y i n g  the 
new SALT nuclear  arms con t ro l  agreement between the  United 
S t a t e s  and Russia (Harr is  792114) 
Favor 
Oppose 
Not sure  
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see 3/1979 (NBC/AP 48/125) 
see 3/1979 (AIPO 1139G) (2 questions) 
see 5/1979b (Harris 792114) 
The Senate is considering the US treaty with the Soviet Union 
which limits strategic nuclear weapons--called SALT. From what 
you know about this SALT treaty, do you think the Senate should 
vote for or against it, or don't you know enough about it to 
have an opinion? (CBS/NYT) 
For 
Against 
Don't know enough 
No opinion 
Do you think the SALT treaty with the Soviet Union will or will 




There are 3000 Soviet troops stationed in Cuba. Do you think 
the U.S. Senate should delay voting on the SALT treaty until 
the troops are removed, or do you think the troops in Cuba 
should not be connected to the Senare vote on the SALT Lreaty? 
(CBS/W) 
Should delay 
Should not be connected 
No opinion 
see 1/1979 (CBS/NYT) 
see 1/1975 (Roper 79-10) 
see 11/1978 (Roper 79-10) 
Of course, everyone is more interested in some things in the 
news than in others. During the past several months, is the 
SALT I1 Treaty something that you have been following closely, 




Not much attention/DK 
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1/1980 Has the Iran crisis made you more favorable to the Senate 
ratification of the SALT TI treaty with the Soviet Union to 
limit nuclear weapons, less favorable to the treaty, or hasn't 





1/1980 see 1/1975 (Roper 80-2) 
1/1980 see 11/1978 (Roper 80-2) 
1/1980b President Carter is taking the following steps as an answer to 
the Russians invasion of Afghanistan. For each, tell me if you 
favor or oppose that step (Harris 802104) 
Favor Oppose NS 
Getting the U.N. General Assembly to demand 
that Russian troops leave Afghanistan 8 6 9 5 
Halting all future shipments of technology to 
Russia 7 8 18 4 
Canceling the delivery of 17 million tons 
of US grain to Russia 7 7 18 5 
Asking the US Senate to delay ratification of 
the SALT Treaty with Russia 7 1 19 10 
1/1980 How effective do you feel . . . will be in discouraging the 
Russians from trying invasions of other countries in the future 
(Harris 802104) 
very moderate Not NS 
eff eff eff 
Cancelling the delivery of 17 million 
tons of US grain to Russia 40 35 2 0 5 
Halting all future shipments of 
technology to Russia 37 38 18 7 
Getting the UN General Assembly to 
demand that Russian troops leave 
Afghanistan 20 32 4 1 7 
Asking the U.S. Senate to delay 
ratification of the SALT Treaty with 
Russia 12 38 4 2 8 
Deferring opening new consulates in this 
country with Russia 11 32 45 12 
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2/1980 Would you be more l i k e l y  o r  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  v o t e  f o r  a  cand ida te  
who took t h e  fo l lowing p o s i t i o n s ?  . . . a )  Favors t h e  SALT 
t r e a t y ;  b)  f a v o r s  b u i l d i n g  nuc lea r  power p l a n t s ;  c )  f a v o r s  
l a r g e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  defense  spending.  (Gallup/NW) 
More l i k e l y  4 6 3 6 6 4 
L e s s  l i k e l y  3 3 3 9 2 0 
N o  difference/No op in ion  2 1 2 5 16 
3,4980 s e e  3/1979 (AIPO 1149G) ( 2  q u e s t i o n s )  
6/1980 The Senate has  been cons ide r ing  t h e  U.S. Lrea ty  wi th  t h e  Sov ie t  
Union which l i m i t s  s t r a t e g i c  nuc lea r  weapons-- c a l l e d  SALT. 
From what you know about  t h i s  SALT t r e a t y ,  do you t h i n k  t h e  
Senate  should v o t e  f o r  o r  a g a i ~ l s t  i t ,  o r  d o n ' t  you know enough 
about  i t  t o  have an opinion? (CBS/NYT) 
For 
Against  
Don't know enough 
No opin ion  
10/1980 From what you've hea rd ,  do you f e e l  t h a t  Ronald Reagan i s  f o r  
o r  a g a i n s t  . . . r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  S t r a t e g i c  A r m s  L imi ta t ion  
Trea ty  (SALT) wi th  t h e  Sov ie t  Union? (YSL?/Time) 
For 
Against  
Not s u r e  
10/1980 How about  Jimmy C a r t e r - -  from what you've h e a r d ,  do you f e e l  
t h a t  Jinuny C a r t e r  i s  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  . . . r a t i f i c a t i o n  of the  




Not s u r e  
10/1980 How about  John Anderson-- from what you've h e a r d ,  do you f e e l  
t h a t  John Anderson is f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  . . . r a t i f i c a t i o n  of  the  




Not s u r e  
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10/1980 And how about you personally, are you for or against . . . 
ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) 




10/1980 see 3/1979 (AIPO) (2 questions) 
11/1980 In general, do you agree or disagree with President-elect 
Reagan that the SALT I1 treaty, which was not ratified by the 
United States Senate, should be scrapped and negotiations 
should be started again for a new nuclear arms agreement with 




11/1980 Now let me read you some statements that some people have made 
about the United States and Russia coming to a new SALT arms 
agreement. For each, tell me if you agree or disagree: (Harris 
80125) 
Agree Disagree Not 
Sure 
At a time when it is possible for the US 
and Russia to blow each other up with 
nuclear weapons it is vital for the 
two countries to reach an agreement 
to limit nuclear srms 
Refusal by the United States to agree to a 
new SALT arms agreement could lead to a 
serious nuclear arms build-up both in 
this country and in Russia, which would 
bring us dangerously close to a nuclear war 50 4 3 7 
Because the chances are that we will keep 
our end of the barbain and the Russi~ns 
will not, we should not sign any 
agreement limiting nuclear weapons 4 7 4 8 5 
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11/1980 All in all, do you favor or oppose President-elect Reagan 
siting down with the Russians to try to come to an agreement on 




11/1980 Do you approve or disapprove of the SALT I1 nuclear weapons 





1/1981 Then, of course, there is the question of our relations with 
the Soviet Union. Do you think that at this time we should or 
should not try to work out a strategic arms limitation 




4/1981 Do you approve or disapprove of the SALT I1 nuclear weapons 







5/1981 Now I'd like to know how you feel about a number of important 
issues thar face the country. Do you favor or oppose . . . : 
(YSW/Time 8607) 
Reopening strategic arms limitations treaty discussions with 
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5/1981- a. Now I'd like to ask you a few more questions about just 
9/1981 some of these issues. People have told us that on some issues 
they have come to a firm conclusion and they stick with that 
position, no matter what. On other issues, however, they may 
take a position, but they know that they could change their 
minds pretty easily. On a scale of 1 to 6--where 1 means that 
you could change your mind very easily, on this issue, and 6 
means that you are likely to stick with your position no matter 
what--where would you place yourself on each issue? (YSW 8607) 
b. On some issues, too, people feel t h ~ t  they really have a11 
the information that they need in order to form a strong 
opinion on that issue, while on other issues they would like to 
get additional information before solidifying their opinion. 
On a sca1.e of 1 to 6--where 1 means that you feel you 
definitely need more information on the issue and 6 means that 
you do not feel you need to have any more information on the 
issue--where would you place yourself on each issue? 
c. On a scale of 1 to 6--where 1 means that you and your 
friends and family rarely if ever discuss the issue and 6 means 
that you and your friends and family discuss it relatively 
often--where would you place yourself on each issue? 
d. On a scale of 1 to 6--where 1 seans that the Lssue affects 
you personally very little and 6 means that you really feel 
deeply irvolved in this issue--where would you place yourself 
on each ~ssue? 
e. On a scale of 1 to 6--where 1 means that you are very 
likely to change your mind on this issue and 6 means that you 
almost certainly will not change your mind--where would you 
place yourself on each issue? (YSW/Time) 
Reopening strategic arms limitations treaty discussions with 
the Soviet Union 
a. could change mind 12 5 18 15 11 4 0 
b. more information 24 9 19 12 9 2 8 
c. discuss 3 9 15 17 9 6 15 
d. affect one 2 6 12 17 14 8 2 3 
e. likely change mind 13 7 18 15 12 3 6 
a. could change mind 12 4 17 15 12 40 
b. more information 23 9 20 13 10 2 6 
c. discuss 3 6 18 19 7 5 15 
d. affect one 26 11 18 13 10 2 2 
e .  likely change mind 14 5 2 1 17 11 3 3 
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9/1981 Now I'd like to know how you feel about a number of important 
issues that face the country. Do you favor or oppose: 
(YSW/Time 4648) 
Favor Oppose Not 
Sure 
Reopening arms limitations treaty 
discussions with the Soviet Union 6 4 2 7 10 
Building the MX missile 45 3 5 2 0 
10/1981 Do you happen to know which two nations have been involved in 
what are known as the SALT talks, or is that something you are 
not familiar with? (ABC/WP)(see 1/1979 CBS/NYT for similar 
question) 
U.S. and Soviet Union 
All other responses 
Don't know, No opinion 
5/1982 President Reagan recently proposed that the US and the Soviet 
Union sit down to negotiate a new agreement to control nuclear 
weapons. Let me ask you about the major provisions of that 
proposal. For each, tell me if you favor or oppoae that 
provision. (Harris 822106) 
Favor Oppose Not 
Sure 
Both the US and Russia would cut back 
by one-third the number of nuclear 
weapons they now possess. 15 3 
The Russians would give up their 
present superiority in land-based 
nuclear missiles in return for the 
US holding back production of 
missile-carrying submarines, 
bombers, and cruise missiles. 8 2 15 3 
6/1982 Some people feel that President Reagan has changed some of his 
views on foreign affairs, others feel he has the same views as 
when he ran for office. Do you feel he has changed his views 
on . . . supporting the previous SALT I and I1 agreements with 
the Russians even though they have not been voted for by the 
Senate . . . a lot, a little, or not at all? (YSW/Time) 
A lot 
A little 
Not at all 
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7/1982 Strategic arms reduction talks--called START--are due to begin 
(began) in Geneva on June 29th. Do you think these 
negotiations on nuclear weapons control will end in success, or 
do you think they will end in failure--or haven't you heard 






11/1982 see 12/1974 (Gallup/CCFR) 
11/1982 see 11/1978 (Gallup/CCFR) 
6/1983 For each of these state.sents about US-Soviet relations in the 
past ten years, please tell me if you believe it to be true or 
not true. (YSW 83-5632) 
True Not 
true 
During the 19701s, hen we were trying 
to iv?rove relations, the Soviet Union 
was secretly building up its military 
s tren&;:i 
We usually keep our promises, they 
usually don' t 
The Soviets treat our friendly gestures 
as weaknesses 
The Soviets are gaining political 
influence in the world, and the US 
is losing political influence 
Our failure to sign the SALT I1 
agreement has been a major cause 
of tension 
The US has to share some of the 
blame for the bad relations between 
the two countries 
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5/1984 To the best of your knowledge, which country- the U.S. or the 
Soviet Union- refused to sign the most recent arms control 
agreement, SALT 11, or was that agreement signed by both 
countries, or by neither one (PAF) 
'US did not sign 
Soviet Union did not sign 
Both couctries signed 
Neither country signed 
Don't know, not sure 
7/1984 I'm going to read you some recent events, and for each one 
would you tell me which of the statements on this card best 
expresses your feeling about whether the US or the Soviet Union 
is to blame? . . . The breakdown of the START nuclear arms 
control talks in Geneva? (Roper 84-7) 
Soviet Union entirely to blame 
Both to blame but USSR more 
US and USSR equally to blame 
Both to blame but US more so 
US entirely to blame 
Neither to blame (vol) 
DK 
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9/1984 How much effect, if any, do you think the following government 
actions have had or will have to reduce the chance of nuclear 
war? A great deal, a moderate amount, almost no effect? 
(ABT 4) 
A. Past US-USSR agreement of SALT I banning deployment of 
anti-ballistic missiles? 
B. Future ratification of the SALT 11 US-USSR agreement 
slightly reducing the numbers of offensive nuclear missiles 
C. Past US-USSR agreement not to test nuclear bombs in the 
atmosphere? 
D. Future agreement on a freeze of further testing, production 
or deployment of nuclear weapons? 
E. Past US-USSR agreement of SALT I that placed a cap on the 
number of nuclear missiles each side could build? 
F. Future US build up of our conventional forces to reduce 
dependence on nuclear weapons? 
G. Future agreement over no-first-use of nuclear weapons? 
H. Future agreement to ban anti-satelite weapons? 
I. Future agreement to ban chemical weapons? 
Great Moderate Almo s t DK/NA 
Deal Amount No Effect 
SALT I/ABM 10 
SALT I1 11 
LTBT 2 1 
Freeze 2 9 
SALT I offense 12 
Conventional build-up 21 
No- First-Use 2 7 
ASAT 2 6 
C W 2 7 
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9/1985 I am going to mention some things that some people feel might 
reduce the chance of nuclear war and improve our relations with 
the Soviet Union. For each item I mention, please tell me if 
you feel it would be extremely helpful, very helpful, only 
somewhat helpful, or not very helpful. (M&K) 
US ratification and completion of nuclear arms control 
agreements, like SALT 11, which have already been negotiat.ed 






11/1985 Missing from any agreement at the (Nov.85) summit (between 
Reagan and Gorbachev) were the following things. For each, 
tell me if you think it is highly significant that nothing was 
done on them, somewhat significant, not very significant, or 
hardly significant at all. . . .No agreement to extend the SALr 




Not very significant 
Hardly significant 
Not sure 
see 1/1979 CBS/NYT (SIRC) 
The Administration says the U.S. will no longer be bound by thL! 
SALT I1 agreement and that it wants a new treaty with the 
Soviet Union. Critics say that the U.S. should stick to the 
terms of the SALT I1 agreement until another one is agreed on. 
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6,4986 Pres ident  Reagan recen t ly  decided t h a t  the  US government would 
end i ts  l i v i n g  up t o  the  SALT I 1  t r e a t y  with the  Russians l a t e r  
on t h i s  year .  H i s  argument f o r  doing t h i s  is t h a t  Russia had 
not  l i ved  up t o  the  t r e a t y  and he wanted t o  put  pressure  on the 
Soviet  government t o  come t o  an agreement on nuclear arms 
iaduct ion i n  Geneva. Others,  however, d isagree  and say t h a t  i f  
SALT I1 is  scrapped it w i l l  s t a r t  another round of a  buildup by 
the  US and Russia of major nuclear  weapons reduct ion.  Are you 
pleased chat  Pres ident  Reagan i s  ending US compliance with SALT 
I1 o r  a r e  you concerned t h a t  i t  w i l l  touch o f f  another nuclear 
arms race? (Harr is)  
Pleased 
Concerned 
Not sure  
6/1986 Nearly a l l  of the  a l l i e s  of the  United S t a t e s  have complained 
t h a t  they were not consulted by our government before t h e  
decis ion was made t o  give up abiding by the  SALT I1 agreement. 
Do you think it  was wrong o r  not  f o r  Pres ident  Reagan t o  make a  
decis ion l i k e  t h a t  without consul t ing with most of our a l l i e s ?  
(Har r i s )  
Wrong not  t o  consul t  
Not wrong 
Not sure  
G/1986 Now l e t  me read some statements about Pres ident  Reagan's 
decis ion t o  not  l i v e  up t o  the  SALT I1 t r e a t y .  For each,  t e l l  
me i f  you tend t o  agree o r  d i sagree .  . . (Har r i s )  
Agree Disagree Not 
Sure 
A t  a  time when j t '  s poss ible  f o r  
the  US and Russia t o  blow each o ther  
up with nuclear weapons, i t  i s  
important t o  keep any previous 
agreement t h a t  might help con t ro l  
the  nuclear  arms race  7 2 2 1 
By saying we v i l l  not  l i v e  up t o  
SALT 11, we a r e  giving the  Russians 
an excuse t o  begin a b i g  nuclear 
arms buildup again 4  9  4 3 
By g e t t i n g  r i d  of SALT 11, we 
a r e  making the  Russians face  the  
f a c t  t h a t  only by making a  new 
arms reduct ion agreement can 
the  nuclear arms race  be con t ro l led  61 2 6  
Since Russia v io l a t ed  ehe SALT I1 
t r e a t y ,  the  only honest th ing  t o  do 
is t o  j u s t  announce we w i l l  not  
abide by i t  i n  the  fu tu r e  5 1 3 7 
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6/1986 Have you heard  o r  r ead  about  SALT 11- t h e  1979 s t r a t e g i c  arms 




6/1986 Do you happen t o  know whether o r  n o t  t h e  U.S. has  r a t i f i e d  t h i s  
t r e a t y ?  (Gallup)  
Yes, h a s  r a t l f i e d  it ( i n c o r r e c t )  
No, has  n o t  r a t i f i e d  i t  ( c o r r e c t )  
No opin ion  
6/1986 (Asked o f  those  67% who had heard  o r  read  o f  SALT 11) Do you 
t h i n k  t h e  U.S. has  o r  has  n o t  l i v e d  up t o  t h e  terms of  t h e  
t r e a t y ?  (Gallup)  
Yes 
No 
No op in ion  
6/1986 (Asked of those  67% who had heard  o r  read  of SALT 11) The 
Reagan Adminis t ra t ion  announced t h a t  it no longer  f e e l s  bound 
by SALT I1 and t h a t  i t  may abandon t h e  t r e a t y ' s  n u c l e a r  weapons 




No opin ion  
6/1986 (Asked of  those  67% who had heard  o r  r ead  of  SALT 11)  Do you 
t h i n k  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  is l i k e l y  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  arms r a c e  a  g r e a t  
d e a l ,  q u i t e  a l o t ,  n o t  very  much, o r  n o t  i ~ t  a l l ?  (Gal lup)  
Great  deal 
Qu i t e  a  ~ L L  
Not v e r y  much 
Not a t  a l l  
No opin ion  
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6/1986 (Asked of those 67% who had heard o r  read of SALT IT) Do you 
think t h i s  decis ion is  l i k e l y  t o  increase  o r  decrease the  
chances of a  nuclear war? (Gallup) 
Increase  
Decrease 
No d i f fe rence  (Vol) 
No opinion 
6/1986 (Asked of those 67% who had heard o r  read of SALT TI) Do you 
th ink  t h i s  decis ion w i l l  he lp  o r  h u r t  the  U . S .  t o  reach fu tu r e  
agreements with the  Soviet  Union on s t r a t e g i c  arms? (Gallup) 
Help 
Hurt 
No d i f fe rence  (vo l )  
No opinion 
6/1986 Have you read o r  heard anything i n  the  pa s t  severa l  weeks about 
the  nuclear arms l im i t a t i on  t r e a t y  o r  SALT TWO agreement 
between the  United S t a t e s  and the  Soviet  Union? (ABC/WP) 
Yes, have read or  heard 
No have not 
Don't know/no opinion 
6/1986 How much would you say you know about the  SALT TWO agreement: a  
g r ea t  d e a l ,  a  f a i r  amount, not  much, o r  nothing a t  a l l ?  
(ABCflP) 
A good dea l  
A f a i r  amount 
Not much 
Nothing a t  a l l  
6/1986 Reagan says the  U . S .  w i l l  no longer be bound by the  SALT TWO 
agrement and t h a t  he wants a new t r e a t y  with the  Soviet  Union. 
C r i t i c s  say t h a t  the U.S. should s t i c k  t o  the  terms of the  SALT 
TWO agreement u n t i l  another one is  agreed on. Which of these 
views is  c lo se r  t o  your own? (ABC/WP) 
Reagan's view 
C r i t i c ' s  view 
Don't know/no opinion 
6/1986 Would you say the  United S t a t e s  should follow the  terms of the 
SALT TWO &e,reement o r  not?  (ABC/WP) 
Yes, should follow terms 
No, should not  follow terms 
No d i f  t 'erence 
Don't know/no opinion 
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7/1986 SALT II is a nuclear arms agreement that was never ratified by 
the U.S. However, the U,S. has continued to abide by its 
terms. President Reagan recently announced that because the 
Soviets have violated SALT I1 the U.S. would no longer be bound 
by it. Do you agree or disagree? (P&S/CPD) 
Yes 
N 0 
Don' t know 
11/1986b Since 1979, the United States has observed the arms limits set 
by thz SALT 2 agreement with the Soviet Union, even though the 
treaty was never approved by the Senate. Ronald Reagan has 
decided that the United States will no longer abide by those 
limits. Do you approve or disapprove of Reagan's decision, or 
hcven't you heard enough about it to have an opinion? (CBS/NYT) 
Approve 
Disapprove 
Haven't heard enough for opinion 
DK/NA 
11/1986 see 11/1978 (Gallup/CCFR) 
1/1987 With the Democrats in control of both the Senate and the House 
in Congress, it is highly probable there will be some serious 
disagreements between President Reagan and the Congress. If 
you had to say, who do you think will be more right- Reagan or 
the Congress-- in their difference over having the US live up 
to the terms of the SALT I1 treaty, favored by Congress but 
opposed by Reagan? (Harris) 
Reagan 
Congress 
Both or neither (Vol) 
Not sure 
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Articles and Books On Nuclear Attitudes 
For complete citations, see Graham, Thomas W. (1987), American 
Public Opinion-- War. Peace. Foreign Policv & Nuclear Wea~ons: An 
Indexed Biblionra~hy - (New Haven, CT: Yale University, International 
Security and Arms Control program) 
AUTHOR ( s ) DATE(s) 
Abt 
Adler 
Aubent, Fisher & Rokan 
Barton 
Belsky & Doble 








Chivian, Tudge, Robinson, 
Popov & Andreyenkov 
Churcher & Lieven 
C lyme r 
Coker 
Cole & Fiorentine 
Cortright & Pollock 
Cottrell & Eberhart 
Dahl 
Dahl & Brown 
de Boer 
Deutch 
G. Diamond & Bachman 
Doble 
Douvan 
Doyle, Dayne & Bernbach 
Eckhardt & Lentz 
Epstein 
Erskine 
Fischhoff, Pidgeon & Fiske 
Fiske, Pratto & Pavelchak 
Fischer 





Graham & Kramer 









Kohut & Horrock 
Kramer, Kalick & Milburn 
Kraus, Mehlink & El-Assal 
Kretch & Crutchfield 
Kulman 
Ladd 
Lanoue t te 
La Porte & Metlay 
Levine & Modell 





Metzner & Kessler 
Mitchell 
Moore 
Nathan & Oliver 
Nealey, Melber & Rankin 
Nehnevaj sa 
Noelle-Nauman 




Public Agenda foundation 
Quester 
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Richman 
Ros i 
Rothman & Lichter 
Rubin & Cunningham 
Ruder, Funn & Rothman 
Russett 
Russett & Deluca 1983 
Russett & Lackey 
Saben 
P. Schmidt 
Schuman, Ludwig & Krosnick 
T.J. Smith 
Social Science Research Council 




Tyler & McGraw 
Viorst & Buchanan 
Walker 
Weart 
Werner & Roy 
Yankelovich & Doble 
Yankelovich & Harman 
Yankelovich, Skelly & White 
Zinberg 
I n t e r v i e w  Da te s ,  Sample S i z e s ,  Sample P o p u l a t i o n s ,  and 
A b b r e v i a t i o r ~ s  f o r  P u b l i c  Opinion Surveys Consul ted  and Analyzed 
Surveys c i t e d  509 
Reference  Survey Code- Begin End Sample Popu la t i on  Appendix/ 
Date book Survey Survey S i z e  (Chapter )  
Date D,,e Date Number 
2/1938 AIPO 112A 2/14 2/16 2/21 2837 n a t a d u l t  2 
1/1940 AIPO 182k 1/19 1/21 1/26 3199 n a t a d u l t  2 
3/1940 AIPO 186k 3/6 3/8 3/13 3180 n a t a d u l t  2 
8/1940 AIPO 205 8/8 8/10 8/15 5825 n a t a d u l t  2 
12/1940 AIPO 225 11/30 12/1 12/6 3024 n a t  a d u l t  2 
2/1941 OPOR 806 1/28 1/29 -2/8 - n a t  a d u l t  2 
5/1941 AIPO 235 4/25 4/27 5/1 2334 n a t  a d u l t  2 
















A I p O  293k&t 
NORC 
OPOR. 1 8  
NORC 217 
AIPO 30 tk&t  
OPOR 19 
AIPO 308 
n a t  a d u l t  
na  t a d u l t  
na t adu l  t 
2464 Chicago 
2903 n a t  a d u l t  
n a t  a d u l t  
na t a d u l t  
nn t a d u l t  
na t a d u l t  
na t a d u l  t 
na t a d u l t  
1/14 3352 n a t  a d u l t  
4/13 2948 n a t  a d u l t  
- n a t  a d u l t  
n a t  a d u l t  
2560 n a t  a d u l t  
11/16 3049 n a t  a d u l t  
-12/3 - n a t  a d u l t  
12/22 3031 n a t  a d u l t  
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Reference Survey Code- Begin End Sample Population Appendix/ 
Date book Survey Survey Size (Chapter) 
Date Date Date Number 
1/1944 AIPO 310k 1/18 1/20 1/25 1602 natadult 5 
3/1944 OPOR 23 3/1 3/2 -3/12 - nat adult 2 
4/1944 AIPO 316 4/12 4/14 4/19 3142 natadult 2 
4/1944 NORC 4/8 - nat adult 5 
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Reference Survey Code- Begin End Sample Population Appendix/ 
Date book Survey Sunrey Size (Chapter) 
De:e Date Date Number 
AIPO 365K&T 2/13 
NORC 139 2/2 
MINN 31 2/26 
AIPO 366k&t 2/26 
AIPO 367 3/13 
NORC 140 - 
NORC 141 3/20 
AIPO 368KdT 3/27 
AIPO 369K&T 4/10 
RCOM 24 
NOR5 142 5/17 
AIPO 370t 4/24 
AIPO 373K&T 6/12 
PSY CORP 173kt 6/6 
SRC 
NORC 143 6/21 
AIPO 375K&T 7/24 
PSY CORP 178kt 8/12 
SRC 
MINN 36 8/13 
RCOM 25 8/46 
NORC 243 
NORC 144 9/46 
AIPO 379K&T 9/25 
NORC 145 10/2 
AIPO 384K 11/13 
AIPO 384T 11/14 
NORC i46 11/15 
NGRC 147 12/11 
A I P 3  386kl:t 12/11 
na t adult 
na t adul t 
state-Minn 
nat adult 
na t adult 
nat adult 
nat adult 

















































































na t adult 
na t adult 
na t adult 
na t adult 
nat adult 







na t adul t 
nat adult 
na t adult 
na t adult 
na t adult 
nat adult 





























1/1952 NORC 315 
1/1952a AIPO 484 
1/1952b AIPO 485 
2/1952 NORC 317 
3/1952 NORC 320 












Code- Begin End Sample Population Appendix/ 
book Survey Survey Size (Chapter) 
Date Date Pdte Number 
nat adult 2,7 
nat adult 1,2,3 
nat adult 1,3 
state-Minn 1 
nat adult 1,3,(3) 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 2 
net adult 2,3 
nat adult 1 
nat ad111 t 1 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 5 
nat adult 1 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 1,2 
12/28 12/29 1/8 1237 nat adult (3) 
1/4 1/6 1/11 1963 nat adult 2 
1/18 1/20 1/25 2076 natadult 2 
2/5 2/6 2/15 1255 nat adult 2 
3/19 3/20 3/29 1260 natadult 2 









na t adult 
- 









































Code- Begin End Sample Population Appendix/ 
book Survey Survey Size (Chapter) 
Date Date Date Number 
nat adult 1,2 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 6,7 
nat adult 7 
nat adult 5 
nat adult 1 
nat adult 5 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 
na t adult 
nat adult 
na t adult 
nat adult 
na t adult 
nat adult 
nat adult 
na t adult 
na t adult 
na t adult 
nat adult 1 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 6,7 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 6 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 6 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 2 
nat adult 6 
nat adult 1,6,7 
nat adult 6 
nat adult 6 
nat adult 6 
state-Minn 6 
nat adult 5 
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Reference Survey Code- Begin End Sample Population Appendix/ 
Date book Survey Survey Size (Chapter) 
Date Date Date Number 
3/1957 AIPO 579K 2/26 2/28 3/5 1531 nat adult 2 
4/1957 AIPO 582K 4/23 4/25 4/30 1626 nat adult 1,6 
4/1957 MINN 160 4/57 - state-Minn 6,7 
4/1957 ISR 423 2/57 3/57 4/57 1919 natadult 6 
7/1957a AIPO 585k 6/25 6/27 7/2 1520 nat adult 6 
7/1957b AIPO 586K 7/16 7/18 7/23 1534 natadult 6 


















1542 nat adult 
1610 nat adult 
state-Minn 
1439 nat aduLt 
s tate-Minn 
650 elite 
1621 nat adult 
state-Minn 
1509 nat adult 
2/4 2/9 1616 natadult 
4/2 4/7 1738 natadult 
5/29 6/3 1536 nat adult 
7/23 7/28 1538 nat adult 
2695 nat adult 
9/18 9/23 5778 nat adult 
11/12 11/17 2750 nat adult 
12/10 12/15 2550 nat adult 
3/1960 MINN 190 2/26 2/26 3/1 597 state-Minn 6 
6/1960 SIND/GE 7250 - - 1500 nat adult 1 












nat adult 5 
nat adult 1 
nat adult 6 
state-Minn 6 
sec loc 6 
state-Minn 6 




R e f e r e n c e  Survey  
Date  
Code- Begin End Sample P o p u l a t i o n  Appendix 
book Survey Survey S i z e  ( C h a p t e r )  
Date  Date  Date  Nurnbe r 
1/1962 AIPO654!:B 1 /9  1/11 1/16 3421 n a t  a d u l t  5 , 6  
3/1962 AIPO 656K 3/6 3/8 3/13 3485 nat ,  a d u l t  6 
4/1962 1 0 6 ~  167 4/13 - 776 s t a t e - I o w a  6 
11/1962 AIPO 665k 11/14 11/16 11/21 4426 n a t  a d l l l t  6 
12/1962 AIPO 666k 12/11 12/13 12/18 3193 n a t  a d u l t  5 , 6  
M I N N  221 
AIPO 669K 
AIPO 674 
NORC SRS 110 
H a r r i s  
AIPO 676K 





NORC SRS 330 
ISR 729 
s t a t e - M i n n  6 
n a t  a d u l t  1 , 5 , 6 , 7  
n a t  a d u l t  5 
1 
n a t  a d u l t  6 
n a t  a d u l t  1 , 5 , 6  
s t a t e - M i n n  6 
n a t  a d u l t  6 
s t a t e - I o w a  6 
6 
n a t  a d u l t  6 
n a t  a d u l t  ( 3 ) , 8  
n a t  a d u l t  1 , 6  
3/1964 AIPO 686 2/26 2/28 5/5 3503 n a t a d u l t  5 
4/1964 AIPO 689k 4/22 4/24 4/29 3509 n a t a d u l t  5 
6/1964 NORC SRS 640 6/64 1464 n a t  a d u l t  1 , 8  
10/1964c G / I I S R  9/64 10/64 3175 n a t  comb ( 3 )  
11/1964 AIPO 701 11/4 11/6 11/11 3432 n a t a d u l t  5 
6/1965 Harris 1 5 ; ~  6/65 - 522 n a t  a d u l t  4 
211966 NORC SRS 876 14?9 - 118 
12/1966 AIPO 738 12/6 12/8  12/13 3542 n a t a d u l t  5 
2/1967 AIPO 741k 2/14 2/16 2/21 3509 n a t a d u l t  5 
12/1967 G a l l u p  1583 n a t  a d u l t  5 
6/1968 ORC/N 6/12 - 1508 n a t  a d u l t  8 
12/1968 H a r r i s  1900 12/68 12/12 12/18 1544 n a t  a d u l t  8 
4/1969 AIPO 777 3/25 3/27 4 /1  1502 n a t a d u l t  1 , 8  
4/1969 H a r r i s  19'6 3 -4 /69  4/5 4 /11  1573 8 
5/1969 AIPO 780 5/13 5/15 5/20 1523 n a t  a d u l t  1 , 8  
5/1969 ORC/Nx 4/25 5/2 i 5 0 8  n a t  a d u l t  8 
7/1969 AIPO 784 7/8 7/10 7/15 1517 n a t  a d u l t  1 , 8  
7/1969 Harris 1939 7/69 7/16 7/22 2087 8 
10/1969 H a r r i s  1970 10/69 10/16 10/22 1982 n a t  a d u l t  8 
9/1970 H a r r i s  2037 8/70 9/18 9/24 1609 n a t  a d u l t  b 
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Reference Survey Code- Begin End Sample Population Appendix/ 
Date book Survey Survey Size (Chapter) 
Date Date Date Number 
1/1971 Harris 2053 1/71 - - 1613 - 1,4,8 
1/1971 Harris 2055 1/71 - 3092 8 
6/1971 Harris 2124 6/71 6/9 6/15 1614 nat adult 8 
6/197 1 ORC/Nx 6/5 6/6 1016 nat adult 1,8 
Harris 2154 2/72 2/8 2/14 1579 nat adult 8 
MIS/N - 1302 nat adult 8 
AIPO 852 5/23 5,426 5/29 1541 nat adult 5 
Harris 2216 6/72 6/7 6/12 1303 nat adult 8 
GaL:up/PA 6/72 - 1137 nat adult 9 
?ield/LMH - 6/2C 7/10 980 state- Ca. 8 
Harris 2234 8/72 8/30 9/1 1624 nat adult 8 
Harris - - nat adult 9 
4/1973 AIPO 868k 4/3 4/6 4/9 1528 natadult 5 
6/1973 Harris 2330 6/73 6/14 6/18 1511 nat adult 8,9 
7/1973 AIPO 874k 7/3 7/6 7/9 1544 natadult 5 
11/1973 Harris 2351 11/73 11/13 11/16 1460 nat adult 8,9 
3/19?4 NORC/GSS 2/74 3/74 1484 natadult 5 
5/1974 Field/LMH 5/1 5/30 786 state-Ca. 8 
i2/1974 Harris/CCFR,2436 2 6  12/14 1513 nat adult 9 
12/1974 Harris/CCFR, 2436L 330 elite 9 
1/1975 Roper 75-2 1/11 1/25 2000 nat adult 1,9 
3/1975 NORC/GSS 2/75 3/75 1490 nat adult 5 
4/1975 CRS/C 9 
12/1975 Harris 2732 12/20 12/30 1394 nat adult 9 
1/1976 Harris 7588 12/75 12/18 1/2 1400 nat adult 7,8,9 
3/1976 CSR/C 9 
6/1976a AIPO 953k 6/7 6/11 6/14 1524 nat adult 1 
6/1976b AIPO 954k 6/22 6/25 6/28 1544 natadult 5 
8/1976 Harris 2624A 8/76 8/27 8/30 1471 nat adult 9 
12/1976 AIPO 964K 12/7 12/10 12/13 1559 nat adult 1 
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Reference Su~rvey Code- Begin End Sample Population Appendix/ 
Date book Survey Survey Size (Chapter) 


















AIPO 998k 3/28 
AIPO llOlG 4/25 
Harris 7882 4/78 
Roper 78-5 
CBS/NYT 
NBC/AP 32/101 - 
Roper 78-6 
YSW/Time 8149 - 
Harris 
Roper 78-7 








Roper 78-10 - 
NBC/AP 37/111 - 
AIPO 1118G - 
MIS/N - 
CSR/C 
1/13 1234 nat adult 
- 
3/7 1546 nat adult 
3/21 1547 natadult 
3/77 1530 nat adult 
4/25 1707 nat adult 
5/7 2002 nat adult 
6/1 800 nat adult 
7/11 1518 nat adult 
7/25 1447 nat adult 
8/27 2005 nat adult 
11/5 2005 natadult 














na t adult 
nat adult 
na t adult 
na t adult 
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Roper 79-2 - 
NDC/AP 39/112 - 
Roper 79- 3 - 
AIPO 1123G 2/20 
NBC/AP 40/113 - 




H a r r i s  792107 4/79 
NBC/AP 41/117 - 
LAT 17 
H a r r i s  792108 5/79 
ABC 8232 5/79 
Roper 79-5 - 
CBS/NYT - 
AIPO 1131G 6/19 
ABC/Harr is - 
Roper 79-6 
Roper 79-7 




Roper 79 - 8 - 
NBC/AP 45/121 - 
AIPO 1138G - 
Roper 79-9 - 
AIPO 1139G 9/25 
H a r r i s  792114 10/79 
AIPO 1140G - 
NBC/AP 48/125 - 
Roper 79-10 - 
CBS/NYT - 
LAT 21 
11/20 1/12 366 e l i t e  
1/23 1/29 1500 n a t  a d u l t  
1/17 1/22 1498 n a t  a d u l t  
116 1/20 2003 n a t  a d u l t  
2/5 2/6 1600 n a t  a d u l t  
2/10 2/24 2004 n a t a d u l t  
2/23 2/26 1534 n a t  a d u l t  
3/19 3/20 1600 n a t a d u l t  
3/16 3/19 1563 n a t a d u l t  
2/23 3/3 1211 n a t a d u l t  
4/6 4/9 1200 n a t  a d u l t  
1024 r e g  v o t e r  
4/26 5/1 1199 n a t  a d u l t  
4/30 5/1 1600 n a t  a d u l t  
5/20 5/25 1304 n a t  a d u l t  
5/18 5/22 1499 n a t  a d u l t  
839 n a t  a d u l t  
4/28 5/5 2007 n a t  a d u l t  
6/3 6/6 1422 n a t  a d u l t  
6/22 6/25 1571 n a t a d u l t  
6/13 6/17 1496 n a t  a d u l t  
6/2 6/9 2006 n a t  a d u l t  
7/7 7/14 2000 n a t  a d u l t  
7/16 7/17 1599 n a t  a d u l t  
7/17 7/21 1496 n a t  a d u l t  
7/27 7/29 1496 n a t  a d u l t  
8/21 8/23 1049 r e g v o t e r  
8/18 8/25 2005 n a t  a d u l t  
9/10 9/11 1599 n a t a d u l t  
9/7 9/10 1538 n a t  a d u l t  
9/22 9/29 2009 n a t  a d u l t  
9/28 10/1 1520 n a t  a d u l t  
9/26 10/1 1500 n a t  a d u l t  
10/5 10/8 1547 n a t  a d u l t  
10/15 10/16 1600 n a t  a d u l t  
10/27 11/3 2008 n a t  a d u l t  
10/27 11/3 1385 n a t  a d u l t  
12/16 12/18 1047 n a t  a d u l t  
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YSW/Time 8606 - 




AIPO 1173G 5/5 
YSW/Time 8607 - 
AIPO 1175G 6/16 
Roper 81-6 
CBS/NYT 
NBC/AP 69 8/18* 
AIPO 1181G 8/11 
YSW/Time 8608 - 
AIPO 1182G 9/15 
Roper 81-9 
ABC/WP 42/8999 - 








ABC/WP 53/7674 - 
CBS/NYT 
Harris 822106 - 
Roper 82-6 - 
YSW/Time 8611 - 
IAT 58 
AIPO 1200G 8/10 
SIND 
AIPO 1204G 11/2 
Gallup/CCFR - 
Gallup/CCFR - 
na t adult 
nat adult 
na t adult 
reg voter 

















na t adult 



















na t adult 
na t adult 
na t adult 
na t adult 
opin lead 
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ABC/WP 68 
Roper 83-2 
YSW/Time 8614 - 
ABC/WP 7995 - 
CBS/NYT - 
Roper 83-5 - 
AIPO 1214G 5/10 
ABC/WP 76/8075 - 
YSW/Time 5632 - 
AIPO 1224G 9/13 
A&S/Meri t 
ABC/WP 84 
YSW/Time 5642 - 
ABC/WP 91 
Harris 832112 11/83 
LAT 73 
YSW/Time 

















na t adult 
na t adult 
nat adult 
reg voter 
na t adult 
na t adult 
na t adult 
reg voter 
reg voter (3) 
nat adult 1,7 
nat adult 1,7,9 
nat adult 9 
nat adult 7 
nat adult 6,9 
nat adult 7 
reg voter (3) 
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YSW/Tirne 5714 - 
ABC/WP 9067 - 
CBS/NYT - 
CBS & TBS 
YSW/Tirne 5731 - 
M&K 






ABC/WP 9225 - 
NBC/WS J 
























na t adult 














na t adult 
na t adult 








na t adult 
nat adult 












na t adult 
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na t adult 
nat adult 
reg voter 
na t adult 
nat atult 
1/7 1/14 1000 reg voter 7 
2/17 2/24 1004 reg voter 7 
5/24 5/27 1003 nat adult 7 
6/25 7/7 1006 reg voter 7 








































American Broadcasting Company 
American Broadcasting Company/Louis Harris Associates 
American Broadcasting Company/Washinaton Post 
Clark Abt Associates- Cambridge, Ma. 
Survey of non-institutionalized adults 18 years of age 
& older 
American Institute of Public Opinion (The Gallup 
Organization) 
Audits and Sunreys/Merit- New York, N.Y. 
Columbia Broadcasting System 
Columbia Broadcasting System & Tokyo Boradcasting Service 
Columbia Broadcasting System/New York Times 
Cambridge Survey Research (Pat Caddell)- Washington, D.C. 
Don' t Know 
Daniel Yankelovich Group/Americans Talk Security 
an elite survey 
exit poll of voters who exited the precinct 
Field Survey (Californai)/LaPorte, Metlay & Heyer 
Arthur J. Finkelstein, New York, NY 
The Gallup Organization (also called AIPO) 
American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup)/Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations 
The Gallup Organization/Newsweek 
The Gallup Organization & Potomac Associates (Formerly IISR) 
Gallup/Times Mirror 
Gallup/International Institute of Survey Research- 
Washington, D.C. 
George Fine Research/Committee on the Present Danger 
General Social Survey (NORC) 
Louis Harris & Associates 
Louis Haris & Asahi Shimbun 
Louis Harris & Associates/Business Week 
Louis Harris/Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
Iowa state poll 
Institute for Survey Research- University of Michigan 
Survey of Japanese adult population 
Los Angeles Times 
Los Angeles Times/Ecomomist 
Lawrence Researchpational Strategy Information Center 
Marttila & Kiley- Boston, Ma. 
Marttila & Kiley/Americans Talk Security 
Minnesota poll 
Market Information Service- Atlanta, Ga. for Professor 
Nehnevaj sa 










































a national survey 
National Broadcasting Company 
National Broadcasting Company/Associated Press 
National Broadcasting Company/Wall Street Journal 
Nehnevajsaflnitersity of Pittsburg 
Natlonal Opinion Rese~rch Center- Chicago, Illinois 
National Opinion Research Center, special surveys,- Chicago, 
Illincis 
National Opinion Research Center/General Social Survey- 
Chicago, Illinois 
New York Times 
a survey of opinion leaders 
Office of Public Opinion Research 
Opinion Research Corporation- Princeton, NJ 
Opinion Research Corporation/Nehnevajsa civil defense surveys 
Opinion Research Corporation/Nixon surveys 
Public Agenda Foundation- New York, N.Y. 
Penn & Schoen Associates- New York, N.Y. 
Penn & Schoen Associates/Committee on the Present Danger 
Public Interest Opinion Research 
Psychology Corporation 
point scale 
Roper- commercial polls 
registered (voter) 
Roper- Fortune polls 
The Roper Organization 
The Roper Organization/US News & World Re~ort 
The Roper OrganizationflS News & World Re~ort/Cable News 
Network 
Several local polls 
Sindlinger & Company, Inc- Media, Pa. 
Sindlinger & Company/Committee on the Present Danger 
Sindlinger & Company/General Electric 
Strategic Information Research Corp. (for Overseas 
Development Council) 
Survey Research Center, University of Michigan 
A survey of a particular State population 
exit polls of voters 
Yankelovoch, Skelly & White 
Yankelovoch, Skelly & White/Time 
Yankelovich, Clancy ti Shulmnn 
Yankelovoch, Clancy & Shulman/- 
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